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NOTES  
ON  
THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

*J. A. STEWART*

VOL. I.

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NOTES  
ON THE  
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS  
OF  
ARISTOTLE

BY  
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## PREFACE

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IN the following *Notes* I quote the text of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as it is given in Mr. Bywater's Edition (Clarendon Press, 1890); and it is to be understood that I approve Mr. Bywater's readings and punctuation throughout, except in the (comparatively few) places where I express doubt or dissent.

Mr. Bywater's *Contributions to the Textual Criticism of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Clarendon Press, 1892) unfortunately did not appear till the first four Books of my *Notes* were already in print; but in preparing the subsequent Books for the press I have taken account of the explanations and valuable suggestions contained in this brochure.

To Prof. Susemihl's critical edition of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, not to mention his edition of the *Eudemian Ethics* and his edition of the *Moralia Magna*, I am deeply indebted. On almost every page of these *Notes* I have to acknowledge something which I owe to Prof. Susemihl's industry and suggestive treatment of the text.

Before leaving the subject of the text, I ought perhaps to apologize for pretty often referring to the readings of certain inferior manuscripts—Cambr., CCC, NC, B<sup>1</sup>, B<sup>2</sup>, B<sup>3</sup>—which I happen to have examined. I quote these readings, not as being valuable in themselves, but—sometimes as enabling me to illustrate from my own observation the operation of causes which we have to take account of in

estimating the readings of the important manuscripts—sometimes simply as not having been hitherto published. So far as the problem of establishing the text of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is directly concerned, Mr. Bywater is undoubtedly right in leaving as our recognised sources K<sup>b</sup> and L<sup>b</sup>, with Γ and Aspasius.

These volumes contain only ‘Notes.’ I have not written ‘Introductory Essays,’ partly because the brilliant and instructive ‘Essays’ contained in the First Volume of Grant’s *Ethics* hold the field—partly, and chiefly, because I think that junior students—to whom I hope these *Notes* may be useful—can master the *Ethics* only by fighting their way through the problems and difficulties of the Treatise, as these start up—sometimes for the first time, sometimes again under altered forms—in the Greek text itself.

Having, for these reasons, dispensed with ‘Introductory Essays,’ I have been obliged to make a good many of the ‘notes’ somewhat long; and being anxious that every important passage, as it occurred, should there and then impress the student with its full weight—its weight being often the weight of Aristotle’s whole Philosophy brought to bear through some technical term—I have not been very careful to avoid repetitions.

The quotations from other works of Aristotle, and from Plato, have been printed in full, in order that the junior student may be able to read conveniently, within the limits of these volumes, what he certainly must read, if he is to understand the *Ethics* in a concrete way as part of Aristotle’s entire Philosophy.

In writing the ‘arguments’ I have allowed myself considerable liberty. In some cases it seemed that the student would be best introduced to the particular context by an epitome, in some cases by a paraphrase and explanation, in other cases again by a more or less free translation.

In composing the ‘notes’ I have of course had a great

mass of material to draw upon in the works of the many scholars, ancient and modern, who have commented on the *Ethics*. The Greek Scholiasts—Aspasius (*Heylbut*, 1889), the Paraphrast Heliodorus<sup>1</sup> (*Heinsius* and *Heylbut*), Eustratius, Michael Ephesius, and the other Scholiasts printed in the Aldine Collection<sup>2</sup> (1536)—I have used carefully throughout; and among the modern commentators I owe much, in different ways, to Zell (1820), Coraes<sup>3</sup> (1822), Michelet (1848), Fritzsche (for v, vi, vii—1851, and viii, ix—1847), Grant (last edition, 1885), Ramsauer (1878), and Jackson (for v—1879).

My largest debt is to Grant, whose *Ethics* I wish to mention here with the greatest respect, as an edition the value of which has steadily grown on me. For help, indeed, in certain classes of detail difficulties, I have had most often to turn to other authorities; but no other edition have I found so fertile in philosophical suggestions. These suggestions, I would remark, are to be found in unobtrusive notes, as well as in the Introductory Essays.

I must not omit to acknowledge my indebtedness to the modern translators—Stahr, Williams, and Peters—especially to the last. Here and there I have felt bound to say that I do not agree with a rendering given by Mr. Peters; but his Translation, taken as a whole, I have found an able and trustworthy assistant.

<sup>1</sup> We seem to have no good reason for believing that this was his name: see L. Cohen in the *Berl. philolog. Wochensch.* Nov. 9, 1889, p. 1419, and cf. Val. Rose in *Hermes*, vol. ii. p. 212.

For the Greek Scholiasts on the *E.N.* generally, see Val. Rose, *Hermes*, vol. v. pp. 61 sqq. *über die griechischen Commentare zur Ethik des Aristoteles*; and cf. Bywater in *Hermes*, vol. v. pp. 354 sqq.

<sup>2</sup> This collection is composed as follows according to Rose (*Hermes*, vol. v, article referred to in foot-note above)—Book I Eustratius, II-IV Anonymus, V Michael Ephesius, VI Eustratius, VII Anonymus rec., VIII Aspasius, IX-X Michael Ephesius.

<sup>3</sup> For the circumstances attending the publication of this interesting edition see ΑΔΑΜΑΝΤΙΟΣ ΚΟΡΑΗΣ ἐπὸ Δ. ΘΕΠΕΙΑΝΟΥ (Trieste, 1890), vol. iii. pp. 47 sqq.

My separate debts to predecessors I have tried to acknowledge in all cases as they were contracted ; but it may well be that, in annotating a Treatise on which there are so many Commentators, I have sometimes put down, from ignorance or forgetfulness, as my own, what ought to have been credited to another.

There is one writer, not yet mentioned, to whom I wish to express special indebtedness. Dr. Rassow's *Forschungen über die Nicomachische Ethik* (1874) have been always before me in writing these *Notes*. I suppose all who know Dr. Rassow's little work will agree entirely with me when I say that very few works of the kind contain so much valuable matter in such small space. It would be a great gain if the *Forschungen*—a model of critical method—were made more accessible by means of an English translation.

It is not necessary to refer here, except generally, to the assistance—acknowledged in detail—which I have derived from the editors of other works of Aristotle, and from the editors of other authors, quoted in these *Notes*.

In conclusion—a few lines about ‘interpolations,’ ‘dislocations,’ and ‘duplicate passages.’ The subject is an interesting one, and I have touched it in some of my notes on Book v and Book vii, in connexion with the views of Dr. Jackson and Prof. Cook Wilson—also in other notes referring to the views of Dr. Rassow ; but it properly lies beyond the scope of these volumes, which aim chiefly at helping readers of the *Ethics* to get hold of the philosophical doctrine of the Treatise. I feel sure that the scholars just mentioned agree with me in thinking that the philosophical doctrine, in its broad outlines and more important details, stands out with such evidence and actuality, that it is impossible to conceive our view of it as having to be appreciably altered in consequence of discoveries which may hereafter be made as to the condition of the text before the age of Andronicus. To take up the subject of ‘interpolations,

dislocations, and duplicate passages'—even if I had been competent to do so—would therefore have been beside the aim of these *Notes* as concerned with the philosophical doctrine of the *Ethics*. Of course it would be a matter of extraordinary *philological* interest, if an Egyptian papyrus were found, old enough to decide for, or against, the ingenious speculations of the modern  $\chi\omega\rho\iota\zeta\sigma\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ .

The Index added to these *Notes* does not profess to be complete. It is designed mainly to help the student by bringing together selected notes on some of the more important topics. To find his way in the Greek text, the student must turn to Mr. Bywater's Index.

J. A. STEWART.

*July, 1892.*



## MANUSCRIPTS



K<sup>b</sup>=cod. Laurent. S1. 11 (10th cent.).

L<sup>b</sup>=cod. Par. 1854 (12th cent.).

M<sup>b</sup>=cod. Marc. 213 (15th cent.).

N<sup>b</sup>=cod. Marc. append. iv. 53 (14th cent.).

O<sup>b</sup>=cod. Riccard. 46 (14th cent.).

H<sup>a</sup>=cod. Marc. 214 (14th cent.).

P<sup>b</sup>=cod. Vat. 1342 (14th or 13th cent.).

Γ=Vetusta translatio (13th cent.).

Cambr.=University Library 1879 I i. v. 44: the Eliensis of Wilkinson, Zell,  
and Michelet, the O<sup>3</sup> of Susemihl (13th cent.).

CCC=Library of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 112: the O<sup>1</sup> of Susemihl  
(15th cent.).

NC=Library of New College, Oxford 227: the O<sup>2</sup> of Susemihl (15th  
cent.).

B<sup>1</sup>=Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 14080 (15th cent.).

B<sup>2</sup>=Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 6790 (15th cent.).

B<sup>3</sup>=Brit. Mus. Royal MS. 16 C. xxi (16th cent.).

Par. 1853=Bibl. Nat. Paris: (part containing E. N. 15th cent.).

[For Bekker's MSS. of the *E. N.* see Susemihl, Die Bekkerschen Hss. der  
N. E. *Neue Jahrbücher für Philol.* 1878, p. 625 sqq.; and Bywater's *Contribu-*  
*tions to the Textual Criticism of Aristotle's Nic. Eth.* For the English MSS.  
of the *E. N.* see *Anecdota Oxon.*, Classical series, vol. i. part 1. For Γ, the  
Vet. tr., see Newman's *Politics*, vol. ii. pp. xli sqq.]

## CORRIGENDA

- Vol. I, p. 5, foot-note, *read καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός.*  
" " 81, thirteenth line from top, *for 'is used' read 'is is used.'*  
" " 169, heading of note on § 2, *read ἀρετῶν.*  
" " 329, tenth line of note on § 2, *read ἀρχιθέωπος.*  
" " 496, ninth line from top, *for 'whole section' read 'clause.'*  
                  tenth line from top, *for οὐ φύσει read μέντοι πᾶν.*  
,, II, p. 133, heading of note on 1146 a. 22 *read παράδοξα ἐλέγχειν.*  
" " 148, top line, *for 'acts also against his consciously realised know-*  
                  *ledge of the including universal' read 'at the same time*  
                  *consciously realises the including universal.'*  
" " 178, sixth line from top, *for 'in' read 'is.'*  
" " 181, fourth line of note on a. 3, *read ἀκρατής.*  
" " 264, sixth line from top, *for 'imply' read 'implies.'*  
" " 295, seventh and eighth lines of note on a. 26, *for ἔτι καὶ αὐτοῖς read*  
                  *καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς.*

## BOOK I.

---

### CHAPTER I.

#### ARGUMENT.

*Every art, every science, every action, every act of choice, aims at some good. Hence they have well defined The Good as ‘the end which all things aim at.’ But ends differ. Sometimes our end is the mere performance of a function; sometimes, something substantive beyond the performance of the function—in which case the something substantive is ‘better than,’ i.e. is the *raison d'être* of the function by which it is produced.*

*There are as many ends as there are arts, sciences, and forms of action. There are certain leading arts, sciences, and forms of action, under which certain other arts, sciences, and forms of action group themselves in various grades of subordination. The end of a leading art, science, or form of action is always more choiceworthy than the ends of the subordinate arts, sciences, or forms of action belonging to the group. Thus Generalship is an art, whose end, ‘victory,’ is more choiceworthy than ‘riding,’ the end of the subordinate art of horsemanship; as ‘riding,’ in its turn, is more choiceworthy than ‘the bridle,’ the end of the still more subordinate art of bridle-making. This example shows that an art whose end is, and an art whose end is not, a substantive product may belong to the same group of subordinate arts. A bridle is a substantive product, riding is the mere performance of a function; but the art of bridle-making and the art of horsemanship both fall under the same leading art.*

§ 1. πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.] Eustratius, and other commentators after him, 1094 a. 1. have noted that many of Aristotle's great philosophical treatises begin with a universal proposition. In the universal the cause is contained (*An. Post.* i. 24. 85 b. 26 τὸ δὲ καθόλου πρῶτον αἴτιον ἄρα τὸ καθόλου): science explains things by their causes (*An. Post.* i. 2. 71 b. 9 ἐπιστάμεθα δὲ οἰόμεθα ἔκαστον ἀπλῶς. . . . ὅταν τὴν τ' αἰτίαν οἰόμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔστιν, ὅτι ἔκεινον αἰτία ἔστι, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν); hence the propriety of beginning a scientific treatise with a universal proposition, rather than with a particular statement. The opening words of the *Politics* are ἐπειδὴ

1094 a. 1. πᾶσαν πόλιν δρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν, καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἔνεκεν συνεστηκίαν (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δῆλον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς στοχάζονται: the *Metaphysics* begin—πάντες ἀνθρώποι τοῦ εἰδέναι δρέγονται φύσει: the *Post. Anal.* begin—πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως: similarly, the treatise *de Partibus Anim.* and the *Physics* begin with universal propositions. On the other hand the later *Eudemian Ethics* begin as Grant says (*Ethics*: essay i. vol. i. p. 23) ‘without any scientific preface, but rather in the form of a literary essay, with the sentence: “In the temple of the God at Delos some one . . . has inscribed the following verses on the vestibule of the shrine of Latona.”’

The exordium of the *E.N.* (taken in connexion with the similar exordia of the *Politics*, *Metaphysics*, *Posterior Analytics*, and other treatises mentioned) thus indicates, by its form, the logical method which Aristotle regarded as proper to ‘a scientific treatise.’ Demonstrative science in the strict sense (ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη—ἡ ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος *An. Post.* i. 2. 71 b. 20) is possible, indeed, only in the regions of metaphysics and mathematics, where the mind confronts truths which are abstract (ἄνευ ὕλης), eternal (ἀιδία), and necessary (μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν). In these regions principles are apprehended by the eye in diagrams, or by the mind’s eye in speculation, with perfect clearness and distinctness, and consequences are evidently seen to flow necessarily from principles<sup>1</sup>. In the concrete enquiries, on the other hand, of the natural and moral sciences, there is no such clearness of principles, or evident consequence of conclusions. *Health*, *Liberty*, *Temperance*, *Utility*, and all other ‘mixed modes,’ as Locke would call them, in themselves as principles, and in their relations to their consequences, stand on a very different footing from an intuition like that of *circle*, and a law of thought like that of *contradiction*. Yet, in his concrete enquiries, Aristotle is so far influenced by the analogy of *ἐπιστήμη*, in the strict sense, that he constantly refers his most particular observations to general principles of a highly abstract and formal character, and often symbolises the primary importance of these principles by the position which he assigns to them at the beginning of an enquiry, as if to show that the conclusions

<sup>1</sup> On space intuition as the ground of apodeictic science, see Lange, *Logische Studien*, p. 9 sqq.

reached in the enquiry flow from these principles, as the geometer's 1094 a. 1. conclusions flow from the visualised definitions, or diagrams, which he posits as his starting-points. This penchant for the 'geometrical method' in concrete enquiry sometimes leads Aristotle far astray, where 'verification' does not force itself upon him, as it does in Ethics and Politics.

So much for the general logical significance of the exordium of the *Ethics*, as one of a class. Its special logical significance in relation to the Treatise which it introduces may now be indicated.

The cause assumed in this section is the Final Cause; and the leading doctrines of the Treatise may be shown to follow as conclusions from the universal proposition in which this cause is assumed.

The good which every being, consciously or unconsciously, strives to realise is not something external to itself (*χωριστόν* i. 6. 13), but *its own* good (cf. i. 5. 4 τάγαθὸν δὲ οἰκείον τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντεύομεθα), the perfection of its own nature, whatever that may be. The oak, which, springing from the acorn, grows according to the law of its nature, and becomes a perfect tree, realises the end of its existence, and attains 'its own good.' The final cause of an organism cannot be distinguished from the organism itself at its best. The final cause, or good, of the tree is the tree itself. Hence, for the term *good*, we may substitute the term *existence*. All beings, Aristotle might have said, struggle for existence according to their kinds. *Φύσις*, which in its strict sense is biological law—the law determining the growth of organised beings, is antagonistic to the *ἀπειρον*, or that which is indefinite and shapeless: see περὶ ζώων γενέσεως i. 1. 715 b. 14 ἡ δὲ φύσις φεύγει τὸ ἀπειρον τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπειρον ἀτελές, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀεὶ ζητεῖ τέλος. The *φύσις* of the acorn produces the oak, and only the oak, an organism realising a definite shape, or *πέρας*, in which no one part, or function, is developed out of due proportion<sup>1</sup>. Such an

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *de Part. Anim.* i. 1. 641 b. 25 ὥστ' εἶναι φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν, φύσιν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὅ τι ἔτυχεν ἐξ ἐκάστου γίνεται σπέρματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐξ τοῦδε, οὐδὲ σπέρμα τὸ τυχὸν ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος σπέρματος ἀρχὴ ἄρα καὶ ποιητικὸν τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ σπέρμα φύσει γὰρ ταῦτα φύεται γοῦν ἐκ τούτου. Cf. *Met.* Δ. 1021 b. 21 ἐκάστον τότε τέλειον, καὶ ἡ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τέλεια, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ μόριον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους. Cf. Themistius on the *Physics*, vol. i. pp. 170, 171 (ed. Spengel)—τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τουτέστιν ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι. παράδειγμα δὲ εἶπον οὐχ ὡς οἱ τὰς ἴδεας λέγοντες αὐτὸ τι καθ' αὐτὸ ὑφεστάς καὶ χωριστὸν εἶδος, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ὠρισται τὸ εἶδος ἐκάστου τῶν ὑπὸ φύσεως γινομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἵππου

1094 a. 1. organism is essentially itself, containing in itself its own *ἀρχή* and *τέλος*, *i.e.* growing in its own way, and for its own sake<sup>1</sup>. In these respects natural organisms differ from the products of workmanship (*τέχνη*), which have an external *ἀρχή*—are shaped by another, and for some end towards which they are merely means. A house exists for the sake of those who inhabit it, but a plant or animal exists for its own sake. *Τέχνη* is accordingly related to the good in a very different manner from that in which *φύσις* is related to the good. *Τέχνη* is a means towards the attainment of the good, whereas *φύσις* is the realisation of the good. Now, since the subject of the *Ethics* is the Life of Man at its best (*τὸ εὖ ζῆν*), it is easy to understand that the relation of *φύσις*, rather than that of *τέχνη*, to the Good will be present to Aristotle's mind throughout the Treatise. Human life at its best is no mere device, or means, adopted by man for the sake of something beyond itself and better. The *εὐδαιμων* *lives*, and there is nothing better than his life. His nature is a *λόγος*, or organism, *δρθός*, balanced in all its parts, and containing, like the nature of a tree, its own *ἀρχή* and *τέλος* within itself—freely initiating functions, in the performance of which it treats itself ‘always as an end and never merely as a means.’ So far, there seems to be no essential difference between the Tree and the Man: the *λόγος*, or organism, of each affirms itself. Whether the fact that in the man the self-affirmation takes the form of consciousness of self makes an essential difference, is a question which need not be discussed here. As it is, the *εὐδαιμων*, in affirming himself, *knows himself*—takes a survey of human nature as an *εἶδος*, or organic whole, consisting of mutually related parts and tendencies.

But why related as they are, and not otherwise? Because ‘it is best’ that they should be so related—because ‘Deus sive Natura’ requires them to be so related. Hence the complete knowledge of human nature, as an *εἶδος*, requires a knowledge of God, and demands *θεωρία* strictly so called, or the contemplation of that which

*βοὸς ἔλατα συκῆς πλατάνου, καὶ ἡ ταῦτα δημιουργοῦσα ἀρχὴ μέχρι τοσούτου πρόεισι κινοῦσα τὴν ὑλην μέχρις οὗ τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο καὶ τὴν μορφὴν τελείως ἐναρμόσσαι τῇ ὕλῃ.*

<sup>1</sup> For its own sake as representative of an immortal type. As individual, it sacrifices itself to the perpetuation of this type: see Aspasius on this §—*Ἐκαστὸν γὰρ ἀγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἴδιας φύσεως σπουδῆ ἐπὶ τὴν ἴδιαν τελειότητα· ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτην ἀγεται διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο νενεκέναι, διὰ πάντων ἐστὶ τελειότατον (i.e. τὸ θεῖον).*

is eternal. Accordingly, we find Aristotle defining *εὐδαιμονία* as 1094 a. 1. *θεωρία τις* (x. 8. 8). And this is the formal definition, not only of the *εὐδαιμονία* of the Thinker (the subject of the context in which this definition occurs), but also of that of the moral agent—*ἡ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς*: for the latter exists for the sake of the former, and must be defined in accordance with it. The city exists for the sake of its thinkers. A materially prosperous city without thinkers would be *ἀτελής*, like the body without the life. Political institutions and moral rules are what they are, because the end of the city is to be the home of a few thinkers. The moral life, which bulks so largely in the city, is *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ιποθέσεως* in relation to the *μορφή* which the life of the thinkers—*τῷ σγκῳ μικρόν*—realises. *Σοφίας ἔνεκα ἐπιτάσσει ἡ φρόνησις, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκείνη* (*E.N.* vi. 13. 8). Hence it is in the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* that the ultimate standard of *all* conduct is found. The ultimate *ὅπος* or *σκοπός*, according to which the moral *μεσότης* is fixed, is given not by the practical, but by the speculative reason. Without the speculative ideal of *τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν* (*E.E.* 1249 b. 20), or *τὸ ἀθανατίζειν* (*E.N.* x. 7. 8), man's moral life would be meaningless. Why should he restrain his desires for the mere sake of restraining them? *Εὐδαιμονία*, then, even when realised in the performance of moral actions, is *θεωρία*, or contemplation of the eternal: for the *εἶδος* of human nature, which must be known, if moral conduct is to be achieved, cannot be known except in view of its end—*τὸ ἀθανατίζειν, τὸ τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν*<sup>1</sup>.

The ultimate good, then, which man seeks after is the consciousness of his own *εἶδος* as *θεῖον*. It is only the 'Thinker,' as such, in the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*, who *has this consciousness clearly* (see *E.N.* x. 8. 8). The morally excellent man, however, *acts in a manner which would be inexplicable unless the εἶδος of Human Nature were such as the 'Thinker' is conscious of it*. The morally excellent man may be said to have a practical, as dis-

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note that Plotinus (quite as much a Neo-Aristotelian as a Neo-Platonist: see Hegel, *Vorles. über die Gesch. d. Philos.* vol. 3, p. 9) actually describes as *θεωρία τὸν εἶδος* the effort of plants and animals to preserve and perpetuate their various types (*Enn.* iii. 8, vol. i. 333 sqq. ed. Kirchhoff), just as Aristotle often describes it as a striving after *τὸ ἀεί καὶ τὸ θεῖον*. So also the *Scientia intuitiva* of Spinoza's wise man is a *θεωρία* of Human Nature *sub specie aeternitatis*, or as related to God. With *scientia intuitiva*, a man forms clear and distinct ideas of his passions, and so regulates them, just as the *καλοκάγαθός* of Eudemus (*E.E.* H. 15) finds in his *θεωρία* of the Divine Nature, and of Human Nature as divine, the *ὅπος τῶν μεσοτήτων*.

1094 a. 1. tingished from a speculative knowledge of it. He knows it as an *όρθος λόγος*, or organism maintaining itself with difficulty in an environment—liable to be disturbed by sensations and passions; and his ‘unconscious metaphysic’ consists in his strong *interest* in its maintenance, which causes him to reject the solicitations of the senses and passions, and ‘choose the mean,’ as the Practical Reason (acting in the service of the Speculative Reason) directs.

The morally inferior man, on the other hand, allows external influences to interfere with the steady operation of the internal organising principle of Reason. He allows himself to grow in this direction or that, out of due proportion (*παρὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον*), in the interest of ends foreign to his nature, as an harmonious organism. He devotes himself to pleasure (*ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος*), or wealth (*χρηματιστής βίος*), or social success (*τιμή*—see *E. N.* i. 5), objects which a turn of fortune may remove from his grasp, leaving him without any ‘good of his own.’ He fails in life, because he ‘makes himself a means and not an end.’

Thus from the Principle laid down in the first section of the *Ethics* the whole teaching of the Treatise may be deduced: that the Practical Life consists in the maintenance of the Mean, or organic balance, in action and feeling, for the sake of the Speculative Life, which is supreme, and furnishes the Practical Life with a *σκοπός*.

**τέχνη]** The habit or faculty of making (*ἔξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ E. N.* vi. 4. 3). It is external to the thing made, and, as such, is distinguished from *φύσις*, which is an immanent formative principle (*Met. A.* 3. 1070 a. 7 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἀλλῷ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ: and cf. *E. N.* vi. 4. 4). Although *τέχνη* aims at the good in a very intelligible sense, its relation to it, as has been pointed out above, is not that in which Aristotle is concerned to show that the rational agent stands to his good. The rational life is not a process, producing beyond itself something which may perhaps in turn be employed for some further purpose; it is good and beautiful in itself, like an organism, and not useful as a means.

**μέθοδος]**: see the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant, and *Index Arist.* s. v. Literally it means ‘way to knowledge’: here it stands for ‘knowledge’ or ‘science’ itself (*ἐπιστήμη*).

**πρᾶξις]** as used in the *Ethics* properly means ‘moral action’: cf. vi. 2. 2 ἡ αἰσθητικὴ οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἰσθητικῶν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. *Πρᾶξις* expresses reason

(λόγος), or what the man is as an indivisible *εἶδος* or person, just as 1094 a. 1. the place of the hands on the dial at a given time expresses the whole mechanism of the clock. As such, *πρᾶξις* is distinguished from reactions in immediate response to isolated stimuli of sense.

*προαιρεσίς*] defined in *E.N.* iii. 3. 9 as *βουλευτική ὄρεξις τῶν ἔφ’ α. 2. ημῶν*. It also is peculiar to man as possessing reason. It is the ‘choice’ of means to some end, the end being distinguished by reason from the pleasure of the moment—the object of *ἐπιθυμία*. It is good when it is the exponent of the whole man as perfectly apprehended by his reason; bad, when the end with which the agent ‘identifies his good’ falls short of being ‘the whole man,’ or is merely a phantastic image of him. Mere *ἐπιθυμία*, on the other hand, expresses only the reaction of the sensibility in relation to an isolated stimulus. It involves no conception of a *good*. Something is *pleasant* at the moment, and *ἐπιθυμία* rushes without reflection to the enjoyment of it. *Προαιρεσίς* therefore, as implying the conception of an end different from present pleasure, is placed here with technical correctness in a list of faculties and functions which aim at ‘a good.’ Even ‘bad choice’ involves the notion, however imperfect, of ‘a good’: as Aspasia says *ad loc.* καὶ γὰρ αἱ μοχθηραὶ πράξεις καὶ μοχθηραὶ προαιρέσεις ἐφέσται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γίνονται, ἀλλὰ πεπλανημένων τῶν πραττόντων ἡ προαιρουμένων.

διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τάγαθὸν οὐ πάντ’ ἐφίεται] cf. *E.N.* x. 2. 4 οἱ δὲ ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐ πάντ’ ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν. Cf. *Rhet.* i. b. 1362 a. 23 ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν ὃ ἀν αὐτὸν ἔαυτοῦ ἔνεκα γένετον καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ἄλλο αἴρομεθα καὶ οὐ ἐφίεται πάντα ἡ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητιν ἔχοντα ἡ νοῦν ἡ εἰ λάθοι νοῦν καὶ ὅσα δὲ νοῦς ἀν ἔκαστῳ ἀποδοῖη, καὶ ὅσα δὲ περὶ ἔκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἔκαστῳ, τοῦτο ἔστιν ἔκαστῳ ἀγαθόν. Cf. Themistius, *Περὶ Ψυχῆς*, fol. 92 (vol. ii. p. 208, ed. Spengel) ἀγαθοῦ γάρ ἡ αἰσθησίς γένεται αἰσθητιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι οὐχ οἴσα τε οὐδὲ κακοῦ, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῦ τέρποντος ἡ ἀνιώντος, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦ νοῦ μόνου κρίνειν ἔστι. But if *αἰσθησίς* and *ἐπιθυμία*, as such, are not directed to ‘the good,’ how can the lower animals, which have only *αἰσθησίς* and *ἐπιθυμία*, be said ‘to strive after the good’? Because their *αἰσθήσεις* and *ἐπιθυμίαι* have, like their protective colours and other bodily adaptations, assumed a definitely fixed character in relation to an orderly (i.e. rational) environment. Their organisms, which their *αἰσθήσεις* and *ἐπιθυμίαι* subserve, are embodiments of reason adequate to the conditions of the

1084 a. 2. environment in which they survive: cf. *E. N.* vii. 13. 6 οὐδ' ἥδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἥδονὴν μέντοι πάντες· ἵστως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἡνὶ οἴονται οὐδ' ἡνὶ ἀν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. Man's ὁρέξεις conflict with his 'good,' because by his θεωρίᾳ he has risen into a sphere in which his merely animal adaptations are inadequate.

a. 3. § 2. **διαφορά . . .]** There are two kinds of ends. Some are immanent, being identical with the ἐνέργειαι, or functions, which constitute the essence, or perfect being, of the things of which they are said to be the ἐνέργειαι. A physical organism, and the noble life, are ends of this first kind. Some ends, however, are not immanent, but exist beyond the functions or operations which produce them. The products of τέχνη are ends of this second kind. They continue to exist after the processes which have produced them have ceased; whereas a physical organism ceases to exist, as such, when its vital functions cease. The end of τέχνη is an ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Hence the ἐνέργειαι, or operations as such, of τέχνη are said to be ἀτελεῖς, and are more properly called κινήσεις than ἐνέργειαι. Cf. *Met.* Θ. 6. 1048 b. 28, &c. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἴσχυασία, μάθησις, βάσισις, οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε· οὐ γὰρ ἄμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδὲ οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ φύκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν, ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηκεν· ἀλλ' ἔτερον καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται· ἔώρακε δὲ καὶ ὅρᾶ ἄμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόκε. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν. Cf. *Met.* Κ. 9. 1066 a. 20 ἢ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τις, ἀτελής δέ. But *Life*, whether viewed as an organised system of various functions, or as mirrored in one high function such as sight or thought, is ἐνέργεια in the strict sense, *i.e.* contains its own end in itself. Such ἐνέργεια, as Aristotle puts it, 'resides in' that organism of which it is said to be the ἐνέργεια, being indeed identical with the οὐσία or εἶδος of the organism; whereas the so-called ἐνέργεια of the builder or weaver, *quā* builder or weaver, passes out into the house or web, which is 'better than' the builder or weaver, *quā* builder or weaver. See *Met.* Θ. 8. 1050 a. 23, &c. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἔσχατον ἡ χρῆσις, οἷον ὅψεως ἡ ὄρασις, καὶ οὐδὲν γίνεται παρὰ ταῦτην ἔτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὕψεως ἔργον· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ γίνεται τι, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδόμησιν . . . οἵσων μὲν οὖν ἔτερόν τι ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἡ ὑφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ· ὅμοιώς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν

ἄλλων, καὶ ὅλως ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ ὅστιν δὲ μή ἔστιν ἄλλο τι 1094 a. 3. ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια· οἶνον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὅρῶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ζωὴ γὰρ καὶ ποιά τις ἔστιν· ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργειά τις ἔστιν. With the doctrine of this passage we may compare Aristotle's theory of the relation of the *ψυχή* to the *σῶμα*. The *ψυχή* is the *function* of the *σῶμα*, its *form*, or *essence*. A dead body is a body only in an equivocal sense, as a marble hand is a hand. It is life which constitutes the body; and the living body does not exist for the sake of any end external to itself. See *De Anima*, ii. 1. 412 a. 19 ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι, ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντες—and *Met.* H. 3. 1043 a. 35 ψυχὴ γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια σώματός τινος<sup>1</sup>. As the whole body exists for the sake of, and is constituted by its life, so an organ like the eye, taken by itself, may be said to exist for the sake of, and be constituted by its special function—sight. The end, good, or being of the eye is sight. This end or good is not something which can exist apart from the eye; and an eye which does not see is not really an eye. Cf. *De Anima*, ii. 1. 412 b. 18 εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῶον, ψυχὴ ἀν αὐτῷ ἦν ἡ ὄψις· αὐτη γὰρ οὐσία ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ κατὰ λόγον· ὁ δὲ ὀφθαλμὸς ὑλη ὄψεως, ἡς ἀπολιπούσης, οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν ὄμωνύμως, καθάπερ ὁ λίθινος καὶ γεγραμμένος. The noble life (*εὐδαιμονία*—τὸ εὖ ζῆν) is the function or *ἐνέργεια* of Human Nature as sight is of the eye.

§§ 3, 4] Τὸ εὖ ζῆν, the noble life, is the chief end of man, and all a. 6. his actions and pursuits are for the sake of this. But every one of these actions and pursuits has its own immediate end, which, in its turn, is a means to the end of some more comprehensive pursuit.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* third ed. p. 487 (Aristot.).—‘ Besteht nun das wahre Wesen jedes Dings in seiner Form, und das Wesen alles Gewordenen in seinem Zwecke, so wird diess auch von den lebenden Wesen gelten müssen. Jedes lebende Wesen ist eine kleine Welt, ein Ganzes, dessen Theile dem Zwecke des Ganzen als Werkzeuge zu dienen haben. (*Phys.* viii. 2. 252 b. 24 εἰ δὲ ἐν ζῷῳ τοῦτο δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, τί καλύνει τὸ αὐτὸν συμβῆναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν; εἰ γὰρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ γίνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ). Jedes Werkzeug ist aber von der Verrichtung abhängig für die es bestimmt ist; der Körper ist mithin um der Seele willen da, und die Beschaffenheit jedes Körpers ist durch die seiner Seele bestimmt: (*de part. animal.* i. 5. 645 b. 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν ὄργανον πᾶν ἔνεκά του, τῶν δὲ τοῦ σώματος μορίων ἔκαστον ἔνεκά του, τὸ δὲ οὐ ἔνεκα πρᾶξις τις, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ σύνολον σῶμα συνέστηκε πράξεως τινος ἔνεκα πλήρους . . . ὥστε καὶ τὸ σῶμά πως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔνεκεν, καὶ τὰ μόρια τῶν ἔργων πρὸς ἀ πέφυκεν ἔκαστον. Cf. *Met.* vi. 10. 1035 b. 14.)’

1094 a. 6. We thus find in life many ἀρχιτεκτονικὰ δυνάμεις, so called however in a relative sense only, because the ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ δύναμις *par excellence* is the art of living nobly. All other ends—Health, Wealth, Victory—are subordinate to, and good only in relation to the noble life. Although some of the special operations of man, such as walking, riding, dancing, differ from the τέχναι proper in not resulting in ἔργα or things made, still they resemble them in looking beyond themselves, as *e.g.* to health, business, or amusement. On the metaphor implied, in the use of the term ἀρχιτεκτονική here, the Paraphrast has the following remarks: ή δὲ στρατηγικὴ ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ πρὸς αὐτὰς [i.e. ἴππικήν κ.τ.λ.] καλεῖται δύναται γὰρ ὅπερ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων ἐν τοῖς τέκτοσιν καθάπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας ἐκεῖνα κελεύει ποιεῖν τοὺς τέκτονας ἢ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο φέρει τὸ εἶδος, οὐτωὶς καὶ ή στρατηγική, καὶ εἴτις ἄλλη τοιαύτη, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου τέλους ταῖς ἄλλαις δίδωσι τοὺς κανόνας.

- a. 10. § 4. δύναμιν] ‘faculty,’ in the sense in which we speak of the Faculty of Arts or Law at a University.
- a. 11. χαλινοποιική] Accepted by Bekker and Bywater on the authority of pr. K<sup>b</sup> alone, for the χαλινοποιητική of rc. K<sup>b</sup>, and apparently all other MSS.
- a. 13. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον] Bywater introduces κατά into the text from K<sup>b</sup>, M<sup>b</sup>, (and Cambr.). For δὴ read here by Bekker and Bywater, Susemihl gives δέ. The best MSS. seem to have δή, while δέ is given by CCC, B<sup>1</sup>, B<sup>2</sup>, and Ald. Where δέ and δὴ are concerned, however, MS. authority is not of much account. I prefer δέ.
- a. 14. ἐν ἀπάσαις δέ] δέ is the reading of all MSS. apparently except M<sup>b</sup> and Γ, which have δὴ. Δέ and δὴ are constantly interchanged in the MSS., and the best of them have not much authority in the matter. Zell, Grant, and Ramsauer read δέ, and explain it as an instance of ‘δέ in apodosi.’ The law of ‘δέ in apodosi’ in Aristotle is thus formulated by Eucken (*de Arist. dicendi ratione: pars prima: de particularum usu*, p. 31)—‘δέ in apodosi usurpatur aut ita ut repetatur apud demonstrativum cum antecesserit apud relativum, aut post demonstrativum, cum non antecesserit, sed enuntiatio demonstrativa quodam modo opponatur relativae, aut post particulam εἰ, ubi apodosis opposita est protasi.’ It seems natural then to bring the ἐν ἀπάσαις δέ of the present passage under the first

clause of the law for ‘δέ in apodosi’ as formulated by Eucken. **1094 a. 14.** Michelet, however, reading δέ, prefers to speak of an anacoluthon here. He follows Krische (*Jenaische allg. Literaturzeitung*: December, 1835: no. 230, p. 403) in thinking that the δσαι δ εἰσιν with which the sentence begins is, after the parenthesis, changed *per anacoluthiam* into ἐν ἀπάσαις δέ, the δέ being simply repeated. The words of Krische (quoted by Eucken, p. 25) are: ‘δσαι δ εἰσι kündigt den Satz an, der durch die Vergleichung, welche aber von ihm nicht zu trennen ist, unterbrochen wird; mit ἐν ἀπάσαις δέ wird der unterbrochene Gedanke, der nun auch die Vergleichung in sich schliesst, wieder aufgenommen, so dass δέ nach ἐν ἀπ. das wiederholte erste δέ ist, und nimmermehr statt δή die Apodosis bildet:’ on which Eucken remarks—‘cujus sententiae assentirer, si Aristoteles scripsisset ἐν ταύταις δέ, sed cum ἐν ἀπάσαις legatur, quo verba omnia quae antecedunt comprehenduntur, nescio an cum codice M<sup>b</sup> (cujus auctoritas in talibus rebus summa est) Korae, Bonitzio δή legendum sit.’ I am inclined to follow Eucken in preferring δή to δέ here, on the principle which he lays down in substituting δή for δέ in *E. N.* iii. 11. 4. 1118 b. 24—‘post πάντα non particula δέ, quae opponit, locum habet, sed δή, quae ea comprehendat quae antecedunt’—and quite independently of the authority of M<sup>b</sup>. M<sup>b</sup> notoriously abounds in unique readings, which have no genealogical significance, and can only be regarded as the conjectures of a scribe: see Susemihl’s Pref. to his edition of *Eth. Nic.*, Teubner, 1880, p. viii.—‘Cum inter peculiares M<sup>b</sup> codicis lectiones haud paucae sint sine dubio e mera conjectura modo falsa modo recta haustae, summa in eo adhibendo cautione opus neque Bekkerus<sup>1</sup> ubique satis ea usus est.’ Eucken therefore seems to me to take up a peculiarly untenable position, when he maintains (p. 40) not only that we must go to the MSS. to decide between δή and δέ, but that on this particular point M<sup>b</sup> is to be preferred to all others: ‘in Ethicis Nicomacheis ubicunque agitur utrum δή an δέ scribendum sit codex M<sup>b</sup> ceteris omnibus praferendus est.’

§ 5. διαφέρει δ’ οὐδέν κ.τ.λ.] It does not affect the subordination of ends described in § 4, whether the subordinate ends are ἔργα, like a bridle, or ἐνέργειαι, like riding. Both fall under the end

<sup>1</sup> According to Rassow (*Forsch. über die Nic. Eth.*, p. 8) Bekker has altered the text on the authority of M<sup>b</sup> unique in about twenty places.

1094 a. 16. of generalship—victory. Again, an *ἐνέργεια* like walking may be subordinated to an *ἐνέργεια* the end of which is an *ἔργον*, as when a builder walks to his work; just as, on the other hand, an end which is an *ἔργον*, like a bridle, may be subordinated to one which is an *ἐνέργεια*, like riding. The *ἔργον* is indeed ‘better than’ the *ἐνέργεια* which produced it, but not better than *any* *ἐνέργεια*. Thus a substantive *ἔργον* may be subordinate to a *πρᾶξις* which results in no *ἔργον*. So the Paraph. *ad loc.* εἰ δὲ καὶ μὴ πράξεις εἴεν τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων, ἀλλὰ ἔργα, οὐδὲν κωλύει βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ αἱρετώτερον καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων τὸ τῆς ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς τέλος καὶ πρᾶξις ὅν τοῦ πράξις νίκη γάρ· καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν νίκην βελτίω εἶναι καὶ αἱρετωτέραν τοῦ χαλινοποιητικῆς μὲν τέλος ἔργον· χαλινὸς γάρ· στρατηγικῆς δὲ τέλος πρᾶξις· νίκη γάρ· καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν νίκην βελτίω εἶναι καὶ αἱρετωτέραν τοῦ χαλινοῦ· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον βελτιόν τῆς πράξεως, οὐ πάσης, ἀλλὰ μόνης ἐκείνης ἡς ἀποτέλεσμά ἔστι, διότι τέλος ἐκείνης ἔστι.

## CHAPTER II.

### ARGUMENT.

*Now, if all forms of human endeavour have ultimately one and the same end, this end being sought after for its own sake, while all other ends are chosen as means towards its attainment—and this must be so, for, if all our ends were but means to further ends, human endeavour would be an endless and vain process—this one ultimate end will be the Chief Good.*

*The knowledge of the true nature of this ultimate end of all human endeavour must evidently have great influence on the conduct of life. If we possess the knowledge of it, we shall be more likely always to do the right thing in particular circumstances. We must therefore try to get at least a general idea of its nature, and to determine the science or art of which it is the object.*

*It must surely be the object of the science which rules all the other sciences, and supplies the plan which they all subserve. Such Statesmanship—the science or art of social life—manifestly is. All other sciences and arts exist and are cultivated subject to the provisions which this supreme science or art lays down for them. It uses the other sciences and arts for its own practical end: it determines authoritatively what we shall do, and what we shall not do. Its end therefore, including as it does the ends of all the other sciences and arts, will be man’s Chief Good. When we say ‘man’s Chief Good’ it is eminently the citizen’s Chief Good that we have in view; for although ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ are essentially one, and their good therefore essentially the same, the accidents of concrete life may partially isolate the individual from the society of his*

fellow-citizens, and the good which he attains to in his partial isolation will differ in degree, though not in kind, from that which men in full rapport with the best social influences realize for themselves and their city. The former good is one which indeed we are often fain to acquiesce in, but the latter is far better—a more divinely beautiful thing to lay hold of and keep.

§ 1.] As Grant says, this is ‘the argument upon which the whole system of the *Ethics* is based.’ We cannot always desire means; there must be an end desired for its own sake alone; for human nature, like the physical organism of an animal or plant, must have a limit or definite form. This limit or definite form will be the *summum bonum* (*τάγμαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον*) of man. As the functions of a physical organism do not build up an indefinitely increasing mass without constant shape, but result in a structure definite both in size and form, so man’s desires do not follow one another endlessly, giving rise to conduct which has no plan, but conspire (with success proportioned to the rationality of the agent) towards the maintenance of a definite system of life. The irrational man, as such, loses sight of this end. He is dominated by the *ἐπιθυμία* which happens at the moment to engage him. This is succeeded by another *ἐπιθυμία*, perhaps in no way related to it. His life is thus not one, but many; it is a mere succession of episodes like a bad play. It has no object: *ἄπειρος γὰρ οὐ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις* (*Pol. ii. 4. 1267 b. 3*). But the rational man has a definite object—the maintenance of the *eîdōs* of human nature. This *eîdōs* he apprehends as an organism which must ‘correspond with a social environment,’ because it cannot otherwise take its appointed place in the *kósmos*, or realise itself as ‘divine.’ That harmonious play of all the functions of his nature, which enables man so to ‘correspond with his social environment’ that he may realise himself as ‘divine,’ is the End or Good of human nature. This ‘correspondence’ is the function of *νοῦς*, the synoptic faculty, which views everything in its relations to all other things, *i.e.* not as *phaenomenon*, but as *noumenon*, or *sub specie aeternitatis*. In the *πρακτικὸς βίος*, with which the main part of the *Ethics* is concerned, the synopsis is less perfect than in the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*; hence, as everything is defined in accordance with its perfection, we find man’s chief end defined at the close of the *Ethics* as *θεωρία*. For the present, however, it will be enough to regard it as ‘correspondence with the social environment.’

In connecting the *ἀγαθόν* with the *πέρας*, Aristotle follows the

1094 a. 18. Pythagoreans and Plato. *E. N.* ii. 6. 14 τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὃς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου. Plato, *Philebus*, 27 B Σω. πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνν ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν. τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τετάρτην λέγων ἅρα μὴ πλημμελοίνην ἂν τι; The good and beautiful are realised in the mixture. Cf. *Phil.* 64 D Σω. καὶ μὴν ξυμπάσης γε μίξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν . . . . ὅτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς ξυμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχοῦστα ἡτισοῦν καὶ ὀπωσοῦν ξύγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυντι τά τε κεραννύμενα καὶ πρώτην ἑαυτήν . . . . νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τάγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ξυμμετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβάνει γίγνεσθαι. Aristotle's view of the relation of πέρας to the ἀγαθόν is very clearly stated in *Met.* a. 2. 994 b. 9 ἔτι δὲ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα τέλος τοιοῦτον δὲ ὁ μὴ ἄλλον ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἔκείνου. ὥστε εἰ μὲν ἔσται τοιοῦτον τὸ ἔσχατον, οὐκ ἔσται ἄπειρον. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα. ἀλλ' οἱ τὸ ἄπειρον ποιοῦντες λανθάνουσιν ἔξαιροῦντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν. καίτοι οὐθεὶς ἀν ἐγχειρήσειν οὐδὲν πράττειν, μὴ μέλλων ἐπὶ πέρας ἥξειν' οὐδὲ ἀν εἴη νοῦς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἔνεκα γάρ τινος ἀεὶ πράττει ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων τοῦτο γάρ ἔστι πέρας τὸ γὰρ τέλος πέρας ἔστι. The ἀγαθόν, or πέρας, at which νοῦς aims, both in science and in the conduct of life, is order, system, κόσμος. Νοῦς combines separate facts into a theory, separate actions into a life, just as, according to Anaxagoras, it brings order into the material universe. No single desire or act can be properly said to be good. The good, like the beautiful, is realized only in the orderly arrangement of parts: see *Poet.* 7. 1450 b. 3 τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἔστι. 'The relation of parts in a definite organism,' is what Aristotle means by the ἀγαθόν, the πεπερασμένον, the καλόν. This relation is the object and realization of νοῦς. It is the νοητόν which exists only for νοῦς. Hence it is said, as in *Met.* A. 9. 1074 b. 33, to be identical with νοῦς. The object of νοῦς is νοῦς itself. Νοῦς is therefore dominated by nothing external to itself, and better than itself, as αἰσθητὸς is dominated by τὸ αἰσθητόν. It is therefore absolutely good—κράτιστον:—ἀντὸν ἅρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις φαίνεται δ' ἀεὶ ἄλλον ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἰσθητὸς καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὐτῆς δ' ἐν παρέργῳ. The true personality of the εὐδαιμῶν is his εὐδαιμονία or rationally ordered life (*E. N.* ix. 7. 4. 1168 a. 6 ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργείᾳ), or perfect correspondence with his environment. It is the law of his own nature to correspond perfectly. We must not abstract him from his environment, as if he were one thing, and the environment another thing, and thus

represent him as dominated by something alien to, or external to himself. In the life of reason he is a ‘law unto himself’<sup>1094 a. 18.</sup> He understands and desires everything as it stands related to the great whole of which it is a part. His knowledge is ‘adequate,’ and his desires are according to his knowledge—*i.e.* his knowledge is equal to what can be known in his sphere, leaving no residuum of the unknown, and his desires give rise to no conduct which can ever become matter for regret. In the life of sense, on the other hand, a man perceives only the superficies of things, and fails to grasp them in their essence as parts of the whole. His desires too, following the superficial information supplied to them by sense, lead him to perform acts which he afterwards wishes undone. The world is wider and more complex than himself, and has many surprises and retributions in store for him. The life of sense is thus one of subjection, or passivity; while the life of reason is one of freedom, and supremacy (*cf.* the term *κράτιστον* applied to *νόος*). This life of reason, in which there is no ignorance or error is, it will be easily understood, an ideal, like Spinoza’s *cognitio adaequata*, which no man ever actually reaches. Yet some men approximate to it more nearly than others; and in the beautiful structures of plants and animals we have a physical rendering of it which, save for the death of the individual, is perfect.

*τῶν πρακτῶν]* *i.e.* ‘*rerum agendarum*,’ Michelet rightly, who finds fault with Muretus for supplying *τελῶν* with *πρακτῶν*, and distinguishing between *τέλη* which are *πρακτά* or attainable by man, and those which are *οὐ πρακτά*—ideal ends. But Aristotle cannot admit such a distinction; see x. 7. 8 χρὴ δὲ οὐ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρωπὸν ὄντα, οὐδὲ θυητὰ τὸν θυητὸν, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν. Τὸ πρακτόν is the result or object of *πρᾶξις* (as τὸ ἐπιστητόν is of *ἐπιστῆμη*, τὸ αἰσθητόν of *αἴσθησις*) and as such may signify either ‘something done’ as a means to an end, or the end itself: see *E.E.* 1. 7. 1217 a. 35 διχῶς λέγεται τὸ πρακτόν. καὶ γὰρ ὅν ἔνεκα πράττομεν, καὶ τὰ τούτων πραττόμενα χάριν, which Grant refers to as ‘a sort of scholium’ upon the term *πρακτόν*.

*βουλόμεθα*] employed here with technical correctness, *βούλησις* a. 19. or wish being directed to ends. See *E.N.* iii. 2. 9 ἔτι δ’ ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἔστι μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαιρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος. Similarly *αἱρούμεθα* implies *προαιρεσις* or choice of means.

*πρόεισι]* impersonal. For examples see *Ind. Arist.*

a. 20.

1094 a. 21. *ματαίαν*] Cf. *Phys.* ii. 6. 197 b. 25 ὡς τοῦτο δὲν τὸ μάτην, τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλου ἔνεκα ὅταν μὴ περαίνῃ ἐκεῖνο οὐ ἔνεκα ἐπεφύκει—*i.e.* where a means misses its end, *i.e.* is no means at all, we have *τὸ μάτην*. But no part or function of a physical organism is thus useless. All parts conspire to the life or good of the organism. See *De Coelo* i. 4. 271 a. 32 μάτην γὰρ ὑπόδημα τοῦτο λέγομεν οὐ μή ἐστιν ὑπόδεσις· ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν ἀλόγως οὐδὲ μάτην ποιεῖ, where *ἀλόγως* means without *λόγος*, or definite structure and ratio of parts. Cf. *De Partibus Anim.* iii. 1. 661 b. 24 μηδὲν μάτην ποιεῖν τὴν φύσιν μηδὲ περίεργον, and other places noted in the *Ind. Arist.*

a. 22. § 2. *ἄρ' οὖν*] Zell and Michelet quote Muretus—‘Mos hic est Aristotelis, ut saepe, quae affirmare instituit, ea interrogando efferat.’ Cf. the common use of *ἢ* in Aristotle introducing as a question the writer’s own opinion, *e.g.* *E.N.* v. 9. 9 *ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν*;

a. 23. *ρόπην . . . σκοπόν*] There is a mixture of metaphors here, *ρόπη* suggesting a balance, *σκοπός* being a target. On *ρόπην* Eustратius says—ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῶν ζυγῶν οἷς ἐν τοῖς βάρεσι χρώμεθα. The metaphor of the *σκοπός* occurs, as Zell and Grant notice, in Plato *Rep.* 519 B, C, where it is said of the *ἀπαίδεντοι καὶ ἀληθεῖας ἄπειροι* that *σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἔνα, οὐ στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν ἀλλὰ πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ*.

a. 24. *τοῦ δέοντος*] Grant says:—‘not “our duty” in the modern sense, this conception not having been as yet developed<sup>1</sup>, but more generally “what we ought to do” from any motive. The word *δέον* was a received term with reference to moral subjects. Cf. Plato *Rep.* p. 336 D, where Thrasymachus, calling upon Socrates to define Justice, says “Mind you don’t tell me that it is the *δέον* or the *ώφελιμον*, or the *λυσιτελοῦν* or the *κερδαλέον*, or the *ξυμφέρον*.” Cf. also *Charmides* p. 164 B; Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 22. But the exact import of the term was not fixed. Aristotle in the *Topics* ii. 3. 4 mentions among the *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα, οἷον εἰ τὸ δέον ἐστὶ τὸ ξυμφέρον ἢ τὸ καλόν*.

The fundamental meaning of *δέον*, or *ὡς δεῖ*, seems to be indicated by the conjunction which occurs in *E.N.* iii. 7. 2. 1115 b. 12 ὡς δεῖ δέ, καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ὑπομενεῖ (ὅ ἀνδρεῖος τὰ φοβερὰ) τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. That is *δέον*, which is necessary as a means to the main-

<sup>1</sup> I cannot assent to the view (apparently held by Grant) that the Greeks had not developed the conception of ‘Duty,’ as we find it—to take a typical modern instance—in Kant.

tenance of the organism of man's moral nature—an organism 1094 a. 24. which realises an ὁρθὸς λόγος, or just proportion of parts, and is therefore καλὸν and ἀγαθὸν in the eye of νοῦς which contemplates it. The same reference to a just proportion may be noticed in the use of τὸ δέον in *E. N.* iv. 2. 13 διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἀν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὅν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὄρθως. Cf. *E. N.* iv. 2. 20 ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει. Similarly, the passage before us (*E. N.* i. 2. 2) means that, if a man knows the ἀγαθὸν of man, *i.e.* the *εἶδος* or organisation of man's nature as a system of harmoniously balanced parts, and if he keeps the thought or perception of it always before him in all that he does, he will not fail to do, at the proper time, what is necessary (*δέον*) to its maintenance.

**§ 3. τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν.]** A frequently recurring metaphor, a. 25. derived from the practice of the sculptor, who makes a *τύπος* or rough clay model before he begins the statue in stone. Before we begin our elaborate treatment of the chief good, we will try to form a rough general idea of what it is, and of the conditions under which it can be realised. See Zell and Michelet *ad loc.*, and Schwegler *Met.* vol. iv. p. 42, and *Index Arist.* s. v. *τύπος*, for such phrases as παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ, καθόλου λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ, τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγειν, τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς λέγεσθαι, τύπῳ διελθεῖν, τύπῳ διοριστέον. The *ὑπογραφή* in painting answers to the *τύπος* in sculpture. In *de An.* ii. 1. 413 a. 9, we find the metaphor from painting mixed with that from sculpture—τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ διωρίσθω καὶ ὑπογεγράφθω περὶ ψυχῆς. In *E. N.* i. 7. 17 there is the same mixture of metaphors. We must suppose that the sources of the metaphors have at last ceased to suggest themselves distinctly. Both metaphors occur in Plato, *e.g.* *Rep.* 414 A τοιαύτη τις δοκεῖ μοι ἡ ἐκλογὴ εἶναι καὶ κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ φυλάκων, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας εἰρῆσθαι, and *Rep.* 548 D ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι.

**ἐπιστημῶν ἡ δυνάμεων]** δύναμις is the generic term, and includes, a. 26. as species, ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη: but here δυνάμεων seems to stand for τεχνῶν.

**§ 4. κυριωτάτης]** Grant remarks that here ‘κυριωτάτης seems partly to mean “most authoritative” or “absolute,” partly “that which is most absolutely a science.”’ Κύριος is (1) ‘sovereign over’

1094 a. 26. (2) ‘in the strict sense,’ i.e. in the sense which has the authority of usage in its favour, and consequently ‘prevails over’ other senses of a term: cf. *E. N.* i. 7. 13 *κυριάτερον γὰρ αὗτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι* = ‘for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term’: cf. also *κυρία ἀρετή* vi. 13. 1, where *κυρία* has probably both the meanings mentioned above—‘virtue, in the strict sense of the term—sovereign virtue.’ The present section may be rendered thus: ‘It would seem to be the object of the science *par excellence*, the science which is mistress and directs (*ἀρχιτεκτονική*) all the other sciences.’

a. 27. §§ 5—7. *τοιαύτη δὲ η πολιτικὴ φαίνεται, κ.τ.λ.*] It is man’s nature to be a citizen—φύσει ἄνθρωπος πολιτικὸν ζῷον. Severed, if that were possible, from the body politic, the individual would be like an amputated hand, which is no longer a hand except in name, for it is the performance of its function in the economy of the living body which constitutes it a hand. The *ἄπολις* would be either a beast or a god; not a man, for he would have no distinctively human function: see *Pol.* i. 1253 a. 19 *καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις η οἰκία καὶ ἔκαστος ήμῶν ἐστίν.* τὸ γὰρ δλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ δλον οὐκ ἐσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὅμωνυμως, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἐσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὕρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ’ ὄμώνυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν η πόλις καὶ φύσει πρότερον η ἔκαστος δῆλον εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἔκαστος χωρισθείσι, ὅμοίως τοὺς ἄλλους μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ δλον, δ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν η μηδὲν δεόμενος δι’ αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε η θηρίον η θεός. Cf. *Met.* Z. 11. 1036 b. 30 οὐ γὰρ πάντως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος η χείρ, ἀλλ’ η δυναμένη τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖν, ὥστε ἔμψυχος οὐσα· μὴ ἔμψυχος δὲ οὐ μέρος.

Man realises his true personality as man, when he becomes conscious of the manifold relations in which he stands to his fellows in that final social system which is distinguished as the *πόλις* from the *κώμη* and *οἰκία*; and when, in consequence of having become conscious of these relations, he acts, not to please or profit himself, but to show himself worthy of the civilization permanently embodied in his *πόλις*. Then his life is the chief good of man as man. Hence *πολιτική*, the science of the plan (*ἀρχιτεκτονική*) according to which the *πόλις* is constituted, will be the science of the chief good of man as man, i.e. of man as a ‘social being<sup>1</sup>.’ Ac-

<sup>1</sup> And as a ‘thinker’: for it is only in the *πόλις* that thinkers are found.

cordingly all man's special pursuits, such as warfare, household management, and public speaking, so far as they may promote or prevent the realisation of this 'plan,' are regulated by *πολιτική*.

The subordination of *στρατηγική* to *πολιτική* does not need much explanation. The true function of the *στρατηγός* is to conduct successfully the wars which are necessary to the maintenance of the *πόλις*, as a home of the peaceful virtues and arts: *πολεμοῦμεν ὑ' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν E. N. x. 7. 6.* It is for *πολιτική* therefore to see that the military spirit is kept within just limits. The main point in Aristotle's criticism of the Spartan constitution is that, by the exclusive attention it paid to military excellence, it produced a state of society which could not last, no place being left for the peaceful virtues. See *Pol. ii. 1271 b. 2 πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἔστι, τὴν πολεμικήν· αὐτῇ γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τοιγαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἀρξαντες, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν, μηδὲ ἡσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἀσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς.*

The subordination of *οἰκονομική* to *πολιτική* is a point of great importance in Aristotle's system. The *πόλις* is composed of *οἰκία* which, though chronologically prior, are logically posterior to the *πόλις*, *i.e.* they exist *for the sake of* the *πόλις*, as the members for the sake of the body. Hence *πολιτική*, which sees to the good of the *πόλις*, or whole, will regulate *οἰκονομική*, which sees to the good of the *οἰκία*, or part. The true function of the *οἰκονόμος* is so to rule his household consisting of wife, children, and slaves, and so to provide for their material wants, as to make his 'home life' such that he, and his sons when they grow up, can, without encumbrance or distraction, devote themselves to 'political life,'—that is, to the leisured life of culture which the society of the *πόλις* offers. In providing, in this 'political' spirit, for the material wants of his family, the *οἰκονόμος* is engaged in *ἡ κτητικὴ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν*, and the capital which he accumulates and administers is *ὁ ἀληθινὸς πλοῦτος*, an amount definitely limited in relation to the end which it, as *ὑργανον*, subserves. But the *οἰκονόμος* may forget that 'political life' is the end, and 'home life' or 'private life' only the means. He may

The final cause of civilization, as developed through the stages of *οἰκία* and of *κάμη*, is the production of the small band of thinkers who, when the stage of the *πόλις* has been reached, illuminate each generation. Averroes rightly interpreted Aristotle's thought with the dictum 'necesse est ut aliquis philosophus semper sit in gente humana (Commentary on *de An.* iii).'

1094 a. 27. make 'home life' or a 'private career' his end. He may make it his end to have a luxurious establishment, or to accumulate wealth for its own sake by trade (*χρηματιστική*)—an unnatural thing to do, for wealth is naturally a means, and the man who makes its accumulation his end is engaged in an endless undertaking.

It is for *πολιτική*, therefore, as the science of the social organism, to see that the spirit of self-aggrandisement in *οἰκονόμοι*, or private persons, does not make the parts useless or even dangerous to the whole. See *Pol.* i. 3. 1256 b. 27 ἐν μὲν οὐν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἔστιν· ὃ δεῖ ήτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ, ἐν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ γ' ἀληθινὸς πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρος ἔστιν, ὥσπερ Σόλων φησὶ ποιήσας.

πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται.  
κεῖται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐδὲν γὰρ ὅργανον ἄπειρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἔστι τέχνης οὕτε πλήθει οὕτε μεγέθει, ὃ δὲ πλοῦτος ὅργάνων πλῆθος ἔστιν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν δῆλον ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸν καλεῖν, χρηματιστικῆν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως.

The 'political' *raison d'être* of 'home life' is nowhere seen more plainly than in Aristotle's theory of slavery (*Pol.* i. 2). The institution of slavery is supported on the ground that the slave is necessary to 'political life.' He exists not to contribute to the personal comfort or luxury of the master, but to give him that *σχολή* without which 'political life' is impossible. A free-man, who is obliged to be, as it were, his own slave, or, like the *βάναυσος*, to do slave's work, is naturally excluded from 'political life.' This defence of slavery, as necessary to 'political life,' becomes intelligible when we recognise the 'gentlemanly' and even 'academic' character of Aristotle's 'political life.' In supporting the institution of slavery as he does, and in excluding the *βάναυσος* and *χρηματιστής* from 'political life,' Aristotle merely gives expression to the truth, or truism, that refined culture and social brilliance are found only within the circle of the leisure class. A 'good man,' according to the modern view, is a man who leads an upright and useful life in his sphere, whatever that may be. Aristotle's 'good man' (*σπουδαῖος*) is, above all, a connoisseur of life, a man of the world, educated, magnificent, fortunate. Slavery or

some analogous institution is obviously necessary to the existence 1094 a. 27. of a caste of men of this sort. See *Pol.* Γ. 3. 1277 b. 35 ἡ καὶ τοὺς βάναύσους πολίτας θετέον; . . . 1278 a. 8 ἡ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάναυσον πολίτην . . . a. 20 οὐ γὰρ οἶδα τὸ ἐπιτηδεῦσαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βάναυσον ἡ θητικόν: Z. 2. 1319 a. 26 ὁ γὰρ βίος φαινός, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔργον μετ' ἀρετῆς, ὃν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλῆθος τό τε τῶν βαναύσων καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τὸ θητικόν. Aristotle's ἀρετή is essentially the quality of the gentleman.

The subordination of ρῆτορική to πολιτική is an interesting point. In Plato's *Gorgias* 452 sqq. we find the sophist Gorgias attempting to identify them, maintaining that ρῆτορική is the true art of government, and is concerned with the greatest good of man—with ‘that which gives men freedom in their own persons, and to rulers the power of ruling over others in their several states,’ viz. ‘the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly or at any other political meeting’ (Jowett). Socrates maintains against this view that ‘rhetoric is the shadow of a part of politics:’ *Gorg.* 463 Δῆστι γὰρ ἡ ρῆτορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον. It is the art of flattery, and the simulation of justice. Similarly in the *Politicus* 304 πολιτική and ρῆτορική are carefully distinguished, and the subordination of the latter to the former insisted upon. Public speaking was so essential to the exercise of political influence in a democratic state that the temptation to regard rhetoric as the highest art was very strong. Aristotle follows the example of Plato in strenuously opposing this view, and we cannot be wrong in supposing that it is his sympathy with Plato's opposition to the professional teachers of public speaking which makes him select ρῆτορική here as one of his instances of an art subordinate to πολιτική. See *E. N.* x. 9. 20.

An orator is too apt to speak so as to obtain applause or benefit for himself, whereas his speaking ought to be a means to the good of the state. This it is for the state to see to. Aristotle obviously considered the art of public speaking as one requiring considerable regulation, for in *Rhet.* i. 1. 1354 a. 11-26 he says that in the best ordered states speakers are not allowed to make appeals to the emotions of the judges, but are confined to the facts of the case—a restriction, he dryly adds, which would reduce many speakers to silence. To appeal to the emotions of a judge is to bend the rule you are about to use. In the interest of the community at large it would seem that oratory ought to be regulated even in private cases

**1094 a. 27.** between citizens; but where the speech is addressed to a sovereign people to determine their policy, the responsibility of the speaker is much greater. It is very little however that statute can do, in the absence of good sense and good feeling, to curtail the licence of public speaking. The institution of the *γραφὴ παρανόμων* at Athens was an attempt in this direction, but does not seem to have been very successful. Its effect was evaded by the passing of *ψηφίσματα* (as distinguished from *νόμοι*), in force for one year, and annually renewable.

The relation of *πολιτική* to public speaking suggests, through the sophists the great teachers of rhetoric, the general subject of the relation of *πολιτική* to education. We are told in § 6 that *πολιτική* determines what sciences and arts shall be taught in the city, and to what extent, and to whom, and in the *Politics* (H. 13—Θ. 7) a sketch of the education which it is desirable that the state should provide is given. Again, in the last chapter of the *E. N.* (x. 9), the question whether education ought to be private or public is discussed (to a certain extent dialectically), and the conclusion reached that it ought to be public. The private point of view, even if it were backed by sufficient authority to enforce its particular system (which it is not), is too narrow.

It has been pointed out above that the difference of opinion between Plato and the sophists seems to have caused the selection here of *ρήτορική* as an instance of an art subordinate to *πολιτική*. The selection of *στρατηγική* seems also to be due to the influence of Plato, who, in *Politicus* 304, 305—a passage from which the present may very well have been borrowed—describes *πολιτική* as the sovereign (*βασιλική*) science which regulates *ρήτορική*, *στρατηγική*, *δικαιοστική*, as well as *μουσική* and *δλως αἱ περὶ χειροτεχνίας ἐπιστῆμαι*. The selection of *οἰκονομική* is not accidental either, but is determined by Aristotle's peculiar view of the evil of *χρηματιστική* (see *Pol.* i. 3. 1256 b. 41), as well as by his theory of the origin of the *πόλις* (see *Pol.* i. 2. 1253 b. 2 ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκιῶν).

b. 4. § 7. *χρωμένης*] *i.e.* using as means to its own supreme end; cf. the use of *χρήσιμον*=‘the means,’ as *e.g.* *E. N.* i. 5. 8 καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· *χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλον χάριν.* *Pol.* ii. 6. 1271 b. 3 *χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν.* *E. N.* viii. 6. 5 *χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλά.*

*χρωμένης . . . νομοθετούσης*] Cf. the division of ἡ περὶ πόλιν φρόνησις

(*E. N.* vi. 8. 2) into (1) *νομοθετική*, (2) *πολιτική*, *i.e.* into that which 1094 b. 4. lays down general rules of life, and that which deals, in the assembly and the law courts, as well as in the various executive departments, with the details of public business.

*ταῖς λοιπαῖς [πρακτικαῖς] τῶν ἐπιστημῶν*] Bywater brackets *πρακτικαῖς*.

§ 8.] The words ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ are a little startling, b. 7. but must not be understood to mean that the individual is in any sense self-subsisting, and able to realise his good independently of the state. We have seen that Aristotle's doctrine is that the individual has no existence apart from the body politic. No man who is not a *πολίτης* can attain to the ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθόν. Indeed this doctrine is implied in the words *ταῦτόν ἔστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει*. Accordingly when Aristotle goes on to distinguish the good of the *πόλης* from that of the *εἰς μόνος*, as *κάλλιον καὶ θειότερον*, he must be understood merely to distinguish between *πολίται* in different social circumstances—between the *πολίτης* who, like Solon or Pericles, is surrounded by all that is best in civil life, and the *πολίτης* who lives in exile, with a memory or a hope instead of a city, or is placed in social circumstances which are mean and unworthy of him, like 'the great soul in a small city' spoken of by Plato (*Rep.* 496). Plato indeed regards exile and a small city as distinctly favourable (in existing circumstances) to philosophy—man's highest occupation; but Aristotle takes the more concrete view, that with mean social surroundings, a man cannot perform his highest function well, although he may perform it in a way. It would be a misapprehension of Aristotle's teaching to suppose that the distinction drawn in this section is that between the good of the community at large—'the greatest good of the greatest number,' and the private good of a single member of the community. No such distinction could be made by Aristotle. The good of the *εἰς μόνος*, in which we must sometimes 'acquiesce,' is still his good as a 'social being'; it is not a *κτῆμα* of which he may be the solitary possessor, but an *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς* which can only be manifested in a social environment, unsatisfactory though that environment may be in a given case. A man's social environment may be fitted to call forth his noblest energies, or it may be such as to impede them without entirely destroying them: this is the distinction which Aristotle draws. His social energies impeded, a

1094 b. 7. man is apt to fall back upon the abstraction of the individual *per se*—to live for himself, and forget that he is a member of the body politic; when his noblest energies are constantly called forth by brilliant social circumstances, he identifies himself with the body politic, which is no longer for him an abstraction, but his own concrete life. The true self is a noble life in a great city. The terms *καλλιον* and *θειότερον* are applied with technical correctness to this life, which is, in the highest degree, one of definite order and form. The term *καλόν*, as we have seen, is applied where there is *μέγεθος καὶ τάξις* (*Poet.* 7. 1450 b. 3); and the term *θεῖον* marks the *εἶδος* which *φύσις*, whether in the natural or in the moral world, strives to perfect, by purifying from the influence of *ὑλη*. *Θεός* is pure form without matter (see *Met. A.* 7, and, for the expression *ἐνέργεια ἀνευ δυνάμεως* *De Interp.* 13. 23 a. 23.); *φύσις* is a principle which, by producing ever more and more definite forms (*εἶδη*), strives to approach the ideal of the divine immaterial form. Plants and animals, which perpetuate their species (*εἶδη*) in young individuals unaffected by the decay of age, are thus said to strive after *τὸ θεῖον* in so doing: *De Anima*, ii. 4. 415 a. 24 *φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν . . . τὸ ποιῆσαι ἔτερον οἶλον αὐτόν*, *ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν* ἢ *δύνανται*. *Oeconom.* i. 3. 1343 b. 23 *ἄμα δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἀναπληροῖ ταντή τῇ περιόδῳ τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἐπεὶ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν οὐ δύναται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος οὐτω προωκονόμηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου ἐκατέρου ἡ φύσις τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν*. Similarly, in following pleasure, which is the symbol of functions tending towards the good of the organism, all animals follow a divine instinct: *E. N.* vii. 13. 6. 1153 b. 30 *οὐδὲ ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες*. *ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἦν οἰονται οὐδὲ ἦν ἀν φαιεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον*. Tò *θεῖον*, then, being the principle of *form*, or *organisation*, in plants and animals, it is easy to understand how, apart from any special motive to use an ornate epithet, *νοῦς* should be described as *θεῖος*, as in *E. N.* x. 7. 8, and many other places. *Νοῦς* is the principle of form and order in man, *quā* man; the faculty whereby he abstracts his attention from the separate presentations, as such, of sense and feeling, and regards the relations in which the presentations stand to one another in an orderly system of science or life. To be able to *identify oneself* with such an orderly system may well be characterised as *καλόν* and *θεῖον*. The identification of *νοῦς* and *τὸ νοητόν* is a doctrine of the

greatest importance in Aristotle's philosophy, enabling him to 1094 b. 7. reconcile the opposition (which Grant finds so conspicuous in his system: see Grant's *Ethics*, vol. i. pp. 412-413) between 'the end for the state' and 'the absolute worth of the individual consciousness.' Only that 'individual (*sc. human*) consciousness' has 'absolute worth' which has for its object, and identifies itself with, 'the end for the state.' The true self is the consciousness of social duty. 'Ημῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἔτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ (*sc. θεῷ*) αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἔστιν (*E. E. H.* 12. 1245 b. 18.).

The Paraphrast shows little appreciation of the philosophical import of the passage: he says οἵστι μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διασῶσαι ἀγαπητὸν (ἂν τε ἐν ἑτέρῳ τις, ἢν τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δυνηθῇ φυλάξαι) κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον οἴθνει καὶ πόλεσιν, ὅσον ἡ τῶν πολλῶν εὐδαιμονία τῆς ἐνὸς ἀμείνων ἔστιν.

**ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν]** The Hellenic race with its various states as b. 10. distinguished from non-Hellenic races is doubtless foremost in Aristotle's mind here.

ἢ μέθοδος] 'This enquiry.'

b. 11.

**πολιτική τις οὐσα]** Michelet says, 'τις nihil aliud indicat, nisi quod practer moralem sint adhuc aliae scientiae quae politicae subjiciantur, ut *oikonomikή*. Inferiores scientiae autem a nobiliore cui subjectae sunt denominantur.' Perhaps it is better to avoid committing Aristotle to the view that 'moral philosophy' falls under 'political philosophy' as species under genus. He can hardly be said to distinguish the two.

### • CHAPTER III.

#### ARGUMENT.

*Our Subject then is the Chief Good, our Science a kind of Statesmanship.*

*Exactness of scientific treatment, it must be premised, depends on subject-matter. Some subjects do not admit of being treated very exactly, just as some materials do not lend themselves to very fine workmanship. Now, the science of society is not an exact science, because its subject-matter, Conduct, is a very complex one—indeed so full of inconsistencies and perplexities, that to some people it seems an arbitrary system, without foundation in the nature of things. On such a subject, then, we shall be satisfied with rough indications of the truth; with probable conclusions from probable premisses: with which the 'educated' reader will also be satisfied; for the educated man looks always in a science for that degree of exactness of which its subject-matter admits: he does not allow a mathematician to give him merely probable conclusions, or demand strict demonstration from an orator.*

1094 b. 12. *A man may be ‘educated’ in some particular branch, or in the general sense of the term. In either case, he is a ‘good judge,’ as far as his education extends. Hence a youth is not a fit student of the science of society. He is not a ‘good judge’ of doctrines belonging to a subject—the conduct of life—of which he has no real experience: moreover, he is so prone to be led away by his feelings, that doctrines have no influence over his conduct: and it is influence over conduct, not inculcation of doctrines, that is the *raison d'être* of our Science. What has been said regarding the youthful in years is true also of the youthful in character. There are men who at mature age still live under the rule of their passions. Their knowledge does such men no good. But if a man rule his desires aright, and act according to the dictates of his reason, knowledge of the truths of our Science will be of great use to him.*

This chapter is devoted to the logical method of Ethics,—a subject which is taken up again in ch. iv. §§ 5–7, and in ch. vii. §§ 17–23.

b. 12. § 1. **ὑποκειμένην ὑλην]** The *ὑποκειμένη ὑλη* is the matter, as distinguished from the form. See *Met. Z. 3. 1029 a. 3* λέγω δὲ τὴν μὲν ὑλην, οἷον τὸν χαλκόν, τὴν δὲ μορφὴν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἰδέας· τὸ δὲ ἐκ τούτων τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸ σύνολον. This *ὑλη* (sometimes called *τὸ ὑποκείμενον*) is, in itself, formless, and therefore not an object of knowledge; see *De Coelo*, iii. 8. 306 b. 17 ἀειδὲς καὶ ἄμορφον δεῖ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι, and *Met. Z. 10. 1036 a. 8* ἡ δὲ ὑλη ἄγνωστος καθ' αὐτήν. It is, however, receptive, in various degrees, of form, and, together with a given form, constitutes a concrete thing (*τὸ σύνολον*): see *Met. Δ. 1015 b. 13* ἡ πρώτη φύσις καὶ κυρίως λεγομένη ἔστιν ἡ οὐσία (i.e. τὸ ἔνυλον εἴδος, Alex.) ἡ τῶν ἔχόντων ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ αὐτά· ἡ γὰρ ὑλη τῷ ταύτης δεκτικὴ εἶναι λέγεται φύσις. Quā receptive of the forms which φύσις or τέχνη may impose upon it, *ὑλη* is τὸ δύναμει ἔκαστον (*Met. N. 4. 1092 a. 4*), i.e. the potentiality of a definite form. Cf. *Met. Z. 7. 1032 a. 20* ἀπαντα δὲ τὰ γινόμενα ἡ φύσει ἡ τέχνη ἔχει ὑλην· δυνατὸν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἔκαστον αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν ἐν ἔκαστῳ ὑλη. Cf. *Met. H. 2. 1043 a. 24* τί ἔστι γαλήνη; δμαλότης θαλάττης· τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὑλη ἡ θάλαττα· ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ἡ δμαλότης. Cf. *Pol. i. 3. 1256 a. 8* λέγω δὲ ὑλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον· οἷον ὑφάντη μὲν ἔρια ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ χαλκόν.

b. 13. **τὸ ἀκριβέστ**] *ὑλη* being the rough material which has to be brought into shape, the finish or perfection (*τὸ ἀκριβέστ*) of the shape will largely depend upon the nature of the material operated on; e.g. a figure carved in wood will differ in artistic character from one cut in marble. The facts dealt with by a science constitute its *ὑλη*, the science being the *εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις* (Eustratius) of the *ὑλη*.

As various materials, wood and stone, lend themselves differently 1094 b. 13. to the efforts of the artist who gives them shape, so various subjects of enquiry admit of different degrees of definiteness in their scientific treatment: οὐχ ὅμοίως ἐν ἀπασι τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητέον τὸ ἀκριβές, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς δημιουργούμενοις: e.g. in medical and sociological enquiries the facts which science has to reduce to order, or *λόγος*, are so numerous, and their relations to one another so complicated, that probable conclusions, i.e. expectations which are more or less likely to be realised, are all that we can hope to reach. We can never be sure that we have taken into consideration everything affecting a social question or a medical diagnosis. In geometry, on the other hand, the influence of *ὕλη* is reduced to a minimum. All other qualities of bodies except their spatial, diagrammatically-representable qualities are ignored by geometry; and of the diagrams, as drawn, all actual irregularities are ignored. In nature there is no such thing as a circle with all its radii absolutely equal; but geometry assumes such a circle, and its deductions are true on the assumption. The first principles of geometry are so clear to the eye in the diagrams which represent them, and the reasoning, guided at every step by the eye, is so obviously affected by nothing save these principles, that we feel sure that our conclusions ‘cannot be otherwise.’ Geometry is thus the type of *ἀπόδειξις*, or necessary reasoning, because it has to do with *εἶδη* as such, i.e. with abstractions, τὰ ἔξ ἀφαιρέσεως—τὰ ἀνευ *ὕλης*; cf. *An. Post.* i. 13. 79 a. 7 τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα περὶ εἴδη ἔστι, κ.τ.λ. Abstractions, or pure *εἶδη* as such, from their very nature are incapable of change, change being incident to concrete things which grow and perish. The plan of a house, as such, i.e. the conception of certain architectural relations, is unaffected by the *γένεσις* and *φθορά* which alter a structure of bricks and mortar. Where λόγος is σὺν τῇ *ὕλῃ* συνειλημμένος, there *γένεσις* and *φθορά* obtain: τοῦ δὲ λόγου οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτως ὥστε φθείρεσθαι οὐδὲ γὰρ *γένεσις*: οὐ γὰρ γίνεται τὸ οἰκία εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ (*Met. Z.* 15. 1039 b. 21). Cf. *Met. Z.* 8. 1033 b. 16 φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὡς *εἶδος* ή ὡς οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίνεται, καὶ ἐν ἀπαντι τῷ γενομένῳ *ὕλῃ* ἔνεστι, τὸ μὲν τόδε τὸ δὲ τόδε. The *εἶδος*, as such, is *indivisible* (*Met. Z.* 8. 1034 a. 8 ἀτομὸν τὸ *εἶδος*): *κίνησις* and *γένεσις* belong only to τὰ μεριστὰ καὶ μὴ δλα (*E.N.X.* 4. 4. 1174 b. 11), i.e. to material things, or *the formations of matter*; their ‘matter’ being the element of divisibility, confusion, and change in them. Cf. *de Gen. et Corr.* i. 4. 320 a. 2 ἔστι δὲ *ὕλῃ* μάλιστα μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὸ ὑποκείμενον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς δεκτικόν. Form,

1094 b. 13. or *εἶδος*, then, as such, being ἀκίνητον, ἀΐδιον, and μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, constitutes the object of ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη. Geometry is the type of ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη; for, although it is impossible for man to apprehend form without a certain admixture of matter (cf. *de Memor.* 1. 449 b. 31 νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος), still, in geometry, the matter, *i. e.* the irregularity due to the actual presentation of the form, is so slight, and so easily eliminated by an effort of imagination, that Aristotle is practically justified in speaking of the objects of the science as being ἄνευ ὑλῆς. See *Met.* a. 3. 995 a. 14 τὴν δ' ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἀπασιν ἀπαιτητέον, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν ὑλην. διόπερ οὐ φυσικὸς δ τρόπος\* ἀπασα γὰρ ἵσως ή φύσις ἔχει ὑλην: and *Met.* Z. 15. 1039 b. 27 τῶν οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ' ἔκαστα οὕτε δρισμὸς οὕτε ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν, ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὑλην, ης ή φύσις τοιαύτη ὡστ' ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μή. διὸ φθαρτὰ πάντα τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ή τε ἀπόδειξις τῶν ἀναγκαίων, καὶ δρισμὸς ἐπιστημονικός, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμην ὅτε μὲν ἐπιστήμην ὅτε δ' ἄγνοιαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δόξα τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξιν οὐδὲ δρισμόν, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἔστι τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἀν εἴη αὐτῶν οὕτε δρισμὸς οὕτε ἀπόδειξις. Cf. *Met.* K. 1061 a. 28 δρισμὸς περὶ τὰ ἔξι ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται περιελῶν γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖν οἷον βάρος καὶ κουφότητα, κ.τ.λ. . . . μόνον δὲ καταλείπει τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχέσ. Simple spatial forms, always the same, and spatial laws or conditions, never counteracted by unforeseen influences, explain for Aristotle, as they do for Dugald Stewart (*Elements of the Phil. of the Human Mind*, Part II. ch. i and ch. ii. § 3), and J. S. Mill (*Logic*, Book II. chs. v and vi) the necessity and universality of the truths of geometry.

On κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὑλην Eustратius has the following note: ὑλη δὲ ἐφ' ἔκαστης μεθόδου καὶ τέχνης λέγεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτῆς περὶ δὲ καταγίνεται, ὑποκείμενον δὲ τῇ ἡθικῇ καὶ πολιτικῇ τὰ ἐν βίῳ ἔστι πράγματα καὶ αἱ περὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράξεις τε καὶ ἐνέργειαι, ἀτινα τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐνδεχομένων εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ ὠσαύτως ἔχοντα, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὐ κάπι τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἀποπίποντα. [Cf. *Phys.* iv. 9. 217 a. 22 ὑλη μία τῶν ἐναντίων.] καὶ ἐπεὶ τοιοῦτον τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ οἱ λόγοι οἱ παραδιδόντες περὶ αὐτοῦ. διὸ οὐδὲ χρὴ ἀναγκαῖας τυνάς ἀποδείξεις περὶ τῶν οὕτως ἐνδεχομένων ἀπαιτεῖν· ὥσπερ γὰρ μέτρον οἱ λόγοι τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσὶ περὶ ὃν λέγονται, καὶ δεῖ τὸ μέτρον ἐφαρμόζον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ μετρούμενον. οὐ δύναται δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ ἔχον ὠσαύτως τῷ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντι ἐφαρμόζεσθαι. The Paraphrast says: οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ πάσῃς ὑλης δμοίως τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἀλήθειαν εὑρεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς, ἀτε ἀναγκαῖαν

ἔχονσιν ὥλην καὶ ἀεὶ ὠσαύτως ἔχουσαν, [cf. *Met.* Δ. 24. 1023 b. 2 ἐκ 1094b.13. τῆς αἰσθητῆς ὑλης ἡ σύνθετος οὐσία ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ εἴδους ὑλης: -and *Met.* Ζ. 10. 1036 a. 9 ὑλη δὲ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἔστιν ἡ δὲ νοητή.] ἀμιγῆς ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ οὐδὲν ἡ ὑλη κωλύει τὸ ἀκριβές· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀλλοις ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα οὐδὲ ἀεὶ δομίως ἔχει, ἀρκετός ἔστι λόγος ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον συνάγων.

**§ 2. τὰ δὲ καλά, κ.τ.λ.]** The subject-matter of moral or political b. 14. science is right conduct,—that which men, being such as they are, ought to do, in the various circumstances in which they are placed. But the notions comprised within this sphere—*Justice*, *Temperance*, *Courage*, &c.—are constituted by relations which vary (within limits) or are ‘contingent,’ not ‘necessary’ or immutable, as are those perceived in mathematics. It would, therefore, be absurd to demand ‘demonstration’ in such a subject. When Locke (*Essay*, iii. 11. 16) maintained that morality might be made ‘capable of demonstration as well as mathematics,’ if ethical terms, such as *Justice*, were carefully defined once for all, and the definitions used as first principles, he failed to see the full import of the circumstance that there are no diagrams in morals, and to appreciate the difference between a ‘mixed mode,’ however carefully defined in words, and a spatial form clearly represented to the eye in a diagram. But, even were it granted that, with definitions of its ‘mixed modes’ as principles of deduction, moral science, notwithstanding the absence of diagrams, might be made as ‘accurate’ as geometry, it would still be true that such an abstract system would be practically useless, being inapplicable to the varying contingencies of life; and indeed might become positively injurious, by stereotyping the conclusions of imperfect enlightenment, and handing them down in an authoritative form to times which might be profited by a change of conduct. Moral rules must suit themselves to the varying exigencies of life (so far as they do vary), and ethics cannot be made an ‘exact science’ without ceasing to be a practical system. According to Aristotle, however, ethics is essentially a practical system: *E. N.* i. 3. 6 τὸ τέλος ἔστιν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις: and πρᾶξις is concerned with the contingent and variable; see *E. N.* vi. 5. 3. Demonstration can be looked for only where the subject-matter is abstract, *i.e.* where it is possible, and convenient, to ignore all actual irregularities and contingencies. But in ethics it would be as absurd to ignore the irregularities and contingencies in circumstances and

1094b.14. conduct, as in the art of navigation to ignore the variations of the weather. A science which is concerned with things as they present themselves concretely in nature can never attain to exactness, ἀπαστα γὰρ ἵσως ἡ φύσις ἔχει ὑλην *Met. a.* 3. 995 b. 17.

Yet, although *Right* and *Wrong* are not abstract and immutable *εἶδη* like the principles of geometry, they are not the arbitrary creations of mere convention (*νόμῳ*), but have a definite nature of their own (*φύσει*). There are certain actions which, except under the most extraordinary circumstances, must be performed, as there are certain which must be avoided by all men, if human society is to maintain itself. We must not be misled by conceivable exceptions, or by the numerous cases of actions which do not involve the very existence of human society, and therefore would be indifferent but for fashion or some local and temporary utility, into supposing that *all* actions are indifferent. Man's nature is of a certain kind on the whole, and his circumstances are of a certain kind on the whole; and if he does not act in a certain way on the whole he will perish. This is the *φύσις* in the distinction between right and wrong. There is a 'natural' distinction between right and wrong as there is between food and poison<sup>1</sup>.

The question as to whether the *δίκαιον* exists *φύσει* or *νόμῳ* is a prominent one in the history of Greek ethical speculation. It is fully discussed by the writer of the fifth book of the *Ethics* (ch. vii), and the *Theaetetus* of Plato is chiefly devoted to it. Protagoras, we are told in the *Theaetetus*, maintained that 'man is the measure of all things,'—that is, that things *are* what they *seem to him*. By 'man' Protagoras did not understand 'the human faculties as such,' but 'every individual man for himself.' *Theaet.* 152 Α φησὶ γάρ που [δ Πρωταγόρας] πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν: ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που; Θεαῖτ. ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις. Σω. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἴα μὲν ἔκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μέν ἔστιν ἐμοὶ, οἴα δὲ σοὶ, τοιαῦτα δ' αὖ σοι ἀνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κάγω; Θεαῖτ. λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως. Hence nothing has a nature or essence of its own, but exists only in relation to the mind which happens to perceive it: *Theaet.* 157 Α οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλά τινι ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον. Hence (*Theaet.*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Rhet.* i. 1. 1355 a. 20 χρήσιμος δ' ἔστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ διά τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τάληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὡστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον αἱ κρίσεις γίγνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι . . . 37 ἀεὶ τάληθῆ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

167 C) οῖα γ' ἀν ἔκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ 1094 b.14. ἔως ἀν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ: and (*Theaet.* 172 A) οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅστια καὶ μῆ, οἷα ἀν ἔκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἔαντῃ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἔκάστη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι . . . (B) ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὄστοις καὶ ἀνοστοῖς ἐθέλοντιν ἴσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἔαντοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινὴ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἀν δοκῆ χρόνον. This view, which was obviously fitted to recommend itself to professional teachers of rhetoric or the art of 'getting on,' seems to have been held by many of the sophists, as also by the Cyrenaics (*e.g.* Theodorus; see Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil. Theodorus*), and, after Aristotle's time, by the Epicureans. For a criticism of the view νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μῆ, see Cudworth's *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, Books II and III.

**§ 3. καὶ τἀγαθά].** ‘Good things’ also, as well as τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ b. 17. δίκαια, are of a mutable nature, and cause many perplexities. The Paraph. has—οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐξ ὃν δοκεῖ συνίστασθαι ἡ εὐδαιμονία (ἀνδρείαν λέγω ή πλούτον ή τοιωτόν τι) καὶ αὐτὰ ἔχει πλάνην πολλήν, κ.τ.λ. Although this section is thus primarily a statement about τἀγαθά, it may perhaps be regarded also as conveying, by its position, a refutation of the immediately preceding νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι φύσει δὲ μῆ. ‘The argument from variability proves too much, viz. that good things *also*, such as wealth, have no quality of goodness in themselves independently of opinion and fashion. If right and wrong are indifferent, then riches and poverty are also.’ Rassow conjectures φιλίαν for ἀνδρείαν (*Forsch.* p. 88). He says, ‘Dass die Tapferkeit unter die ἀγαθά gerechnet wird, und nicht unter die καλὰ καὶ δίκαια, steht in auffälligstem Widerspruch mit den Grundanschauungen und dem Sprachgebrauche der Ethik. Der Scholiast [Eustratius] nimmt ἀνδρεία in der Bedeutung von ἴσχύς, aber diese Aushilfe ist unzulässig [the *Index Arist.* gives no instance of ἀνδρεία=ἴσχύς]. Ich vermuthe daher: διὰ φιλίαν Vgl. 9. p. 1099 a. 31 φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἔκτὸς ἀγαθῶν πρυτανεόμενη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀδύνατον γὰρ η οὐ ράδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι' ὄργανων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως.’ The assumption which underlies Rassow’s objection to ἀνδρείαν seems to be that τἀγαθά here, as distinguished from τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, must be τὰ ἔκτὸς ἀγαθά. I confess that I cannot see why Aristotle

1094 b. 17. should not be allowed, even immediately after the mention of *τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια*, to take *τάγαθά* in its generic sense, and, having given *πλοῦτος* as an instance of *τὰ ἔκτὸς ἀγαθά*, to add *ἀνδρεῖα* as an instance of *τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ* (see *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 26); cf. Eustatius, *εἰ δὲ τὴν κυρίως ἀνδρείαν* (as distinguished from *ἰσχύς*: Eustatius is here offering an alternative explanation for the *ἀνδρεία=ἰσχύς* explanation which he seems to favour), *ἔρεις ὅτι ἐν πρὸς ἐν ἀντέθηκε, πρὸς τι τῶν θυραίων καὶ ἔξωθεν, ἐν τῶν ἐντὸς καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν.*

b. 19. § 4. *περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων*] A common Aristotelian expression, *περὶ τοιούτων* referring to the matter of the enquiry, and *ἐκ τοιούτων* to the principles available for the establishment of scientific conclusions relating to this matter. See *Rhet.* ii. 1. 1377 b. 16, quoted by Zell—*ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ φέγειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις ταῦτ’ ἐστίν· περὶ γὰρ τούτων (i. e. τὸ προτρέπειν κ. τ. λ.) καὶ ἐκ τούτων (i. e. αἱ δόξαι καὶ αἱ προτάσεις) τὰ ἐνθυμήματα.* Cf. *Top.* i. 8. 103 b. 39 *περὶ δὲ μὲν οἱ λόγοι καὶ ἔξ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτά ἐστι: de Part. Anim.* i. 5. 644 b. 23, sqq. *συμβεβήκει δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐκείνας (i. e. τὰς ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους οὐσίας) τιμίας οὕτας καὶ θείας ἐλάττους ήμūν ὑπάρχειν θεωρίας (καὶ γὰρ ἔξ δὲ τις σκέψαιτο περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ δὲ εἰδέναι ποθοῦμεν, παντελῶς ἐστὶν ὀλίγα τὰ φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν κ. τ. λ.). Cf. *Hist. Anim.* i. 6. 491 a. 13 *περὶ δὲ τε γὰρ καὶ ἔξ δὲ εἶναι δεῖ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἐκ τούτων γίνεται φανερόν.* Add to these examples given by Zell, *E. N.* i. 3. 5 οἱ λόγοι δ’ ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. *E. N.* vi. 11. 6 *ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων.**

In *Anal. Post.* i. 7. 75 a. 39, sqq. Aristotle says—*τρία γάρ ἐστι τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν ἐν μὲν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον συμπέρασμα· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον γένει τινὶ καθ’ αὐτό· ἐν δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα· ἀξιώματα δέ ἐστιν, ἔξ δὲ τρίτον τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὐ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ συμβεβηκότα δῆλοι ἡ ἀπόδειξις: and *An. Post.* i. 10. 76 b. 11 πᾶσα γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τρία ἐστίν, ὅσα τε εἶναι τίθεται ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ γένος οὗ τῶν καθ’ αὐτὰ παθημάτων ἐστὶ θεωρητική· καὶ τὰ κοινὰ ἀ λέγομεν ἀξιώματα, ἔξ δὲ πρώτων ἀποδεικνύουσι· καὶ τρίτον τὰ πάθη δὲ τί σημαίνει ἔκαστον λαμβάνει:—and in the same chapter, 76 b. 22 *τρία ταῦτά ἐστι, περὶ δὲ τε δείκνυσι, καὶ ἀ δείκνυσι, καὶ ἔξ δὲ.* On the passage 75 a. 39, sqq. Themistius (vol. i. p. 28, ed. Spengel) writes—*τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν, ἐν μὲν δὲ δείκνυται ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κατηγορούμενον ἐν τῷ συμπεράσματι, ἐν δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα ἔξ δὲ δείκνυται,**

αῦται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ προτάσεις ἐκ τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ὑπαρχόντων, τρίτον δὲ τὸ γένος 1094 b. 19. τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡς τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ὑπάρχοντα δεικνύασιν αἱ ἀποδείξεις, οἷον ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέγεθος: and on 76 b. 11 he writes (i. 36 Spengel) τρία ἔστιν ὅπερ ὁν ἐκάστη πραγματεύεται ἐπιστήμῃ, τό τε ὑποκείμενον γένος οἷον ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέγεθος, καὶ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ὑπάρχοντα τούτῳ, οἷον τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν, ἢ τὸ δύο ὄρθλας ἔχειν, ἢ τὸ συμπίπτειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰ ἀξιώματα, οἷον ἐὰν ἵστα ἀπὸ ἴστων. It is to be noted that the analysis given in these passages (*An. Post.* 75 a. 39—76 b. 22) is introduced in order to expose the illogical procedure of applying the principles and method of one subject (*γένος*) to the explanation of another subject—75 a. 38 οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους μεταβάντα δεῖξαι, οἷον τὸ γεωμετρικὸν ἀριθμητικὴν τρία γάρ ἔστι κ.τ.λ. The conclusions (*ἀ δείκνυσι*) of a given science are proved within the sphere of its own subject matter (*περὶ ὁ δείκνυσι, γένος*), by means of certain formal principles (*ἐξ ὅν*), available within that sphere. The expression *περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων* evidently contains a reference to this analysis, *περὶ τοιούτων* relating to the *γένος* or *ὑποκείμενη ὥλη* of moral science, viz. *τὰ πρακτά*, and *ἐκ τοιούτων* to the principles available in such an enquiry. We must remember that these principles do not resemble either the axioms or the definitions of geometry, which are ‘eternal and immutable,’ but rather embody ‘tendencies.’

**ἐνδείκνυσθαι**] Eustratius has—ἀπόδειξις μὲν καθηρῶς καὶ βεβαίως τὸ b. 20. ζητούμενον παριστᾶ, ἔνδειξις δὲ διά τινων ἐκτυπώσεων καὶ μημήσεων καὶ ἐμφάσεων. According to the *Ind. Arist.* Aristotle does not use the verb elsewhere, and nowhere uses the noun (*ἔνδειξις*). In Athenian law *ἐνδεικνύναι* means ‘to inform against, lay an *ἔνδειξις* against’ anyone for illegal conduct. Cf. Plato, *Apol.* 32 Β καὶ ἑτοίμων ὅντων *ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων*. The ‘probable’ nature of the evidence upon which an *ἔνδειξις* relied may have suggested to Aristotle the employment of *ἐνδείκνυσθαι* in the present connexion. The author of the *ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον* 38. 1445 b. 8, speaking of the *ἔξεταστικὸν εἶδος*, uses the verb with what certainly seems to be a reference to its legal use—*ἔφεξῆς ἐκαστον προτιθέμενοι τῶν ῥηθέντων ἢ πραχθέντων ἢ διανοηθέντων ἔξετάσομεν, ἐνδεικνύντες αὐτὰ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ τοῖς νομίμοις καὶ τοῖς ἴδιᾳ καὶ κοινῇ συμφέροντιν ἐναντιούμενα*. At any rate, in the present passage *ἐνδείκνυσθαι* may be rendered by ‘indicate’ (as distinguished from ‘demonstrate’—*ἀποδεικνύναι*).

**τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ]** That which generally takes place. It is b. 21. distinguished from *τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης* on the one hand, and *τὸ*

1094 b. 21. *συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ τυχόν* on the other hand, see *Met.* K. 8. 1064 b. 32, sqq. Πᾶν δὴ φαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔξ ἀνάγκης [e.g. the angles of a triangle are = 2 right angles], τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐπ τὸ πολὺ [e.g. perseverance is rewarded by success], τὸ δὲ οὐθὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐτὸν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔξ ἀνάγκης, ἀλλὰ ὅπως ἔτυχεν [e.g. when a man digging his vineyard, finds a treasure] . . . ξεῖτι δὴ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὁ γίγνεται μὲν οὐκ ἀεὶ οὐδὲ ἔξ ἀνάγκης, οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. Cf. also *Topics* ii. 6. 112 b. 1 τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἔστι, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὰ δὲ ὅπότερ' ἔτυχεν. Hence Deliberation is concerned with τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, for τὰ ἔξ ἀνάγκης and τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης are equally removed from the sphere of man's influence: *E.N.* iii. 3. 10 τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον: and cf. §§ 1-9 of the same chapter. In *E.N.* v. 10. 4 τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον is used in the same sense as τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. On the distinction between ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (=far) and ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (both ὡς and the article with πολύ are essential to the expression) see Eucken, *über den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles* (1868), p. 55, sqq. Thuc. (ii. 13) has θαρσεῖν τε ἐκέλευε προσιόντων μὲν ἔξακοσίων ταλάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φόρου κατ' ἐνιαυτόν: and Isocrates περὶ εἰρήνης 166. b καὶ ταῦτ' εἰ μὴ κατὰ πάντων οὕτως εἴθισται συμβαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τό γ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτον γίγνεται τὸν τρόπον. A fragment apud Meineke *Fragm. Com.* vol. iii. 469 has ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ πολλὰ τοῦτο ποιῶ.

b. 22. *τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι*] From probable premisses only probable conclusions (*συμπεράσματα*) can be drawn; cf. *E.N.* vi. 5. 3 εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετὰ ἀποδείξεως, ὃν δὲ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν τούτων μὴ ξεῖται ἀπόδειξις (πάντα γάρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν) κ.τ.λ.

*τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεών ξεῖστα τῶν λεγομένων*] The Paraphrast gives the right sense,—ὅσπερ δὲ ὁ περὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς λέγων οὐ δύναται ἀκριβεστέραν ἀλήθειαν εὑρεῖν ἢ ὅσην ἡ ὑλη δίδωσιν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κρίνων τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους καλῶς ἀν κρίνοι εἰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον μὴ ἀκριβεστέραν ἀλήθειαν ἀπαιτεῖ ἢ ὅσην ἡ ὑλη δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἀποδέχεται. For ἀποδέχεσθαι in its present meaning of ‘accipere cum assensu, probare,’ see *Index Arist.* Peters brings out the point of the remark well—‘The reader, on his part, should take each of my statements in the same spirit.’

b. 23. *πεπαιδευμένου*] The *πεπαιδευμένος* is the man whose culture (*παιδεία*), whether special or general, enables him to criticise and estimate fairly scientific methods and results. His familiarity with the general principles of the ‘logic of the sciences’ leads him to

expect differences of treatment, as the ὑποκειμένη ὥλη differs in 1094 b.23. various departments; and his acquaintance with the precise character of the ὥλη of a given department, aided by his knowledge of logic, enables him to judge whether a certain method of dealing with that ὥλη is appropriate or inappropriate. See *E.E.* i. 6. 1217 a. 8 ἀπαιδευσία γάρ ἔστι περὶ ἔκαστον πρᾶγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τούς τ' οἰκείους λόγους τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους: *Met.* Γ. 4. 1006 a. 6 ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γινώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ξῆτεν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι. Cf. *Met.* Γ. 3. 1005 b. 3 ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη· ὅσα δ' ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἥκειν προεπισταμένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ξῆτεν. With this last passage cf. Aristoxenus, *Harmonica* p. 30 (ed. Marquard)—βέλτιον ἵστως ἔστι τὸ προδιελεῖν τὸν τρόπον τῆς πραγματείας τίς ποτ' ἔστιν, ἵνα προγιγνώσκοντες ὥσπερ ὅδὸν ἢ βαδιστέον ράδιον πορευώμεθα εἰδότες τε κατὰ τί μέρος ἐσμὲν αὐτῆς καὶ μὴ λάθωμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παρυπολαμβάνοντες τὸ πρᾶγμα· καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀεὶ διηγεῖτο τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἀκουσάντων παρὰ Πλάτωνος τὴν περὶ τάγαθοῦ ἀκρόασιν παθεῖν· προσιέναι μὲν γὰρ ἔκαστον ὑπολαμβάνοντα λήψεσθαι τι τῶν νομιζούμενων τούτων ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν οἷον πλοῦτον ὑγίειαν ἰσχὺν τὸ ὅλον εὐδαιμονίαν τινὰ θαυμαστήν· ὅτε δὲ φανείησαν οἱ λόγοι περὶ μαθημάτων καὶ ἀριθμῶν καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀστρολογίας, καὶ τὸ πέρας ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἔστιν ἔν, παντελῶς οἷμαι παράδοξόν τι ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς· εἰλθ' οἱ μὲν ὑποκατεφρόνουν τοῦ πράγματος, οἱ δὲ κατεμέμφοντο. τί οὖν τὸ αἴτιον; οὐ προήδεσταν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἐριστικοὶ πρὸς τοῦνομα αὐτὸν ὑποκεχηνότες προσήγεσαν· εἰ δέ γέ τις οἷμαι προεξετίθει τὸ ὅλον, ἐπεγίνωσκεν ἀν δ μέλλων ἀκούειν καὶ εἴπερ ἥρεσκεν αὐτῷ διέμενεν ἀν ἐν τῇ εἰλημμένῃ ὑπολήψει. Προέλεγε μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης δι' αὐτὰς ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας, ὡς ἔφη, τοὺς μέλλουσιν ἀκροάσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ, περὶ τίνων τ' ἔστιν ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τίς. Cf. *Met.* a. 3. 995 a. 6 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐὰν μὴ μαθηματικῶς λέγη τις οὐκ ἀποδέχονται τῶν λεγόντων· οἱ δ' ἀν μὴ παραδειγματικῶς οἱ δὲ μάρτυρα ἀξιούσιν ἐπάγεσθαι ποιητήν καὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα ἀκριβῶς, τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνείρειν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν [i.e. the minuteness of such enquiries, which seems to them tedious], ἔχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦτον· ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθερον εἶναι τισι δοκεῖ διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πῶς ἔκαστα ἀποδεκτέον. Cf. *de Part. Anim.* i. 639 a. 1 περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν, τε καὶ μέθοδον δμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι, ὃν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγο-

1094 b.23. ρεύειν, τὴν δὲ οἶν παιδείαν τινά. πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἔστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρίναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ηὔ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων. τοιοῦτον γὰρ δῆ τινα καὶ τὸν ὅλως πεπαιδευμένου οἰόμεθ' εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον. πλὴν τοῦτον μὲν περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικὸν τινα νομίζομεν εἶναι ἔνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα, τὸν δὲ περὶ τίνος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης· εἴη γὰρ ἄν τις ἔτερος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ εἰρημένῳ διακείμενος περὶ μόριον· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσιν ἴστορίας δὲι τινὰς ὑπάρχειν ὄρους τοιούτους πρὸς οὓς ἀναφέρων ἀποδέξεται τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων, χωρὶς τοῦ πᾶς ἔχει τάληθες εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως. In the last passage δὲ οἵ τῶν πεπαιδευμένους (cf. δὲ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος of the *Ethics*) is one who is remarkable for his grasp of the general principles of logical method, and for his delicate appreciation of the applicability to various subjects of the notions defined in a work like the *Metaphysics*; while δὲ περὶ τίνος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης (cf. δὲ καθ' ἔκαστον πεπαιδευμένος of the *Ethics*) is one who is distinguished for his appreciation of the method proper to a particular department, of the details of which he happens to have special knowledge, although his knowledge may be that of the amateur, as distinguished from the expert—a point made plain in *Pol.* iii. 11. 1282 a. 1 ὥσπερ οὖν ἰατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἰατροῖς οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς δμοίοις· ἰατρὸς δὲ ὁ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος δὲ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ γάρ τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας· ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἥπτον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ηὔ τοῖς εἰδόσιν. But, after all, the περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος and the καθ' ἔκαστον πεπ. are not so much separate persons as personifications of two elements in παιδείᾳ. A man cannot show special παιδείᾳ in a particular department with the details of which he has at least an amateur's acquaintance, without possessing a certain amount of the general παιδείᾳ which consists in knowledge of the principles of logic as they apply in other departments; nor, on the other hand, can a man be said to realise the true meaning of these principles unless he has applied them for himself in a particular enquiry. Naturally, however, critics of science differ according as they present the one or the other of these two elements of the critical habit with the greater prominence. The difficulty raised by Eustratius regarding the *possibility* of δὲ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος, 'the man who knows everything,' is thus irrelevant. Aristotle does not imagine the existence of a man who knows the details of all the sciences, as well as each specialist knows the details of his own department. The περὶ πᾶν

*πεπ.* is, as has been just said, the man who is familiar with the logic of the sciences, and the notions more or less applicable in all departments; who brings, in short, to his criticism of the method of a given enquiry familiarity with the doctrines of the *Organon* and the *Metaphysics*; his habit realising the requirements of *παιδεία* specified by Alexander on *Met.* 995 a. 6 (p. 126 ed. Bonitz) δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς ἔγγυμάζεσθαι καὶ τοῖς λογικοῖς δλως, καὶ εἰδέναι τοὺς τρόπους τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ τὰς τῶν λόγων συναγωγάς. In many respects the distinction between the *περὶ πᾶν πεπ.* and the *καθ' ἔκαστον πεπ.* is the same as that marked by the terms *λογικῶς* and *φυσικῶς* respectively, on which see *Phys.* iii. 5. 204 b. 4-10 λογικῶς [κοινῶς τε καὶ οὐ φυσικῶς, Themistius *ad loc.*] μὲν οὖν σκοπουμένοις . . . φυσικῶς δὲ μᾶλλον θεωροῦσιν κ.τ.λ., i.e. looking at the subject (1) in the light of the general formal conceptions which dominate all science, and (2) more concretely, in connexion with its own special proximate principles; cf. *Phys.* viii. 8. 264 a. 7 οἷς μὲν οὖν ἀν τις ὡς οἰκεῖοις λόγοις πιστεύσειν οὗτοι καὶ τοιοῦτοι τινές εἰσιν λογικῶς δὲ ἐπισκοποῦσι κ.τ.λ. It will evidently be one of the most important functions of *παιδεία* to see that each of the two points of view—the formal (*λογικῶς*) and the concrete (*φυσικῶς*)—has its proper place assigned to it in a given enquiry, according as that place is determined by the nature of the ὑποκειμένη ὕλη. On the *πεπαιδευμένος* see the excellent notes of Michelet and Grant, to which I am largely indebted.

[*γένος*] ‘is with Aristotle the object of a single science: *μία* b. 25. *ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνὸς γένοντος* (*An. Post.* i. 28 [87 a. 38]). Cf. the whole of *Met.* ii. 3,’ Grant. See also *Met.* Δ. 6. 1016 a. 26 for the identification of the *γένος* with the *ὕλη*.

[*μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι*] Taken from Plato, b. 26. *Theaet.* 162 E, as Zell and Grant point out—ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδὲ ἡντινοῦν λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, φέτι εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἡ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδὲ ἐνὸς μόνου ἀν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τηλικούτων λεγομένους λόγους. ‘*Ἀποδέχεσθαι* takes the gen. of the person, like ἀκούω, generally, however, with a participle such as λέγοντος, εἰπόντος. See *Liddell and Scott*, s. v.

[*ρήτορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν*] The orator uses ἐνθυμήματα (*Rhet.* b. 27. i. 1. 1355 a. 6) which are arguments ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων (*Rhet.* i. 2. 1357 a. 32).

1095 a. 1. § 5. καθ' ἔκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος] καθ' ἔκαστον must be supplied after ὁ, and κρίνει καλῶς understood from the preceding sentence. Coraes reads in his text ἀγαθὸς κριτής. "Ἐκαστον ἄρα ὁ καθ' ἔκαστον πεπαιδευμένος" ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος, a reading supported by the version of Aretinus, *singula igitur is qui in singulis*. The μέν inserted after καθ' ἔκαστον by Bywater, is given by Mb, rc Ha and pr Kb.

ἀπλῶς] means 'simply,' 'without qualification' (distinguished from κατὰ πρόσθεσιν *E. N.* vii. 4. 3), 'universally.'

a. 2. διὸ . . . περὶ τούτων] Whatever his proficiency in logic, as such, may be, the youth is deficient in the other element of παιδεία, viz. special acquaintance with the material details of moral science, should he pose as a critic or connoisseur of it. The matter of moral science is life, with its circumstances and actions, of which he has as yet no sufficient experience. On account of his ignorance of life he will be likely to regard ethical problems as being more simple than they really are. His ignorance of the moral *ὑλη* will be practically tantamount to a denial of its existence. He will treat Ethics as if it were an abstract science like geometry. He will apply a few hastily assumed and arbitrarily defined principles to circumstances of all kinds. The author of the Sixth Book of the *Nic. Ethics* (ch. 8, §§ 5, 6) remarks that boys may succeed in mathematics, because the abstractions of that science (*τὰ δι' ἀφαιρέσεως*) do not need much experience for their acquirement; but that they do not show prudence, and are unfit students of natural science, because experience produces prudence, and the principles of natural science are not easily apprehended spatial relations, but generalisations, the results of long and careful inductive enquiries. *E. N.* vi. 1142 a. 12 γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τουαῦτα, φρόνιμος δὲ οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἣ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δὲ ἐμπειρος οὐκ ἐστιν πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἐπειὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν πᾶς γένοιτο ἄν, σοφὸς δὲ ἡ φυσικὸς οὐ. ἡ δὲ τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεως ἐστιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τι ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον; As a critic of moral science, then, the youth will demand more elegance and exactness than the *ὑλη* (of which he is ignorant) admits. Geometry will supply him with his conception of what moral science ought to be. Not realising the endless

complexity of every moral and social question, he will admire a system in proportion to the ‘lucidity’ with which it pushes a few ‘clear ideas’ to their logical issues. Cf. in this connexion Mill’s *Logic*, book vi. ch. 8, on the ‘geometrical method’ of reasoning in morals and politics.

ἀκροατής] Michelet says ‘Cum auditore, non cum lectore rem habet Aristoteles. Illa igitur vox luce clarius facit hoc opus Aristotelis, ut pleraque, ex praelectionibus in Lycaeо habitis ortum, ab ipso Aristotele vel etiam a proximis ejus discipulis hunc in ordinem redactum atque editum esse quem hodie servat.’ It seems better to suppose that the *critical function* of the πεπαιδευμένος has suggested the word ἀκροατής, it being customary for Aristotle to think of κρίσις as the function of listeners (in the law courts or elsewhere) who follow a speech intelligently; see *E. N.* vi. 10. 2 ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον, and vi. 10. 3 ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ δὲν ἡ φρόνησις ἔστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς [ἔστιν ἡ σύνεσις]. Cf. *Philemon* apud Meineke *Fragm. Com.* iv. 46 χαλεπόν γ' ἀκροατὴς ἀσύνετος καθήμενος, | ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀνοίᾳ οὐχ ἔαυτὸν μέμφεται.

§ 6. ἔτι . . . πρᾶξις] Not only is the youth too inexperienced in the difficulties of life to appreciate a science attempting to deal with them, but even such knowledge of the principles and rules of conduct as may reach his understanding will be practically useless to him, because he allows his passions rather than his knowledge to determine his actions. This circumstance—that his knowledge will be practically useless to him, is conclusive against the attempt to impart it, the end of the science of life (*πολιτική*) being conduct and not mere knowledge. It is one of the most distinctive points in Aristotle’s ethical teaching—that it is useless to address the understanding (*λόγος*) until the passions (*πάθη*) have been brought into order. So long as a youth is passionately fond of a certain course of conduct, it is vain to tell him that it is *wrong*. He will not understand what you mean; he will only feel that the course of conduct styled wrong is *pleasant*. *Right* and *wrong* have definite meaning only for one who is detached from the sway of his passing passions, and can regard them, and their objects, coolly in relation to life conceived as an organic whole. ‘Affectus, qui passio est, desinit esse passio, simulatque ejus claram et distinctam formamus ideam.’ (Spinoza, *E/h.* v. 3.) When the passions

1095 a. 4. and desires have been *organised*, as it were, by the moral training which the state supplies, *i.e.* when  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$ , or proportion, has been thus effected among them, then the time has come to appeal to the consciousness of this  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$  which has now dawned in the man's mind, and to instruct him in the *rationale* of that conduct to which he has been imperceptibly habituated by influences operating from without upon his sensibility to pleasure and pain. Cf. *E.N.* ii. 3. 2 διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαι πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ ἡ γὰρ ὅρθη παιδεία αὕτη ἔστιν. When he has come to *like*, and *habitually do* what his moral instructors think *right*, then, but not till then, it will be useful to explain to him *how* and *why* it is right. The  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$ , or moral understanding, appealed to by a theory of Ethics, does not come into existence till the desires have been reduced by moral training to  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$ , or order. The youth who acts *κατὰ πάθος*—on the stimulus of present feeling, cannot realise the truths of ethical science, which are recognised as such only by the calm survey of the man in whom the  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$  or moral order is assured. The youth, like the *ἀκρατής*, may possess a precarious  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$ —a fine system of generous aspirations and good intentions, in relation to which moral truths may have some sort of vague meaning for him in his calmer moments; but this  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$ , and the vague  $\gamma\nu\omega\sigma\tau\iota s$  which it renders possible, cannot withstand the assault of *πάθος*: *τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόητος ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν* (§ 7)—‘their knowledge, such as it is, turns out profitless for them.’ The *ἀκρατής* or ‘incontinent man’ knows (after a fashion) that it is wrong to yield to *πάθος*, but nevertheless yields. He possesses a  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$  which opposes itself unsuccessfully to *ἐπιθυμίᾳ* (see *E.N.* i. 13, §§ 15, 16, and vii. 3)—not the  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\sigma$  which amounts to *φρόνησις* (for that resists *ἐπιθυμίᾳ* successfully), but merely the faculty of posing dramatically, as a temperate man, in his intervals of reflection: see *E.N.* vii. 3. 8 τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδεῖξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἵσασι δ' οὕπω δεῖ γὰρ συμφνῆναι, τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου δεῖται· ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὗτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατεομένους.

To sum up—The *νέος* is an incapable student and critic of moral philosophy, because he is unacquainted with the facts, a knowledge of which it presupposes. His ignorance is due (1) to the short time he has lived, (2) to the strength of his passions,

which do not allow him to see even the facts, which he has had 1095 a. 4. opportunities of observing, in their true light—*i.e.* as involving the distinction of *right* and *wrong*, rather than that of *pleasant* and *unpleasant*. He has not yet acquired the faculty by which the truths of moral philosophy can be apprehended, viz. the *λόγος* which neglects the pleasure or pain of the present, and regards the relation in which the pleasant or painful action stands to the whole life. Such knowledge of moral philosophy as the *νέος* acquires is but ear and lip knowledge, of no influence upon his conduct. The moral faculty (*λόγος*) must be evolved as the result of the right ordering of his *δρέξεις* by moral training, before it becomes profitable for him to study the theory of morals. If the end were merely to construct a speculative system, perhaps a youth might be able to appreciate such a system, as he appreciates the elements of geometry; but conduct is the end; and conduct requires knowledge of the perplexities of life, and a settled character directed towards a high ideal.

§ 7. τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς δρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι a. 10. πολυωφελὲς ἀν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι.] To the man of settled moral character a knowledge of the principles of moral philosophy will be very useful, just as a clear and methodical statement of the principles hitherto unconsciously followed is always useful to the artist or enquirer of practical experience. The Logic of a science is of very little use to one beginning the science; but may prove an invaluable guide to the experienced enquirer. A ‘critique’ may be meaningless to one who has not studied the picture or statue carefully for himself: but may become instructive after he has done so. Moral philosophy is useless to one who has no experience of life, and no faculty to discriminate between right and wrong, only a feeling for what is immediately pleasant or painful. Some of the Sophists, Aristotle says, (*E. N.* x. 9. 20), thought that it would be easy to legislate by making a collection of the most approved laws in existence, and selecting the best of them—as if the selection of the best required no judgment—as if the whole difficulty did not lie in judging correctly, as in music all depends upon the musical ear. Similarly (*E. N.* x. 9. 21), medical reports are useless to non-professional readers, but useful to men of professional experience.

The description of the *πεπαιδευμένος* given by Isocrates (*Pana-*

1095 a. 10. *thēnaios* 239), although differing from that given by Aristotle in not involving a technical specialisation of the term, is interesting as bringing into clear light the combination of experience and ethical moderation which Aristotle regards as essential to *παιδεία* in relation to the science of *πολιτική*. Τίνας οὖν καλῶ πεπαιδευμένους, ἐπειδὴ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζω; πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς καλῶς χρωμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἔκαστην προσπίπτουσι, καὶ τὴν δόξαν εὐτυχῆ τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντας καὶ δυναμένην ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ στοχάζεσθαι τοῦ συμφέροντος<sup>6</sup> ἐπειτα τοὺς πρεπόντας καὶ δικαίως ὅμιλούντας τοῖς ἀεὶ πλησιάζοντι, καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀηδίας καὶ βαρύτητας εὐκόλως καὶ ρᾴδιως φέροντας, σφᾶς δ' αὐτοὺς ὡς δυνατὸν ἐλαφροτάτους καὶ μετριωτάτους τοῖς συνοῦσι παρέχοντας· ἔτι τοὺς τῶν μὲν ἡδονῶν ἀεὶ κρατοῦντας, τῶν δὲ συμφορῶν μὴ λίαν ἡττωμένους, ἀλλ' ἀνδρωδῶς ἐν αὐταῖς διακειμένους καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἀξίως ἡς μετέχοντες τυγχάνομεν· τέταρτον, ὅπερ μέγιστον, τοὺς μὴ διαφθειρομένους ὑπὸ τῶν εὐπραγῶν μηδὲ ἔξιστα-μένους αὐτῶν μηδὲ ὑπερηφάνους γιγνομένους ἀλλ' ἐμμένοντας τῇ τάξει τῇ τῶν εὐ φρονούντων, καὶ μὴ μᾶλλον χαίροντας τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρξασιν ἀγαθῶν ἢ τοῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένους. The *πεπαιδευμένος* is thus described by Isocrates as the man of experience and moderation, who knows how to deal with the circumstances of life as they occur. In the *Ethics* the *πεπαιδευμένος* is the *critic* of the science of life. But it is only the man of the world described by Isocrates, who fulfils the conditions, moral and intellectual, which Aristotle regards as essential to *παιδεία* (in his technical sense of the term), when it is engaged in the critical estimation of *πολιτική*. It is only the man of experience and moderation who can know what is meant by right and wrong. As the man of experience and moderation knows how to live, he is also the only competent critic of the science of life. His critical faculty, like his practical judgment, has become an instinct in him. See *E. N.* vi. 11. 6 ὅστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἡττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὅμμα ὀρθῶς.

The ethical and political doctrines of Aristotle are thus, we see, φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσι: hence the difficulty which we, at our distance from the ancient Greek life, experience in the study of them.

## CHAPTER IV.

## ARGUMENT.

*What then is the Chief Good which is the object of our Science? Most people, cultivated and uncultivated, agree as to its name and call it Happiness: but here the agreement ends; for some make Happiness consist in Pleasure, others in Wealth, others in Social Recognition; and often a man's view of it changes with his circumstances, e.g. when he falls sick, he thinks that it is Health, and when he is poor, that it is Wealth. Others again, conscious of their own ignorance, identify it with the Wisdom and Learning which they admire from afar: lastly, it has been held to be Something by Itself, apart from all particular good things, but the cause of their being good. It would take too long to examine all these views: it will be enough to notice those which have the greatest vogue, or most to say for themselves as theories of Life.*

But before we begin an examination of these views, and thereafter attempt to set forth a view of our own, it is important that we should be clear about the method proper to the Science of the Chief Good. Where ought the enquiry to begin? With general principles? or with particular facts? Evidently with something known: but when we say 'known', we may mean either known in the strict acceptation of the term, known for what it is, i.e. known scientifically as a general principle is known; or known from our point of view, i.e. known as a particular fact presented to the senses. It is with the 'known' in the latter acceptation that our present enquiry must begin. This is why it is so important that the student of the science of conduct should bring to his study of the subject a good moral character. Without this, he cannot 'know' the elementary facts with which his study must begin, i.e. cannot understand a teacher who begins by pointing to certain concrete examples of Virtue or Vice, or by quoting certain popular sayings, or by taking for granted that this thing is wrong and that thing right. Indeed this elementary 'knowledge' is so important in itself that it does not matter much if the average man never proceed from it to the knowledge of principles, or of the reason why.

§ 1. πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ προαιρεσίς] 'The original four terms τέχνη, 1095 a.14. μέθοδος, πρᾶξις, προαιρετις are here reduced to two.' Grant.

Γνῶσις has for its object, or 'good,' the reduction of the data of experience to form, law, or theory; προαιρετις aims at the preservation of the moral organism amid the dangers to which it is exposed in its environment.

1095 a. 18. § 2. εὐδαιμονίαν] It is Aristotle's object, in the *Ethics*, to give a new meaning to this accepted term. The popular view regarded 'Happiness' as consisting in the favour of Heaven and Fortune, and in the multitude of a man's possessions. Aristotle shows that it consists, not in what a man *has* or *receives*, but in what he *is* and *does*. It is an active function (*ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*), not a condition of passivity. It is 'noble living'—τὸ εὖ ζῆν in the active sense. Cf. the remarkable fragment of Aristotle preserved by Stobaeus, *Flor.* Γ. 54. vol. i. p. 78, ed. Meineke (assigned by Rose, *Frag. Arist.* 89 to the dialogue *περὶ πλούτου*),—νόμιζε τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἐν τῷ πολλὰ κεκτήσθαι γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τῇ ψυχῇ εὖ διακεῖσθαι· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ σῶμα αὐτὸ τὸ λαμπρᾶ ἐσθῆτι κεκοσμημένον φαίη τις εἶναι μακάριον ἀλλὰ τὸ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἔχον καὶ σπουδαίως διακείμενον, καν̄ μηδὲν τῶν προειρημένων αὐτῷ παρῆ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ψυχὴ ἔαν ἥ πεπαιδευμένη, τὴν τυιάτην καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον εὐδαιμόνα προσαγορευτέον ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀν̄ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἥ λαμπρῶς κεκοσμημένος, αὐτὸς μηδενὸς ἄξιος ὡν̄ οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑππον, καν̄ ψέλια χρυσᾶ καὶ σκευὴν ἔχη πολυτελῆ φαῦλος ὁν̄, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄξιον τινος νομίζομεν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὃς ἀν̄ διακείμενος ἥ σπουδαίως, τοῦτον μᾶλλον ἐπαινοῦμεν. ὕσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις τῶν οἰκετῶν αὐτοῦ χείρων εἴη, καταγέλαστος ἀν̄ γένοιτο, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷς πλείονος ἀξίαν τὴν κτῆσιν εἶναι συμβέβηκε τῆς ἴδιας φύσεως, ἀθλίους τούτους εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν· καὶ τοῦτο κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὕτως ἔχει· τίκτει γάρ, ὕσπερ φησὶν ἥ παροιμία, κόρος μὲν ὑβριν, ἀπαιδευσία δὲ μετ' ἔξουσίας ἄνοιαν· τοῖς γὰρ διακείμενοις τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς, οὔτε πλούτος οὔτε ἵσχυς οὔτε κάλλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ὅσῳ περ ἀν̄ αὗται μᾶλλον αἱ διαθέσεις καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὑπάρξωσι, τοσούτῳ καὶ πλείω καὶ μείζω τὸν κεκτημένον βλάπτουσι, χωρὶς φρονήσεως παραγενόμεναι.

χαρίεντες] 'Cultivated'—synonymous with *τοῖς σοφοῖς* three lines below. Cf. *E. N.* i. 13. 7 τῶν ἱατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες, an expression regarded by Zell as equivalent to τῶν ἱατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφωτέρως τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες, *de Sensu*, i. 436 a. 21. Cf. *de Divinat.* i. 463 a. 4 λέγουσι γοῦν καὶ τῶν ἱατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες ὅτι δεῖ σφόδρα προσέχειν τοῖς ἐνυπνίοις· εὐλογον δὲ οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ τοῖς μὴ τεχνίταις μέν, σκοπουμένοις δέ τι καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. For other references to the use of χαρίεις see *Index Arist.*

a. 19. τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν] 'εὖ πράττειν is an ambiguous phrase. In its usual acceptation it would rather mean "faring-well" than "acting-well." Grant. It is Aristotle's object to give

an active instead of a passive sense to these commonly accepted 1095 a. 19. expressions for the Chief End.

**τί ἔστιν]** *Tis ἔστιν* is the reading of Ob, CCC, NC, adopted by a. 20. Zell, Coraes, Michelet, and Ramsauer. The Paraph. and Aspasius seem to have read *τί ἔστιν*. Eustratius distinguishes between the two readings: *ῶν τὸ μὲν (i.e. tis) τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ (i.e. τί) τοῦ οὐσιώδους λόγου δηλωτικόν*: i.e. *tis ἔστιν* relates to a thing looked at in the concrete with all its material qualities, while *τί ἔστιν* (as=τὸ τί ἦν εἴναι) is the technical expression for the essence (*οὐσία ἀνεν ὑλης*) or form (*εἶδος*), declared in definition (*ὁρισμός, ὅρος, or λόγος*). Michelet argues that *tis* is the better reading here, since Aristotle is about to state, not the definition of *εὐδαιμονία*, but popular opinions regarding it. See the notes of Zell and Michelet. The weight of MS. authority is in favour of *τί*, and *τί* seems to be required to bring out with sufficient sharpness the antithesis between the clauses beginning *ὄντας μὲν οὖν* and *περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας*.

**§ 3. ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν]** Eudemus (*E. E. i. 2. 1214 b. 24*) a. 23. explains the identification of *εὐδαιμονία* with *τιμή, δόξα, πλοῦτος, or παιδεία*, by the fact that these are *conditions* of Happiness, and there is a natural tendency to identify the conditions of the existence of a thing with the thing itself: *ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτ’ αἴτια τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως περὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τί ἔστι, καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων ὃν ἀνεν γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἔνιοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσιν.*

**συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἀγνοιαν]** ‘Conscious of their own ignorance.’ a. 25. They answer to those who make *παιδεία*, ‘superior attainments,’ the *σκοπὸς τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν*, in the list given by Eudemus, i. 2. 1214 b. 8.

**ἕνιοι]** The Platonists, whose view is examined in chapter 6. a. 26. Aristotle formulates the doctrine of ideas in the expression *ἐν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλά (i.e. a single ‘universal substance,’ καθόλου οὐσία, in which the particulars, τὰ πολλά, τὰ αἰσθητά, ‘participate’—μετέχει, but which is nevertheless separate from them—χωριστόν)*. His own view opposed to this doctrine he formulates in the expression *ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν (i.e. that in which the particulars are seen to resemble one another, which is predicated of—κατηγορεῖται κατά—any one of them, as a quality—ποιόν τι—possessed by it.* See *An. Post. i. 11. 77 a. 5* εἴδη μὲν οὖν εἶναι, ἡ ἐν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται εἶναι μέντοι ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ καθόλου, ἄν μὴ τοῦτο ἥ: ἐὰν δὲ τὸ καθόλου μὴ ἥ, τὸ μέσον οὐκ ἔσται, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξις. *Met. Z. 13. 1038 b. 35* φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν

1095 a. 26. τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσίᾳ ἔστι, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῆς κατηγορουμένων τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε.

Spengel (*Aristotelische Studien I. Nic. Eth.* p. 203) conjectures γάρ for δ' after ἔνιοι: ‘Es folgen nämlich die Philosophen, welche etwas von den gewöhnlichen Ansichten weit abgehendes sagen, und dadurch dem Volke imponirten, das waren aber jedenfalls die Idealisten. Aristoteles ist damit in den Gegensatz von den πολλοῖς zu den σοφοῖς übergegangen, und hat zugleich den Platonikern einen Schlag gegeben; ihre Lehre werde von der Masse nur angestaunt, weil sie gar zu frappant und eigenthümlich scheine. Ich halte γάρ für nothwendig.’ Spengel’s γάρ would certainly convey a very pretty ‘hit’ at the Platonists; but I think that δέ is needed to answer to μέν, line 22.

a. 29. § 4. τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον] Views which ‘lie on the surface’ and are therefore popularly accepted, or views which, as ‘involving a theory of some kind,’ are more recondite, and are therefore confined to philosophers. Cf. *Rhet.* iii. 10. 1410 b. 22 ἐπιπόλαια γάρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα καὶ ἀ μηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι, quoted by Zell and Grant. Cf. Aristotle’s *Fragm.* 470. 1555 b. 12 sqq. διὸ καὶ τὰς κώπας αὐτῶν ἐλεφαντίνας ἐποιήσαντο καὶ τῷ μεγέθει περιπτάσ· ὅθεν ἡ Κορκυραία ἐπεπόλασε μάστιξ καὶ εἰς παροιμίαν ἥλθε. The Paraphrast’s note is ἵκανὸν δέ ἔστιν εἰ ἐξετάσομεν τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν πλειόνων νομιζομένας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. The principle of selection laid down here is that of *Toφ.* i. 12. 105 a. 34, referred to by Zell after Mureetus: τὰς μὲν οὖν προτάσεις ἐκλεκτέον, δσαχῶς διωρίσθη περὶ προτάσεως, ἢ τὰς πάντων δόξας προχειριζόμενον ἢ τὰς τῶν πλείστων ἢ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν· καὶ τούτων ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων ἢ τῶν γνωριμωτάτων.

a. 30. § 5.] ‘From hence, to the end of the chapter, follows the second digression on the method of Ethics.’ Grant.

Before beginning the examination, promised in § 4, of the popular views (examined in chap. 5), and of the philosophical views (examined in chap. 6), Aristotle enters upon a παρέκβασις concerning the method of moral science and the previous training which the student of the science must have received. The παρέκβασις seems to suggest itself suddenly in connexion with the mention of τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας δόξας, as distinguished from τὰς δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. The former δόξαι are of inductive origin, based on observation, however onesided, of the circumstances of life; whereas

the latter recommend themselves on *a priori* and abstract grounds. 1005 a. 30. Hence the words *μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς*.

In every enquiry a beginning must be made from what the enquirer ‘knows.’ Cf. *An. Post.* i. 1. 71 a. 1 πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητική ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως. The enquirer’s ‘previous knowledge’ may be either of abstract formulae generally applicable to the explanation of particular cases, or of particular concrete phenomena requiring explanation. Thus in Geometry he starts from the axioms and definitions,—certain abstract principles which are ‘known,’ and proceeds from them to the various more particular truths of the science. In the science of Medicine, on the other hand, the knowledge with which he begins is of symptoms—certain particular concrete phenomena of health and disease, from the observation and comparison of which he proceeds to the discovery of the hitherto unknown general laws of life, on which they depend. Where a few abstract forms of great simplicity, and therefore easily ‘known,’ can be applied to the resolution of particular problems, the enquiry is deductive. Geometry, which makes complex spatial relations plain to the eye by breaking them up into simple spatial relations already ‘known,’ (*Met.* Θ. 9. 1051 a. 21, &c. εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ διαιροῦντες γὰρ εύρισκουσιν· εἰ δ' ἦν διηρημένα φανερὰ ἀν ἦν· νῦν δ' ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει· διὰ τι δύο ὄρθαι τὸ τρίγωνον; δτι αἱ περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι, ἵσαι δύο ὄρθαις· εἰ οὖν ἀνῆκτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν, ἰδόντι ἀν ἦν εὐθὺς δῆλον) is the perfect type of deductive reasoning. But where the enquiry is concerned not with abstract spatial relations, or with the development of mere notions, but with the behaviour of real phenomena in nature, no such simple formulae capable of explaining the phenomena are ‘known’ to the enquirer from the first. The concrete phenomena themselves are ‘known,’ and the formulae have to be abstracted from them. The falling of bodies to the earth, the swinging of the pendulum, the tides, the orbit of the moon, and the orbits of the planets, had all been separately ‘known’ before Newton evolved the great generalisation which explains them. An enquiry concerned with the behaviour of real phenomena in nature is (in its earlier stages at least) inductive.

Having alluded to the distinction between Deduction and Induction, and indicated, by the expressions *γνώριμα ἀπλῶς* and *γνώριμα ἡμῖν* (of which more hereafter), the ground on which the

1095 a. 30. one or the other of these two methods is adopted in a given enquiry, Aristotle asserts that moral science must be prosecuted on the inductive method, because particular cases of conduct are at first 'better known' to the enquirer than the general principles of conduct which give them significance. These particular cases, however, which must be known to begin with by the student of morals, will be entirely beyond the experience of one who has not been habituated to perform right actions and avoid wrong actions, and therefore has no stable moral character. Moral science assumes that the student has learnt practically to discriminate in his conduct between right and wrong actions, or, to use the technical language of the present passage, that he 'knows' that such and such actions are right, and such and such others are wrong; it then proceeds to show him *how* and *why* they are right and wrong—*i.e.* to discover their law. But the man of unstable moral character does not 'know' that such and such actions are right or wrong, because these terms have no meaning except in relation to a definite system of life, and his life is conducted on no system, but is obnoxious to the temptation of the passing moment. The present *παρέκβασις*, then, in which it is thus stated that the method of Ethics is observational and inductive, prepares us for the use which Aristotle afterwards (*E. N.* i. 8) makes of the popular views, which embody at least a certain amount of true observation, and explains the contempt with which he treats the *à priori* system of the Platonists.

a. 31. οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι] Deduction, *συλλογισμός*, *E. N.* vi. 3. 3  
οἱ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου.

οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς] Induction, *ἐπαγωγή*, *Τορ.* i. 10. 105 a. 13  
*ἐπαγωγὴ* δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθέκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος.

a. 32. ὁ Πλάτων] Bekker and Sus., following L<sup>b</sup>, omit ὁ. Bywater, following K<sup>b</sup>, M<sup>b</sup>, Cambr., restores it to the text. Grant, omitting ὁ, remarks that 'the use of the word *Πλάτων* here, without the article, shows that a personal reference to the philosopher is intended': see also Grant's note on vi. 13. 3, where it is remarked that Aristotle uses the article when he speaks of characters in books (*e.g.* of the Socrates of Plato's Dialogues), but gives the names of real persons without the article, except in cases of renewed mention. But, as Plato is not a character in a book, like ὁ Σωκράτης, but always a real person, it is difficult to see what we gain by being told here 'that a personal reference to the philo-

sopher is intended.' Grant continues, 'The use of the imperfect 1005 a. 32. ἡπόρει shows that the reference is *general*; when Aristotle quotes from a particular passage in the *Laws* (653 A) of Plato (*Eth.* ii. 3. 2) he says ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν.' It will be observed that in ii. 3. 2 the article appears in apparently all MSS., and yet the reference to Plato as the writer of a particular passage is as much 'a personal reference to the philosopher' as the 'general reference' to him in the present section. It seems to me to be unsafe to attach importance to the presence or absence of the article before Πλάτων here or elsewhere, more especially where, as here, the MSS. are divided. Σωκράτης, of course, is in an entirely different position. As regards the reference in ἡπόρει being 'general,' not (as Michelet and Heylbut, *Asp.* p. 9, suppose) to the passage on the dialectical method at the end of *Rep.* vi. 510 sqq., I think that this may very well be so. Muretus, failing to find any discussion of the ἀπορία in the writings of Plato, suggests that the reference is to his ἔγραφα δόγματα.

ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων] Cf. *An. Post.* i. 1. 71 a. 1 b. 2. πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως: *Top.* vi. 4. 141 a. 28 γνωρίζομεν δ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων . . . οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ μάθησις ἔχει.

ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς] 'Απλῶς attached to a term indicates that the term is to be taken in its *strict sense*: cf. the ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής of *E. N.* vii. 4. Γνώριμα ἀπλῶς, then, are objects which are *known* (*notā* not *scibilia*: see the notes of Zell and Michelet), in the strict sense of the term *known*. According to Aristotle the pure form (*εἶδος*, *οὐσία* ἀνεν *ὑλῆς*) is known in the strict sense of 'known.' Where the form is with difficulty recognised, or not at all, on account of its implication with *ὑλή* in a *σύνολον*, or concrete material object, there is *knowledge* only in a secondary and qualified acceptation of the term. This inferior kind of knowledge, however, is given in experience before 'knowledge' strictly so called. Concrete objects of sense are *πρότερα πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, or *γνωριμώτερα ἡμῖν*, while the *εἶδη* are *πρότερα φύσει* or *γνωριμώτερα φύσει*, *i. e.* although not first known by us in the *order of time*, the *εἶδη* are *logically* first, inasmuch as the knowledge of them is necessary to the right understanding of the material objects in which they are embodied; and they are 'naturally better known,'

1095 b. 2, because knowledge realises its true ‘nature,’ or reaches its goal, when it apprehends the *εἶδος* without admixture of matter. Cf. the use of *φύσει* in the statement, *Pol.* i. 1. 1253 a. 19 πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἡ οἰκία καὶ ἔκαστος ἡμῶν τὸ γάρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους—i.e. although the family existed before the *πόλις* was evolved by the *συνοικισμός* of *κῶμαι*, yet the *πόλις* is the goal towards which the *φύσις* of man tends from the very first; he is *φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον*, and we cannot properly understand him in his earlier phases, unless we keep in view the final goal of his *φύσις*. Man moves towards the *πόλις*, in which individualism gives place to the consciousness of social relations, as the whole natural world moves towards the perfect form of the *πρώτον κινοῦν*, attracted, as it were, by its beauty. See *Met.* A. 7. 1072 a. 24 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν μέσον [see Bonitz *Met.* ad loc. on the text], ἔστι τοίνυν τι ὁ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσίᾳ καὶ ἐνέργειᾳ οὖσα. κινεῖ δὲ ὡδεῖ τὸ ὄρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον . . . 1072 b. 3 κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον. Similarly, knowledge advances from the confused data of the senses to the clear perception of relation or form. Form is the goal of knowledge, and is therefore *φύσει γνώριμον*. It is the ἀπλῶς *γνώριμον*, that which is known in the true sense of ‘known.’ See *An. Post.* i. 2. 71 b. 33 πρότερα δ’ ἔστι καὶ γνωριμώτερα διχῶς. οὐ γάρ ταῦτὸν πρότερον τῇ φύσει καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον, καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον λέγω δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἀπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ πορρώτερον. ἔστι δὲ πορρωτάτῳ μὲν τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα ἐγγυτάτῳ δὲ τὰ καθ’ ἔκαστα, καὶ ἀντίκειται ταῦτ’ ἀλλήλοις. ‘Quamvis,’ says Michelet, p. 21, ‘cognitio rerum sensibilium sit facilior nobis et primi ad eam feramur, vulgusque ipsum ea non careat (*Met.* i. 2): tamen minus scientiae et veritatis in rebus sensibilibus inest, et tum demum scire putamur, si universalia, difficillima cognitu et a sensibus remotissima, perceperimus; quo fit, ut principiorum, quippe quae non ἡμῖν γνωριμώτata sint, etsi ἀπλῶς ἡ φύσει γνωριμώτata, admodum pauci, ii nempe, qui divinam quaerunt beatitudinem, i.e. sapientes participes fiant. Principia vero ideo γνωριμώτερa sunt, quod ipsius animi naturam efficiunt, singularium autem rerum cognitio ex fortuitis uniuscujusque perceptionibus pendet . . . p. 22, Attamen si semper singularia nobis essent notiora, semper in scientiis ab singularibus ad principia ascendere deberemus; et Aristoteles prorsus, ut putant, esset empiricus qui analytica sola utatur methodo (i.e. induction). Sed

hoc loco Paraphrastes et Eustratius recte scientias distinguunt. 1095 b. 2. Sunt enim scientiae in quibus, naturali rerum ordine servato (*i.e.* the order of our knowledge is, as it were, that of φύσις), ἀπλῶς γνώριμα et nobis sunt γνωριμώτερα, ita ut ex causis (*aἰτίων*) utpote plus perspicuitatis habentibus ad effectus (*αἴτια*) digrediamur; ex gr. in mathematica et metaphysica, in quibus hanc ob causam a principiis et universalibus ad reliqua descendendum est. In quibusdam vero aliis scientiis effectus manifestiores nobis quam ipsae causae apparent, ubi, naturali rerum ordine mutato, nobis notiora non simpliciter sunt notiora. Quamobrem hisce in scientiis viam alteram ingredi oportet, non ex principiis, sed ad principia.' The difficulty of this ascent from the particular to the universal, from the effect to the cause, from the concrete to the abstract, from the matter to the form, is noticed in an interesting passage in *Met.* Z. 4. 1029 b. 4, sqq., where it is said that, as in moral education, the problem is to make that which is really or 'naturally' good also good for the individual, so in science, the problem is to make that which is really or 'naturally' known or true, also known or true for the individual student: ή γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἥπτον γνωρίμων φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον· καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἔστιν, ὡσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν, τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἐκάστῳ ἀγαθά, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῷ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριμα. The 'ordinary way of knowledge' from the concrete effects to the general law is described in *Top.* vi. 4. 141 b. 5, sqq., and illustrated by the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of the στιγμή, or mathematical point. The solid is more evident to the senses than the plane, the plane than the line, and the line than the point. This is the order of our knowledge, but the order of natural production is in the opposite direction. The motion of the point generates the line, of the line the plane, of the plane the solid. The point is φύσει πρότερον to the line, plane, and solid; but the solid is πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον, *i.e.* more obvious to our senses. Τὸ φύσει πρότερον is the source from which the sensible particulars flow, as it were, and, though last to be known by us, is the first principle of natural generation. We can gather from Aristotle's theory of Definition διὰ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων, or *à priori*, which is stated in *Top.* vi. 4, as well as from his theory of ἀπόδειξις, that he found it more difficult than we do now to distinguish between a principle of actual generation, and a principle of clear explanation. He concludes the passage in the *Topics* (vi. 4) with the words

1095 b. 2. (141 b. 15) ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῶν προτέρων (*i.e.* φύσει πρ.) τὰ ὕστερα πειρᾶσθαι γνωρίζειν· ἐπιστημονικώτερον γάρ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἔστι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδυνατοῦντας γνωρίζειν διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἵστως διὰ τῶν ἐκείνοις γνωρίμων ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον . . . 142 a. 9 ἵστως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς γνώριμον οὐ τὸ πᾶσι γνωρίμον ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῖς εὖ διακειμένοις τὴν διάνοιαν. Cf. *E. N.* vii. 3. 13, 14, where the *καθόλου* is distinguished as *ἐπιστημονικόν* from the *ἔσχατος ὅρος* of sensation.

Our knowledge of concrete objects, then, coming before our knowledge of the forms or general laws which they realise, the method of all the concrete or natural sciences will be (at least in the earlier stages) observational and inductive: see *Phys.* i. 1. 184 a. 16 πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμώτερων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γάρ ταῦτα ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἀπλῶς διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει, ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων, ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δὲ ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα. But in mathematics the case is different. Here there are no concrete objects, in which the *εἶδος* is obscured by the *ὑλη*, and has to be abstracted from it by a toilsome process of comparison and generalisation. The objects are *εἶδη* pure and simple, or abstractions—τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, *ab initio*; and among these abstractions the simplest and most easily ‘known’ are those of the widest application. The axioms and definitions are more easily ‘known,’ than the particular properties of the various figures which are shown to involve these axioms and definitions; hence the method of mathematics will be deductive. This does not, of course, affect the truth of the position (on which Aristotle is quite explicit: see *An. Post.* i. 18) that our knowledge of mathematical, as of all other *ἀρχαί*, is derived from the materials presented in sense-experience. The experience, however, required for the acquisition of mathematical principles is much *slenderer* than that necessary for the attainment of the principles of a concrete science like medicine or politics. In other words—where we deal with diagrammatically representable relations of space we can begin the deductive method almost at once; where we deal with concrete phenomena, the deductive stage, if reached at all, must be preceded by a long period of inductive enquiry. *Noûs*—the faculty of specially attending to that which is common in a multitude of sense-presentations, and of abstracting it as a point of view—perceives the form in the

matter supplied by induction, easily, or with difficulty, according to 1095 b. 2. the nature of the matter. Spatial forms are easily abstracted, but ‘kinds’ or ‘metaphysical notions’ with difficulty; and when abstracted ‘kinds’ and ‘notions’ are not the lucid principles of deduction that spatial forms are, because their application is not diagrammatic, but to concrete phenomena. On τὰ φύσει γνωρίμωτερα and τὰ ἡμῖν γν. see Michelet’s note *ad loc.*, Trendelenburg’s *Elementa Logices Aristoteleae*, § 19, and his *De Anima* ii. 2, § 1, note.

ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων] ‘Perhaps then b. 3. we at all events must commence with what we know? Aristotle was probably unconscious of the sort of pun in this sentence. He merely asserts that *we* (*i. e.* ethical philosophers) must start from a basis of personal experience.’ (Grant.) The gist of the present παρέκβασις may be given as follows. Εὐδαιμονία is the ἀρχή, or first principle of human life. Are we in possession of the knowledge of this ἀρχή *ab initio*, as we are in possession of the principles of geometry, and will moral science consist merely in the deductive application of it to explain the details of conduct; or will the science not rather consist mainly in the attempt to abstract this ἀρχή from the ὥλη of our particular experience, *i. e.* to *find* it? Aristotle, as Eustratius and the Paraphrast (the latter with a certain qualification) interpret the present passage, decides here in favour of the second alternative. How far he is true to his decision we shall see. The Paraphrast’s words are—ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος (ἀρχὴ γάρ καὶ αἵτια ἔστι τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων δι’ ἐκεῖνο γάρ τι πράττομεν) ζητητέον, πῶς δεῖ ποιήσασθαι τὸν περὶ αὐτῆς λόγον· ἔχει γάρ διαφοράν καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν μικρὸν διαληφόμεθα· τῶν γάρ αἵτιων τὸ μὲν τελικόν ἔστι τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν τὸ δὲ ὑλικὸν τὸ δὲ ποιητικὸν καὶ ποιητικὸν μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ τεχνίτου· ὑλικὸν δὲ τὰ ἔνδιλα καὶ οἱ λίθοι ἐξ ὧν ἡ οἰκία. εἰδικὸν δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας· τελικὸν δὲ δι’ ὃ ἡ οἰκία γέγονεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα αἵτια εἰσὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τοῦ εἶναι, αἵτια εἰσὶ καὶ τῆς γνώσεως αὐτῶν καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν δύνανται ἐκεῖνα γινώσκεσθαι. ἔαν γάρ τις εἰδῆ τὴν τέχνην τοῦ τεχνίτου καθ’ ἣν τὴν οἰκίαν ἐδημιούργησεν, εἴσεται τὴν οἰκίαν ἡ ἀγαθὴν ἡ φαύλην, ὅσον τῇ τέχνῃ προσῆκε. καὶ ὁ τὴν ὑλην εἰδὼς καὶ ὁ τὸ εἶδος ὄμοίως. πάλιν δὲ γινώσκοντες τί τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς εἰσόμεθα ἡ ἀγαθὴν ἡ φαύλην. Συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀνάπταλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τὰς αἵτιας γινώσκειν ὁ γάρ εἰδὼς τὴν οἰκίαν, [v. l. αἵτιαν] τὴν τέχνην εἴσεται τοῦ τεχνίτου, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὄμοίως. ὅπτε τοὺς λόγους διχῶς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι· ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποτελέσματα· εσμάτων τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποδεικνύναι, ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰ ἀποτελέσματα·

1095 b. 3. χρήσομεθα δὲ ἔκατέρᾳ τῶν μεθόδων κατὰ καιρόν. [This is the qualification, alluded to above, with which the Paraphrast seems to accept the present passage as pledging Aristotle to an inductive method in Ethics.] καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀποδείξομεν ὅταν αὐταὶ δῆλαι ὁσιν<sup>·</sup> τὸ δ'  
ἀνάπαλιν, ὅταν τὰ ἀποτελέσματα φανερώτερα ἥ. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ Πλάτων  
καλῶς ἔζητε τοῦτο καὶ ἡπόρει, ὡς οὐκ ἀδιάφορον ὅν ἐπὶ παντός, πότερον ἀπὸ<sup>·</sup>  
τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ προσήκουσα τῆς ἀποδείξεως ὄδος, ἥ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς<sup>·</sup> ὕσπερ ἐν  
σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἥ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν. διτῆς οὖν οὕσης  
τῆς ὄδοῦ, πόθεν ἡμῖν ἀρκτέον; ἥ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων  
δηλονότι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων, ὃν ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον τὸ πολιτικὸν τέλος  
ἐστί; δεῖ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἀρέσασθαι, οὐ τῇ φύσει, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν. Φύσει  
μὲν γὰρ γνώριμα λέγονται αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια<sup>·</sup> ἐκεῖνα γὰρ ἡ φύσις  
πρότερα παρίστησι, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πρώτως ὅρᾳ<sup>·</sup> ἡμῖν δὲ τὰ ἀποτελέσματα  
γνώριμα<sup>·</sup> ὅθεν ἀρκτέον<sup>·</sup> οὕτω γὰρ σαφῆς ἔσται ὁ λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν  
γνωρίμων γινομένος. Eustatius explains as follows—ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἀρχὴ<sup>·</sup>  
μὲν τελικὴ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τέλος ἄγονται αἱ κατὰ τὰς  
ἀρετὰς εἰσι πράξεις, αὗται δὲ ὑστεραὶ μὲν τῇ φύσει ὡς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας  
αἴτιαται, ἡμῖν δὲ σαφέστεραι καὶ γνωριμώτεραι, ἐκ τούτων ἡμῖν ἀρκτέον καὶ  
ἀντέον δὶ αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ αἴτιον—i. e. εὐδαιμονία is the Final Cause of  
Life. The various ἀρεταὶ are naturally subsequent to it, as being  
its effects—i. e. as being what they are in virtue of it, just as the  
hand is a hand in virtue of the body; but they are more evident  
to us than it is—i. e. we learn (under the influence of moral training)  
to discriminate practically, or in our habitual conduct, between  
good and bad actions, before we can form a notion of life as  
a great whole, and understand why and how they are good and  
bad; accordingly, we must begin our study of moral science with  
this merely empirical ‘knowledge of the ἀρεταὶ,’ and rise from it  
to the knowledge of their cause, εὐδαιμονία.

b. 4. §§ 6, 7. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἥχθαι καλῶς . . . τοῦ διότι.] The con-  
nexions here may be exhibited as follows. Moral science must begin  
with moral facts—with particular moral actions. The student of  
moral science must be able to see for himself that a particular act is  
good or bad. (Ἀρχὴ τὸ διότι . . . ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων). It will be  
useless to tell him that such and such an act is good or bad; he  
must have a tendency to think it good or bad. He cannot manifest  
this tendency unless he has often performed, or abstained from  
performing, the act in question—i. e. unless he has acquired a  
*habit* in relation to it. When he has once acquired good habits,

he may derive profit from the study of moral science; for then 1095 b. 4. he knows what it is about—he then realises what is meant by calling such and such actions good or bad. Habit makes him think a/certain act good: moral science explains to him why it is so. Thus *ἀρχή* here means ‘what we start with’—the particular in this case: whereas *ἀρχάς* in the next sentence (§ 7) is to be understood in the technical sense of ‘universal principles’ (see Grant *ad loc.*). At the same time we cannot help seeing that in using *ἀρχή* popularly, Aristotle is not uninfluenced by the associations connected with its technical meaning. The perception that a particular act is good or bad, which is an *ἀρχή*, in the sense of being simply the beginning of the study of moral science, itself involves a universal principle. The universal principle is the tendency to regard the act as good or bad, derived from the habit of performing it or avoiding it. The habits are thus ethical *ἀρχαῖ*, or first principles, or, at least, *media axiomata* under the supreme *ἀρχή*—*εὐδαιμονία*. Without the habits, the moral perceptions have no existence. Accordingly we cannot be said to start from the moral perception in the popular sense of ‘starting’ (*ἀρκτέον, ἀρχή*), unless we have already a habit which is a ‘starting-point’ in the technical sense as being a general principle. This seems to be the implication of the passage before us; and our interpretation of it is borne out by passages elsewhere in which habit is actually described as a sort of universal, viz. *E. N.* vi. 11. 4 *ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα* (*i.e.* the habitual motive or aim), *αὗται* (*i.e.* particular acts)· *ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου*—where *καθόλου* describes the habit which has been acquired by repetition of particular acts: and again *E. N.* i. 7. 20 *τῶν ἀρχῶν δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δὲ αἰσθῆσει, αἱ δὲ ἐθισμῷ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ ἄλλως*—‘we perceive our starting-point, sometimes by induction, sometimes by simple sensation, sometimes by habituation. . .’—where *ἐθισμός* is presented as a sort of ‘moral induction,’ which puts us in possession of ‘moral principles,’ just as scientific induction gives us the principles of deduction.

There is no moral *ὅτι*, then, unless there are good habits. We begin our ethical studies with the *ὅτι* (*ἀρχὴ τὸ ὅτι*); but we should not perceive the *ὅτι* at all, unless we possessed the *ἀρχή* of habit. Our perception of the *ὅτι* is thus a sort of deduction from the principle of habit. So far as the conduct of ordinary men is concerned, the perception of the *ὅτι* supersedes the necessity of the knowledge

1095 b. 4. of the *διότι*—*i.e.* the fact that they perceive a certain act to be good (it being really good: this the *νομοθέτης* has seen to), implies that they are so habitually disposed towards it, that, from a practical point of view, speculative reasons, proving that it is good, may be dispensed with. Ordinary men, who act virtuously from habit, do not need to know, and perhaps could not understand, *why* they ought so to act. Their *Habit*, with the accompanying *Opinion* that the things habitually done are good, is a sufficient substitute for the *why*, *ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις*. The *νομοθέτης*, however, who is the author of the habit, must possess the *why*—he must know why certain acts are good. In his case, at least, it cannot be said, that the *ὅτι* is enough without the *διότι*. He must be able to show how the law of the habit (which is merely ‘empirical’ to the ordinary citizen) can be ‘derived from’ the Supreme Law (*τὸ διότι*) of Human Nature—*εὐδαιμονία*.

So much for the meaning which the immediate context undoubtedly gives to the present passage. But we must remember that *ὅτι* (as distinguished from *διότι*) has a special application, which could not fail to make itself felt to Aristotle’s mind here. *Tὸ ὅτι* is that which is accepted without *ἀπόδειξις*: it is *τὸ ἀναπόδεικτον*. Hence it is a term specially applicable to the *ἀρχαὶ* or universal principles of *ἀπόδειξις*, which of course would not be *ἀρχαὶ* if they admitted of deductive proof—*i.e.* if they could be explained by means of a *διότι*. Thus we find *E.N.* i. 7. 20. 1098 a. 33 *οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ’ οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἀπασιν ὄμοιως, ἀλλ’ ἵκανὸν ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς τὸ δ’ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή*. Accordingly, the words before us—*ἀρχή γὰρ τὸ ὅτι καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδέήσει τοῦ διότι*—if abstracted for a moment from their context<sup>1</sup>, mean that *ἀπόδειξις* must start from an *ἀρχή ἀναπόδεικτος*; and that, if this *ἀρχή* is self-evident, it is unnecessary to attempt to make it more evident by trying to find some higher *ἀρχή* (*διότι*), which may explain it. The Paraphrast actually speaks of the *ὅτι* of the present passage as *ἀρχὴ ἀποδείξεως*. He says—*εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀπεδείκνυμεν τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις ἀγαθὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὸν μὴ πεπαιδευμένον ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐπειθομεν ἄν, λόγων ἀνάγκη δήσαντες ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τὴν ἀρχὴν βουλόμεθα ἀποδεικνύναι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων δηλονότι, καὶ δεῖ ὑποκείσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν καθάπερ ἀρχὴν ἀποδείξεως ὅτι ἀγαθαῖ*,

<sup>1</sup> The passage would run very well with the clause *ἀρχή . . . διότι* omitted.

φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ δύναται πεισθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ὁ πείρᾳ καλὰς καὶ δικαίας τὰς 1095 b. 4 τοιαύτας πράξεις εἰδῶς.

ὅ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἡ λάβοι ἀν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως] ‘i.e. ὁ καλῶς ἡγμένος. b. 7. Such a one is in possession of moral facts, which either stand already in the light of principles, or can be at once recognised as such on the suggestion of the Philosophers.’ Grant. The Paraphrast’s comment is—εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι ἀγαθὰ αἱ πράξεις ἀρκούντως δέξαιτο τις οὐδὲν δεησόμεθα τοῦ διότι· Τὴν δὲ αἰτίαν, τὸ τέλος δηλονότι, ἡ γινώσκει ἥδη, ἡ ἀκούσας ῥᾳδίως γνώσεται· ὃς δὲ οὐδὲ ἔτερον ἔχει τούτων, καὶ μήτε αὐτὸς γινώσκει, μήτε παρ’ ἔτερων δύναται μανθάνειν, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου: Stahr’s note (*Aristoteles’ Nic. Eth. übersetzt und erläutert*) on this passage is good: ‘Aristoteles will also dass die *Erkenntniss der Prinzipien* der Sittlichkeit beim Menschen hervorgehe aus der *thatsächlichen Erfüllung* der Sittlichen *Pflichten*.’

μηδέτερον] neither ἔχει, ποτ λάβοι ἀν ἀρχάς.

b. 8.

οὗτος μὲν κ.τ.λ.] Hesiod, *ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι* 291–295. The sentiment expressed in these verses became proverbial, and reappears frequently in literature: see the notes of Magirus, Zell, Coraes, Michelet and Grant, who refer to Herod. vii. 16, Soph. *Antig.* 720, Livy xxii. 29, Cic. *Pro Caelio* 31. The words of Sophocles are—

φήμ’ ἔγωγε πρεσβεύειν πολύ,  
φῦναι τὸν ἄνδρα πάντ’ ἐπιστήμης πλέων·  
εἰ δὲ οὖν, φιλεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο μὴ ταύτη ρέπειν,  
καὶ τῶν λεγόντων εὖ καλὸν τὸ μανθάνειν.

and Livy’s words are—‘Saepe ego (i.e. Minutius addressing the soldiers) audivi, milites, eum primum esse virum qui ipse consulat, quid in rem sit, secundum eum qui bene monenti obediatur: qui vero nec ipse consulere nec alteri parere sciatur, eum extremi ingenii esse.’

## CHAPTER V.

## ARGUMENT.

*It is quite natural that men's views about the Chief Good, or Happiness, should be determined by the manner of their lives. There are three prominent lives, and, corresponding to them, three leading views about Happiness.*

(1) *The life of sensual enjoyment.* The votaries of this life make Happiness Pleasure. This view has received more attention than it deserves, because the life of which it is the theory—the life of a brute beast—is that led by many persons of high station.

(2) *The life of the man of affairs.* He makes Social Success the Chief Good. But Social Success is too superficial a thing to be the Chief Good. It has its being rather in the applause of others than in the nature of the man himself; whereas the Chief Good must surely be something in a man—something which is his own, and not easily to be taken away from him. Moreover, those who seek the applause of their fellow citizens, seek it that they may have the satisfaction of believing in their own Goodness. Thus they put Goodness above applause. But even Goodness falls short of being the Chief End, for a man may ‘have Goodness’ and yet spend his whole life without doing anything worth doing—nay, may be involved in the greatest misfortunes, notwithstanding his Goodness: and it would be paradoxical to call such a man ‘Happy.’

(3) *The life of the thinker.* This we shall examine afterwards.

*As for the life of money-making, it is contrary to nature. Its end, money, is obviously but a means, unnaturally converted into an end. Although the same is true of the other ends examined above, it is not so obviously true.*

1095 b.14. § 1. ήμεις . . . υπολαμβάνειν] Let us return from this digression and examine men's *υπολήψεις* concerning the chief good, for (*γάρ*) these *υπολήψεις* are worth examination, being derived, as is only natural, from their own experience of life (*οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων υπολαμβάνειν*). Incorrect as these *υπολήψεις* are, they are not without a certain foundation in experience, and will embody part of the truth which we are in search of. They place happiness in the satisfaction of one side of human nature; a review of them will bring to light how many sides human nature has, and will enable us to fill in the details of our own theory of life, which, stated in outline, is that all the sides of human nature ought to be duly satisfied under the synoptic eye of *νοῦς*. The subject of *ἐοίκασιν* is *οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ* in § 2, and *οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες* in § 4, the words *διό* § 2 . . . *Σαρδαναπάλλω* § 3, being parenthetical. Peters does not bring out the force of *οὐκ ἀλόγως* correctly; he translates—‘As to men's notions of the good or happiness, it seems (to judge, as we reasonably may from their lives) that the masses, who are the least

refined, hold it to be pleasure.' Οὐκ ἀλόγως relates not to *our 1095 b.14.* *inference*, but to the *derivation of ὑπολήψεις from βίοι by those who live the βίοι*; the ὑπολήψεις so derived are pronounced 'natural' or 'not unreasonable.' Williams falls into the same error as Peters; he translates—'the many and baser sort give by their lives a fair presumption that their conception of the chief good and of happiness is that it consists in material pleasure.' Stahr is right—'Wir kehren jetzt zu dem Gegenstande zurück, wovon wir abgeschweift sind. Es scheint mir nämlich, dass die Menschen nicht ohne eine gewisse Berechtigung ihre Ansichten über das was gut und was Glückseligkeit sei, nach ihren verschiedenen Lebensarten bilden.' So Lambinus—'Sane vero summum bonum et beatitudinem non sine ratione ex variis vitae generibus existimare videntur.' The Paraphrast takes too narrow a view of the scope of the clause *τὸ γάρ ἀγαθὸν . . . ὑπολαμβάνειν*, when he understands it merely to give a reason why men's views of the chief good vary so much—viz. because their lines of life (*βίοι*) vary—ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν δθεν παρεξέβημεν. ήν δὲ ήμιν ὁ λόγος περὶ τοῦ ὅτι διαφόρους οἱ ἄνθρωποι περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἔχουσι δόξας. ἔκαστος τοίνυν ἀκολούθως τῷ οἰκείῳ βίῳ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δρίζεται. This takes no account of οὐκ ἀλόγως, which prepares us for the importance which is attached below in chapter 8 to the ὑπολήψεις of the various classes of men.

§ 2. διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι] 'Αγαπᾶσι means that they acquiesce b. 17. in, or look no higher than; καὶ means that their life is in accordance with their theory, or ὑπόληψις.

**τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι κ.τ.λ.]** In the ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος a man sacrifices the λόγος, or harmony of his nature as a whole, to the ἐπιθυμητικὸν μέρος—to his desire for pleasure; in the πολιτικὸς βίος (as the term πολιτικός is used here) he sacrifices it to the θυμοειδὲς μέρος—to ambition, or love of social success, and the applause of others; but in the θεωρητικὸς βίος human nature is not treated as a means, but reverenced as an end. To be reverenced as an end it must be seen *sub specie aeternitatis* as divine, and this involves θεωρία. Hence human nature cannot be maintained as a λόγος in the πρακτικὸς βίος, except by one who has the σκοπός (see vi. 1. §§ 1, 2, 3, notes) which θεωρία gives. To have this σκοπός, it is not indeed necessary to be oneself a 'philosopher' or 'thinker,' or actually to lead the separate θεωρητικὸς βίος strictly so called; but it is necessary to live in a city which has 'thinkers,' and is regulated for the sake

1095 b. 17. of them. In such a city *θεωρία*, which appears in the professed ‘philosophers’ or ‘thinkers’ as the clear consciousness of speculative truth, manifests itself in the men of affairs as a spirit whereby they are enabled to detach themselves somewhat from the influence of merely personal pleasures and ambitions—‘material grounds of action,’ and take a ‘formal,’ ‘theoretic’ view of life, comprehending it in its *μέγεθος καὶ τάξις* as a system of *καλαὶ πράξεις*. This is the spirit of the ‘true politician,’ as described by Eudemus—*E. E.* i. 5. 1216 a. 23 οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γάρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἔστι πράξεων προαιρετικὸς αὐτῶν χάριν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἔνεκεν ἅπτονται τοῦ ζῆν οὔτως. The ‘true’ πολιτικὸς *βίος* is thus, in a sense, a *θεωρητικὸς βίος*, even in the case of the man of affairs who is not a professed philosopher or thinker. More literally, of course, it is a *θεωρητικὸς βίος* in the case of the man of affairs who not only lives in a city which exists for the sake of ‘philosophers’ or ‘thinkers,’ but is himself also a ‘thinker’ in the strict sense, and enjoys moments of inward philosophical *σχολή* in the course of his ‘political’ career. It is not necessary to be a professed ‘philosopher’ or ‘thinker,’ and to abstain from active participation in affairs in order to lead the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*. Perhaps the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* is most successfully realised, not as a separate life, but as the *form* of the πολιτικὸς *βίος*.

The three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (*Rep.* 581)—τὸ φιλοκερδὲς γένος, τὸ φιλόνεικον καὶ φιλότιμον, and τὸ φιλόσοφον, in the first of which *ἐπιθυμία* has the mastery, in the second *θυμός*, in the third λόγος. These three types of individual character are exemplified on a large scale in *πολιτεῖαι* (*Rep.* 544, sqq.). In *ἀριστοκρατίᾳ* there is *όμόνοια*, ‘one mind’ extending throughout the whole body politic: all classes cheerfully conspire to maintain the good of the state, each performing its own function under λόγος or ‘the constitution.’ In *τιμοκρατίᾳ* order and discipline are confined to one class—the military class, representing *θυμός*, or the pushing self-asserting principle in human nature. In *δλιγαρχίᾳ* the principle of *ἐπιθυμία*, represented by a wealthy clique, takes the place of *θυμός*, and for a time, by adopting the maxim of ‘cool self-regard,’ manages to ward off anarchy. Finally, in *δημοκρατίᾳ* anarchy prevails, every individual doing what pleases him best at the time—till the *τύραννος*, representing the supremacy of some one *ἐπιθυμίᾳ* in

the individual character, puts an end to the licence of the many, 1095 b. 17. that the licence of one—the worst anarchy—may reign. So, in the ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος some tyrant ἐπιθυμία may determine conduct, or many ἐπιθυμίαι may have their turns; in the πολιτικὸς βίος ambition is the master-passion, and keeps order to a certain extent, but not in the interest of the whole man, only in its own interest; while in the θεωρητικὸς βίος all the functions of man's nature are exercised duly.

Michelet and Grant point out that this three-fold division occurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heraclides Ponticus (apud Cic. *Tusc.* v. 3), in which life is compared to the concourse at Olympia—some come to contend for prizes, some to buy and sell, some—the noblest sort—to look on as spectators: '[Pythagoran] ut scribit auditor Platonis Ponticus Heracleides vir doctus in primis, Phliuntem ferunt venisse; cumque Leonte principe Phliasiorum, docte et copiose disseruisse quaedam; cuius ingenium et eloquentiam cum admiratus esset Leon, quaevisisse ex eo, qua maxime arte confideret: at illum, artem quidem se scire nullam, sed esse *Philosophum*; admiratum Leontem novitatem nominis quaevisisse quinam essent Philosophi, et quid inter eos et reliquos interesset: Pythagoran autem respondisse—Similem sibi videri vitam hominum et mercatum eum qui haberetur maximo ludorum apparatu totius Graeciae celebritate: nam ut illuc alii corporibus exercitatis gloriam et nobilitatem coronae peterent, alii emendi aut vendendi quaestu et lucro ducerentur: esset autem quoddam genus eorum, idque vel maxime ingenuum, qui nec plausum nec lucrum quaererent; sed visendi causa venirent, studioseque perspicerent quid ageretur et quo modo: ita nos quasi in mercatus quandam celebritatem ex urbe aliqua sic in hanc vitam ex alia vita et natura profectos, alias gloriae servire, alias pecuniae; raros esse quosdam qui, ceteris omnibus pro nihilo habitis, rerum naturam studiose intuerentur: hos se appellare sapientiae studiosos: id est enim philosophos: et ut illuc liberalissimum esset spectare nihil sibi adquirentem, sic in vita longe omnibus studiis contemplationem rerum cognitionemque praestare.' Iamblichus (*vita Pythag.* § 58) preserves the story in the following words—(see Cic. *Tusc.* v. 3, ed. Davisii, note) ἔοικέναι γὰρ ἔφη (Πυθαγόρας) τὴν εἰς τὸν βίον τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάροδον τῷ ἐπὶ τὰς πανηγύρεις ἀπαντῶντι ὅμιλῳ· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖσε παντοδαπὸι φοιτῶντες ἀνθρωποι ἄλλος κατ' ἄλλου χρέαν ἀφικνεῖται, ὁ μὲν χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ κέρδους χάριν ἀπεμπολῆσαι τὸν φόρτον ἐπειγόμενος· ὁ

1095 b. 17. δὲ δόξης ἔνεκα ἐπιδειξόμενος ἥκει τὴν ρώμην τοῦ σώματος· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τρίτον εἶδος καὶ τό γε ἐλευθεριώτατον, συναλιξόμενον τόπων θέας ἔνεκα καὶ δημιουργημάτων καλῶν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἔργων καὶ λόγων· οὕτω δὴ κἀν τῷ βίῳ παντοδαποὺς ἀνθρώπους ταῖς σπουδαῖς εἰς ταῦτα συναθροίζεσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ χρημάτων καὶ τρυφῆς αἱρεῖ πόθος. τοὺς δὲ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ὕμερος, φιλονεικίᾳ τε δοξομανεῖς κατέχουσιν· εὐλικρινέστατον δὲ εἶναι τούτον ἀνθρώπου τρόπον τὸν ἀποδεξάμενον τὴν τῶν καλλίστων θεωρίαν δὲν καὶ προσονομάζειν φιλόσοφον.

The Neoplatonic rendering of the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*, which makes it an ecstatic life of entire freedom from bodily influences, is quite foreign to the concrete view of human nature taken by Aristotle. Aristotle's *θεωρητικὸς βίος* is the *raison d'être* of the *πόλις*, in the same sense that the *ψυχή* is the *raison d'être* of the *σῶμα*. We know of no *ψυχή* except as correlated with a *σῶμα*; so we know of no *θεωρία* except as manifested by a civilized man, or *πολίτης*. It is true that in the Tenth Book of the *Ethics* he uses language which may seem to lend itself to a Neoplatonic rendering; but his object there is to abstract, and present clearly, the formal principle or theoretic element in actual life, and we must be careful not to make 'a material use' of this merely 'formal principle,' and suppose that he asserts the possibility or desirability of an actual life of pure *θεωρία* for man, in which the *ζῶν πολιτικόν* should be transformed into the *θεός*. The *σοφός*, as distinguished in the Tenth Book from the *πολίτης*, is as much an abstraction as *θεός* considered apart from the *κόσμος*. Hence we must not accept as a correct account of Aristotle's view the mystical comment of Eustratius on the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* of this passage—διακόπτων τὴν ὑλην καὶ τὸ σαρκινὸν τοῦτο νέφος καὶ προκάλυμμα θεῷ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς δι' ἀπάθειαν συγγίνεται. Aristotle himself was no believer in such a Nirvana, whatever influence he may have had on the evolution of the mystical doctrines of which this note of Eustratius is a reminiscence.

b. 19. § 3. ἀνδραποδώδεις] Zell and Michelet compare *E. N.* iii. 10. 8 περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἥδονάς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἔστιν δὲν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἄφη καὶ γεῦσις. Magirus connects the contemptuous character of Aristotle's criticism of the *ἀπολαυστικὸς βίος* in this section with the remark made in *Top.* i. 9. 105 a. 3 οὐ δεῖ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα, οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπεῖν· ἀλλ' ἦν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις τῶν λόγου δεομένων, καὶ μὴ κολάσεως ἡ αἰσθήσεως. The 'castigation,' as distinguished

from 'argument,' is contained here in the terms φορτικώτατοι and 1095 b. 19. ἀνδραποδώδεις, and in the comparison with βοσκήματα.

τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου] 'Obtain consideration.' Grant compares x. 6. 3. b. 21.

τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἔξουσίαις] Zell compares viii. 6. 5 οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἔξουσίαις.

Σαρδαναπάλλω] Cf. E. E. i. 5. 1215 b. 36 δ γοῦν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βοῦς b. 22. ὃν ὡς Ἀπιν τιμῶσιν ἐν πλείστι τῶν τοιούτων (i.e. τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν) ἔξουσιάζει πολλῶν μυναρχῶν . . . 1216 a. 16 οἱ δὲ Σαρδανάπαλλον μακαρίζοντες ἡ Σμινδυρίδην τὸν Συβαρίτην ἡ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰς τῶν ζώντων τὸν ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον, οἵτοι δὲ πάντες ἐν τῷ χαίρειν φαίνονται τάπτειν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. See Cic. *Tusc.* v. 35 (among Rose's *Fragments of Aristotle*, No. 77) 'Quo modo igitur jucunda vita potest esse a qua absit prudentia, absit moderatio? Ex quo Sardanapalli opulentissimi Syriae regis error agnoscitur qui incidi jussit in busto,

Haec habeo quae edi, quaeque exsaturata libido

Hausit: at illa jacent multa et praeclara relicta.

Quid aliud, inquit Aristoteles, in *bovis* non in regis sepulchro inscriberes? Haec habere se mortuum dicit, quae ne vivus quidem diutius habebat quam fruebatur.' Cf. also Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 32. 106 quoted by Rose *Fr.* No. 77. Had Eudemus, when he wrote δ γοῦν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βοῦς κ.τ.λ., the work (*περὶ δικαιοσύνης* according to Rose) to which this fragment belongs before him? The verses translated by Cicero are given by Athenaeus viii. 14. 335 τί γὰρ τῶν ἐπιτρῆφαι δυναμένων παρέλιπεν δ καλὸς οὗτος ἐποποίος (i.e. Archestratus, author of *γαστρονομία*) καὶ μόνος ζηλώσας τὸν Σαρδαναπάλου τοῦ Ἀνακυνδαράξεω βίον, ὃν ἀδιανοητότερον εἶναι κατὰ τὴν προσηγορίαν τοῦ πατρὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἔφη. ἐφ' οὐ τοῦ τάφου ἐπιγεγράφθαι φησὶ Χρύσιππος τάδε·

εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι θυητὸς ἔφυς τὸν θυμὸν ἀεξεῖ,

τερπόμενος θαλίγηστος θανόντι τοι σύτις ὅνησις.

καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σποδός εἴμι, Νίνου μεγάλης βασιλεύσας.

κεινὸς ἔχω ὅσσος ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ σὺν ἔρωτι

τέρπον' ἔπαθον τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὅλβια πάντα λέλειπται.

ἡδὲ σοφὴ βιότοιο παραίνεσις, οὐδέ ποτ' αὐτῆς

λήσομαι. ἐκτήσθω δ' δ θελῶν τὸν ἀπείρονα χρυσόν.

Athenaeus (xii. 38. 528, 9, apparently quoting Ctesias) and Nicolaus Damascenus (ed. Tauchn. p. 251) 'describe fully the luxurious habits of Sardanapalus. The latter writer says οὐκησιν ἔχων ἐν Νίνῳ, ἔνδον τὸ σύμπαν ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις διατρίβων, ὅπλων μὲν οὐχ ἀπτόμενος, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ θήριων ἔξιών, ὥσπερ οἱ πάλαι βασιλεῖς, ἐγχριόμενος

1095 b. 22. δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον, καὶ τοὺς ὁφθαλμοὺς ὑπογραφόμενος, πρός τε τὰς παλλακίδας ἀμιλλώμενος περὶ κάλλους καὶ ἐμπλοκῆς, τό τε σύμπαν γυναικείῳ ηθεὶ χρώμενος. Cf. Athenaeus xii. 39. 530 Ἀριστόβουλος (served under Alexander, and wrote a history of his wars, which was Arrian's chief authority) δ' “ἐν Ἀγχιάλῃ ἦν ἐδείματο (φησὶ) Σαρδανάπαλος, Ἀλέξανδρος ἀναβαίνων εἰς Πέρσας κατεστρατοπεδεύσατο. καὶ ἦν οὖ πόρρω τὸ τοῦ Σαρδαναπάλου μνημεῖον, ἐφ' οὗ ἐστάναι τύπον λίθινον συμβεβληκότα τῆς δεξιᾶς χειρὸς τοὺς δακτύλους, ὡς ἂν ἐπικροτοῦντα. ἐπιγεγράφθαι δὲ αὐτῷ Ἀσσυρίοις γράμμασι· ‘Σαρδανάπαλος, Ἀνακυνδαράξον παῖς, Ἀγχιάλην καὶ Ταρσὸν ἐδειμεν ἡμέρῃ μιῇ. ἔσθιε, πῖνε, παιζε’ ὡς τἄλλα τούτου οὐκ ἄξια· —τοῦ ἀποκροτήματος ἔσικε λέγεν.’” Sardanapalus (Asshur-bani-pal), son of Esarhaddon, reigned from about 667 till about 647. His reign marks the culmination of Assyrian power and civilization.

- b. 23. § 4. τιμήν] On τιμή as the end of ‘political’ life, see *E. N.* v. 6. 7 μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος (*i. e.* to the ἀρχῶν), τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας. Cf. *Pol.* ii. 4. 1266 b. 38, where the πολλοί are said to be satisfied with κτήσεις, but the χαρίεντες to strive after τιμαί, *honores*—ἔτι στασιάζουσιν οὖ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν τούναντίον δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον· οἱ μὲν γάρ πολλοί διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνισον, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν ἔαν ἴσαι.
- b. 24. ἐπιπολαιότερον] ‘Too superficial for that which we are in search of.’ Grant. Honour is not the nature and life of the person honoured, but a merely superficial and transitory reflection on him of the opinion of other people.

δοκεῖ . . . μαντευόμεθα] Honour depends on those who give it, not on him who receives it. It therefore cannot be the chief good, which is ‘one’s own’ and depends on oneself; cf. *Met.* Θ. 8. 1050 a. 34 sqq., from which we can understand how ἐνδαιμονία, being an ἐνέργεια which contains its own end in itself, must be οἰκεῖόν τι—*i. e.* something which resides wholly in the man who realises it—οἵσων δὲ μή ἐστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ή ἐνέργεια· οἷον ή ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὅρωντι καὶ ή θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ή ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· διὸ καὶ ή ἐνδαιμονία· ζωὴ γάρ ποιά τις ἐστίν. On the other hand, where a result different from the ἐνέργεια is produced by its operation, *i. e.* where the ἐνέργεια is not its own end, but has an external end, the ἐνέργεια (consummation) is in the result—1050 a. 30 οἵσων μὲν οὖν ἐτερόν τι ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν ή ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν, οἶον ή τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ή ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ· ὅμοιώς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ὅλως ή κίνησις

ἐν τῷ κινούμενῳ. As ὑφανσις then is ἐν τῷ ὑφανομένῳ, so τιμή is ἐν 1095 b. 24. τοῖς τιμῶσι: it does not reside ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ as θεωρία resides ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι. The good opinion of others is an ἔργον, as it were, which a man produces, like a web or a house; it is not *his own life*.

The notion of *inherence*, which is doubtless the one primarily attaching to *ἐν* in the present case, does not of course exclude that of *being in the power of*, into which indeed it easily passes.

**[μαντευόμεθα]** Zell quotes *Schol. Par.* μαντευόμεθα εἴρηται διὰ τὸ b. 26. μήπω τι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀποδειχθῆναι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν εἰκασμῷ οὕτω λαμβάνεσθαι, στοχαστικὴ γὰρ τέχνη ἡ μαντική. Cf. *De Gen. Anim.* iv. 1. 765 a. 27 μαντευόμενοι τὸ συμβήσομενον ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων καὶ προλαμβάνοντες ὡς οὕτως ἔχον πρὸν γυνόμενον οὕτως ἰδεῖν. May not the term have a special appropriateness in connexion with τἀγαθόν, or the true Form of human life—τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, which man ‘divines,’ just as all plants and animals after their kinds instinctively, by a kind of natural divination, find their good—succeed in maintaining and perpetuating their various types, and so realise τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ θεῖον? See note on i. 2. 8 b. 7. All life—moral and physical—is a striving after Form, a divination of τὸ θεῖον.

**§ 5. ἔτι . . . κρείττων]** The editors refer to viii. 8. 2, where τιμή is said to be sought κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

**[πιστεύσωσιν]** K<sup>b</sup>, M<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>, H<sup>a</sup> have πιστεύσωσιν, which ought to b. 27. be restored to the text for Bekker’s πιστεύσωσιν. See Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 53: ‘der Aorist hat inchoative Bedeutung.’

**καὶ ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ]** Epexegetical—‘i. e. for their virtue.’

b. 29.

**§ 6. ἀτελεστέρα]** ἀρετή is a mere ἔξις, or possession of the power b. 32. of acting well, not an ἐνέργεια or act; see ii. 5. This ἔξις may subsist without going forth in action. It is therefore ἀτελεστέρα—‘falls short of being the τέλος’ (Grant)—which is τὸ εὖ ζῆν in actuality, not in mere potentiality. Εὐδαιμονία is the manifestation of ἀρετή, and is defined in i. 7. 15 as ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν. Thus ἀρετή is to εὐδαιμονία as δύναμις to ἐνέργεια.

**καθεύδειν]** is opposed to ἐνεργεῖν x. 8. 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς [τοὺς θεούς] καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὁσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα.

**ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετήν]** i. e. with the mere ἔξις of ἀρετή. ‘Past merits,’ b. 33.

1095 b. 33. says Grant, ‘or the passive possession of qualities whose existence depends on the attestation of fame, cannot be thought to constitute the chief good. Very different from this is ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν an actual life of virtue in the present.’

1096 a. 1. **κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν]** cf. i. 9. 11. The good things of body and estate are the *ὑλὴ* in which the *εὐδαιμωνία* realises the form of his nature. Without this matter the form cannot be realised; but the form is not to be confounded with the matter. *Εὐδαιμονία* is a certain manner of life. This manner of life requires certain conditions, as the art of Phidias required marble or ivory. As Eudemus puts it (*E. E.* i. 2. 1214 b. 16), we must be careful to distinguish between *τὸ ζῆν καλῶς* and *ῶν ἄνευ οὐ δυνατὸν ζῆν καλῶς*. Cf. Didymus, ‘Αριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν περιπατητικῶν περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν δόγματα apud Mullach. *Fragm. Phil.* vol. ii. p. 90 τοὺς δὲ νομίζοντας τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθὰ συμπληροῦν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ή μὲν εὐδαιμονία βίος ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ βίος ἐκ πράξεως συμπεπλήρωται· τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἔκτος ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν οὕτε πρᾶξιν εἶναι καθ’ ἑαυτό, οὕτ’ ὅλως ἐνέργειαν . . . τὰ ὅν ἄνευ πράττειν διτοῦν ἀδύνατον μέρη τῆς ἐνέργειας λέγειν οὐκ ὄρθον.

a. 2. **εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων]** For the meaning of *θέσις* as an *ἀρχὴ ἀποδείξεως* see *An. Post.* i. 2. 72 a. 14 sqq. where it is distinguished as *ἀρχὴ ἦν μὴ ἔστι δεῖξαι, μηδ’ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν μαθησόμενὸν τι* from *ἀξίωμα*, which is an *ἀρχὴ ἦν ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν διτοῦν μαθησόμενον*. Here (*E. N.* i. 5. 6) however we are concerned with the *dialectical* (as distinguished from the *apodeictic*) *θέσις*, which is described in *Top.* i. 9. 104 b. 19 (quoted by Eustratius and the commentators after him) *θέσις δέ ἔστιν ὑπὸληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης· ἡ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον· ἡ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ὅν, καθάπερ Μέλισσος φησί· τὸ γὰρ τὸν τυχόντος ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφηναμένου φροντίζειν εὐηθές ἔστι. A *θέσις*, then, is a paradox maintained on the authority of some great philosopher. An exception is made in its favour in the application of that rule of Dialectic by which only *ἔνδοξα* are admitted as premisses, and *παράδοξα as such* excluded.*

In Aristotle’s time the Cynics maintained the paradox indicated in the present passage, and after his time the Stoics, contending ὅτι *αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν*—that the mere consciousness of virtue, even though its manifestation ‘in works’ be prevented by external circumstances, constitutes Happiness. (See Zeller’s *Stoics*,

*Epicureans, and Sceptics*, pp. 224, 225, Engl. transl.) Cicero (*Paradoxon*, 2) defends the θέσις—ὅτι ἀντάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, ‘arguing,’ as Grant remarks, ‘the greatness of Regulus in his misfortunes, as though that were identical with his happiness’; or perhaps rather identifying his ‘idea of happiness’ with ‘the consciousness of happiness,’ to borrow a delicate distinction drawn by Prof. Jowett (*Plato*, Introduction to the *Gorgias*). ‘Nec vero,’ says Cicero, ‘M. Regulum aerumnosum nec infelicem nec miserum unquam putavi. Non enim magnitudo animi ejus cruciabatur a Poenis, non gravitas, non fides, non constantia, non ulla virtus, non denique animus ipse: qui tot virtutum praesidio tantoque comitatu, quum corpus ejus caperetur, capi certe ipse non potuit . . . bonus vir et fortis et sapiens miser esse non potest. Nec vero, cuius virtus moresque laudandi sunt, ejus non laudanda vita est, neque porro fugienda vita est quae laudanda est. Esset autem fugienda, si esset misera. Quamobrem quicquid est laudabile idem et beatum et florens et expetendum videri debet.’ ‘Plato,’ says Prof. Jowett (l. c.), ‘does not mean to say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience, or that the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than of the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. . . . What then is his meaning? . . . He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that physical suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy. . . . We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the standard of utility or by the rules of logic, but merely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the better part of human nature.’

Aristotle was not deficient in appreciation of the part which the idea of happiness plays in life; but his idealism was not of the kind to express itself rhetorically, and seem to have always in view some heroic figure of the tragic stage. His idealism consisted in his profound recognition of the fact that man has aspirations which can never be satisfied; which, nevertheless, must be fostered, because they give *élan* to those functions which are capable of actual fulfilment. The *aiperátoros Bios* is indeed unattainable by man; but if he ceased to aspire to it, the good life, which is actually within his reach, would become, in its turn, an impossible ideal. See *E. N.* x. 7. 8. 1177 b. 31 οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τὸν παρανοῦντας ἀνθρώ-

1096 a.2. πινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρωπον ὅντα οὐδὲ θυητὰ τὸν θυητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅστον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ.  
The account given of the spirit of the ἀνδρεῖος in *E. N.* iii. 9. §§ 3-5 shows us how well Aristotle understood the place of ‘the idea of happiness’ in life—not as a ‘constitutive principle,’ and equivalent to an actual ‘consciousness of happiness,’ but as a ‘regulative principle.’

- a. 3. ἵκανως γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν] It is often assumed that τὰ ἐγκύκλια are the same as ἔξωτερικοὶ λόγοι. One of the reasons for holding that the reference of the latter expression is to commonly accepted views, not necessarily embodied in any written work, is that the present tense is invariably (or almost invariably) used with it. But here, the perfect seems to indicate a special reference to a definite class of written works, or it may be to a definite course of lectures. See note on ἔξωτερικοὶ λόγοι i. 13. 9.
- a. 4. § 7. ὑπὲρ οὐ] περὶ is Bekker's reading against the MSS., which all apparently give ὑπέρ. Susemihl and Bywater accordingly read ὑπέρ. ‘Ὑπέρ with the genitive is so characteristic of the *M. M.*, and the Aristotelian commentators, that its reception into the text here (justified by the MS. authority) raises the question, whether the clause in which it occurs should not be bracketed as an interpolation. See notes on iii. 3. 2, and iv. 2. 4.

- a. 5. ἐπομένοις] x. 7.

§ 8. ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς (sc. βίος) βίαιος τις ἐστίν] The money-getting life is contrary to nature, for nature has always a definite τέλος, whereas money-getting goes on *εἰς ἄπειρον*, see *Pol.* i. 3. 1256 b. 41 χρηματιστικήν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως . . . 1257 b. 19 ἔστι γὰρ ἐπέρα ἡ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ κατὰ φύσιν. The term *βίαιος* is to be taken in its technical sense =παρὰ φύσιν: see *de Coelo* 300 a. 23 τὸ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ταῦτον: *Met.* Δ. 5. 1015 b. 14 εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἄττα δίδια καὶ ἀκίνητα, οὐδὲν ἐκείνοις ἔστι βίαιον οὐδὲ παρὰ φύσιν: *Met.* I. 1. 1052 a. 23 φύσει . . . καὶ μὴ βίᾳ: *Phys.* iii. 5. 205 b. 5 εἴη γὰρ ἀν τὸ που βίᾳ καὶ οὐχ οὖν πέφυκεν: *Phys.* iv. 8. 215 a. 1 πᾶσα κίνησις ἡ βίᾳ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν . . . ἡ μὲν γὰρ βίαιος παρὰ φύσιν ἐστίν: *Phys.* viii. 4. 255 b. 31 πάντα τὰ κινούμενα ἡ φύσει κινεῖται ἡ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίᾳ. Newman (note on *Pol.* i. 3. 1253 b. 18) remarks that the connexion which Aristotle traces between τὸ βίαιον and τὸ παρὰ φύσιν is inherited by him from Plato (*Tim.* 64 D), and from still earlier inquirers (cf. *Protag.* 337 D, for the words of the

Sophist Hippias). Eustratius interprets the passage incorrectly. 1096 a. 5. He says that the *χρηματιστής βίος* employs violent means to make money. Dante (*Inf.* xi. 109-111, quoted by Michelet) had this interpretation in view when he placed usurers among the ‘violent’ in Hell: although it is to be observed that the ‘violence’ consists in ‘setting Nature, in herself, and in her follower (Art), at nought.’ Grant translates—‘But the life of gain is in a way compulsory,’ and remarks that *βίαιος* ‘is to be taken in a passive, not in an active sense. It is the opposite of *έκοντιος*, meaning “forced,” as in *Eth.* iii. 1. 3. It implies that no one would devote himself, at the outset, to money-making, except of necessity, “parce qu'il faut vivre” . . . It is true that in several places *βίαιος* is opposed to *κατὰ φύσιν*, and in such contexts means “unnatural”; . . . But without such a context, it cannot simply stand for *παρὰ φύσιν*.’ To this it may be answered that the term *χρηματιστής* of itself supplies the context required. That *χρηματιστική* is *ἀπειρος* and *παρὰ φύσιν* is a common-place in the Aristotelian system.

For *βίαιος* we have the conjectures *βίος ἄβιος*, or *ἄβιος* (Muretus), and *οὐ βίος* (Coraes); but no correction is necessary. Aspasius has *τὸν δὲ χρηματιστὴν βίαιον λέγοντι, τουτέστι μικρόν, ὡς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν βίαιον λέγοντες τοῦτον*—as if he read *βαιός*.

*χρήσιμον*] useful as means to end: see *Index Arist.* s. v. The a. 7. term is technically employed (alone or with *εἰς τι* and *πρὸς τι*) to denote the *means*. The life of money-making is concerned only with means, and has no limiting conception of the end of human endeavour. This the life of *θεωρία* has, and with this end identifies itself. The *θεωρητικὸς βίος* is Life, and exists for its own sake (see x. 7. 5); whereas the *χρηματιστῆς βίος* is not Life, but undue care for one of the material conditions of Life.

*καταβέβληνται*] The editors quote *Pol. Θ. 2. 1337 b. 22 ai a. 10.* *καταβέβλημέναι μαθήσεις*, ‘the ordinary branches,’ and *Pol. Θ. 3. 1338 a. 36 τῶν καταβέβλημένων παιδευμάτων*—where the notion of the *fundamental* character of these branches is conveyed. Here we may render—‘and yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them,’ thus bringing out the idea of a *foundation laid* for the claims of *ἡδονή* and *τιμή* and at the same time indicating that *labour has been wasted* on the attempt to lay such a foundation. I think that *πρὸς αὐτά* obliges us to take account of this latter point by suggesting *κατηγόρωνται πρὸς αὐτά*.

## CHAPTER VI.

## ARGUMENT.

Now let us examine the opinion of those who make the Chief Good a Universal Essence, or Idea, existing apart from all particular good things. It is an unpleasant duty to have to criticise this opinion, which is that of men who are our personal friends; but the philosopher is bound to prefer truth to friendship.

(1) Objects conceived as members of a sequence (e.g. numbers), where the subsequent depends upon the prior, they do not bring under a common Idea. But good is a conception which appears in the Category of Substance, and also in the Categories of Quality and Relation, which are subsequent to the Category of Substance, i.e. presuppose it as their ground. How then, on their own principles, can they bring these various appearances of Good under one common Idea?

(2) If all good things fall under one common Idea, i.e. have all one and the same Essence, or Form of Being, how comes it that, there being ten Categories, or Forms of Being, we find good things in all the ten, and not in one Category only? Thus, in the Category of Substance we find God and Reason, in that of Quality, the various Virtues; in that of Quantity, the Moderate; in that of Relation, the Useful—and these are all 'good things,' although the 'Form of their Being,' or 'their Essence' is not the same.

(3) Since things that have the same essential nature, or fall under one Idea, are all objects of one Science, good things ought all to be objects of the same science. But this is not so. Even good things in the same Category are objects of different sciences—under the Category of Time, the science of the favourable opportunity in sickness is Medical Science; that of the favourable opportunity in warfare is Generalship.

(4) What do they gain by the prefix *real* by which they mark their Ideas? Real-man, and man, have the same essential nature, viz. that of 'man,' which is common to both. Similarly the real-good, and a good thing, are both 'good.'

(5) If they reply that *real* means everlasting, we ask, How can mere duration enhance Essence, and put the real-good in a higher position, qua good, than a good thing? If the Idea of the Good is good, it is so independently of time, and if a particular thing is good, it also is good independently of time, just as a thing is white, whether it be white for a day, or a thousand years.

A more plausible position than that before us is the position of the Pythagoreans, who give us a column of good things, within which, not outside of which, they place the Principle of Unity. Even Speusippus, it would appear, follows the Pythagoreans rather than the Platonists here.

But it may be objected to the foregoing criticism—'you have ignored the distinction between things good in themselves, and things good as means to these. It is only things good in themselves which the theory professes to bring under one Idea.'

Let us then confine our attention to things good in themselves.

If it be asked What things may be so described?—there are two alternative answers possible, viz. They are things such as seeing, or thinking, or as certain

pleasures and honours—or *The Idea of the Good is the only thing good in itself.* If the latter alternative be accepted, the class of things good in themselves will be left empty, for the Idea is not in the class. If the former alternative be accepted—i. e. if it be admitted that seeing, thinking, &c., are also good in themselves, as well as the Idea, then the same essential nature of Goodness must be apparent in them all, as the same quality of whiteness is apparent in snow and white paint. But as a matter of fact the ‘goodness’ of thinking differs essentially from that of seeing, and has its own definition. For the same reason the goodness of each of the pleasures and honours referred to has its own separate definition.

When we call a thing ‘good,’ then, we do not mean that it participates in common with all other good things in one Idea of the Good. What then do we mean? We mean something: for the same epithet is surely not applied by mere accident to all these things, without there being some common characteristic in them all justifying its application. What is this common characteristic? Perhaps the fact that they ‘belong to the same department,’ or ‘contribute to the same end’—i. e. they are perhaps called ‘good,’ as a knife and a bandage are both called ‘surgical,’ because they belong to the same department—surgery, or as cleanliness and exercise are both called ‘healthy,’ because they contribute to the same end—health: or perhaps it is safer to say that things are called ‘good’ ‘on the ground of identical relations’—e. g. the relation of the eye to the body is the same as that of reason to the soul; if we call the eye ‘good’ in its relation, we must call reason ‘good’ in its also. But the discussion of these matters belongs properly to another part of our system, and need not detain us further, especially as the Universal Good, apart by itself, even if it exist, is evidently a thing which man cannot make the end of his action, and lay hold of: and it is an end which he can lay hold of that we are now looking for.

But it may perhaps be said that a knowledge of the Idea of the Good helps us to perform those good actions which we can perform, and to lay hold of those good things which are within our reach, by giving us an ‘example or standard of goodness’ to serve as a test of the goodness of our conduct. This is a plausible view; but it is not supported by what, as a matter of fact, is the procedure of the sciences and arts. They all try to realise a good, and to supplement what is lacking to them, but it is never ‘the knowledge of the Idea of the Good’ that they make their desideratum. If this knowledge were really useful, is it likely that all men of science and artists would thus neglect it? But the chief argument against this view that a knowledge of the Idea is useful, is that derived from the difficulty of explaining to oneself how it can be useful—how it can be useful to a weaver or carpenter in his trade—how it can make a man a better general or a better doctor. So far, indeed, is a doctor from troubling himself with such wide ‘knowledge,’ that he does not take a wide view even of ‘health,’ the final end of his own profession. It is not Universal Health which he considers, but man’s health, or rather his patient’s health.

*Introductory Note.]* The ‘Ideas’ of Plato answered, in part, to 1096 a. 11. what we now call ‘Laws of Nature.’ As distinguished from particular phenomena which come and go, the ‘Ideas are fixed;’ hence are the objects of scientific knowledge, as distinguished from

1096 a. 11. mere sensation. Particular men are men, because they 'participate in,' or are 'copies of' the 'Idea of Man'; as we should say—because they are common results of that fixed Law of Nature which brings forth such beings as men. Particular things are beautiful, because they are 'copies of the Eternal Beauty'—as we should say—because there is that in the fixed constitution of the universe which determines the production of things so characterised. To give force to his assertion that the 'Ideas' are fixed, Plato was accustomed to speak of sensible things as fluctuating, and even unreal<sup>1</sup>. Such reality, at any rate, as they possess they derive from the 'Ideas' in which they 'participate.' We must not, however, take Plato too literally. He speaks of the unreality of particulars, in much the same way as we speak of the impossibility of an uncaused phenomenon,—a phenomenon which is not part of the universe of Natural Laws. The language at his disposal for expressing the 'reality' of the Ideas was not adequate to the task. He was obliged to say that the Ideas have more *οὐσία* than the particulars, or that the particulars derive such *οὐσία* as they possess from the *οὐσία* of the Ideas; thus seeming to make the Ideas separate *things*. But how can the particulars 'participate in' the *οὐσία* of a thing separate from them? This was the question which Aristotle put to Plato, or the Platonists. The *οὐσία* of a thing must belong to itself; a thing cannot have its *οὐσία* outside itself *in another thing*. This difficulty, raised by the inadequacy of the word *οὐσία* for the task assigned to it, was felt by Plato himself (see the *Parmenides*), and was probably brought home to him, as to Aristotle, by the literal interpretation which pupils of the Academy gave to the doctrine of the Ideas, not only speaking of them as separate *things* (that was almost unavoidable), but thinking of them as such.

The 'Ideas' then answer, in part<sup>2</sup>, to our 'Laws of Nature,' the objects of scientific knowledge. But these 'Ideas' are members of a system, in virtue of belonging to which they are what they are. This system is the Universe—the One, or the Good. If the 'Ideas,' are *οὐσίαι*, or 'fixed Laws of Nature,' the Universe of which they are the fixed Laws, is *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*—is not itself

<sup>1</sup> Modern Biology seems to enforce Plato's doctrine of the unreality of the particular. We see the life of the individual shortened by natural selection for the sake of the Race. See Weismann, *Essays upon Heredity* (Clarendon Press), Essays i and iii.

<sup>2</sup> In part they answer to the 'Categories of the Understanding' in modern philosophy. The *ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ* answers to the 'Ideas of the Reason.'

a Law of Nature, but higher. How this doctrine of the Idea of 1096 a. 11. the Good was misunderstood—by the Platonists, we may suppose, rather than by Aristotle—is best shown in the chapter now before us. There is nothing, I venture to think, in the Dialogues of Plato to justify the interpretation which Aristotle's criticism assumes: we shall accordingly follow the line of least difficulty, if we suppose that the Platonists are mainly responsible for the misunderstanding. In all likelihood too they are responsible for the popular ridicule which seems to have been bestowed on the doctrine—see *Diog. Laert.* iii. 26 and 27 quoted by Meineke, *Fragm. Com.* vol. iii. 302 τοιοῦτος δ' ὁν (Πλάτων), θμως ἐσκάφθη καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν κωμικῶν—”Αμφις Ἀμφικράτει—

τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὅ τι ποτ' ἔστιν, οὐ σὺ τυγχάνειν  
μέλλεις διὰ ταύτην, ἥττον οὖδα τοῦτ' ἔγώ,  
ὡς δέσποτ', η τὸ Πλάτωνος ἀγαθόν· πρόσεχε δή.

It will now be convenient to place by the side of Aristotle's criticism, analysed above in the *Argument*, Plato's own account of the Idea of the Good as given in *Rep.* 506 sqq. The Guardians of the State must know the nature of the Good, for if they have not this knowledge, they cannot know the real nature of the Just or the Beautiful. What then is the Good? Socrates can answer only by a simile. The Sun, the Eye, and Visible objects, are in the sensible world, what the Good, Reason (*νοῦς*), and the Ideas (*τὰ νοούμενα*), are in the intelligible world. The *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* is that which gives their truth (*ἀλήθεια*) to the objects of real knowledge, as the sun gives visible colour to the objects of sight. It is the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* which also gives the power of apprehending this truth (*ἐπιστήμη*), as the sun gives the eye the power of seeing. As light and sight are not identical with the sun, so *ἀλήθεια* and *ἐπιστήμη* are not identical with the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, but only *like* it; moreover as the sun causes the *γένεσις* of all things but is not itself *γένεσις*, so the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* imparts *οὐσία* to the objects of real knowledge, but is itself something higher than *οὐσία*—οὐκ *οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος (509 B).

“Good,” says Plato, “is the cause of existence and knowledge.” This opens a sublime conception, on the one hand, of a world in which all things are very good; on the other hand, of a philosophy whose method of the deepest knowledge consists in no mere abstract investigations, nor any mere accumulation of

1096 a. 11. experience, but in apprehending with enthusiasm and joy the all-pervading idea of good, as it manifests itself under the three forms of beauty, symmetry, and truth [*Philebus* 65 A].’ Grant, *Ethics*, Essay iii. vol. i. p. 205.

It is difficult to understand a man of Aristotle’s calibre attacking, as he does, a theory like this; especially as his own philosophy of human life, with its ideal of the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*, and its doctrine of *εὐδαιμονία* as something not to be counted among particular good things (*E. N.* i. 7. 8.), is in entire sympathy with it. ‘Im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen resolut zu leben,’ is the ideal for Aristotle’s *εὐδαιμων*, no less than for Plato’s *φιλόσοφος*. We are tempted to believe that it is not Plato’s theory which Aristotle attacks here, but the formalism of the Platonic school; at any rate, the criticisms contained in this chapter are entirely beside the mark, as directed against the theory which is exhibited in *the Republic*. ‘Ο τὴν ἴδεαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος is the man who, after a long education, has risen to the speculative height from which he can see, like Spinoza’s wise man, all things as belonging to a single system, in relation to which they ‘have existence,’ ‘are good,’ and ‘are known.’ The *ἴδεα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* is not a separate *thing*—*χωριστόν τι*; it is the system to which ‘things’ belong, and by belonging to which (or ‘participating in’ which) are ‘things’—it is the One, *Deus sive Natura*<sup>1</sup>. If the Platonic school had confined itself to presenting, as Plato does in *the Republic*, the conception of *τὸ ἔν*, or *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, as a great ‘regulative principle,’ probably no objections would have been raised by Aristotle. But the Theory of Ideas tended always to become more and more a Theory of Ideal Numbers, lending itself to obscurantism; it also stood in the way of the acceptance of that critique of the forms of speech (as epoch-making as Kant’s deduction of the forms of thought) which it was Aristotle’s greatest service to European culture to have begun and carried so far. It is therefore not entirely surprising to find the *ἴδεα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, notwithstanding Plato’s presentation of it (an unexceptionable presentation of it, one might have supposed, from Aristotle’s point of view), coming in for a share of the opposition which the *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ*, and *χωριστὰ εἶδη* of the school naturally roused in the author of the doctrine of Categories.

<sup>1</sup> There is a very interesting passage in Teichmüller’s *Literarische Fehden*, pp. 232, 233 (to all the views contained in which I do not however wish to pledge myself) which may be consulted in this connexion.

It is in the distinction drawn between *πρώτη* and *δευτέρα οὐσία* in 1096 a. 11. *Cat.* 5 that the doctrine of the *χωριστὸν εἶδος* or ‘universal thing,’ as held by the Platonists, is most effectively met. That doctrine, like the paradox of Antisthenes (see Plato, *Soph.* 251 A, and Arist. *Met.* Δ. 29; cf. also Mullach, *Fragm. Phil.* vol. ii. 270 and 281, 2) and Stilpo (see Plutarch, *adv. Colotem* 23), practically assumed that all words stand for *things*. Antisthenes consistently denied the possibility of predication, because each thing, marked by its own name, is itself. The thing marked by the word *Kallias* is itself, and the thing marked by the word *man* is itself. You cannot predicate *man* of *Kallias*, for that would be to change *Kallias* into *man*, and *make him another individual*. The Platonists, on the other hand, affirmed the possibility of predication; but it was only by the *tour de force* of their dogma of *μέθεξις* that they were able to do so. *Man* was indeed the name of a thing separate from the thing of which *Kallias* was the name; but somehow the thing called *Kallias* ‘participated in’ the ‘Substance’ of the other thing called *man*.

In opposition to Antisthenes and the Platonic *χωρίζοντες*, it is pointed out, in *Cat.* 5 that, although the term *man* looks like the name of a separate thing, it is really indicative of an aspect or attribute of a thing: see 3 b. 10 ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἔστιν ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει . . . τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὅμοιως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπη ἄνθρωπον ἡ ζῶν, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει, οὐ γάρ ἐν ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὃσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν [as distinguished from the *ἐν παρὰ πολλά* of the Platonists] ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζῶν. The distinction drawn here is, in grammatical language, that between the proper name and the common term, practically amounting to that between the ‘reality of existence’ and ‘the reality of validity’ noted by Lotze, *Logic* p. 441 Eng. Tr.

‘Among all the reasons,’ says Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 302) ‘with which Aristotle opposes the theory of Ideas, there are two which rise into prominence, and to them all the others may be mediately or immediately reduced, (1) That the universal notions . . . posited in the Ideas are not substances, but mark only certain properties and relations—at most, genera and species, not things themselves. (2) That the Ideas lack moving force, and that they not only do not explain, but render impossible, the change of

1096 a. 11. phenomena, creation and destruction, alteration and movement, and the natural properties of things thereon dependent.'

The position taken up by Aristotle against the Platonic  $\chiωρί-$   
 $\xi\circ\nu\tau\epsilon s$  in objection (1) is that of the critic of the forms of speech,  
or thought (the two are inextricably connected in Aristotle's mind),  
who distinguishes  $\tau\grave{a}\ \gamma\acute{e}v\eta\ \tau\grave{a}\nu\ \delta\acute{e}v\tau\omega\nu$ —the various senses in which  
Kallias *is* something, *is* a man, *is* good, *is* a father. Unless these  
distinctions were kept steadily in view (and the 'realism' of the  
Platonists was the great obstacle to their recognition) it was vain,  
Aristotle rightly thought, to hope for advance in the sciences. As  
for objection (2), it comes from the man of science, who is not  
satisfied unless he has *efficient* causes. But, as Lotze says (*Logic*  
p. 447), 'The fact that they supply no beginning of motion proves  
little against the doctrine of the Ideas . . . As concerns Aristotle's  
criticism let us turn to the sciences of our own day. What shall  
we say to our Laws of Nature? Do they contain in themselves  
a beginning of motion? On the contrary, they all presuppose  
a series of data which they cannot themselves establish, but from  
which *once given*, the necessary connexion one with another of the  
phenomena which ensue is deducible. No natural law ordains  
that the different bodies in our planetary system should move, or  
that their course should be directed towards one and not another  
quarter of the heavens, or that the acceleration which they impose  
on each other by the force of attraction should have the particular  
amount which it has and not a different one. But is the whole  
system of mechanical truths useless and mere empty babble ( $\kappa\epsilon\nu\omega-$   
 $\lambda\circ\gamma\epsilon\nu$ ) because it leaves these first beginnings of motion to be  
explained from some other source, and starting from the fact  
of motion as it actually finds it, is satisfied with explaining its  
different phases in their necessary connexion with each other? . . .  
To see in the world of Ideas the patterns to which all that is, *if*  
anything is, must conform, was a thought of which the importance  
is unfairly ignored by Aristotle.'

The doctrine of Ideas, as Plato himself sets it forth in his Dialogues, was, it must be admitted by the reader of Aristotle's criticisms in the *Metaphysics*<sup>1</sup>, misunderstood—but probably more by the Platonists than by Aristotle. Be that however as it may, Aristotle's criticisms have done much to give currency to false

<sup>1</sup> It is in *Cat.* 5, as it seems to me, that we have the really valuable results of the Aristotelian opposition to the doctrine of Ideas.

views regarding the doctrine, as held by Plato himself. For the 1096 a. 11. doctrine, as held by Plato himself, we must go to Plato's own writings: and if we sometimes find statements there which seem to imply the *χωριστὸν εἶδος*, we must remember that Plato could hardly help using language which might be interpreted as implying it. He wished to describe the relation of Laws of Nature to particular things, and the Greek language almost obliged him to speak of these Laws as 'things.'

On the Platonic 'Ideas' generally see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* (Plato), Grant's *Ethics*, Essay iii. vol. i. p. 200 sqq., Jowett's *Introduction to the Parmenides*, Lotze's *Logic* Book iii. ch. 2—*the world of Ideas*; for Aristotle's general criticisms see *Met. A.* 6, Z. 13, 14, 15, *M.* 4, 5, 9, 10, and *Cat.* 5, Zeller's *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 293 sqq. (3rd German ed.), Zeller's *Plat. Studien*, pp. 232, 3, Grote's *Aristotle*, appendix i and appendix iii.

Keeping in view the account of the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* given in *Rep.* 506 sqq. and remembering that Plato himself, as distinguished from weak disciples, did not regard—could not have regarded—'The Good' as a 'Thing' separate from 'particular good things,' we may go on to examine Aristotle's criticism in detail.

**§ 1. τὸ δὲ καθόλου]** sc. ἀγαθόν. Eudemus introduces his dis- a. 11. cussion of the Idea of the Good (*E. E.* i. 8. 1217 b. 1) as follows—  
*σκεπτέον τούννα τί τὸ ἄριστον, καὶ λέγεται ποσαχῶς. ἐν τρισὶ δὴ μάλιστα φαίνεται δόξαις εἶναι τοῦτο. φασὶ γὰρ ἄριστον μὲν εἶναι πάντων αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸ δὲ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῶντας εἶναι τό τε πρώτῳ εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ αἰτίῳ τῆς παρουσίᾳ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι.*

**§ 2. ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον].** Things related to one a. 18. another as the terms of a series were not brought by the Platonists under one Idea. Where one thing grows out of another thing, the two things cannot be regarded as coordinate impressions of a single type. Aristotle recognises this in *Pol.* iii. 1. 1275 a. 34 (see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. p. 295 n. and Jowett, *Pol.* ad loc.) where he notes the impossibility of finding a common definition for the *πολιταὶ* of the various states, which he distinguishes as *δρθαὶ* and *παρεκβεβηκναὶ*, the latter being subsequent to, or degenerations of, the former.

I understand Aristotle in the present § to refer, not to the *εἰδητικοὶ ἄριθμοι* of the Platonists, but to the *μαθηματικοὶ ἄριθμοι*. The distinction between these two is given in *Met. M.* 6–8. The

1096 a. 18. μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί are the 1, 2, 3 of ordinary numeration; the μονάδες of which these ἀριθμοί are composed are all συμβλητά, being homogeneous. The μαθηματικὸς ἀριθμός 3 arises out of 2 by the addition of 1, and is thus subsequent to 2 (*ὑστερον*), or implies 2. The εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί, on the other hand, are ἀσύμβλητοι: ἡ δύὰς αὐτή, and ἡ τριὰς αὐτή, (Duality and Trinity as notions), cannot be added together: the μονάδες of which ἡ δύὰς αὐτή is composed are not homogeneous with those of which ἡ τριὰς αὐτή is composed: the τριὰς αὐτή is not the δύὰς αὐτή + 1: it is independent of the δύὰς αὐτή. Thus the εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί, with which the Platonists identified the ἰδέαι, are distinguished from one another not as the term ἀριθμοί naturally implies—quantitatively, but qualitatively. They are ἀσύμβλητοι, which means that they are not quantitatively comparable. Accordingly, when they, equally with the μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί, are described as involving πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον (see *Met.* M. 6. 1080 b. 12, and Bonitz's note, p. 542 sqq., on τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ἰδέας—Trendelenburg's conjecture, μὴ before ἔχοντα, accepted by Zeller, *Platon. Stud.* p. 243, rejected *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 1. p. 433, is wrong), the description is to be taken as one awkwardly transferred from the μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί, which are not independent entities, to entities which, though called ἀριθμοί, are yet regarded as independent of one another. The phrase ἀσύμβλητοι ἀριθμοί really involves a contradiction. As Bonitz says, *Met.* p. 540: 'Plato enim licet ex Aristotelis testimonio dixisse videatur τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι ἀριθμούς, tamen hos numeros, qui idearum exprimerent naturam, a mathematicis ea distinxit ratione, quae revera ipsam numerorum naturam penitus tolleret. Hos enim numeros dixit esse ἀσυμβλήτους, consociari non posse nec computari alterum cum altero. Sed quum numeris abstractis, utpote magnitudinibus ejusdem speciei, id necessario tribuendum sit, ut incrementa ac decrementa inter se et efficiant et patiantur, hoc qui negat, is numeros manifesto non quantitates definitas esse dicit, sed qualitates definitas, quas quum ipsas describere non possit, ad numerorum imaginem confugit.' The πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον of the εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί, in short, is *their being qualitatively distinct*. Alexander on *Met.* M. 6. 1080 b. 12 accommodates himself so entirely to this strained use of πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον as to say (Alex. in *Met.* p. 722 ed. Bonitz) τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας τὸν εἰδητικὸν ἀριθμόν, τὸν δὲ μὴ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔχοντα μηδὲ κατ' εἶδος διαφέροντα τὸν μαθηματικὸν εἶναι ἐπίθετο.

We may safely assume, I think, that for Plato himself the 1096a. 18. *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί* were rather symbols of the fixity, separateness, and, as it were, impenetrability of the qualitatively distinct *ἰδέαι*, than the *ἰδέαι* themselves: but it is evident from Aristotle's criticism in *Met.* M. 6–8 that Pythagorizing followers confounded the symbols and the things symbolised.

I take it, then, that the reference in the present § is to the *μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί* and not to the *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί*: and I understand Aristotle to remind his Platonic opponents that, according to their own view, the *μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί* do not involve a common *ἰδέα*, because they are not mutually exclusive *εἶδη* independent of one another, (like the various species under the genus *animal*), but are so related to one another that the prior is included, as condition, in the subsequent. That the *ἰδέαι* themselves are *ἀριθμοί* is another entirely different opinion of the Platonists, not, as I think, alluded to here. It would not be true to say οὐδὲ τῶν (*εἰδητικῶν*) ἀριθμῶν *ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον*, for the Platonists certainly posited τὸ ἐν as the supreme *ἰδέα* or formal principle which produces the other *ἰδέαι* (called *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί*,) in the matter of the δύάς, τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν: see *Met.* A. 6. 988 a. 10.

The parallel passage in the *E. E.* runs as follows, i. 8. 1218 a. 1  
*ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, οὐκ ἔστι κοινόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστόν.* Εἴη γὰρ ἄν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστὸν διὰ τὸ ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρώτον. Οἷον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον πρώτον τῶν πολλαπλασίων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῆ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν· ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλασίου πρότερον, εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν *ἰδέαν*, οἷον εἰ χωριστὸν ποιήσειε τις τὸ κοινόν. Fritzsche (followed by Grant) makes the *ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον* of this passage the *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοί*, and compares *Met.* B. 3. 999 a. 6 ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερόν ἔστω, οὐχ οὖν τε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἶναι τι παρὰ ταῦτα οἷον εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ δύάς, οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ σχῆμα παρὰ τὰ εἴδη τῶν σχημάτων. I agree with Bonitz (*Met.* pp. 153 and 154) against Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 1. p. 434), and Schwegler (on *Met.* Δ. II. 1019 a. 3) that the *μαθηματικοὶ ἀριθμοί* are intended in *Met.* B. 3. 999 a. 6. If so, the presumption is strong that they are intended in *E. E.* i. 8. 1218 a. 1, and if in the latter passage, then in *E. N.* i. 6. 2. It ought to be mentioned that Zeller's opinion in the *Platonische Studien* (p. 239 sqq.) was that the reference in *E. N.* i. 6. 2 is to the *μαθηματικοί*, not to the

1096 a. 18. *εἰδητικοὶ ἀριθμοὶ*: but that in his *Ph. d. Gr.* (ii. i. p. 433 second edition) he reverses this opinion.

a. 19. τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται κ.τ.λ.] The category of substance—τὸ τι ἔστιν<sup>1</sup>, τὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἡ οὐσία, is naturally prior to the other categories: *i.e.* the various relations and qualities recognised under the other categories presuppose *Things* to be related and qualified. ‘Being white,’ and ‘being small,’ are kinds of ‘being’ (*γένη τῶν ὄντων*), dependent on ‘being a thing.’ ‘Being a thing’ is the strict and primary sense of ‘being.’ If, then, the subsequent or dependent kinds of ‘being,’ on the one hand, and ‘being’ in the primary and fundamental sense, on the other hand, are equally described as ‘good,’ it is plain that the term ‘good’ cannot represent a generic notion. Substance and its accidents or offshoots are not independent *εἴδη*, to be brought under ‘good’ as their *γένος*.

Two points are to be noted in this argument, (1) It seems to assume that the Aristotelian doctrine of the Categories had come to be so far accepted by the Platonists that the inconsistency of their theory of Ideas with it was worth pointing out to them. (2) In laying stress upon the *dependence* of the other categories on the first category it certainly makes a point against *οἱ μὴ κατασκευάζοντες τῶν ἀριθμῶν ίδέαν*, but at the expense of somewhat staggering the reader when he comes to § 3, where the *independence* or separateness of the categories is assumed, and it is contended that, since *θεός* as substance, and *ἀρετή* as quality, fall under different *κατηγορίαι* τοῦ ὄντος, or differ τῷ εἶναι (see *Met. Δ.* 7. 1017 a. 23 δοσαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται [sc. κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας] τοσανταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει: and cf. note on *E. N.* v. i. 20), they cannot both be called ‘good’ *quād* having one common nature. In § 2, line 22, τοῦ ὄντος is the ‘being,’ or τὸ εἶναι, of the first Category, and the other Categories are presented as related to it as *accidents*, *συμβεβηκότα*; whereas in § 3, line 24, τῷ ὄντι is used generally for the ‘being,’ or τὸ εἶναι, which is found in ten distinct kinds corresponding to the ten Categories.

<sup>1</sup> ἔστιν is omitted by K<sup>b</sup> M<sup>b</sup> O<sup>b</sup> and CCC in l. 20, and apparently by all MSS. in l. 24. See Bonitz's note on *Met. E.* 2. 1026 a. 36. In enumerating the Categories it would appear that Aristotle sometimes writes τὸ τι for τὸ τι ἔστιν. Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* p. 203) argues that the writer of *M. M.* must have found no ἔστιν here in line 20, for he has i. 1. 1183 a. 10 καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ. In *E. E.* i. 8. 1217 b. 27, however, we have τι ἔστιν. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 53) would omit ἔστιν both in line 20 and in line 24.

§ 3. ἔτι δ' ἐπεί κ.τ.λ.] The argument in § 2 was that ‘good,’ 1096 a. 23. when applied to a substance, and to a relation respectively, is not applied to two things belonging to mutually exclusive classes, capable of being brought under a higher class notion: the argument in § 3 is that substances and relations belong to mutually exclusive classes—these classes, however, are not *ἴδη*, but ultimate γένη incapable of being brought under one common γένος or *ἴδεα*. The categories are τὰ γένη τῶν ὄντων, and τὸ εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία οὐδενί· οὐ γάρ γένος τὸ ὄν *An. Post.* ii. 7. 92 b. 13. Cf. *de An.* i. 5. 410 a. 16 οὐ δοκεῖ κοινὰ πάντων [sc. τῶν γενῶν τῶν κατηγοριῶν] εἶναι στοιχεῖα.

τάγαθὸν ἴσταχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι] ‘The use of the term *good* is coextensive with that of the word *is*.’ The categories, as *αἱ κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος*, are the various senses in which the word *is* used: see *Met. A.* 7. 1017 a. 22 καὶ ἀντὰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται ὅσαπερ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας· δισταχῶς γάρ λέγεται, τοσανταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν τί ἔστι σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποιόν, τὰ δὲ ποσόν, τὰ δὲ πρός τι, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, τὰ δὲ ποῦ, τὰ δὲ πότε, ἔκαστῳ τούτων τὸ εἶναι ταῦτα σημαίνει. Οὐθὲν γάρ διαφέρει τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνων ἔστιν ἢ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζων ἔστιν ἢ τέμνων τοῦ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει ἢ τέμνει.

ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἀρεταῖ] see notes on ii. 5.

a. 25.

δίαιτα] ‘residence.’

a. 27.

§ 4. τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἴδεαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη] cf. *Met. I.* 4. 1055 a. 29. a. 31 καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἐν γένος ἡ μία. ‘This argument,’ says Grant, ‘is certainly unsatisfactory if applied to Plato’s point of view. Plato would say dialectic is the science of the Idea of good, and in this all other sciences have their meeting-point. Even of the *πρακτὸν ἀγαθὸν* it might be said that according to Aristotle’s own account it falls (in all its manifestations, whether as means or ends) under the one supreme science—*Politics*.’

§ 5] Susemihl brackets this § and § 6 as ‘inserta ab editore a. 34. antiquissimo.’ I do not think that bracketing is safe or helpful in a chapter like the present.

ἀπορήσεις δ’ ἄν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον] Grant compares *Met. A.* 9. 990 a. 34 οἱ δὲ τὰς ἴδεας αἰτίας τιθέμενοι πρῶτον μὲν ζητοῦντες τωνδὶ τῶν ὄντων λαβεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἔτερα τούτοις ἵσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀριθμῆσαι βούλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οὕτοι μὴ δυνήσεσθαι, πλειόν δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοί. The *ἴδεαι* are merely the doubles of the particulars, and do not help us to explain them.

1096 a. 34. This criticism is valid against those Platonists who regarded the *ἰδέαι*, or laws which explain particular things, as themselves also *things*; but does not affect Plato who, in the *Parmenides* 132 A–E, anticipates it in its most telling form—in the form of the τρίτος ἀνθρωπος refutation. (For this refutation see Bonitz. *Met.* pp. 111, 112 on A. 9. 990 b. 17.)

1096 b. 1. ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος] The same definition, expressing the same essence or nature.

b. 2. οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν] sc. αὐτοάνθρωπος καὶ ἀνθρωπος.

b. 3. οὐδ’ ή ἀγαθόν] sc. διοίσει ἀγαθόν τι καὶ αὐτοαγαθόν.

§ 6. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέ τι.] The connexion between this and the preceding section is well brought out in the parallel passage *E. E.* i. 8. 1218 a. 10 ἔστι τοίνυν, φασίν, αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν τὸ οὖν αὐτὸ πρόσκειται πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν κοινόν τοῦτο δὲ τι ἀν εἴη πλὴν ὅτι ἀΐδιον καὶ χωριστόν. ‘This prefix αὐτο-,’ the Platonists are supposed to answer, ‘is not mere surplusage: αὐτο- = ἀΐδιον.’ Aristotle replies—‘mere duration does not enhance essence. The nature of whiteness is as perfect in a snowflake, which falls into the river, as in a block of Parian marble.’ I cannot agree with Grant (*Ethics*, Essay iii. p. 210), who sees in Aristotle’s argument merely a ‘confusion between length of duration (*πολυχρόνιον*) and eternity (*αἰώνιον*)<sup>1</sup>. According to Aristotle’s doctrine the *οὐσία*, or τι ἡν εἶναι, immanent in particulars is ἀΐδιον, in the sense of being independent of the accidents of γένεσις and φθορά, which take place in time—ἐν χρόνῳ. It is the Platonists who confuse πολυχρόνιον and ἀΐδιον, by making their *ἰδέαι things* separate from the particulars—χωριστὰ εἴδη, thus placing them in space and time—in space as τρίτοι ἀνθρωποι somewhere, in time as πολυχρόνια. I therefore understand the ‘confusion between ἀΐδιον and πολυχρόνιον’ to be due to the Platonists, not to Aristotle. Aristotle says to them—‘You make the *ἰδέα*, or notion, which is ἀΐδιον, or independent of the accident of time, a thing among things in space and time. Your ἀΐδιον is, after all, only πολυχρόνιον. You have not grasped the distinction between a law which is eternally valid, and a thing which comes into existence and perishes.’

The statement εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου I take to mean that the accident of time does not affect the τι ἡν

<sup>1</sup> Grant here follows Eustratius.

εἶναι οἱ λευκότης. Cf. Themistius περὶ ψυχῆς, fol. 69 a (vol. ii. pp. 1096 b. 3. 38, 39, ed. Spengel), where λευκότης, as such, is said to be independent of μέγεθος or space, and in this respect is compared with νῦν—ὦ γὰρ οὐδὲν συντελεῖ τὸ μέγεθος εἰς τὴν φύσιν, τοῦτο ἀμέγεθες καθ' αὐτό, εἰ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβήκὼς διαιροῦτο· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ πηχυαῖον λευκὸν μᾶλλον τοῦ ποδιάν . . . διὸ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ταῖς ποιότησιν οὐ συντελεῖ, ἀλλὰ ἀδιαιρέτος ἡ λευκότης ὡς λευκότης καὶ ἐν τῷ μεγέθει. ὠσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως εἰ τοῦ κύκλου καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους τό τε μεῖζον, δροίως καὶ τὸ σμικρότερον μόριον νοήσει, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ νοῦ τὸ μέγεθος, εἴπερ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια. οὕτω γάρ τινα καὶ ἀχρόνως γίνεσθαι λέγομεν, οἷς οὐδὲν ὁ χρόνος πρὸς τὴν τελείωσιν συνεισφέρει, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς τελεία καὶ ὀλόκληρα γίνεται ἐν ὅτῳδὲν μορίῳ τοῦ χρόνου.

I conclude this note with an extract from Michelet *ad loc.*, to whom, it will be seen, I am much indebted—‘Hoc loco pugnat Aristoteles adversus eos, qui ideas separant a singulis. Ii, qui ideas vel formas rerum ut ipsarum substantias ipsis rebus insitas esse putant, jam, etsi pereant singulae res, aeternitatem formarum adseverant, sive in hac exstant sive in illa re caduca: est enim aeternum immutabile aliquid, in quolibet temporis momento totum existens; singulae igitur res ipsae aeternae, quamvis caducae. Qui vero ideas separant a rebus singulis, illis aeternitas nihil aliud est atque infinitum temporis spatium, quod, cum percurri reque existere nunquam possit, idem est ac diurnitas. Itaque non ex vera Philosophi sententia, sed ex falsa istorum opinione ἀίδιον et πολυχρόνιον idem est.’

§ 7. This brief and obscure jotting, which is not reproduced b. 5. either in the *E.E.* or in the *M.M.*, may be taken as a sort of *argumentum ad homines* addressed to the Platonists—‘Your doctrine of the *αὐτοαγαθῶν* is not held even by Speusippus, the head of your own school: he agrees with the more plausible view of the Pythagoreans.’ The ἀρχαὶ αἱ κατὰ συστοιχίαν λεγόμεναι of the Pythagoreans, or rather of a section of the Pythagoreans, are given in *Met.* A. 5. 986 a. 23 as—πέρας ἄπειρον, περιπτὸν ἄρτιον, ἐν πλῆθος, δεξιὸν ἀριστερόν, ἄρρεν θῆλυ, ἡρεμοῦν κινούμενον, εὐθὺν καμπύλον, φῶς σκότος, ἀγαθὸν κακόν, τετράγωνον ἑτερόμηκες. Here τὸ ἐν appears in the column of good things—*i.e.* in the *στοῖχος* in which τὸ ἀγαθόν occurs. Taking this circumstance in connexion with the fact mentioned in *Met.* A. 6. 987 b. 27 that, while Plato regarded τὸ ἐν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς as παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, the Pythagoreans regarded them as immanent in

1096 b. 5. particulars—οἱ δὲ ἀριθμὸς εἶναι φασιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, we may perhaps venture to explain the section before us as praising the Pythagoreans at the expense of the Platonists, because they—the Pythagoreans—‘make the One good, instead of making the Good one’: *i.e.* they do not make the Good an abstract unity separate from things; they find it immanent in things in various forms which they enumerate; unity is only one of the forms of its immanence—being a united whole is one of the ways in which a thing is good. The Pythagoreans, in fact, are praised for drawing up a list of good things. Τὸ ἔν, τὸ πέρας, &c., may each be called good. There is no good separate from the things enumerated in the column: see Plut. *Is. et Osir.* (quoted by Zell) ch. 48 (ed. Parthey)—οἱ μὲν Πυθαγορικοὶ διὰ πλειόνων ὀνομάτων κατηγοροῦσι τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἔν τὸ πεπερασμένον τὸ μένον τὸ εὐθὺ τὸ περισσὸν τὸ τετράγωνον τὸ ἵσον τὸ δεξιὸν τὸ λαμπρόν, τοῦ δὲ κακοῦ τὴν δυάδα τὸ ἀπειρον τὸ φερόμενον τὸ καμπύλον τὸ ἄρτιον τὸ ἐτερόμηκες τὸ ἀνιστον τὸ ἀριστερὸν τὸ σκοτεινόν.

As regards the precise nature of the agreement of Speusippus with the Pythagoreans we are left pretty much to conjecture. It is not unlikely, however, that Aristotle is contrasting with the one ἀρχή of the Platonists the πολλὰ ἀρχαί of Speusippus: see *Met.* Z. 2. 1028 b. 21 Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλέοντος οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης οὐσίας ἀλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν, ἀλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας. These ἀρχαί or οὐσίαι derived from τὸ ἔν, Speusippus held to be better than τὸ ἔν, because (as may be seen from a comparison of the seed with the adult form) τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἀριστον is not in the Beginning but in the End. Τὸ ἔν, then, although the first beginning of things (cf. ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς), is not, for this reason, in an exceptional position as regards goodness. *Qua* good, it is only one among many good ἀρχαί, and indeed the least good among them, as being the most remote. It is to this doctrine, then, that Aristotle probably refers when he says here that Speusippus is one of οἱ τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἔν: see *Met.* A. 7. 1072 b. 30 ὅσοι δὲ ἱπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἀριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὁρθῶς οἴονται. The reason which Aristotle gives for this judgment is τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων καὶ τὸ πρώτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον. The First Cause is the Best—God, who is ζῷον αἰδίον ἀριστον (*Met.* A. 7. 1072 b. 29). It is plain then that, in

the section before us (*E. N.* i. 6. 7), Aristotle must not be under-<sup>1096 b. 5.</sup> stood to approve the doctrine of Speusippus when he describes it as *πιθανώτερον* than that of the Platonists criticised. He merely uses the name of Speusippus as a controversial weapon against the Platonists. On the doctrine of Speusippus see Grant, *Eth. ad loc.* and *Essay iii.* pp. 217-218.

§§ 8-11] See *Argument.*

b. 7.

**§ 8.** ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος] I agree with Grant that 'we need not confine the reference of *περὶ τούτων* to the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, or refer it, with some commentators, to the books mentioned in the list of Diogenes (v. 25) *περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων α· περὶ Σπευσίππου καὶ Ξενοκράτους α·*' The reference is rather to 'the whole subject of the good in its relation to unity—to existence—to the world'; *i.e.* to 'the scope of Aristotle's entire *Metaphysics*.'

**διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τὸν λόγον εἰρῆσθαι]** *τὸν b. 9.* λόγον is the theory of the Platonists. Coraës gives the sense of the clause well—ἀντειπεῖν τις ἀν ἔχοι μοι τοῦτο, ὅτι Πλάτων οὐ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ κυρίως καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ἀγαθοῦ πεποίηται τὸν λόγον. The Platonic theory does not bring *all* good things (things relatively good included) under one Idea, but only things absolutely good. The omission of *μὴ* in CCC and Ob seems to be a mere blunder.

**καθ' ἐν εἶδος]** 'Assigned to one species.' *εἶδος* is here, as Grant b. 10. remarks, the Aristotelian *species*, not the Platonic *idea*.

**§ 10. η̄ ὅσα . . . η̄ οὐδ' ἄλλο]** These are alternative questions. b. 16. The latter is disposed of first by ὅστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος, and the former is dealt with in § 11. If the ἴδεα τάγαθοῦ is the only thing absolutely good, the class (*εἶδος*) of things absolutely good, which the Platonists ask us to distinguish, will be void of contents, for the ἴδεα is not *in* the class; as Michelet says—'Distinxerat Noster in genere duas bonorum species (*εἶδη*): bona per se et propter aliud. Iam si omnia vere bona, tanquam non existentia per se, ab idea excluderimus, et alteram speciem tantum ideam esse voluerimus, haec bonorum species erit vana, omnique carebit argumento; nec essent duae species, generi coordinatae (id, quod tamen supposui-  
mus), sed idea vana et multitudo existentium bonorum.'

1096 b. 21. § 11. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ’ ἔστι τῶν καθ’ αὐτά] If, on the other hand, the things enumerated also (*καὶ*, *i.e.* as well as the Idea) are absolutely good, and, as such, are λεγόμενα κατὰ μίαν ἴδεαν, how are we to account for the fact that they do not all exhibit a common nature or essence of goodness capable of identical definition like the whiteness of white things?

b. 25. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἴδεαν] ‘The application, then, of the *term* “good” (cf. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; in the next sentence) to things does not imply that they all participate in a common “idea.”’

b. 27. § 12. ὁμωνύμοις] ὁμώνυμα are things which have the same name without having the same nature (*e.g.* κλεῖς, a key, and the collar-bone), as distinguished from συνώνυμα, things which have the same name and the same nature (*e.g.* ox and horse, which both not only are *called* animals, but *are* animals): see *Cat.* i. 1 a. 1. When such very different things as *e.g.* a knife, a dinner, a field, and a horse are all called ‘good,’ they surely cannot get this common name by accident (*οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις*). There must be some reason why they are called ‘good.’ That reason, we have seen, does not lie in their participation in one Idea, or universal substance; nor does it lie in their having a common inherited nature, like the members of a biological class, which are συνώνυμα. What, then, is the reason of their being called ‘good?’

ἀλλ’ ἄρα γε . . . ἀναλογίαν ;] τὰ ἀφ’ ἐνὸς λεγόμενα and τὰ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα (the two phrases are practically equivalent) are technically distinguished by Aristotle from τὰ ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενα on the one hand, and τὰ συνωνύμως οἱ καθ’ ἐν λεγόμενα on the other hand. Τὰ ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενα have their common name ἀπὸ τύχης: τὰ συνωνύμως οἱ καθ’ ἐν λεγόμενα have it because they belong to the same εἶδος or γένος, whereas τὰ ἀφ’ ἐνός, or πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα, are things which do not necessarily belong to the same εἶδος or γένος, but agree in contributing to one end, in relation to which they are regarded as belonging to one department—as, *e.g.* a knife and a lecture may both be called ‘surgical.’ They are both called ‘surgical,’ not as an ox and a horse are both called ‘animals,’ nor yet as a key and the collar-bone are both called κλεῖς. See *Met.* K. 3. 1060 b. 37 τό τε ἱατρικὸν καὶ ὑγιεινὸν . . . πολλαχῶς λέγομεν . . . ἱατρικὸς γὰρ λόγος καὶ μαχαίριον λέγεται τῷ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἱατρικῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι, τὸ δὲ

ταύτη χρήσιμον. Cf. *Met.* Z. 4. 1030 b. 2 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἰατρικὸν σῶμα καὶ 1096 b. 27. ἔργον καὶ σκεῦος λέγεται οὕτε δμωνύμως οὕτε καθ' ἐν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐν—on which Alex. (*in Met.* p. 441, l. 13, ed. Bonitz) has οὕτε καθ' ἐν καὶ συνωνύμως, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐν, ἥγουν ὡς τὰ ἀφ' ἐνός τε καὶ πρὸς ἐν. Cf. also *Met.* Γ. 2. 1003 a. 33 τὸ δὲ ὃν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ δμωνύμως ἀλλ' ὁσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἄπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ τῷ σημείον εἶναι τῆς ὑγίειας, τὸ δ' ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς. Καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικήν τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν λέγεται ἰατρικόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ εὑφυές εἶναι πρὸς αὐτήν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἔργον εἶναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς. ‘Ομοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ ἀλλα ληψόμεθα λεγόμενα τοίτοις. Οὗτο δὲ καὶ τὸ ὃν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μέν, ἀλλ' ἄπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν’ τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὅντα λέγεται, τὰ δ' ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας, τὰ δ' ὅτι ὄδος εἰς οὐσίαν, ἡ φθορὰ ἡ στερήσεις ἡ ποιώτητες ἡ ποιητικὰ ἡ γεννητικὰ οὐσίας, ἡ τῶν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων, ἡ τούτων τινὸς ἀποφάσεις ἡ οὐσίας’ διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν εἶναι μὴ ὃν φαμέν. Καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ἀπάντων μία ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, δμοίως τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν καθ' ἐν λεγομένων ἐπιστήμης ἔστι θεωρῆσαι μᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρὸς μίαν λεγομένων φύσιν’ καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τρόπον τινὰ λέγεται καθ' ἐν. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ὅντα μιᾶς θεωρῆσαι ἡ ὅντα: on which Alex. (p. 199, l. 20) has—καθ' ἐν μὲν λεγόμενα λέγει τὰ συνώνυμα καὶ ὑφ' ἐν τι κοινὸν τεταγμένα γένος. οὐ μόνον δέ, φησί, τῶν οὔτως ἔχοντων πρὸς ἀλληλα μία ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀφ' ἐνός καὶ πρὸς ἐν . . . ἐν πᾶσί πως αὐτοῖς ὁρᾶται ἡ φύσις αὐτῇ ἀφ' ἦς καὶ δι' ἣν οὔτως καλεῖται . . . καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ φυλακτικῷ τῆς ὑγίειας καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιητικῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑγίειά ἔστιν ἡ θεωρούμενη. There is μία ἐπιστήμη of all ὅντα ἡ ὅντα, just as there is μία ἐπιστήμη τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ἀπάντων: for not only τὰ καθ' ἐν λεγομένα (τὰ συνώνυμα), but τὰ πρὸς μίαν λεγόμενα φύσιν fall under ‘one science.’ The term τὸ ὃν is used in many senses, but in all πρὸς ἐν, just as ὑγιεινόν is always used πρὸς ὑγίειαν, whether it be used to qualify something which produces, preserves, declares, or is receptive of health; thus food, exercise, and a good complexion are all called ὑγιεινά. Similarly τὸ ὃν is always used in reference to (πρὸς) one object, viz. οὐσία, sometimes marking οὐσία itself, sometimes its πάθη, sometimes ὄδος εἰς οὐσίαν, sometimes φθορὰ οὐσίας. Cf. also *M. M.* ii. 11. 1209 a. 23 οἷον φαμέν ἰατρικὸν τὸ μαχαίριον, ἰατρικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ταῦτ' οὐχ δμοίως λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν μαχαίριον τῷ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς ἰατρικὴν ἰατρικὸν λέγεται, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος τῷ ποιητικὸς εἶναι ὑγίειας, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τῷ αἰτίᾳ εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή: *E. E. H.* 2. 1236 a. 16 ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἴδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ' ἐν ἀπάσας μήθ' ὡς εἴδη ἐνός γένους μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι δμωνύμως. Πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται

1096 b. 27. καὶ πρώτην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἱατρικόν. Καὶ ψυχὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ὅργανον καὶ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον. Πρῶτον δ' οὖν λόγος ἐν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. Οἶον ὅργανον ἱατρικόν, φῶν ὁ ἱατρὸς χρήσαιτο· ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἱατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ὅργανου. Ζητεῖται μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ τὸ πρῶτον: and for other references see note on v. i. 7.

We can now see that the distinction made above in § 8 between τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα, as καθ' ἐν εἴδος λεγόμενα, and τὰ ποιητικὰ τούτων καὶ φυλακτικὰ ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικά, as διὰ ταῦτα λεγόμενα is really that between the συνώνυμα, or τὰ καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα, and the τὰ πρὸς ἐν καὶ ἀφ' ἐνός of § 12, and the other passages quoted. The Platonists assert that there are ἀγαθά so called συνωνύμως, *i.e.* ἀγαθά which are members of a true εἴδος (or γένος), their membership being explained as their μέθεξις in one ἰδέα; Aristotle's refutation consists in showing that no ἀγαθά are συνώνυμα, but are τρόπον ἄλλον λεγόμενα.

b. 28. ἡ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν;] This is Aristotle's final answer: Different things are called ἀγαθά on the ground of identical relations (*ἀναλογία* is defined in *E.N.* v. 3. 8. as *ἰσότης λόγων*). Thus the relation in which sight stands to the body is the same as that in which reason stands to the soul. If sight is 'good' in its relation—*i.e.* contributes to its particular end, the welfare of the body, reason is 'good' in its like relation to the welfare of the soul: see Alexander in *Met.* p. 550, l. 17 (ed. Bonitz) τὰ ἀνάλογον λεγόμενα . . . ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ, οἷον ὡς ὄψις ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ, and p. 329, l. 13 τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἐν ὀρίσατο ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο. Different things are called 'good,' not because they all contribute well to *one* end, but because they all contribute well to *their respective ends*. Τὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν λεγόμενα may be represented by parallel, τὰ πρὸς ἐν by converging, lines.

b. 31. § 13. ἄλλης ἀν εἴη φιλοσοφίας] πρώτη φιλοσοφία, as distinguished from the present enquiry which is πολιτική τις. ‘Υπέρ for περί, however, makes me suspect the whole clause from ἐξακριβοῦν to τῆς ἰδέας as an interpolation. On this late use of ὑπέρ see notes on i. 5. 7, iii. 3. 2, and iv. 2. 4.

b. 32. εἰ γάρ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τι τὸ κοινῇ κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 53, 54) defends καί, the reading of K<sup>b</sup>, M<sup>b</sup>, and Camb. against τό.

b. 35. §§ 14, 15, 16.] The χωριστὸν ἀγαθόν is not only an unrealisable good, but it is also useless as an *ideal*—παράδειγμα. Grant has a good note on these sections: 'It has been objected that Aristotle

fixes on too mean specimens of the arts, and that he might have 1096 b. 35. spoken differently if he had adduced the fine arts. But the question is whether, for practical life, the Idea, that is, a knowledge of the absolute, could be made available? This forms a great point of divergence between Plato and Aristotle. The latter seems to regard the Idea as an object of the speculative reason alone, something metaphysical and standing apart; and between the speculative and practical powers of man he sets a gulf. Plato, on the other hand, speaking without this analytical clearness, seems to think of the Idea as an object for the imagination, as well as the reason, as being an ideal as well as an idea. In this its many-sided character he would make it affect life as well as knowledge; for by contemplation of it the mind would become conformed to it.'

§ 16. ὑφάντης ἡ τέκτων . . . εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν] This is 1097 a. 8. not a fair criticism of Plato. He does not represent the knowledge of the *ἰδέα τάγαθοῦ* as attainable by artisans, but only by those exceptional natures who, having gone successfully through a long course of scientific training, are found capable of *διαλεκτική*, and, as philosopher-kings, are to be entrusted with the management of the State. See *Rep.* vii. In the *E. E.* i. 8. 1218 b. 7-24 the uselessness of the knowledge of the *ἰδέα τάγαθοῦ* is demonstrated from the fact that this *ἰδέα* is not an *αἴτιον ὡς κινῆσαν*; it does not produce motion, either as the efficient cause at the disposal of an artificer produces it, or as the *τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν*, which calls forth the energies of the *πολιτικός*, produces it. Aristotle and Eudemus, when they criticise Plato, seem to forget their own great philosophical principle—that the *τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν* is not ultimate, but sought for the sake of the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*, in the *σκοπός* of which—*θεὸν θεωρεῖν καὶ θεραπεύειν*, *τὸ ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν*—the *ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων* is to be ultimately found. Aristotle with his *ὁ τὸν σκοπὸν ἔχων ὀρθόν*, and Plato with his *ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος*, are at one in making *amor intellectualis Dei* the ultimate spring and coordinating principle of all man's varied activities, scientific, moral, and artistic.

τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν] (the reading of K<sup>b</sup> restored to the text by a. 9. Bywater for the *αὐτὸ τάγαθόν* of L<sup>b</sup> and Γ preferred by Bekker) is equivalent to *τοῦτο τὸ αὐτοαγαθόν*. Instances of the separation of the prefix *αὐτο-* from its word, are given in the *Index Arist.*, e. g. *Met.* M. 8. 1084 a. 21 *αὐτὸ ἔκαστος ἄνθρωπος*.

## CHAPTER VII.

## ARGUMENT.

*But to return now from the Good of the Platonists, which, to say the least, is unattainable, to the attainable good, the object of the present enquiry—we see that this attainable good is something which differs in different actions and arts. But can we find no general term to characterise it in every case? Surely in every case the good is that for the sake of which is done what is done—health in medical practice, victory in warfare, the house in building—in short the End, whatever its special nature, in every case. So, if we have always ultimately one end in all our actions, this one end will be the good attained by man in action; if more than one end, then these will be the forms in which good is attained in action. Thus we are led again to our old conclusion, which it is now time to explain more fully.*

There are many so-called ends which are not really ends, but only means to something else. Money, e.g. and tools are ends which are not really ends. But the Chief Good must be really an end. Now that which is sought for its own sake is more really an end than that which is sought for the sake of something else; and that which is never sought for the sake of something else is more really an end than that which is sought both for its own sake and for the sake of something else; while that which is always sought for its own sake and never for the sake of something else is most really an end, i. e. is an end without qualification. Now Happiness is such an end without qualification. Honour, pleasure, understanding, and the virtues, we seek both for their own sakes and for the sake of the Happiness which we suppose they will bring. But Happiness no man seeks as a means to these, or to anything.

That Happiness is the Chief Good may be inferred also from the fact that Happiness is self-sufficient. The Chief Good is self-sufficient: its possessor lacks nothing; and with Happiness a man lacks nothing—when we say ‘a man’ we mean not ‘the solitary individual,’ for he is an abstraction, but the real man—the citizen, whose concrete personality is constituted by the manifold relations in which he stands to kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens, within a definite circle. Such a man, then, with Happiness, lacks nothing: he has that which is the best of all good things—not best, however, in the sense of being one of them, for if it were one of them, it could be made better by the addition of the least one of them.

But ‘Happiness is the Chief Good’ is, after all, a truism which throws little light on the real nature of Happiness or the Chief Good. Perhaps we may reach something more definite by determining ‘the function of man.’

Every artist has his peculiar work or function. Surely man, as man, has his peculiar function also. What is it then? Let us review the vital functions in order. It cannot be taking in nourishment, and growing, for plants and animals, as well as man, live this kind of life, and we are looking for his peculiar function. Nor can it be perceiving with the senses, and feeling, for

this kind of life he shares with all animals. We are left then with the conclusion that man's peculiar function is the rational life—that is, rational conduct. The good man will perform this function well, i.e. so as to realise the end of his being in the manifestation of his own peculiar excellence. The end or Chief Good of man may then be defined as 'vital function manifesting the excellence which is highest and most perfect in human nature.' But it is only 'in a perfect life' that this end can be realised; 'for one swallow does not make spring.'

Let this serve as a 'rough sketch' of the Chief Good. If the outline is right, it will be easy to fill in the details afterwards. But our former warning must not be forgotten—the same exactness must not be looked for in all enquiries; for exactness varies with subject-matter, and with the nature of the particular enquiry or art. Nor must we always demand syllogistic antecedents. First principles have no such antecedents, but are data of sense perception, induction, or habit. We must try then to look for our principles in the place natural to each kind, and be careful to define them well when we have got them: for good definitions, to begin with, have great influence on what follows: 'the beginning is more than half the whole.'

§ 1. ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν] See i. 5. 8, where the 1097 a. 15. expression τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν occurs, immediately before the digression of chapter vi.

φαίνεται μὲν γάρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ] This result has been a. 16. reached in ch. vi. § 12—καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. The γάρ introduces a clause which gives direction, as it were, to the question *τί ποτ' ἀν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν*; What is good, we have just seen, differs in different arts and pursuits, but is always the *end* of the art or pursuit in question; *τέλος* is the most general description which can be given of ἀγαθόν. Hence the ἀγαθόν, i.e. τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν must be *τελειότατον*—the end *par excellence*. Accordingly, if all *πρᾶκτα* have ultimately one *τέλος*, or certain assignable *τέλη*, this, or these, will be τὸ *πρᾶκτὸν ἀγαθόν*.

§ 2. μεταβαίνων δή κ.τ.λ.] Michelet has 'haec aberratio ipsa a. 24. Philosophum jam ad ea quae sibi proposuerat reduxit'; Stahr translates 'So ist denn auf ihrem *Umwege* unsere Untersuchung doch zu demselben Resultate gelangt'; Williams, 'Our argument has now returned to the question from which it originally digressed'; and Peters, 'Our argument has thus come round by a different path to the same point as before.' I do not think that *μεταβαίνων* here implies *digression*, but rather *advance step by step*, through the particular cases of *ἰατρική*, *στρατηγική*, *ἰκοδομική*, &c., to the generalisation ἐν ἀπάσῃ πράξει τὸ *τέλος*: cf. *Met.* Z. 4. 1029 b. 1-12, where

1097 a. 24. *τὸ μεταβαίνειν* expresses the inductive process by which *τὰ φύσει γνώριμα* are reached through *τὰ αὐτῷ γνώριμα*: πρὸ ἔργου γὰρ τὸ μεταβαίνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμώτερον. ή γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἥπτων γνωρίμων φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὃσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθῷ τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθά, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῷ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριμα. τὰ δὲ ἑκάστοις γνώριμα καὶ πρώτα πολλάκις ἡρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἡ οὐθὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἐκ τῶν φαιόλως μὲν γνωστῶν, αὐτῷ δὲ γνωστῶν, τὰ ὅλως γνωστὰ γνῶναι πειρατέον, μεταβαίνοντας, ὃσπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν. Eustratius evidently understands *μεταβαίνων* here (*E. N. i. 7. 2*) to mean gradual advance—*μεταβαίνων δὲ λόγος ἀφ’ ἐνὸς πρὸς ἔτερον*, καὶ τοῦ μὲν τελειοτέρου ἀπτόμενος ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἀτελέστερον ὑπερβαίνων εἰς αὐτὸν τὸ ζητούμενον τὸ κοινὸν ἀπάντων τέλος, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφίξεται.

*εἰς ταῦτον*] *i. e.* to the same result as that reached in *i. 2. 1.*

- a. 27. § 3. *αὐλούς*] Zell ejects *αὐλούς* as due to the following *ὅλως*. *Ἄγρούς*, *φίλους*, and *δούλους* have been conjectured by Coraes, Bonitz, and Bywater (*Journ. of Philol.* vol. xvii. p. 68) respectively. I confess that I do not see any objection to retaining *αὐλούς*.
- a. 28. *τέλεια*] ‘Ends in themselves.’
- a. 30. § 4.] ‘The conception of ends was not fully developed in Plato; at the beginning of the second book of the *Republic*, those are said to be the highest goods which are desired both for themselves and for their results.’ Grant. It is misleading, I think, thus to compare directly what Plato says about *δικαιοσύνη*, at the beginning of *Rep.* ii, with what Aristotle says here about *τὸ ἄριστον*. Plato merely says of *δικαιοσύνη* what Aristotle himself says of *ἀρετή* in § 5, —that from one point of view it is an end, from another point of view a means; and Aristotle would certainly not dispute the statement that its being a means, as well as an end, makes it more valuable than it would be if it were merely an end. On the other hand Plato would agree with Aristotle in regarding the *εὐδαιμονία*, or noble life, of the indivisible organism of the *πόλις*, as an end which is never a means. It must be carefully noted that when Plato says, in the passage referred to by Grant, that *δικαιοσύνη*, as both end and means, is better than things which are merely ends, the ends which he has in his mind are *τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς*. He is not thinking of *τὸ ἄριστον*—the noble life, which the *διαλεκτικός* alone grasps in its unity. Perhaps we may say that

*δικαιοσύνη* has two senses with him—that, as one of the virtues, it is 1097 a. 30. both end and means; but, in its highest sense, as equivalent to Aristotle's *εὐδαιμονία*, it is an end, never a means.

§ 5. *νοῦν*] Not 'Reason' in the highest sense, but 'intelligence' 1097 b. 2. or 'prudence' as in vi. 11. 6 καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην. Those who systematically make τιμή or ἡδονή their end, *i. e.* choose it δι' αὐτό, are those who identify it with *εὐδαιμονία*, as they are described in ch. v. The truly good man chooses τιμή, ἡδονή, νοῦς, and ἀρετή, for the sake of *εὐδαιμονία*: *i. e.* in all his special pursuits he is regulated by the ideal of the noble life.

§ 6. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν] 'The b. 6. same conclusion (viz. that *εὐδαιμονία* is the *summum bonum*) follows also from the consideration of its self-sufficiency.'

τὸ δ' αὐταρκεῖς κ.τ.λ.] 'The term "self-sufficient," however, b. 8. we do not apply to the life of the *mere Self*—the solitary Self, but to that of the Self realised in association with others—with parents, children, and wife—with friends and fellow-citizens.' In this rendering I have tried to bring out the *logical* construction of the sentence, according to which *aὐτῷ*, the *logical* subject of *αὐτάρκεια*, is qualified (1) by *μόνῳ*, and (2) by *γονεῦστι . . . πολίταις*: *i. e.* the Self may be regarded either (1) in isolation, or (2) as constituted by social relations. In the first case it is a mere abstraction, and its self-sufficiency is only nominal; in the second case it is concrete and real, and self-sufficient in virtue of the presence of those relations which constitute its concrete reality.

According to the *grammatical* construction, however, *γονεῦστι* and the following datives are *coordinate with* *αὐτῷ*. The dative *αὐτῷ* depends on the verbal notion in *αὐταρκεῖς*, as Ramsauer points out: 'Egregia brevitate,' he says, 'per solam dativi casus vim tota enunciatio confecta est. Nobis magis perspicuum esset, si in eandem sententiam legeremus: *αὐταρκεῖς* δὲ λέγομεν οὐχ ὁ *αὐτῷ* μόνῳ ἀρκεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσιν ἀρκεῖν δεῖ κ.τ.λ.' Cook Wilson (*Transactions of Oxf. Philological Society*, Feb. 3, 1888) calls attention to the words of the Paraphrast as giving 'the right explanation of the dative'—*αὐταρκεῖς* δὲ ὁ ἀρκεῖ οὐ μόνον τινὶ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι κ.τ.λ. Of course properly *αὐταρκεῖς* (neut.) cannot govern *αὐτῷ* (masc.), much less *γονεῦστι*: the only proper construction is *αὐτάρκης αὐτῷ* (cf. *M. M.* ii. 15. 1212 b. 26 αὐτὸς ἔαντῷ αὐτάρκης ἔσται): *αὐτάρκης ἄλλοις* (*γονεῦστι . . . πολίταις*) is a contradiction in

1097 b. 8. terms. The grammar therefore of the sentence is loose: we ought to have had something like this—*τὸν δὲ αὐτάρκη λέγομεν οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἢ μονώτης, αὐτάρκη, ἀλλ’ αὐτῷ, ἢ οἰκονόμος καὶ πολίτης*. The singular *γυναικί* (K<sup>b</sup> and M<sup>b</sup> however have *γυναιξὶ*), among the plurals, points to *αὐτῷ* as the logical subject of the clause *ἀλλὰ . . . πολίταις*.

b. 11. *φύσει πολιτικὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπος*] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 54) defends the reading *πολιτικόν* given by K<sup>b</sup> against the *πολιτικός* of L<sup>b</sup> M<sup>b</sup>, and compares ix. 9. 3 *πολιτικὸν γάρ δὲ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός*.

Man realises his true nature or personality in the *πόλις*. The true ‘self,’ to which ‘self-sufficiency’ is ascribed, is that which consists in the clear consciousness of manifold social relations, and of the duties which they entail, as distinguished from the ‘self’ which is made up of the sensations and feelings, as such, of the individual: see *Pol.* i. 1. 1253 a. 1 φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἔστι· καὶ ὅτι δὲ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ δὲ ἀπόλις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἦτοι φαῦλός ἔστιν ἡ κρείττων ἡ ἄνθρωπος.

§ 7. *τούτων δὲ ληπτέος δρός τις*] Social life, the realisation of which by the individual constitutes his true personality, is, so to speak, a natural organism (*τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἔστι Pol.* i. 1. 1253 a. 2), and must be *definite*—*ώρισμένον*: cf. ix. 10. 3, 4, a passage which seems to redeem the promise *ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον*.

b. 12. *γονεῖς*] = *προγόνους*. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 111) suggests that after *γονεῖς* a genitive, *τῶν γονέων*, may have fallen out, but does not press the suggestion.

The true self, described as ‘self-sufficient,’ is constituted by the consciousness of relations to others—ancestors, contemporaries, and descendants, within a definite, and comparatively narrow, circle. The self, like the state, must be *εὐσύνοπτος*. The *σπουδαῖος*—the man who is earnest about the performance of duty, will not allow himself to be influenced in his daily life by the supposed wishes of very distant ancestors, or by the supposed wants of very remote posterity: nor will he try to adapt himself to a very wide and miscellaneous body of contemporaries.

b. 16. § 8.] All the editors have long notes on this section, which, after all, is not very difficult. ‘Moreover we take (supply *οἰόμεθα*) Happiness to be the most choiceworthy of all good things—not “most choiceworthy” in the sense of being itself one of them, for (δέ as introducing this apagogic proof is practically equivalent to *γάρ*,

which Susemihl, following Aretinus, indeed reads) plainly, if it 1097 b. 16. were counted together with them as one of them, it would be made *more* choiceworthy by the addition of the least of them—the addition would cause an overbalance of good, and the greater good is always the more choiceworthy.' Cf. the Paraphrast's very clear note—*ἔτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ λέγομεν συναριθμεῖσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς τῶν γὰρ αἱρετῶν ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τὸ ἄκρον καὶ εἰ σύνστοιχον αὐτὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήσομεν ἀγαθοῖς, φανερὸν ὅτι, εἰ προσθήσομέν τι τῶν ἄλλων αὐτῇ, αἱρετωτέραν ποιήσομεν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἀν εἴη αὐτὴν τὸ ἄκρον τῶν αἱρετῶν.* Eustratius, on the other hand, absurdly interprets the passage as meaning that *εὐδαιμονία*, though *πάντων αἱρετωτάτη* without addition of minor good things, is nevertheless made *αἱρετωτέρα* *έαντης* by the addition of them—*οἷον τὸ εὔτριχον ἵστως, ή τὸ ἐπιδεξίως βαδίζειν, ή τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερον, δὲ προστιθέμενον τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ μηδενὸς λειπομένη τῶν κυριωτέρων πρὸς σύστασιν αἱρετωτέραν αὐτὴν έαντης ἀποτελεῖ.* I will not trouble the student with the other views of the interpretation of this passage. A statement and criticism of them will be found in Rassow's *Forsch.* pp. 112–115. Rassow interprets as I have done above, following the Paraphrast. So also do Coraes, Michelet, and Grant; Zeller, however (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. pp. 610, 611, third ed.), at the end of a somewhat puzzling note, suggests that the words *συναριθμούμενην δὲ . . . δεῖ*, or at least *ὑπεροχή . . . δεῖ* are an interpolation. But it is difficult to suppose that the writer of the *M. M.* i. 2. 1184 a. 15–25 had not the words suspected by Zeller before him when he wrote—*μετὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν πῶς τὸ ἄριστον δεῖ σκοπεῖν; Πότερον οὕτως ὡς καὶ αὐτοῦ συναριθμούμενον; Ἄλλ' ἀποπον.* Tὸ γὰρ ἄριστον ἐπειδή ἔστι τέλος τέλειον, τὸ δὲ τέλος τέλος ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν οὐθὲν ἀν ἄλλο δόξειν εἶναι ή *εὐδαιμονία*, τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν συντίθεμεν; ἐὰν δὴ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ συναριθμῆς, αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔσται βέλτιον αὐτὸ γὰρ βέλτιστον ἔσται. Οἷον τὰ ὑγιεινὰ θεῖς καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν, σκόπει τί τούτων πάντων βέλτιστον. Βέλτιστον δὲ ἔστιν ὑγίεια. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτο πάντων βέλτιστον, καὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ βέλτιστον ἀποπον δὴ συμβαίνει. Οὐ δὴ ἵστως οὕτω γε σκεπτέον τὸ βέλτιστον.

The doctrine of the present section may be explained as follows—*Εὐδαιμονία* is Life, and, as such, cannot be classed among the 'good things' of life. It is the Form and organisation of man's powers and opportunities. To suppose it possible to add one of these powers or opportunities to the already perfect Form, would be to suppose that the power or opportunity in question

1097 b. 16. has not been already organised in the Form<sup>1</sup>, and that consequently the Form is imperfect. The absurdity of such a supposition would equal that of representing a perfectly healthy man as made more healthy by the addition of a heart. As the various organs of the body have no function, and therefore no real existence, apart from the living body, so particular good things (virtue, health, beauty, wealth) have no existence, except as elements of the noble life.

In this section Aristotle virtually maintains all that Plato contended for in his doctrine of the Idea of the Good. As the Idea of the Good is the unity of good things, and that by reason of which they are good—in other words, as it is that definite system, or order, by belonging to, and subserving which, particular things are said to be *good*, rather than pleasant, or otherwise attractive to mere sense; so *εὐδαιμονία* is that orderly and beautiful life in relation to which, and only to which, man's powers and opportunities have any significance. The man who has no rational conception of the greatness and beauty of Life, as a system, will cherish, instead of that conception, an image borrowed from sense; he will identify Happiness, or Life, with pleasure, or honour. Having made this identification, he will easily persuade himself that 'Happiness' may be enhanced by the addition of particular good things; for *his* 'Happiness' is itself only a particular good thing. But Happiness, as the rational man conceives it, is not a *thing*—not something that a man receives passively and possesses (*κτῆμα*), but the *use* (*χρήσις*) which he makes of the things he has received and possesses. So, a tree is not the inorganic elements into which it may be analysed, but the use, as it were, to which the organising principle puts these elements. *Noūs* in man, like *φύσις* in the plant and animal worlds, recognises and imposes definite limits. Particular details are valued by it, not for themselves (if they were, no limit could be assigned to their desirable multiplication), but for the sake of the beautiful Life which transforms them. But the man who lives by 'sense and imagination' is immersed in these details. Life, or 'Happiness,' is for him a mere succession of particular experiences—an indefinite sum of good things which never satisfies him. To the external view

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Met.* Z. 17. 1041 b. 11 sqq., where it is shown in the case of *σάρξ* that the *οὐσία*, or organic whole, is not co-ordinate with its *στοιχεῖα* or elements, and cannot be added to them.

he may seem to be *εὐδαιμων*, because the material conditions or 1097 b. 16. elements of *εὐδαιμονία* are separately present; but the transforming spirit is inwardly wanting—

‘Er hat die Theile in seiner Hand,  
Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.’

He is receptive of isolated impressions; he lives *κατὰ πάθος*; he does not assert a personality in active function. Cf. *Poet.* 6. 1450 a. 18 ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἔστι, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξις τις ἔστιν, οὐ ποιότης.

§ 9. ἀλλ’ ἵσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν b. 22.  
τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δέ κ.τ.λ.] According to Ramsauer τὸ ἄριστον is the subject and τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν the predicate, and τὸ ἄριστον must be understood after τι ἔστιν. The accepted *name* εὐδαιμονία and the desiderated *definition* are thus contrasted by μὲν and δέ. But, if this were the construction, should we not have ἀλλ’ ἵσως τὸ μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δέ κ.τ.λ.?

§ 10. ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τάγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ] whether the *ἔργον* b. 26. be a substantive result *παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*, or simply the *ἐνέργεια* itself (see *E. N.* i. 1. 2 and *Met.* Θ. 8. 1050 a. 22-b. 3). In the former case the *ἔργον* is better than the *ἐνέργεια*, in the latter case than the *ἔξις*. Cf. *E. E.* ii. 1. 1219 a. 13 τὸ ἔργον λέγεται διχῶς· τῶν μὲν γάρ ἔστιν ἔτερόν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν, οἷον οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκίας ἀλλ’ οὐκ οἰκοδόμησις καὶ ιατρικῆς ὑγίειας ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑγίασις οὐδὲ ιατρευσις, τῶν δὲ ἡ χρῆσις ἔργον, οἷον ὅψεως ὅρασις καὶ μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης θεωρία. “Ωστ’ ἀνάγκη, ὅν ἔργον ἡ χρῆσις, τὴν χρῆσιν βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἔξεως. Of this latter kind is the *ἔργον* ἀνθρώπου of the present passage: cf. *Met.* Θ. 8. 1050 a. 34 ὅσων δὲ μή ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὄρῳ καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τις ἔστιν. Cf. also *M. M.* i. 3. 1184 b. 9 Τὸ δὲ τέλος ἔστιν οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἀλλὰ διπτόν· ἐνίων μὲν γάρ ἔστι τὸ τέλος αὐτὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ χρῆσις, οἷον τῆς ὕψεως· καὶ ἔστι γε ἡ χρῆσις αἱρετώτερά τῆς ἔξεως: Τέλος δὲ ἡ χρῆσις· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀν βούλοιτο ἔχειν τὴν ὕψιν μὴ μελλων ὅρῳν ἀλλὰ μύειν. ‘Ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ’ ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ‘Ων ἄρα καὶ χρῆσις καὶ ἔξις ἔστιν, ἀεὶ βέλτιον καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἡ χρῆσις τῆς ἔξεως· ἡ γὰρ χρῆσις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τέλος, ἡ δὲ ἔξις τῆς χρήσεως ἔνεκεν.

§ 11. πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ.] The editors point out that this passage b. 28. is taken from *Rep.* i. 352 Ε δοκεῖ τι σοὶ εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον; ἔμοιγε. ἄρα

1097 b. 28. οὖν τοῦτο ἀνθείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὄτουσῶν ἔργον, δὲ ἀνθείης μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῆτις ἡ ἀριστα; . . . ἐσθὲ ὅτῳ ἀνθείῳ ἀλλῷ ἴδοις ἡ ὁδοθαλμοῖς; οὐδῆτα. τι δή; ἀκούσαις ἀλλῷ ἡ ὡσίν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἀνταῦτα τούτων φάμεν ἔργα εἶναι; . . . οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστῳ, φίπτερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέτακται; . . . οὐδὲ δή, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι . . . ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι; μᾶλιστά γε, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι; φαμέν.

b. 33. §§ 12, 13.] The following extracts give in outline the psychology of these sections—viz. that living beings (*τὰ ἔμψυχα*), possessing the power of nutrition and growth, are either sentient (*ζῶα*) or non-sentient (*φυτά*). Sentient beings either combine their separate sensations into a rational experience (*ἀνθρωπος*), or they do not (*τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα*). *De An.* ii. 2. 413 a. 20 Λέγομεν οὖν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τῆς σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου τῷ ζῆν. Πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, κανὸν ἐν τι τούτων ἐνυπάρχη μόνον, ζῆν αὐτὸν φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἰσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφὴν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις. Διὸ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα πάντα δοκεῖ ζῆν φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι' οὓς αὔξησίν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους· οὐ γὰρ ἄνω μὲν αὔξεται, κάτω δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ὅμοιώς ἐπ' ἄμφῳ καὶ πάντῃ ὅσα καὶ τρέφεται, καὶ ζῆν διὰ τέλους, ἔως ἀν δύνηται λαμβάνειν τροφήν. Χωρίζεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τῶν ἄλλων δυνατόν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτου ἀδύνατον ἐν τοῖς θυητοῖς. Φανερὸν δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν φυομένων οὐδεμίᾳ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει δύναμις ἀλλῃ ψυχῆς. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῶσι, τὸ δὲ ζῶον διὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν πρώτως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα μηδὲ ἀλλάττοντα τόπον, ἔχοντα δὲ αἰσθησιν ζῶα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον. Αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πάσιν ἀφή. Ὁσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἀφῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἡ ἀφή τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. Θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιούτον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχει· τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἀπτικὴν αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα. 3. 414 a. 29 Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖται τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ εἴτομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη. Δυνάμεις δὲ εἴτομεν θρεπτικόν, ὀρεκτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. Υπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον, ἐτέροις δὲ τοῦτο τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν ὅρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντα ἔχουσι μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἀφήν· φὶ δὲ αἰσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδεός ὅρεξις αὔτη: . . . Ἐνίοις δὲ πρὸς τούτους ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, ἐτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἰ τι

τοιοῦτον ἔτερόν ἐστιν ἡ καὶ τιμιώτερον. . . . οἵς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει 1097 b. 33.  
λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, οἵς δ' ἐκείνων ἔκαστον,  
οὐ πᾶσι λογισμός, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασίᾳ, τὰ δὲ ταύτη μόνη ζῶσιν.  
Περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ ἔτερος λόγος.

§ 13. πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος] Grant translates, ‘a moral 1098 a. 3. life of the rational part,’ and compares vi. 2. 2 τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. This translation is somewhat misleading. Man's highest function is not *πρᾶξις* in the sense of moral, as distinguished from speculative ‘action’—*θεωρία*: nor do the words *πρακτική τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος* really limit us to the ‘moral life.’ See *Pol. H. 3. 1325 b. 14* ’Αλλ’ εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῆ πάσης πόλεως ἀν εἴη καὶ καθ' ἔκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. ’Αλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἔτερον, καθάπερ οἴονται τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβανόντων χάριν γυγνομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὅστε καὶ πρᾶξίς τις· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἔξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις ἀρχιτέκτονας. It is better then to translate the words *πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος*, ‘a life consisting in the action of the rational part.’

τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον] a. 4.  
‘With regard to the present passage,’ Grant says, ‘Bekker exhibits no variation in the MSS., and the Paraphrast evidently had it in his text. All that can be said therefore is that the present sentence interrupts the sense and grammar of the context, and that it is conspicuously awkward in a book which for the most part reads smoothly.’ Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 72) brackets the sentence, pointing out that *ἐπιπειθῆς* does not occur elsewhere in the Aristotelian canon, and appears only in very late Greek. While the sentence itself, then, is doubtless an interpolation, its doctrine is strictly Aristotelian, being, in fact, that laid down afterwards in ch. 13, § 19 of this book. ‘The rational part’ is (1) Reason proper, *τὸ λόγον ἔχον κυρίως*—that which ‘has reason’ in the strict and proper sense of ‘having,’ i.e. ‘has it *in itself*;’ (2) the appetites *qua* obedient to reason, *τὸ μετέχον λόγον*—that which ‘has reason,’ not in the strict and proper sense of ‘having,’ but in the sense of ‘participating in, or benefiting by, what another has.’

διττῶς κ.τ.λ.] ‘But, as this “rational life” may be understood in a. 5.

**1098 a. 5.** either of two senses—either as a state, or as a function, we must take it in the latter, which seems to be the more proper sense.' I am inclined to agree with Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 72) that *kai'* before *ταύτης* ought to be omitted. He supposes it to have been inserted after the clause *τούτου δὲ . . . διανοούμενον* had been interpolated. After *λεγομένης* Rassow conjectures that such words as *τῆς μὲν καὶ ἐνέργειαν τῆς δὲ καθ' ἔξιν* have fallen out (*Forsch.* p. 73).

**a. 7. §§ 14, 15.]** The apodosis begins with *τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν* § 15, where *γίνεται*, as Grant remarks, 'is used as denoting a deduction from premisses' [cf. i. 8. 3 for a similar use of *γίνεται*], and may be rendered 'it results that the good for man, &c.' Eustratius, however, gives a different force to *γίνεται*: *οὐκ εἰπε δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια ἐστίν ἀλλὰ γίνεται, διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἵστασθαι ὀφείλειν τὸν τέλειον ἀνθρωπον ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ διὰ παντὸς ἐμμένειν αὐτοῦ ἀντεχόμενον . . . ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως εἰπεῖν τὸ γίνεται· ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τινὰ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ὡς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἀγῶν καὶ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ὁ ἐνιαυτός τούτων γὰρ ἔκαστον ὅλον μὲν ὡς ὅλον οὐκ ἀπηρτισμένον ὑφίσταται, κατὰ μέρος δὲ γινόμενον ἀποτελεῖται παρερχομένων τῶν μερῶν οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν γεγονὸς ἥδη παρῆλθε, τὸ δὲ ἐπιγίγνεται μετ' ἐκεīνο, καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως, καὶ οὐδέποτε ὀλόκληρος ἵσταται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μικρὸν ἀπαρτίζεται· διὸ καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖον εἶναι εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι.* Is Eustratius thinking of *E. N.* ix. 9. 5 ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργεια τις ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ἑπάρχει ἀσπερ κτῆμά τι?

Grant's explanation of *γίνεται* is of course correct.

**§ 14. ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια]** The term *ψυχή* has not been actually used above, but is naturally suggested by the divisions enumerated in §§ 12 and 13, which are those of the *ψυχῆς*.

**κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου]** The Paraphrast explains rightly, I think, the distinction intended here: *κατὰ λόγον*, ὅταν διανοῆται, ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ λόγου, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος κινῆται μετὰ λόγου<sup>1</sup>. The expression *κατὰ λόγον* at the beginning of this section is followed, it will be observed, by the expression *μετὰ λόγου* at the end of the section; but the technical opposition between *κατὰ λόγον* (where *λόγος* is a principle governing life mechanically from without), and *μετὰ λόγου* (where *λόγος* regulates life from within: see notes on vi. 13. 5) does not seem to me to be raised in the present passage,

<sup>1</sup> So also Eustratius—*τὸ μὲν κατὰ λόγον περὶ τῆς οἰκείου ἔχονσης λόγον καὶ διανοούμενης ψυχῆς θέμενος· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου περὶ τῆς λόγῳ ἐπιπειθοῦς.*

although the two expressions occur in it. The expression  $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$  1098 a. 7.  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$  often stands merely for ‘rational,’ instead of  $\lambda\circ\gamma\kappa\circ\delta$ , which Aristotle does not use in this sense—or hardly ever: cf. *Met.* Θ. 5. 1048 a. 3, where  $\delta\upsilon\eta\mu\epsilon\iota\sigma$   $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$   $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$  are opposed to  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\eta\delta\eta\sigma$   $\delta\upsilon\eta\mu\epsilon\iota\sigma$ . Here, then (*E. N.* i. 7. 14), I think, the phrase  $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\iota\sigma$   $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$   $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$ = $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\iota\sigma$   $\lambda\circ\gamma\kappa\circ\delta$  (as a later writer might employ the adjective); and expresses shortly what has been set forth more fully in the words  $\epsilon\eta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$   $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$   $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$   $\eta$   $\mu\eta$   $\ddot{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$ , understood as by the Paraphrast<sup>1</sup>. Perhaps, however, it may be thought that  $\eta$   $\mu\eta$   $\ddot{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$  is= $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$   $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$  in the technical sense of the latter expression (*i.e.* where  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$  is an immanent principle regulating life), and that  $\eta$  thus introduces a correction of the inadequate formula  $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$   $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$ , which accordingly is not repeated, the more correct  $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$   $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$  being used. But it does not seem likely that Aristotle would introduce such an important distinction by means of the merely negative expression  $\mu\eta$   $\ddot{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$ . On the other hand, such a negative expression is well fitted to designate the obedience of the passions to reason, as distinguished from the spontaneous activity of reason itself in the sphere of thought.

$\tau\hat{\omega}$  γένει] qualifies  $\tau\hat{\omega}$  δ’ αὐτό.

a. 8.

§ 15.] *The Definition of εὐδαιμονία.* Muretus quotes Cicero’s neat a. 16. rendering of Aristotle’s definition of εὐδαιμονία, ‘Aristoteles virtutis usum cum perfectae vitae prosperitate conjunxit.’ *De Fin.* iv. 7.

$\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$   $\tau\hat{\eta}\nu$   $\dot{\alpha}\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\eta\eta$  καὶ  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\eta$ ] *i.e.*  $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$   $\tau\hat{\eta}\nu$  τοῦ νοῦ  $\dot{\alpha}\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\eta\eta$ . a. 17. Reason is the Form of man which is impressed on the matter of the lower nature which he shares with the brutes. This Form (identical with the  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\sigma$  or  $\dot{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\circ\eta$ , cf. *E. N.* iii. 7. 6 ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἔκαστον  $\tau\hat{\omega}$  τέλει: *Met.* Θ. 8. 1050 a. 21 τὸ γὰρ  $\dot{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\circ\eta$   $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\sigma$ ) is the  $\dot{\iota}\delta\iota\circ\eta$  (§ 12) which is the object of the present enquiry. In seeking to discover the definition of a thing (and Aristotle is here really seeking to discover the *definition of man*), we always look for the characteristic Form irrespective of the matter in which it is realised. Hence here, when Aristotle identifies Happiness with the  $\epsilon\eta\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$  of Reason, he is considering it *formally*—as something which admits of *definition* (see note on vii. 13. 2 b. 10). But

<sup>1</sup> This was written before I became acquainted with Bywater’s view that  $\dot{\alpha}\eta\theta\acute{\rho}\acute{\alpha}\pi\circ\eta$  1098 a. 12 . . . οὗτω 16 is a repetition of what has gone before. This view explains the conclusion which I had reached that  $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$   $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$  and  $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$   $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\nu$  are not distinguished here, as they are in vi. 13. 5.

- 1098 a. 17. it must not be forgotten (and Aristotle, unlike the Neoplatonist exponents of his system, never forgets this) that Reason, or the Form of Happiness, is only realised by man in a given matter, vegetative and sensitive. Accordingly, when Happiness is said to be an ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειωτάτην ἀρετήν, i.e. κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ, it is understood that *all* the functions, vegetative and sensitive, of man as a composite being are exercised in a harmony characteristic (*ἴδιον*) of man alone. This harmonious exercise of all his natural faculties is the ‘exercise of Reason’ in which man’s chief good consists. The exercise of Reason is *best* in the sense of being the co-ordination of all other functions, not in the sense of being itself a function abstracted from the others, capable (in man as distinguished from God) of operating without a material basis laid in the *ψυχή qua θρεπτική* and *αἰσθητική*. See Laas (*εὐδαιμονία, Aristotelis in Ethicis Principium quid velit et valeat*, Berlin, 1859), pp. 10 and 11: ‘In hac definitione non omnia plana sunt: mirum est quod hominis munus in sola ratione versatur, quia ejus propria sit; quasi non sentire et vivere, quamvis non proprium, tamen hominis munus sit. . . . Ut igitur cur rationi humana omnia tribuantur noscas, memineris quaeeso Aristotelem hominis proprium quaevisisse; est igitur hoc potius anquirendum cur alicujus rei vis in ejus proprio solo sit non in toto. . . . Cum Platoni omnis essentia vertatur in universalis, illi (i.e. Aristoteli) generalis definitionis pars nihil est nisi materia in qua vera essentia specificae differentiae exprimatur. . . . Ac si omne genus materia est, quo mersa differentiae forma, ut ita dicam, sola vim totius exprimit, etiam in rerum natura omne eatenus existit quatenus materiae forma est impressa: conditiones igitur necessariae ut forma possit comparere pro materia habentur; ut, cum primum illud forma definitum prodiit, eae ad rei vim percipiendam nullius sint momenti. Itaque si ex Aristotelis sensu omnis plantarum vita animalium propriam existentiam tempore praecedit tanquam conditio sine qua non, est ea in ipso animali materia, vera autem essentia in proprio est quod in ea exprimitur. Quare verum munus hominis non in vivendo, non in sentiendo seseque movendo—sed hae sunt conditiones in quibus rationalis hominis vita efflorescat.’
- a. 18. § 16. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 116, &c.) discusses the question whether these words mean, as generally supposed, ‘das volle menschliche Leben bis zum Tode’—i.e. a complete life spent prosperously up to the day of death. He begins by

admitting that there is much in favour of the view that such is their meaning: *first* the passage *E.N.* i. 9. §§ 10 and 11 οὐδὲ πᾶς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· οὕπω γάρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλὰ γάρ μεταβολὰ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ’ εὐθηροῦντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπετεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μιθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει: *secondly*, the circumstance that the later Peripatetics undoubtedly took the words in this sense—*E.E.* ii. 1. 1219 b. 6 διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς τὸ μὴ ζῶντ’ εὐδαιμονίζειν, ἀλλ’ ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθὲν γάρ ἀτελὲς εὐδαιμον’ οὐ γάρ ὅλον: *M.M.* i. 4. 1185 a. 4 οὐδ’ ἐν χρόνῳ γε ἀτελεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἐν τελείῳ τελείος δ’ ἀν εἴη χρόνος ὅσον ἄνθρωπος βιοῖ. There is nothing, however, in the expression *βίος τέλειος* taken by itself, Rassow thinks, to warrant us in assuming that Aristotle—as distinguished from his followers—makes a long continuously prosperous life a necessary condition of Happiness. The phrase *βίος τέλειος* taken by itself means simply a life that reaches its end or aim. Of course to reach its end or aim a life must have a reasonable duration, and a reasonable amount of prosperity; but the question still remains, Did Aristotle, like his successors of the Peripatetic school, identify this reasonable duration and prosperity, necessary for the attainment of the end, with a long life continuously prosperous up to the day of death? To answer this question, Rassow appeals to *E.N.* i. 10. 14 οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γάρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθῆσται ῥᾳδίως, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἀν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπίβολος. Thus, while Solon will allow the title of ‘happy’ only to the man who possesses Happiness without interruption to the end of his natural life, Aristotle does not regard it as impossible to regain a Happiness which one has lost. If then it is conceivable that a man may possess, lose, and then regain Happiness, how can the *βίος τέλειος*, in the sense of ‘das volle menschliche Leben bis zum Tode,’ be the necessary condition of Happiness? We shall have to return to this subject in ch. 10.

§ 17. περιγεγράφθω . . . ἀναγράψαι] The editors compare *de a. 20. gen. anim. ii. 6. 743 b. 20* ἀπαντα δὲ ταῖς περιγραφαῖς διορίζεται

1098 a. 20. πρότερον, υστερον δὲ λαμβάνει τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰς μαλακότητας καὶ τὰς σκληρότητας, ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἂν ὑπὸ ζωγράφου τῆς φύσεως δημιουργούμενα· καὶ γὰρ οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράψαντες τὰς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφοντι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ξένον. The meaning of ὑποτυπώσαι is to ‘mould slightly or roughly,’ then to ‘outline’ = περιγράψαι, which is opposed to ἀναγράψαι, to ‘fill in in detail.’

In this (the third) digression on the logical method of Ethics (§§ 17–23), Grant remarks (*Ethics* vol. i. p. 394) that ‘Aristotle points out his definition of the chief good as a “sketch to be filled up”; and also, it would appear, as an ἀρχή or leading principle, which in importance amounts to “more than half the whole” science. In filling up the sketch, he again cautions us that too much ἀκρίβεια is not to be expected. But it is plain that he has deserted his former view of the science as inductive [*i. e.* in i. 4. 5]; he now makes it depend on a general conception of the chief good which is to be applied and developed.’ See generally Grant’s Appendix A on the *Ethical method of Aristotle*. Grant seems to me to go too far when he says that, in the passage before us, Aristotle ‘has deserted his former view of the science as inductive.’ The opposition between induction and deduction is not an absolute one. In a concrete enquiry, of the complexity of that pursued in the *Ethics*, the phenomena could not be grouped and handled, as ‘induction’ requires, without the aid of ‘deduction.’ ‘A general conception of the chief good,’ framed in anticipation of the evidence to be afterwards fully adduced in support of it, is essential at the outset, as ‘throwing the light of science’ (to use Mill’s expression) upon phenomena which would otherwise baffle knowledge by their complexity and apparent inconsistency. Aristotle’s method in Ethics is thus ‘inductive,’ or ‘deductive,’ according to the point of view from which we choose to regard it. He starts with a ‘general conception,’ framed in advance of the facts, which he applies to their interpretation; so far his method is ‘deductive.’ But the results of the application of this ‘general conception’ are so carefully verified by appeals to experience at every step, and so often modified, to bring them into agreement with experience, that the so-called ‘deductive’ enquiry seems not to differ from the ‘inductive’ process of establishing generalisations by the observation of particular phenomena. In short Aristotle’s method in Ethics answers pretty exactly to what Mill (*Logic* Book vi. ch. 9) calls the ‘Physical or Concrete Deductive

method,' the method of astronomy, natural philosophy, physiology, 1098 a.20. and especially of social science, 'that most complex of all studies.' The author of the *Ethics* is 'aware' (to borrow Mill's words) 'that the same superior complexity [of social phenomena] which renders the instrument of deduction more necessary, renders it also more precarious'; and he meets this difficulty by the systematic use of verification, characterised by Mill as 'the third essential constituent part of the Deductive method,' and described as the process 'of collating the conclusions of the ratiocination either with the concrete phenomena themselves, or when such are obtainable, with their empirical laws.' Aristotle's appeals to 'the concrete phenomena themselves'—to his own observations in Ethics and Politics, occur on every page; while to 'their empirical laws,' as popularly recognised in *ἐνδοξα* and *λεγόμενα*, he attaches the greatest weight. The spirit in which Aristotle employs the concrete deductive method in the *Ethics* could not be better characterised than in the following passage (Mill's *Logic* vi. 9): 'The ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the *à priori* reasoning itself, but the accordance between its results and those of observation *à posteriori*. Either of these processes, apart from the other, diminishes in value as the subject increases in complication, and this in so rapid a ratio as soon to become entirely worthless; but the reliance to be placed in the concurrence of the two sorts of evidence, not only does not diminish in anything like the same proportion, but is not necessarily much diminished at all. Nothing more results than a disturbance in the order of precedence of the two processes, sometimes amounting to its actual inversion; insomuch that instead of deducing our conclusions by reasoning, and verifying them by observation, we in some cases begin by obtaining them conjecturally from specific experience, and afterwards connect them with the principles of human nature by *à priori* reasonings, which reasonings are thus a real verification.'

In the *Ethics* 'the order of precedence' is frequently 'disturbed,' and even 'inverted,' in correspondence with the exigencies of a difficult enquiry. Hence the hesitation which Aristotle's commentators have shown in deciding the question, whether the method of the *Ethics* is 'deductive,' or 'inductive.' The truth however is, as we have seen, that the abstract distinction between Deduction and Induction is not *à propos* in relation to a concrete enquiry like the present.

1098 a.20. With regard to Aristotle's attitude, in other concrete enquiries than those of the moral sciences, to the three operations noted by Mill (*Logic* iii. 11) as essential to the Deductive method, viz. the processes (1) of direct induction, (2) of ratiocination, and (3) of verification, it may be said that while he is fully aware of the importance of the third, and carries out the second with marvellous acuteness, he is not sufficiently careful about the first. His natural science is largely vitiated by the influence of *notiones temere a rebus abstractae*. But in ethical and political science the case is different. Here the ratiocinations, the results of which are carefully verified, proceed from principles which, from the nature of the subject to which they belong, are based on a solid foundation of experience. Human life is always present to our observation, and rouses our liveliest interest; and we frame true generalisations about it before we are well aware that we are generalising at all; at any rate, our unconscious generalisations are so nearly true, that subsequent conscious verification easily corrects them. But in the field of natural science, Aristotle had no such foundation already laid for his *ἀρχαί*. He had to depend, in an age in which observers were few and inexperienced, scientific collaboration unknown, and instruments of observation non-existent, almost entirely upon himself. Little wonder then that his principles in this field did not answer to the 'subtlety of nature,' and gave results often so vague, and wide of the mark, that they *seemed* to be verified by observations which were really quite irrelevant to the subject of enquiry.

a. 22. δόξειε . . . ἐλλεῖπον] Victorius, followed by most of the editors, quotes *Soph. El.* 34. 183 b. 17 τῶν γὰρ εὑρισκομένων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ' ἔτερων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεπονημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδέδωκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὕστερον τὰ δ' ἔξ ὑπαρχῆς εὑρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρώτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἴωθε, χρησιμωτέραν μέντοι πολλῷ τῆς ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξήσεως. Μέγιστον γὰρ ἵστως ἀρχὴ παντός, ἀσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτῳ μικρότατον δὲ τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ὀφθῆναι. Ταῦτης δ' εὑρημένης ῥᾶσιν τὸ προστιθέναι καὶ συναύξειν τὸ λοιπόν ἐστιν· ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς λόγους συμβέβηκε, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας τέχνας.

διαρθρώσαι] 'to articulate,' 'to work out in detail.'

a. 23. καὶ ὁ χρόνος κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Plut. *Conviv.* vii *Sap.* 9 τί σοφώτατον; χρόνος (ἔφη Θαλῆς) τὰ μὲν γὰρ εὑρηκεν οὗτος ἡδη τὰ δὲ εὑρήσει.

a. 26. § 18.] See Grant's useful note on the various meanings of *ἀκρίβεια*.

Here, according to Grant, *ἀκρίβεια* combines three meanings: ‘It 1098 a. 26. seems to say that *mathematical exactness* is not suited to Ethics—that too much *subtlety* is not to be expected (*καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης κ.τ.λ.*)—that too much *detail* is to be avoided (*ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα κ.τ.λ.*).’

The definition of the Chief Good is not like a definition in Geometry, the consequences of which can be demonstrated to the eye plainly in a diagram. It only enables us to trace *tendencies*—*τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*, which may be counteracted in particular cases. It is a principle, after all, not so much of science as of conduct; it leads us not to scientifically demonstrated conclusions, but to good and useful acts: cf. i. 3. 6 *τὸ τέλος ἔστιν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις*. Like the carpenter’s right angle, it is a principle *χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον* sufficiently correct for the practical purpose in view—a purpose which would be defeated if greater elaboration were attempted: cf. i. 13. 8 *θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσου ἰκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα*. Cf. Mill’s *Logic* vi. 9: ‘It is evident . . . that Sociology considered as a system of deductions *à priori* cannot be a science of positive predictions but only of tendencies. We may be able to conclude from the laws of human nature applied to the circumstances of a given state of society that a particular cause will operate in a certain manner, unless counteracted; but we can never be assured to what extent or amount it will so operate, or affirm with certainty that it will not be counteracted; because we can seldom know, even approximately, all the agencies which may coexist with it and still less calculate the collective result of so many combined elements. [E.g. the collective result in a given case of the elements of *εὐδαιμονία*. One man’s *εὐδαιμονία* may be seriously affected by external circumstances, which do not so seriously affect that of another.] The remark, however, must here be once more repeated, that knowledge insufficient for prediction may be most valuable for guidance. It is not necessary for the wise conduct of the affairs of society, no more than of any one’s private concerns, that we should be able to foresee infallibly the results of what we do. We must seek our objects by means which may perhaps be defeated, and take precautions against dangers which possibly may never be realized. The aim of practical politics is to surround any given society with the greatest possible number of circumstances of which the tendencies are beneficial, and to remove

1098 a. 26. or counteract as far as practicable those of which the tendencies are injurious. A knowledge of the tendencies only, though without the power of accurately predicting their conjoint result, gives us to a certain extent this power.'

a. 28. κατὰ τὴν ὑποκείμενην ὅλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ] Eustratius explains the distinction made here—οὐ μόνον φησίν, κατὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐπιζητεῖν δεῖ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὰς μεθόδους τὰς καταγινομένας περὶ αὐτά . . . εὑρίσκομεν γὰρ πολλάκις διαφόρους μεθόδους καταγινομένας ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸν ὑποκείμενον, οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπὸν ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν κατὰ τήνδε, τὴν δὲ κατὰ τήνδε τὴν πρόθεσιν . . . παράδειγμα τοῦ λόγου τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης περὶ ζῆτησιν ἀμφώ τῆς ὁρθῆς γωνίας καταγινόμενοι κ.τ.λ.

a. 29. § 19. καὶ γάρ] The connexion here is explained by Eustratius, as quoted in the last note. The comparison of the γεωμέτρης and τέκτων occurs also in Aristoxenus 33. 15 (p. 48, ed. Marquard)—δ μὲν γεωμέτρης οὐδὲν χρῆται τῇ τῆς αἰσθήσεως δυνάμει, οὐ γὰρ ἔθιζει τὴν ὄψιν οὔτε τὸ εὐθὺν οὔτε τὸ περιφερὲς οὔτ' ἀλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε φαύλως οὔτε εὖ κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δέ τέκτων καὶ δ τορνευτής . . . τῷ δὲ μουσικῷ σχεδόν ἐστιν ἀρχῆς ἔχουσα τάξιν ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀκρίβεια, οὐ γὰρ ἔνδεχεται φαύλως αἰσθανόμενον εὖ λέγειν περὶ τούτων ὥν μηδένα τρόπον αἰσθάνεται.

a. 30. τὴν ὁρθήν] sc. γωνίαν.

a. 31. τί ἐστιν ἡ ποιόν τι] 'Its essence, or essential attributes.' Technically τί ἐστι stands for the γένος, and ποιόν τι for the διαφορὰ εἰδοποίος which, impressed upon the matter of the γένος, makes the οὐσία or τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι declared by the ὄρισμός. See *Tōp.* iv. 2. 122 b. 15 οὐδενὸς . . . ἡ διαφορὰ γένος ἐστιν ὅτι δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, δῆλον· οὐδεμίᾳ γὰρ διαφορὰ σημαίνει τί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι, καθάπερ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπον: *Tōp.* iv. 6. 128 a. 26 ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ τὴν ποιώτητα τοῦ γένους, δεῖ σημαίνει . . . δέ γὰρ εἰπὼν πεζὸν, ποιόν τι λέγει ζῷον: *Met.* Δ. 14. 1020 a. 33 τὸ ποιὸν λέγεται ἔνα μὲν τρόπον ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς οὐσίας· οἶνον ποιόν τι ἀνθρωπος ζῷον, ὅτι δίπον, ἵππος δὲ τετράπον· καὶ κύκλος ποιόν τι σχῆμα, ὅτι ἀγώνιον, ὡς τῆς διαφορᾶς τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιότητος οὕσης. 'Diese Unterscheidungsmerkmale der Arten (i. e. ἡ διαφορά) . . . sind nicht,' says Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 206, ed. 3) 'accidentelle, sondern Wesensbestimmungen' (*Met.* vii. 4. 1029 b. 14, 1030 a. 14, *Tōp.* vi. 6. 144 a. 24 οὐδεμίᾳ γὰρ διαφορὰ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπαρχόντων ἐστί, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ γένος· οὐ γὰρ ἔνδεχεται τὴν διαφορὰν ὑπάρχειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν'), sie gehören zum

Begriff des Subjekts, von dem sie ausgesagt werden, alles daher, 1098 a. 31. was in ihnen enthalten ist, gilt von den Arten und den Einzelwesen, denen sie zukommen (*Kat.* c. 5. 3 a. 21 ff., b. 5). Es kann desshalb von ihnen gesagt werden, dass sie (zusammen mit der Gattung) die Substanz bilden (*Met.* vii. 12. 1038 b. 19), dass sie etwas substantielles aussagen (*Top.* vii. 2); sie selbst jedoch, für sich genommen, sind nicht Substanzen, sondern Qualitäten, drücken nicht ein *τι*, sondern ein *ποιόν τι* aus (*Top.* iv. 2. 122 b. 16, ch. 6, 128 a. 26, vi. 6. 144 a. 18-21, *Phys.* v. 2. 226 a. 27).<sup>1</sup>

The words before us are *τι ἔστιν ή ποιόν τι*, not *τι ἔστι καὶ ποιόν τι*. With *καὶ*, we could translate—‘the genus and difference,’ or ‘the generic and specific attributes,’ giving *τι ἔστι* its strict meaning, according to which it is distinguished from *τὸ τι ἥν εἶναι*. In *de part. anim.* i. 1. 641 a. 16 the phrase *καὶ τι καὶ ποιόν τι* actually occurs, where *τι* and *ποιόν τι* are equivalent to *γένος* and *διαφορά* respectively, and the whole amounts to *οὐσία*, or *τὸ τι ἥν εἶναι*. But here *ἢ* obliges us to give *τι ἔστιν* by itself the meaning of *τὸ τι ἥν εἶναι*, *οὐσία*, or ‘essence’; while the alternative (*ἢ*) *ποιόν τι*, which may be rendered by ‘essential attributes,’ expresses the same ‘essence’ looked at from a slightly different point of view, as constituted by the *τελευταία διαφορά*: see *Met.* Z. 12. 1038 a. 19 *φανερὸν ὅτι ή τελευταία διαφορὰ* [μετὰ τοῦ γένους δηλαδή, *Alex. ad loc.*] *ἢ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος ἔσται*: on which Alexander (p. 488, Bonitz’s edition of *Alex.*) has *ἢ τελευταία διαφορὰ ἔστι τὸ εἶδος, τὰ δὲ πρὸ αὐτῆς ὕλη . . . τὸ μὲν ζῷον πεζὸν ὕλη ἔστι . . . τὸ δὲ δίπονν εἶδος*: and Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 207, ed. 3) explains that the *τελευταία διαφορά* is not simply the last specific character as such, but the specific notion determined by it. On the technical distinction between *τι ἔστι* and *τὸ τι ἥν εἶναι* see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 207-9, ed. 3; Schwegler, *Met.* Excursus i; Trendelenburg, *Rhein. Mus.* 1828, vol. ii. 457-483; Trendelenburg, *De Anima* note on i. 1. 2 (cf. his note *de An.* iii. 4. 7 on *τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι*); Trendelenburg, *Kategorienlehre* 34 ff.; Biese, *Ph. d. Arist.* i. 243, 366, 427, ii. 35; Waitz, *Organ.* 67. b. 12, 94 a. 11. ‘Zu dem einfachen *τι ἔστι*,’ says Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 209, ed. 3), ‘verhält sich das *τι ἥν εἶναι* wie das Besondere und Bestimmte zum Allgemeinen und Unbestimmten . . . Das *τι ἥν εἶναι* ist mithin eine bestimmte Art des *τι ἔστι* (daher *De Anima*, iii. 6. 430 b. 28 *τοῦ τι ἔστι κατὰ τὸ τι ἥν εἶναι*, das Sein nach der Seite des Wesens), und es kann desshalb dieses, wie diess bei Arist. sehr häufig ist, in der engeren Bedeutung des *τι ἥν εἶναι* gebraucht werden, wogegen das letztere niemals

1098 a. 31. in der umfassenderen des *τι ἔστι* steht, so dass es auch den Stoff oder die blosse Eigenschaft oder das Allgemeine der Gattung, abgesehen von den artbildenden Unterschieden, bezeichnete.' Eustratius' note on the words before us is—ό δὲ γεωμέτρης τὴν τε οὐσίαν καὶ ποιότητα τῆς ὁρθῆς ἐπιζητεῖ τί τέ ἔστιν ἔξετάσων, καὶ τίνα ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν ὁξείαν καὶ ἀμβλεῖαν. This would be its *τελευταία διαφορά*.

a. 32. ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα κ.τ.λ.] cf. Agathon, apud Athen. 185

τὸ μὲν πάρεργον, ἔργον ὡς, ποιούμεθα,  
τὸ δὲ ἔργον, ὡς πάρεργον, ἐκπονούμεθα.

a. 33. § 20. οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον . . . ὅμοίως] Sections 17–19 have insisted on the importance of a *περιγραφή*, or *ἀρχή*, to the subsequent development of a science. Section 20 suggests that, while every science must accept its particular *ἀρχή* or *ἀρχαῖ* as ultimate (*i.e.* without foregoing *demonstration*), some sciences push their *ἀρχή* or *ἀρχαῖ* farther back than others. The theoretical sciences are concerned to have principles as ultimate and irreducible as possible<sup>1</sup>, whereas the practical science of Ethics, the end of which is not knowledge but conduct, does well to acquiesce in a principle or principles leading to useful applications, without troubling itself to go back very far upon the theoretical reasons which might be adduced (were it worth while) in support of the principle or principles in which it acquiesces. What the Paraphrast says of *ἀρχαῖ* generally is especially true of the *ἀρχή* of morals—εἰ γὰρ ξητήσομεν τῶν ἀρχῶν αὐτίαν οὐδέποτε ἀρξόμεθα ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἄπειρον βαδιούμεθα.

1098 b. 1. τὸ ὅτι] as distinguished from the *διότι*: see *An. Post.* i. 13. 78 a. 22, sqq. Cf. *E.N.* i. 4. 7. 1095 b. 6. Tὸ ὅτι may signify, either a particular fact accepted immediately on the authority of sense, or a general principle accepted, without syllogistic proof, on the authority of induction. In either case there is an *ἀρχή* or Beginning—a stimulus which initiates, in the one case, a movement in correspondence, or a process of continued observation; in the other

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Tēr.* i. 1. 100 a. 27 ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὅταν ἔξι ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων ὁ συλλογισμὸς ή, ή ἐκ τοιούτων ἀ διά τινων πρώτων καὶ ἀληθῶν τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνῶσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε . . . ἔστι δὲ ἀληθῆ μὲν καὶ πρώτα τὰ μηδὲ δι’ ἐτέρων, ἀλλὰ δι’ αὐτῶν ἔχοντα τὴν πίστιν οὐ δεῖ γάρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, ἀλλ’ ἐκάστην τῶν ἀρχῶν αὐτὴν καθ’ ἑαυτὴν εἶναι πιστήν. Cf. *De Gen. An.* ii. 6. 742 b. 32 τῆς γὰρ ἀρχῆς ἄλλῃ γνῶσις καὶ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις.

case, a ratiocinative train of thought. A sudden noise which 1098 b. 1. makes me turn round to look, and a general point of view which enables me to explain the particulars of a science, are both ἀρχαῖ.

οἶν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή] Rassow b. 2 (*Forsch.* p. 16), following Zeller and Münscher (*Quaest. crit.* p. 18), regards the words οἶν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς as an interpolation, at the same time holding that the whole passage § 18 μεμνῆσθαι a. 26 . . . § 23 ζητουμένων, b. 8, consisting mainly as it does of repetitions of i. 3. 1 and i. 4. 5–7, is not by Aristotle. Susemihl brackets § 17 δόξεις a. 22 . . . § 23 ζητουμένων b. 8. Ramsauer proposes the omission of δ' before ὅτι, and takes the clause τὸ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή closely with οἶν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς—‘velut in iis quae principia sunt causas quaerere absurdum; esse enim illa, omnium primum est.’ I think that οἶν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς may be an interpolation, but that we have no substantial grounds for condemning it as such.

§ 21. τῶν ἀρχῶν . . . ἄλλως] ‘And these starting-points, or principles, are arrived at, some in one way, some in another; some by induction, others by perception, others again by some kind of training.’ Peters.

ἐπαγωγῇ] Cf. *E.N.* vi. 3. 1139 b. 28 ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἔστιν καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. See *An. Post.* ii. 19, where the part played by the repetition of particular experiences in producing principles is graphically described. Cf. *An. Post.* i. 18. 81 a. 38 φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἴ τις αἰσθησις ἐκλελουπεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐκλελουπέναι, ἦν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν, εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ ἡ ἀποδείξει. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι εἰ μὴ δὲ ἐπαγωγῆς. . . ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἰσθησιν ἀδύνατον τῶν γὰρ καθέκαστον ἡ αἰσθησις. This last passage, dealing as it does with the origin of τὰ καθόλου or general principles, does not contradict the statement before us, αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ θεωροῦνται αἱ δὲ αἰνθῆσει κ.τ.λ. dealing with the origin of ἀρχαὶ or principles which are not regarded as necessarily general principles in all cases. Where an ἀρχή is the result of ἐπαγωγή, it is of course a general principle; but sense-perception (*αἰσθησις*) can also give an ἀρχή which, though merely a particular impression, is a *Beginning* (*ἀρχή*), or stimulus, capable of inducing a train of *φαντάσματα*, or of rousing an *ἐπιθυμία*, or of immediately calling forth a movement in response. The

**1098 b. 3.** ἀρχή produced by ἐπαγωγή is the cumulative result of a great many sense impressions, and action or thought suggested by such an ἀρχή is more likely to be in correspondence with the environment than that suggested by a single impression which may be of an exceptional character. But such a single impression obviously differs in degree rather than in kind from the deeper impression produced by induction. Sometimes we think and act on the strength of deep impressions produced by long and uniform experience, sometimes on the strength of the impressions which we receive at the moment. It is to be remembered, however, that the channels of these latter impressions—the organs of special sense—are themselves the results of long and uniform experience in the race, and that the impressions received through them are consequently not so particular as they seem to be when contrasted with ‘generalisations from experience,’ the formation of which we can trace in the life of the individual. Indeed Aristotle himself recognises the universal element in *αἰσθησις* in such passages as *An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 a. 16 καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἔκαστον, ἡ δὲ *αἰσθησις* τοῦ καθόλου ἔστιν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' οὐ Καλλίου ἀνθρώπου: and *An. Post.* i. 31. 87 b. 28 εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἡ *αἰσθησις* τοῦ τοιοῦδε, καὶ μὴ τοῦδέ τιος, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεσθαι γε ἀναγκαῖον τόδε τι, καὶ ποῦ, καὶ νῦν.

The latter part of the passage quoted above (note on § 19 a. 29) from Aristoxenus illustrates how *αἰσθησις* may be an ἀρχή: τῷ δὲ μουσικῷ σχεδόν ἔστιν ἀρχῆς ἔχοντα τάξιν ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀκρίβεια, οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φαύλως αἰσθανόμενον εὖ λέγειν περὶ τούτων ὥν μηδένα τρόπον αἰσθάνεται.

The ἀρχαὶ obtained by *ἔθισμός* are (1) the moral habits or tendencies to act in certain ways. These habits are produced by the repetition of particular acts, just as scientific generalisations result from repeated perceptions. After many observations we acquire a certain point of view which dominates our scientific procedure in the department to which the observations belong. After performing many similar acts we acquire a bent which disposes us to go on performing the acts in question. Farther, as belief goes with action, a tendency to act in a particular way is attended by a belief that it is good (*i.e.* right or desirable) to act in that particular way. Hence *ἔθισμός* not only produces the ἀρχή of Habit, or tendency to act in a particular way, but also, as a kind of *ἐπαγωγή*, produces (2) a point of view from which conduct is re-

garded—the ἀρχή of belief or opinion on moral matters. Cf. *E. N.* 1098 b. 3. i. 4. §§ 5, 6.

**καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως]** This does not mean that there are *other* b. 4. ways in which ἀρχαί are obtained besides the three mentioned. Transl. ‘some in one, some in another of these three ways.’

Eustratius has a note which brings out well the connexion between the clause *τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μέν κ.τ.λ.* and what immediately precedes: ἐπεὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ δὶ ἀπόδειξιν εἰπε γνώσκεσθαι, μηδὲ τὸ διότι περὶ αὐτῶν ἀποδίδοσθαι, ὡσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος—καὶ πῶς ταύτας γνωρίσομεν καὶ ἐπιστησόμεθα ἀγνώστους οὕστας καὶ μὴ ὑποβαλλομένας ἐπιστήμην; συμβήσεται γὰρ διὰ τῶν ἀδήλων δῆλα τὰ ἀδηλα γίνεσθαι—παραδίδωσι τοὺς τρόπους δὶ ὁν ἡμῖν ἡ γνῶσις τῶν ἀρχῶν περιγίνεται ἄλλους παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὅντας. ἐπαγωγῇ μὲν θεωροῦνται ὡς αὗται· τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἵσα καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἵσα κ.τ.λ. . . . αἰσθήσει δὲ ὡς τὰς ἑκάστου τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων οἰκείας γνωρίζομεν ποιότητας· οὖν πυρὸς μὲν τὴν θερμότητα, ἀέρος δὲ τὴν ὑγρότητα, ὕδατος τὴν ψυχρότητα, γῆς τὴν ἔηρότητα. ἐθισμῷ δέ, ὡς αἱ ἀρεταὶ πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως καλὰ εἶναι γνωρίσομεν τὰ σωφρονικὰ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ταῦτα;

**§ 22. μετιέναι κ.τ.λ.]** ‘We must endeavour to attain each in the natural way’—Grant. *E.g.* we must remember that moral principles naturally result from ἐθισμός. We must not try to reach them by a purely intellectual process, as if they were theoretical principles, or by the short-cut of the intuition or feeling of the moment. Cf. Eustratius—ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ διαφόρους τρόπους ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν γνῶσις ἡμῖν περιγίνεται, διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν ὅτι πειρατέον ἑκάστας κατὰ τὸν τρόπον ἐκείνου μετέρχεσθαι καθ' ὃν πεφύκασιν εἰς γνῶσιν ἡμῖν ἔρχεσθαι.

**διορισθῶσι]** Cf. *An. Post.* ii. 3. 90 b. 24 αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων b. 6. δρισμοί· ὁν διὰ οὐκ ἔσονται ἀποδείξεις, δέδεικται πρότερον. ἡ ἔσονται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀποδεικταί, καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀρχαί, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς ἀπειρον βαδιεῖται, ἡ τὰ πρώτα δρισμοὶ ἔσονται ἀναπόδεικτοι. Bywater has restored διορισθῶσι from K<sup>b</sup>, for the δρισθῶσι of all other MSS.

**§ 23. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἡ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή]** Cf. *Pol.* E. b. 7. 4. 1303 b. 29 ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἥμισυ εἶναι παντός, which seems to be the ordinary form of the proverb. Did Aristotle borrow the modification πλεῖον ἡ ἥμισυ from Plato, *Legg.* 753 E—ἀρχὴ γὰρ λέγεται μὲν ἥμισυ παντὸς ἐν ταῖς παροιμίαις ἔργου, καὶ τό γε καλῶς ἀρξασθαι πάντες ἐγκεκωμάζομεν ἑκάστοτε· τὸ δ' ἔστι τε, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, πλέον ἡ τὸ ἥμισυ καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτὸς καλῶς γενόμενον ἐγκεκωμίακεν ἴκανῶς? If we are to believe Teichmüller, however (*Literarische Fehden*, p. 188), the

- 1098 b. 7. *Ethics* were written before the *Laws*. Cf. *Probl.* x. 13, 892 a. 29  
 $\eta\mu\acute{e}v\gamma\grave{a}\rho\acute{\alpha}\chi\eta\pi\alpha\nu\tau\acute{o}s\acute{e}\rho\gamma\acute{o}n\mu\acute{e}\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\acute{o}v\eta\mu\acute{e}v\gamma\grave{a}\rho\acute{\alpha}$ . Cf. Hor. *Ep.* i. 2. 40 ‘Dimidium facti, qui coepit, habet,’ and Orelli’s note *ad loc.* Lucian, *Hermot.* 3, erroneously attributes the proverb to Hesiod; but Hesiod’s dictum ( $\acute{e}\rho\gamma\alpha\kappa.\eta\mu.30\nu\acute{e}\pi\acute{o}i\acute{o}\acute{v}\acute{e}\acute{d}\acute{e}\acute{\pi}\acute{\sigma}\acute{\omega}\acute{\pi}\acute{\lambda}\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\o}\acute{\nu}\eta\mu\acute{e}v\gamma\grave{a}\rho\acute{\alpha}\acute{\nu}\acute{\tau}\acute{\o}\acute{s}$ ) has an entirely different meaning.
- b. 8. [συμφανῆ] The notion of the Chief Good ‘throws the light of science’ upon the complicated phenomena of human life.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### ARGUMENT.

*Let us now see if our Definition agrees with popular opinions about Happiness, for if it does not, it cannot be true in fact, however correct in logic.*

*Good things are popularly distinguished as (1) external good things, (2) good things of the soul, (3) good things of the body; and good things of the soul are placed highest. Our Definition agrees, making the Chief Good consist in certain vital functions or actions of the soul, and in conduct. Indeed the expressions ‘functions,’ ‘actions,’ and ‘conduct,’ by themselves, are sufficient to show that our end is a good thing of the soul, not an external good thing. Again, the Happy man is popularly said to ‘live well,’ and ‘to do and fare well’: now, we practically define Happiness as ‘a good life,’ or as ‘well-doing.’ Further, everything that has ever been viewed as an essential requirement of Happiness, and has consequently been identified with it, is included in our Definition—Goodness, Prudence, Wisdom, Pleasure, External Prosperity. We must believe that these, as elements, are really contained in Happiness, unless we are prepared to deny all weight to consensus and authority.*

*In the first place, then, we have the support of those who say that Happiness is Goodness, for we make it a function manifesting excellence, or goodness—our advance being that we thus make it consist, not in possession, but in use, not in having something, but in doing something: for a man may have a good thing, and yet it may result in no good for him. As at Olympia the crown is for one of the competitors, not for the strongest man in Greece if he hold aloof, so in life, success is won not by being good, but by well-doing.*

*Again, our Definition gives due place to Pleasure, for the ‘life of well-doing’ has its own pleasure—an inherent pleasure, not a merely ornamental pleasure, which may be put on, as it were, and taken off. Whatever a man does habitually he likes, i. e. takes pleasure in; and the good man takes pleasure in the good actions which constitute his Happiness—indeed he would not be a good man if he did not take pleasure in them. Moreover, taking pleasure in the things which he ought to take pleasure in, he enjoys real pleasures, i.e. pleasures which*

combine together harmoniously in his life; whereas the pleasures of ordinary men are unreal, as judged by this test, i. e. they conflict with one another.

And not only are the actions in which Happiness consists pleasant in the eyes of the good man—they are also truly good and truly fair in his eyes: and he is the best judge.

Happiness, then, is in itself ‘fairest, sweetest, best’—all three: it is not righteousness which is fairest, and possession sweetest, and health best, as the Delian Inscription hath it: yet, ‘the functions of the highest excellence,’ in which Happiness consists, cannot be performed in the absence of external good things. It is impossible, or difficult, to play a brilliant part on the stage of life without equipment. Friends, wealth, influence, are the instruments; high birth, fair children, beauty, the ornaments of the Happy Life. This is why some have even identified Happiness with external prosperity, i. e. with good fortune.

§ 1. σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς] αὐτῆς grammatically refers to ἀρχή in 1098 b. θ. 7. § 23, but the sense requires us to understand εὐδαιμονίας. I read δέ for δή, with Susemihl and Bywater.

ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος] These words are to be taken as a periphrasis for ‘logically,’ ‘syllogistically,’ or ‘formally.’ ‘But we must examine our principle—the notion of the Chief Good, not only from the formal point of view—from the point of view of “Conclusion and Premisses,” but also in the light of the popular opinions about it.’ This rendering takes λόγος=συλλογισμός by a common usage, and contrasts τὰ ἐξ ὧν, the premisses, with the συμπέρασμα. Cf. *An. Post.* i. 7, i. 10, and especially *An. Prior.* ii. 4. 57 a. 36 (quoted by Ramsauer) φανερὸν οὖν ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τὸ συμπέρασμα ψευδές, ἀνάγκη ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος ψευδῆ εἶναι ή πάντα ή ἔνια. This passage seems decisive as to the meaning of the phrase ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, and deprives of plausibility an objection which might be urged against our rendering, viz. that λόγος must here mean ὄρισμός, and not συλλογισμός, because in the subsequent sections it means ὄρισμός. Coraes is therefore wrong with ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος τὰ μέρη ἐξ ὧν ὁ ὄρισμός σύγκειται τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. The definition of the Chief Good has been reached as a συμπέρασμα by a process of reasoning from premisses (ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος) involving such abstract notions as τέλος, ἀγαθόν, ἐνέργεια. The result of this abstract process—the Definition of the Chief Good in i. 7. 15—must, Aristotle now says, be *verified* by being collated with concrete experience as embodied in the common opinions and sayings of men. While this seems to be the plain meaning of the passage before us, the awkwardness of its phraseology must be admitted. Συμπέρασμα, the technical term for the conclusion of the συλλογισμός, is im-

1098 b. 9. properly applied to an ἀρχὴ ἡσ οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμός, especially in a context like the present (unless Rassow and Susemihl are right in bracketing ch. vii. §§ 17 or 18–23), where the non-syllogistic origin of ἀρχαὶ is carefully insisted upon. Eustratius, who sees the difficulty just noticed, has a good note, in which he gives what I take to be the correct interpretation—*ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας δρισμοῦ μεταβὰς εἰς τὸ κοινῶς εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, κάτεισιν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἥν αὐτὸς ἔθετο τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δρισάμενος. ἐπεὶ δὲ συλλογισάμενος διὰ πολλῶν συνηῆσεν αὐτήν, τὸ δῆτι οὐ τὸ διότι ἀποδιδούς* [Eustr. has said above in his note on 7. § 20 τὰ μέρη τοῦ δρου τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐκλεγόμενος οὐδαμῆ αἰτίαν εἴληφε δι' ἣν ὑπάρχει ἐκείνων ἔκαστον τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ οὐδὲ διατί μέρος τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς ἔστιν . . . ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη δείξις τοῦ δῆτι οὐ τοῦ διότι ἔστι], φησὶ νῦν δῆτι σκεπτέον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰ ἀρμόδιος δρος τῆς εὐδαιμονίας δ ἀποδοθείς, οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος δ αὐτῇ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁ δρός ἔστι, καὶ ἐξ ὧν δ λόγος τουτέστιν ἐκ τῶν προτάσεων ἐξ ὧν ἡ περὶ αὐτοῦ δείξις συντέθειται, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.]

The doctrine, justly insisted upon by Aristotle in the present passage—that the principle of moral science must be brought to the test of substantial agreement with popular opinion—does not admit of analogical extension to the principles of the physical sciences. Popular opinion cannot afford to be far wrong in matters of conduct, but has little reason for being right as to the remote truths of the physical sciences. Aristotle, however, submits the principles of the physical sciences, equally with the principle of moral science, to *dialectical* tests, *i.e.* examines them in connexion with τὰ ἔνδοξα: see *Top.* i. 2. 101 a. 36 ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρώτα τῶν περὶ ἔκαστην ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν [*χρήσιμος ἡ πραγματεία, i.e. the Topics, which supply premisses for the διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμός, and rules for its employment*]: ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτεθεῖσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ πρῶται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀπάντων εἰσὶ, διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἔκαστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν διελθεῖν τοῦτο δ' ἵδιον ἡ μάλιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἔστιν ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα, πρὸς τὰς ἀπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὅδὸν ἔχει. In his note on the above passage, Alexander (Berlin Schol. 254 b. 36) illustrates the relation of Dialectic to first principles, by showing how ἔνδοξα may be used in support and elucidation of the Definitions of Geometry. See Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. pp. 243–4 ed. 3) ‘Sie (*i.e.* die Dialektik) dient insofern namenlich zur Feststellung der wissenschaftlichen Prinzipien, denn da sich diese als ein erstes nicht durch Beweisführung aus etwas gewisserem ableiten lassen, bleibt nur übrig, sie vom

wahrscheinlichen aus zu suchen. Ihren Ausgang nimmt eine 1098 b. 9. solche Untersuchung von den herrschenden Annahmen der Menschen; denn was alle, oder doch die erfahrenen und verständigen glauben, das verdient immer Beachtung, da es die Vermuthung für sich hat, auf einer wirklichen Erfahrung zu beruhen (cf. *E. N.* vi. 11. 6, x. 2. 4, vii. 13. 5; *Rhet.* i. 1. 1355 a. 15). Je unsicherer aber diese Grundlage ist, um so mehr drängt sich auch Aristoteles das Bedürfniss auf, aus welchem schon die Sokratische Dialektik entsprungen war, ihre Mangelhaftigkeit dadurch zu verbessern, dass die verschiedenen in der Meinung der Menschen sich kreuzenden Gesichtspunkte zusammengebracht und gegen einander ausgeglichen werden. Daher die Gewohnheit des Philosophen, seinen dogmatischen Untersuchungen *Aporien* voranzuschicken.'

That Aristotle failed to draw consciously any very marked distinction between the principle, or principles, of moral science, and the principles of the physical sciences, as related to *ἐνδοξα*, shows how defective his conception of the method of the physical sciences really was. The dialectical sifting of *ἐνδοξα*, or men's opinions about facts, in order to find the residuum of truth contained in these opinions, can never take the place, in the physical sciences, of direct observation and arrangement of the facts themselves. The dialectical method of physical enquiry is on a par with the attempt to sift historical truth directly out of myths by a rationalising process (on which see Grote's *Greece*, Part i. ch. 16)<sup>1</sup>. The importance, however, of a dialectical treatment of the principle, or principles, of *moral* science cannot be too much insisted on. The value of these principles is that they lead 'not to knowledge but to conduct.' Unless conduct is to be revolutionised rather than regulated, these principles must, on the whole, agree with the moral sentiments and opinions which, by their prevalence, prove themselves to be such as the welfare of man requires.

The moralist's function, then, according to Aristotle's view (the justice of which is indisputable), is to introduce form, clearness, consistency, into the body of opinions, on practical matters, commonly held by men. These opinions are, on the whole,

<sup>1</sup> We must not, however, underrate the indirect service rendered by Aristotle to these very physical sciences. His 'dialectical' treatment of their principles put Europe in possession of the subtle calculus of philosophical language, without which later brains could not have thought out the discoveries suggested to them by wider and more careful observations.

1098 b. 9. sound (otherwise they would not prevail on matters of such vital importance to the human race), but are wanting in clearness and consistency viewed as a body. The moralist, viewing them as a body, detects and removes the inconsistencies, and produces a system in which his contemporaries recognise the clear expression of their own obscurely entertained sentiments. So, to take a parallel case, the policy of Pericles was recognised by the Athenian δῆμος as the perfect form of its own political views and aspirations, which, without his genius, would never have found expression as a system. See *E. E.* i. 6. 1216 b. 26 πειρατέον δὲ τούτων πάντων ξητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις· εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντας, ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν ἔχει γὰρ ἔκαστος οἰκείον τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύναι πῶς περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶν μὲν λεγομένων, οὐ σαφῶς δὲ προϊοῦσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαμβάνοντας δεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι συγκεχυμένως (cf. *de Anima* ii. 2. 413 a. 11): *E. N.* vii. 1. 5 δεῖ δ' ὁσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα, καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας, οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λίγηται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἀν εἴη ἰκανός. —*E. N.* x. 12 σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον (cf. *E. N.* x. 1. §§ 3, 4).

b. 11 τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ . . . τάληθεῖ] The passage *E. N.* x. 12, just quoted, helps us to understand this clause. Τὰ ὑπάρχοντα are ‘the natural attributes of the thing, the facts of its nature’ (Grant), which, it is here tacitly assumed, are adequately represented in the opinions or λεγόμενα appealed to. If the Definition be true (*τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ*), these commonly recognised facts will agree with it; but if it be false (*τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ*), they will soon show themselves at variance with it. Grant notices the confusion caused ‘by the word *τάληθεῖ* in the second part of the sentence answering to *τὰ ὑπάρχοντα* in the first,’ and consequently having to be taken in a different sense from *τῷ ἀληθεῖ* immediately above. Rassow, however (*Forsch.* p. 73), conjectures, with great plausibility, that *τάληθεῖ* is the blundering interpolation of a reader, who did not observe that *τὰ ὑπάρχοντα* is the subject of *διαφωνεῖ*, as well as of *συνάδει*. His words are ‘Vergegenwärtigt man sich den Zweck

des Abschnittes, so wird man nicht Anstand nehmen können, das 1098 b. 11. Wort τὰληθές als falschen Zusatz eines Lesers, der ein Subject zu διαφωνεῖ vermisste, auszumerzen. Denn Aristoteles kann nur dieses sagen wollen: ist eine Begriffsbestimmung richtig, so stimmt sie mit den ὑπάρχοντα überein d. h. hier mit dem, was einem Dinge nach allgemeiner Ansicht zukommt; ist sie falsch, so ergiebt sich bald, dass sie damit in Widerstreit steht.'

§ 2. νενεμημένων δή . . .] ‘To apply our principle ( $\delta\eta$ ), goods b. 12. have been divided into three kinds’ (Grant)—i.e. to apply the principle of appealing to λεγόμενα.

As Ramsauer observes, this threefold division of goods is indicated by Plato in *Philebus* 48 E and *Euthyd.* 279 B. Cf. also *Legg.* 743 E. It is a very natural division, and doubtless was made long before Plato and Aristotle; but the Peripatetics seem to have given it philosophical importance, by taking it in connexion with their discussions of εὐδαιμονία. Cf. Plut. *de Vita et Poesi Homeri*, ch. 137 οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου πρωτεύειν μὲν τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθὰ νομίζουσιν οἶν φρόνησιν ἀνδρείαν σωφροσύνην δικαιοσύνην. δεύτερα δὲ εἴναι τὰ τοῦ σώματος οἶν ὑγίειαν κ.τ.λ. . . . τρίτα δὲ τὰ ἔκτὸς οἶν εὐδοξίαν κ.τ.λ. . . ἐπαινετὸν μὲν γὰρ εἴναι καὶ θαυμαστὸν τὸ ἐν ἀλγηδόσι καὶ νόσῳ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ συμφορᾶις ἀβουλήτοις χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀρετῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀντεχούσης τοῖς κακοῖς, οὐ μέντοι αἰρετόν, οὐδὲ μακάριον· τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀγαθοῖς νοῦν ἔχειν τῷ ὄντι εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν κτῆσιν μόνην τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἴναι καλόν. Didymus—Αριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν περιπατητικῶν περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν δόγματα (Mullach, *Fr. Phil.* ii. pp. 89, 90)—after making out a parallelism between the ἀγαθά of body, mind, and estate thus—

ὑγίεια	σωφροσύνη	πλοῦτος
ἰσχύς	ἀνδρεία	ἀρχή
κάλλος	δικαιοσύνη	φιλία
εὐαισθησία	φρόνησις	εὐτυχία—

goes on to say—τοὺς δὲ νομίζοντας τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθὰ συμπληροῦν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν εὐδαιμονία βίος ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ βίος ἐκ πρᾶξεως συμπεπλήρωται· τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἔκτὸς ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πρᾶξιν εἴναι καθ' ἕαντό, οὐθ' ὅλως ἐνέργειαν.

The passages in which Aristotle refers to this threefold division are *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 25 οὗτοι γὰρ αὐταρκέστατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τὰ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἔκτὸς ἀγαθά. ἔστι δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δὲ εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμή:

1098 b.12. *Pol. H. I.* 1323 a. 22 νομίσαντας οὖν ἵκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ μὲν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ πρός γε μίαν διαιρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσειεν ἄν, ὡς οὖ, τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἑκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίοις χρή. Cf. *E. E. ii. I.* 1218 b. 32 πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἦ ἑκτὸς ἦ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τούτων αἱρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις: *M. M. i. 3.* 1184 b. 2 ἔστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ σώματι οἷον ὑγίεια, κάλλος, τὰ δὲ ἑκτός, πλοῦτος ἀρχὴ τιμὴ ἦ εἴ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων. τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βέλτιστα. The following passage, attributed by Mullach (*Fr. i. p. 554 b.*) to the Pythagorean Archytas, is so evidently from a late Peripatetic summary done into the Doric dialect, that it is added here merely as another proof of the importance given by Peripateticism to the threefold division of ἀγαθά, not as being a possible source from which Aristotle may have borrowed that division: ὁ δ' ἀνθρωπος οὐχ ἀ ψυχὰ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τὸ γὰρ ἔξ ἀμφοτέρων ζῶον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνθρωπος· καὶ γὰρ αἱ τᾶς ψυχᾶς ὅργανον τὸ σῶμα πέφυκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ μέρος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἀ ψυχά. διὸ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀ μέν ἐντι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀ δὲ τῶν μερέων, καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν ἀγαθὸν εὐδαιμοσύνα, τῶν δὲ μερέων τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ψυχᾶς μέν, φρόνασις, ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνα, σωφροσύνα, σώματος δὲ κάλλος, ὑγίεια, εὐεκτία, εὐαισθασία. τὰ δὲ ἑκτός, πλοῦτος καὶ δόξα καὶ τιμὴ καὶ εὐγένεια ἐπιγέννημα ἥμεν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἀκόλουθα τοῖς φύσει προϋφεστακόσιν ἀγαθοῖς. δορυφορεῖ δὲ τὰ μῆρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέρονα, φιλία μὲν καὶ δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος σῶμα καὶ ψυχάν, ὑγίεια δὲ καὶ ἴσχὺς καὶ εὐαισθασία ψυχάν, φρόνασις δὲ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνα καὶ ἀ δικαιοσύνα τὸν νόον τᾶς ψυχᾶς, δὲ νόος τὸν θεόν. οὗτος γὰρ ὁ κράτιστός ἐντι καὶ ὁ ἀγεμονεύων· καὶ τούτῳ ἔνεκα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν ἀγαθῶν δεῖ παρῆμεν. στρατεύματος μὲν γὰρ ἀγεῖται στραταγός, πλωτάρων δὲ κυβερνάτας, τῷ δὲ κόσμῳ θεός, τᾶς δὲ ψυχᾶς νόος, τᾶς δὲ περὶ τὸν βίον εὐδαιμοσύνας φρόνασις. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτερόν ἐντι φρόνασις, αἱ μὴ ἐπιστάματα τᾶς περὶ τὸν βίον εὐδαιμοσύνας ἦ ἐπιστάματα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθῶν.

b. 14. λέγομεν] ‘are commonly said to be.’ Peters.

b. 16. τίθεμεν] ‘may be said to be.’ Peters.

ῶστε καλῶς ἀν λέγοιτο] ‘so our Definition (λόγος) is right.’ Tὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνέργειας τὰς ψυχικάς of the present passage is equivalent to the ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια of the Definition, as given in ch. 7. § 15. In making the highest good an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, the Definition agrees with the commonly accepted view that the goods of the ψυχῆς are the highest.

§ 3. δρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι . . . τέλος] ‘But indeed we secure the 1098 b.18. support of this opinion by the mere statement that certain actions and exercises are the end’—Peters: *i. e.* ‘our Definition is also seen’ to be right, in that it makes certain actions and functions the end.’ ‘Qui enim dicunt, actionibus humanis felicitatem contineri, in animo sitam felicitatem volunt, cum solus animus in homine agendi sit principium’—Michelet. As *ψυχικάς* was the emphatic word in the previous §, *ἐνέργειαι* is emphatic here: see Eustr., *διαφέρει δὲ τοῦτο* (*i. e.* the point made in § 3) *τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ* (*i. e.* that made in § 2), *ὅτι ἐν ἔκεινῳ μὲν τὸ καλῶς εἰρῆσθαι ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν συνέστησεν* ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ δρθῶς λέγεσθαι πράξεις εἶναι καὶ ἐνέργειας τὸ τέλος. *τὸ δὴ τινὲς προσέθηκεν ὅτι οὐχ ἀπλῶς πράξεις καὶ ἐνέργεια τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ ποιαῖ· ἥτοι κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀγαθαῖ.*

γίνεται] ‘is shown to be.’ Cf. i. 7. 15 for this use of *γίνεται*. b. 20.

§ 4. τῷ λόγῳ] ‘our Definition.’

τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαιμονα] ‘the popular saying that the *εὐδαιμων* lives and fares well.’

εἰρηται] *i. e.* in our Definition.

b. 22.

§ 5.] ‘Farther, the various things which are looked for in Happiness seem all to belong to it as we have defined it.’

§ 6. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῇ] The Cynics, who held *αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν* b. 23. *εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν* (Diog. L. vi. 11 apud Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Ph.* § 226 *Cynici*)—a view afterwards adopted by the Stoics.

τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις] The commentators generally identify this with b. 24. the view of Socrates, comparing *E.N.* vi. 13. 3; cf. *E.E.* i. 5. 1216 b. 3 Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ὡς τέλος εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ ἐπεξήγεται τί ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἔκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς ἐποίει γὰρ ταῦτ’ εὐλόγως. ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ὡς τέλος εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὡσθ’ ἂμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. ἄμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἔσμεν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι. Of course this is an absurd travesty of the doctrine of Socrates.

ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις] Anaxagoras probably for one: cf. *E.E.* i. 5. 1216 a. 11 τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τινα διαποροῦντα τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα, καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἔνεκ’ ἂν τις ἔλοιτο γενέσθαι

1098 b. 24. μᾶλλον ἡ μὴ γενέσθαι “τοῦ” φάναι “θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον τάξιν.” Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης τιὸς ἔνεκεν τὴν αἰρεσιν ὥστο τιμίαν εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν. Cf. *E. E.* i. 4. 1215 b. 6 Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν δὲ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς δὲ εὐδαιμονέστατος, “οὐθεὶς” εἶπεν “ῶν σὺ νομίζεις, ἀλλ’ ἄτοπος ἂν τίς σοι φανέΐ.” Τούτον δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὅντα καὶ καλὸν ἡ πλούσιον ταύτης τυγχάνειν τῆς προσηγορίας. Αὐτὸς δὲ ἵστως ὥστο τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἡ τινος θεωρίας κουνωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν μακάριον εἶναι. Cf. *E. N.* x. 8. 11.

b. 25. τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἡ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἡ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς] cf. Plato *Philebus* 27 D ἦθι δὴ νικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως: cf. *Phileb.* 60 D, E.

μεθ' ἡδονῆς] seems to mean ‘with pleasure added,’ as distinguished from οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς, ‘with pleasure essentially involved’; so, apparently, the Paraphrast—τοῖς δὲ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀπὸ αὐτῶν τούτων τικτομένης. Cf. below, § 12 οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς δὲ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. When Plato praises τὸν μικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως, he, like Aristotle, regards the relation of pleasure to virtuous action as an essential one: this is plain from *Philebus* 63 E ἀλλας δὲ ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς ἃς εἶπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθ' ὑγείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῦν καὶ δὴ καὶ ἔνυπάστης ἀρετῆς ὅπόσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὀπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ ἔνυπακολουθοῦσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μίγνυ κ.τ.λ. Aspasius explains differently: μεθ' ἡδονῆς μὲν οἱ λέγοντες μέρος τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ποιοῦσι τὴν ἡδονήν, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς, οὐ μέρος ἀλλ' ὡν οὐκ ἄνευ ἡ εὐδαιμονία λέγουσι τὴν ἡδονήν.

b. 26. ἔτεροι] The commentators identify this with the opinion of Xenocrates, Plato's disciple: see Clem. Alex. *Strom.* ii. p. 419 a, quoted by Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Ph.* § 301 Ξενοκράτης . . . τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι κτῆσιν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς αὐτῇ δυνάμεως. εἴτα ως μὲν ἐν φῷ γίγνεται φαίνεται λέγων τὴν ψυχήν, ως δὲ ὑφ' ὧν τὰς ἀρετάς, ως δὲ ἐξ ὧν ως μερῶν τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας ἔχεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις, ως τούτων οὐκ ἄνευ τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἔκτός. This does not seem to differ essentially from Aristotle's own view of the nature and conditions of εὐδαιμονία.

συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν] M<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>, Ald., C C C, and N C give συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν. M S. authority does not count for much where παρά and περί are concerned. Συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν ('take in as an

adjunct,' *Liddell and Scott*) expresses a view of the relation of 1098 b. 26.  $\eta\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\tau\delta\sigma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\tau\eta\rho\alpha$  to  $\epsilon\nu\deltaai\mu\nu\alpha$  such as Aristotle himself holds;  $\sigma\nu\mu\pi\epsilon\pi\lambda\mu\beta\alpha\nu\sigma\omega\iota\omega$  ('include along with') expresses a view which Aristotle would object to as putting  $\eta\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\tau\delta\sigma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\tau\eta\rho\alpha$ —a mere condition,  $\text{o}\bar{\nu}\text{ }\dot{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\text{ o}\bar{\nu}\text{ }\dot{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\text{ }\dot{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\eta$ , or  $\dot{\alpha}\nu\alpha\kappa\dot{\alpha}\iota\omega\text{ }\dot{\epsilon}\xi\text{ }\dot{\eta}\pi\omega\theta\epsilon\sigma\epsilon\omega\text{}$ , too much on a par with the formal elements, or  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta$  strictly so called, of  $\epsilon\nu\deltaai\mu\nu\alpha$ . On  $\tau\dot{\alpha}\text{ }\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\eta\text{ }\tau\dot{\eta}\text{ }\epsilon\nu\deltaai\mu\nu\alpha\iota\omega$  see below note on § 16.

$\epsilon\nu\epsilon\tau\eta\rho\alpha\iota\omega$ ] literally, 'goodness of season ( $\epsilon\tau\omega\text{}$ ),' and then, generally, 'prosperity.'

§ 7.] Cf. vii. 1. 5, and note there.

b. 27.

§ 8.] 'Aristotle now proceeds to show his own coincidence b. 30. with these preexistent theories. It is to be observed that he says nothing here in reference to those who made happiness to consist in "thought" [ $\phi\acute{r}\omega\eta\sigma\iota\omega$ ] or "a sort of philosophy" [ $\sigma\omega\phi\acute{f}\iota\omega\text{ t}\iota\omega$ ]. This is one of the marks of systematic method in the *Ethics*. He will not anticipate the relation of  $\phi\acute{r}\omega\eta\sigma\iota\omega$  and  $\sigma\omega\phi\acute{f}\iota\omega$  to  $\epsilon\nu\deltaai\mu\nu\alpha$ .' Grant.

Although it is true that Aristotle makes no explicit reference in this chapter to those who made happiness to consist in  $\phi\acute{r}\omega\eta\sigma\iota\omega$  or  $\sigma\omega\phi\acute{f}\iota\omega\text{ t}\iota\omega$ , he seems to me not entirely to overlook their opinion; for in § 13 he passes from the consideration of the pleasure involved in  $a\bar{i}\text{ k}\dot{\alpha}\text{ }\dot{\alpha}\rho\acute{e}\tau\dot{\eta}\nu\text{ p}\dot{\rho}\acute{a}\xi\iota\omega$  to the assertion that they are not only pleasant, but also  $\kappa\dot{\alpha}\text{ }\dot{\alpha}\gamma\dot{\alpha}\theta\dot{\alpha}\iota\omega\text{ k}\dot{\alpha}\text{ k}\dot{\alpha}\lambda\dot{\alpha}\iota\omega$ , as judged by the  $\sigma\pi\omega\delta\dot{\alpha}\iota\omega$ , the standard of excellence. This appeal to the  $\kappa\dot{\rho}\acute{i}\sigma\iota\omega\text{ t}\dot{\omega}\text{ }\sigma\pi\omega\delta\dot{\alpha}\iota\omega$  involved in defining the Chief Good as  $\psi\omega\chi\dot{\eta}\text{ }\dot{\epsilon}\nu\acute{e}\rho\acute{y}\dot{\epsilon}\omega\text{ k}\dot{\alpha}\lambda\dot{\alpha}\iota\omega\text{ t}\dot{\eta}\nu\text{ }\dot{\alpha}\rho\acute{i}\sigma\iota\omega\text{ }\dot{\alpha}\rho\acute{e}\tau\dot{\eta}\nu$  seems to me to give full weight in the Definition to the opinion of those who make Happiness consist in  $\phi\acute{r}\omega\eta\sigma\iota\omega$  or  $\sigma\omega\phi\acute{f}\iota\omega\text{ t}\iota\omega$ , and I think that § 13 is intended to bring this out.

$\sigma\nu\omega\delta\dot{\alpha}\iota\omega$ ] Susemihl now wishes to read (*E. E.* Appendix, p. 163)  $\sigma\nu\omega\sigma\omega\text{ }$  ('conterminous with') after Kb. He thinks that  $\sigma\nu\omega\delta\dot{\alpha}\iota\omega$ , given by NC (not by Z=CCC) and Cambr., supplies the intermediate form between the correct  $\sigma\nu\omega\sigma\omega\text{ }$  and the plausible  $\sigma\nu\omega\delta\dot{\alpha}\iota\omega$ : see his reply to Adolf Busse (*zur Textkritik der Nic. Eth.*: *Hermes*, vol. xviii. p. 137, sqq., 1883) in *N. Jahrb.* 1883.

$\tau\dot{\alpha}\omega\tau\dot{\eta}\text{ }\gamma\dot{\alpha}\rho\text{ }\dot{\epsilon}\sigma\dot{\tau}\iota\omega\text{ }\eta\text{ k}\dot{\alpha}\text{ }\dot{\alpha}\omega\dot{\tau}\dot{\eta}\nu\text{ }\dot{\epsilon}\nu\acute{e}\rho\acute{y}\dot{\epsilon}\omega$ ] 'For "exercise of faculties b. 31. in accordance with excellence" belongs to excellence.' Peters.  
'Zur Tugend gehört die ihr gemässie Wirksamkeit.' Stahr.

§ 9.] With this § cf. *M. M.* i. 4. 1184 b. 28  $\tau\dot{\alpha}\text{ }\ddot{\alpha}\rho\alpha\text{ }\epsilon\nu\deltaai\mu\nu\alpha\iota\omega\text{ k}\dot{\alpha}\text{ }$

1098 b. 31. ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῷ εὐ ζῆν ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ εὐ ζῆν ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν. Τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἔστι τέλος καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. Ἐν χρήσει τοίνυν τινὶ ἀν εἴη καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. Ὡν γὰρ ἦν ἔξις καὶ χρῆσις, ἡ χρῆσις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τέλος· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἡ ἀρετὴ ἔξις ἔστιν. Ἐστι δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὥστε τέλος ἀν εἴη ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς. Ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἄρ' ἀν εἴη ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ζῆν. Ἐπειδήπερ οὖν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ αὐτῇ τέλος ἐνεργείᾳ, ζῶντες ἀν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς εὐδαιμονες ἀν εἴημεν καὶ ἔχοιμεν τὸ ἄριστον ἀγαθόν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλειον ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλος, οὐδὲ τούτο δεῖ λανθάνειν ὅτι καὶ ἐν τελείῳ ἔσται. Οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἐν παιδί (οὐ γάρ ἔστι πᾶς εὐδαιμων) ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνδρί· οὗτος γὰρ τέλειος. Οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ γε ἀτελεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν τελείῳ. Τέλειος δὲ ἀν εἴη χρόνος, οἷσαν ἀνθρωπος βιοῦ. Καὶ γὰρ λέγεται ὀρθῶς παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὅτι δεῖ τὸν εὐδαιμονα ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ βίου κρίνειν, ὡς δέον τὸ τέλειον εἶναι καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ τελείῳ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ. Ὅτι δὲ ἐνέργειά ἔστιν, ἵδιοι ἀν τις καὶ ἐντεῦθεν. Ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὑπνοῖς, οἷσαν εἴ τις καθεύδοι διὰ βίου, τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ πάνυ βουλόμεθα λέγειν εὐδαιμονα εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ὃ ἦν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν: cf. E. N. ix. 5, and x. 6. 2.

b. 32. ἐν κτήσει ἡ χρῆσις . . . ἐν ἔξει ἡ ἐνέργεια] Eustr. has ἡ μὲν χρῆσις καὶ κτήσις, ἐπὶ τῶν ὄργανων λέγεται καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ἀνάλογον, ἡ δὲ ἔξις καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐπὶ τῶν ἔν τινι θεωρουμένων ποιοτήτων καὶ τελειουσῶν αὐτό. οἶνυ πλούτος μὲν καὶ σκεύη καὶ τὰ τῆς τέχνης ὑπουργὰ ὄργανα ἐν κτήσει εἶναι τοῖς ἔχοντι λέγονται, καὶ δεῖ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ δέοντα ὡς μὴ μάτην ἡ τούτων εἴη κτήσις· τέχνη δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀρετὴ ἔξεις τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν αὐτῇ μὲν ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὐσαι, τελειωτικαὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐν φεισί, καὶ δεῖ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐνέργειν ὡς μὴ μάτην τὰς ἔξεις ἔχοιμεν· ὡς γὰρ θησαυρῷ μὴ φαινομένῳ μάτην ἡ κτήσις, οὕτω καὶ ἔξει ἀγαθῇ μὴ ἐνεργούσῃ εἴη ἀν τὸ ὑπάρχειν διάκενον.

b. 33. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν . . . ὑπάρχουσαν] ‘for the Habit (of Virtue) may be present, and yet bring forth no good result.’

1099 a. 2. ἔξηργηκότι] ἔξαργειν means ‘to lie quite idle,’ like a field ‘lying fallow.’

a. 3. πράξει] The subject is ἐνέργεια, but Eustrat. has πράξει γὰρ ἔξ ἀνάγκης ὁ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργῶν καὶ εὐ πράξει· ἐκ γὰρ ἀγαθῆς ἔξεως ἀγαθαὶ προβαίνουσιν ἐνέργειαι. So the Par. πράξει γὰρ ἔξ ἀνάγκης ὁ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχων, καὶ εἰ τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει, εὐ πράξει.

ῶσπερ δὲ Ὁλυμπίασιν κ.τ.λ.] Cf. E. E. ii. 1. 1219 b. 9 στεφανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν, μὴ νικῶντες δέ.

τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κάγαθῶν . . . ἐπήβολοι γίνονται] ‘win the great 1099 a. 5. prizes of life.’ Cf. i. 10. 14 μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν . . . γενόμενος ἐπήβολος.

§ 10. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ’ αὐτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι a. 7. τῶν ψυχικῶν] The connexion is explained by the Paraphrast—ἔστι δὲ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἡδύς, οὐκ ἔξωθεν ἔχων τὴν ἡδονήν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἥδεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ἔστιν (cf. E. N. x. 3. 6 εἰ δή ἔστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν φῇ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ’ ἀν καὶ ἡδοῖτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδέ ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις ἡδονή), οὐδὲν κωλύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαν μεθ’ ἡδονῆς εἶναι. Cf. E. N. x. 4. 10, 11, and x. 5. 6: also E. E. ii. 1. 1218 b. 32 πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἡ ἐκτὸς ἡ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἱρετῶτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῦς λόγοις· φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ: and M. M. i. 3. 1184 b. 5 τὰ δὲ ἐν ψυχῇ διώρισται ἀγαθὰ εἰς τρία, εἰς φρόνησιν εἰς ἀρετὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν.

ἐκάστῳ δὲ ἔστιν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὁ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος] If a man is a. 8. φιλοτοιοῦτος, he will, unless hindered, perform the *πράξεις* which his disposition prompts. These *πράξεις*, being *his own*, i.e. proceeding from *his own disposition*, will be pleasant (see E. N. viii. 3. 6 ἐκάστῳ γὰρ καθ’ ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις); their being pleasant and their being performed are two inseparably connected characteristics of such *πράξεις*.

§ 11. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ’ a. 11. εἶναι] The *φαῦλος* is not an organic whole. His desires do not represent the good of a permanent personality, but are merely the cravings of this or that part as separately affected. The whole does not live in every part, but every part is devoted to its own separate gratification. What pleases one part displeases another part. But the rational man—the *φρόνιμος* or *σπουδαῖος*—perceives and loves the beautiful Form of Human Nature (*τὸ καλόν*), and is regulated by his consciousness and love of it in all his desires. Nothing is pleasant to him which harms, or even does not benefit, his nature as a whole—*τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἔστιν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα*. Τὰ φύσει ἡδέα—‘things naturally pleasant’ are thus things which call forth the functions, and preserve the health, of a man’s true *φύσις*—his rational personality; τὰ μὴ φύσει ἡδέα are things which stimulate desires ‘not obedient to reason,’ i.e. not organised as parts of a consistent and permanent system. Cf. the description in E. N. ix. 4 of the *σπουδαῖος* and of the *φαῦλος* respectively—§ 3 ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ (ὁ *σπουδαῖος*) καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ

**1099 a.11.** βούλεται δὴ ἔαυτῷ τάγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τάγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἔαυτοῦ ἔνεκα (τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἔκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ)· καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἔαυτὸν καὶ σώζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. On the other hand (§ 9) στασιάζει (τῶν φαύλων) ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τὸ δὲ ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἔλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα. It may be noted that the term φύσει has the same reference, in the phrase τὰ φύσει ἥδεα, as the term *natural* has in Butler's expression, 'the natural supremacy of Conscience' (*Sermon 2*), viz. to Human Nature *as a system*.

**a. 14.** ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἥδεῖαι καὶ καθ' αὐτάς] 'accordingly they are pleasant, both to those who perform them, and in themselves,' i.e. the desires of the φιλόκαλοι are in perfect correspondence with 'the Nature of Things,' or 'moral environment'—τὰ φύσει ἥδεα, the things in which a man *ought* to take pleasure, are αὐτοῖς ἥδεα, things in which they do, as a matter of fact, take pleasure. Cf *E. N.* iii. 4. 5 καθ' ἔκαστην γὰρ ἔξιν ἵδια ἔστι καλὰ καὶ ἥδεα, καὶ διαφέρει πλείστου ἵσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τάληθες ἐν ἔκαστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὕν.

**a. 15.** § 12. οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται κ.τ.λ.] Ramsauer contrasts the relation of εὐδαιμονία to τὰ ἔκτὸς ἀγαθά—§ 15 φαίνεται δὲ ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἔκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη. In short, ἥδονή, being τῶν ψυχικῶν, cannot be a περίαπτον. On the whole § 12 see Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 620 (third edition): 'Die Lust soll nicht der Zweck und Beweggrund unseres Thuns sein, sondern nur eine nothwendige Folge der naturgemässen Thätigkeit; könnten beide getrennt werden, so würde ein tüchtiger Mensch die Thätigkeit ohne Lust der Lust ohne Thätigkeit unbedingt vorziehen (*E. N.* x. 3. 12 οὐδεὶς τ' ἀν ἐλοιτο ξῆν παιδίον διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἥδομενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἶνον τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν ποιησάμεθ' ἀν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἥδονήν, οἶον ὁρᾶν, μημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἔπονται τούτοις ἥδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἐδοίμεθα γὰρ ἀν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἥδονή); in Wahrheit jedoch besteht die Tugend eben darin, dass man die Lust von der Tugend gar nicht zu trennen weiss, dass man sich in der tugendhaften Thätigkeit unmittelbar befriedigt fühlt, und keines weiteren, äusserlichen Zusatzes von Vergnügen bedarf.' Zeller then quotes *E. N.* i. 8. 12. Cf. also ii. 3. 1.

**a. 16.** περιάπτου] 'τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν φυλακτήριον, καὶ συνηθέστερον, φυλακτόν (Γαλλ.

*amulette*)'—Coraes. Grant quotes Plut. *Pericles* 38 Θεόφραστος . . . 1099 a.16. ίστορηκεν ὅτι νοσῶν ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπισκοπουμένῳ τινὶ τῶν φίλων δείξειε περίαπτον ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν τῷ τραχήλῳ περιηρτημένον: and Plato, *Rep.* iv. 426 Β οὐδὲ αὖ ἐπωδαὶ οὐδὲ περίαπτα.

οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων] 'This anticipates *Eth.* ii. 3. 1, where a. 17. it is said that pleasure is the test of a *έξις* being formed.' Grant.

§ 13. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθά γε καὶ καλά] cf. Eustrat. οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖαι a. 22. φησὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰς αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὡς οὐσιωδῶς αὐταῖς ἐνυπάρχουσαν κεκτημέναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ καλαὶ.

καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἔκαστον] i.e. ἄρισται καὶ κάλλισται.

εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὡς εἴπομεν] See a. 23. note on § 8 b. 30 above. Cf. Eustrat. καὶ τοῦτο (i.e. καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἔκαστον) δῆλον ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος σπουδαῖος γάρ ὁν ὁ κρίνων περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅρθιν ἔχει τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὸ κριτήριον, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡδιστον αὐτῷ καὶ ἄριστον καὶ κάλλιστον αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεις κρίνονται, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, εἴεν ἀν ἔξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοιαῦται· εἰ δὲ μή, φαῦλος τε ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ διάστροφος ὁ ὅρθος· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. On the σπουδαῖος as the standard cf. *E. N.* iii. 4. 5; ix. 4. 2, 3.

κρίνει δ' ὡς εἴπομεν] viz. καὶ ἀγαθὰς καὶ καλὰς εἶναι τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἔκαστον.

§ 14. καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα] 'and a. 25. these are not separated as they are in the Delian Inscription.' The Eudemian Ethics open with the quotation of these lines<sup>1</sup>. Zell, Coraes, Fritzsche (*Eth. Eud.*), Michelet, and Grant collect various renderings of the sentiment, e.g. Plato, *Gorgias* 451 Εἰ οἴμαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐνῷ καταριθμοῦνται ἀδόντες, ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἔστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὡς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως κ.τ.λ.: Theognis (*Poet. Gn.* p. 11, Tauchnitz) κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον· λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν | πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνότατον τοῦ τις ἐρῶτο τυχεῖν: Simonides (or Epicharmus)

ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ  
δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φυὰν γενέσθαι,  
τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,  
καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων:

<sup>1</sup> Brit. Mus. 16. C. xxi (B<sup>3</sup>) and the Aldine Edition give—ἡδιστον δὲ τυχεῖν οὐ τις ἔκαστος ἐρᾶ.

1099 a. 25. Soph. *Creusa* (apud Stob.)

κάλλιστον ἔστι τοῦνδικον πεφυκέναι  
λῷστον δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἄνοσον ἥδιστον δ' ὅτῳ  
πάρεστι λῆψις ὃν ἐρâ καθ' ἡμέραν.

a. 29. ταύτας δέ, ἣ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν]  
The unity of *eudaimonia*—the *aristē* *énérgeia* in which the other *énérgeiai* are not lost, but co-ordinated and used for the good of the whole—is well brought out by Eustr. in his note, here—ἔστι δὲ ἡ *eudaimonia* ἡ δμοῦ πᾶσαι αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς *énérgeiai*, ἡ εἰ μίαν τις τούτων ἔρει, ἡ ἀρίστη πασῶν . . . αὗτη δ' ἀν εἴη ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ φρόνησιν, ἡ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας συντηροῦσα καὶ συνέχουσα.

a. 31. § 15.] External goods are necessary as conditions of *eudaimonia*, but are no parts of it, just as air and light are necessary to the life of a plant, but are no parts of that life. Even pleasure, although it must not be accounted a *part* of *eudaimonia*, is more intimately connected with it than external goods. Cf. *Pol. H.* 7. 1328 a. 21 ἐπεὶ δ', ὅσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταῦτα ἔστι μόρια τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως, ὃν ἄνευ τὸ δόλον οὐκ ἀν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν . . . διὸ κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἔστιν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως . . . ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἔστι τῶν δμοίων, ἔνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν *eudaimonia* τὸ ἀριστον, αὗτη δὲ ἀρετῆς *énérgeia* καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος κ.τ.λ.: *E. E.* i. 2. 1214 b. 11 μάλιστα δὲ δεῖ πρῶτον . . . διορίσασθαι . . . ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ ζῆν εὖ, καὶ τίνων ἄνευ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γάρ ταῦτον, ὃν ἄνευ οὐχ οἶον τε ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. δμοίων δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἔτέρων πολλῶν· ὡστε οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν καλῶς, καὶ ὃν ἄνευ οὐ δυνατὸν ζῆν καλῶς: *E. N.* vii. 13. 2 οὐδεμίᾳ γάρ *énérgeia* τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἡ δ' *eudaimonia* τῶν τελείων διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ *eudaimon* τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαis μεγάλαις περιπίποντα *eudaimon* φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐάν ἡ ἀγαθός, ἡ ἔκοντες ἡ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. See Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. 620, 621 (ed. 3) ‘Mit mehr Schein liesse sich seinen Aeusserungen über die äusseren Güter der Vorwurf machen, dass er den Menschen hier zu sehr von blos natürlichen und zufälligen Vorzügen abhängig mache. Aber doch verlangt er auch jene nur darum und nur so weit als sie unentbehrliche Bedingungen eines vollendeten Lebens und Werkzeuge der sitzlichen Thätigkeit sind, womit er unstreitig Recht hat. . . . pp. 622, 3 Die Glückseligkeit besteht wesentlich und ur-

sprünglich in der vernunftgemässen Thätigkeit, in der Ausübung 1099 a. 31. einer vollendeten Tugend; alles übrige kommt nur als eine Bedingung derselben in Betracht und ist nur insofern für ein Gut zu halten, wiefern es mit jener zusammenhängt, als ihre natürliche Folge, wie die Lust, oder als ihr Hülfsmittel, wie die leiblichen und äusseren Güter; muss aber vorkommenden Falls zwischen diesen verschiedenen Gütern gewählt werden, so müssen alle andern den geistigen und sittlichen, weil sie allein unbedingte Güter sind, nachstehen.'

**ἀχορήγητον]** ‘*Tanquam ars poetae vel actorum virtus jacet nisi a. 33. extero splendore ac pompa scenaque adjuvetur, ita ἡ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετὴν fere nulla est nisi vita hominis instructa sit variis bonis.*’ Ramsauer. Without the *χορηγία* of favourable circumstances a man cannot play a brilliant part on the stage of life.

§ 16. *ἐνίων δέ . . . ]* Things, the absence of which mars *εὐδαιμονία*, 1099 b. 2. are distinguished, as Ramsauer notes, from things which are necessary to it as *ὅργανα*. The *δέ* after *ἐνίων* thus answers to the *μέν* after *πολλά*. Grant quotes *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 18 εἰ δή ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν, πολυφλίαν, χρηστοφλίαν, πλοῦτον, εὐτεκνίαν, πολυτεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς, οἷον ὑγείειαν κάλλος ἴσχὺν μέγεθος δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικήν, δόξαν, τιμήν, εὐτυχίαν, ἀρετὴν ὅντω γὰρ ἀν αὐταρκέστατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τά τ’ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἔκτὸς ἀγαθά· οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. He adds, ‘The expression in the *Rhet.* “parts of happiness” is equivalent to “instruments” of happiness, the more accurate designation in the present passage.’ This is scarcely correct;—the present passage, as we have just seen, distinguishes the instruments (*ὅργανα*) of happiness, such as *πλοῦτος*, and its ornaments, such as *κάλλος*; whereas in the *Rhet.* both are called ‘parts’—*μέρη*. In *E. E.* i. 2. 1214 b. 26 (*ῶν ἀνεν γὰρ οὐχ οἷον τε εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔνιοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζοντι*), on the other hand, we find *μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας* contrasted with *ῶν ἀνεν οὐχ οἷον τε*, this latter expression being, in fact, equivalent to the *μέρη* of the *Rhet.* The *Rhet.*, concerned as it is to supply points to speakers addressing popular audiences, naturally differs from the more philosophical *Ethics* (*Nic.* and *Eud.*) in its presentation of *εὐδαιμονία*. It includes conditions, instruments, and ornaments among the *μέρη*. For *μέρη* as ‘formal elements of the notion’ see *Met. Z.* 10 and 11.

1099 b. 3. *εὐγενείας*] See Pseudo-Plut. *de Nobilitate* 7 'Αριστοτέλην ὄρῶμεν ἐν τῷ ἐκδεδομένῳ περὶ εὐγενείας βιβλίῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς διάκεκοσμηκότα καὶ ἐν τῶν ἀγαθῶν λόγῳ διηριθμηκότα<sup>1</sup>. The fragments from this Dialogue περὶ εὐγενείας, preserved in Stob. *Flor.* 86. 24, 25, and 88. 13 (see Berlin Aristotle, 1490), seem to suggest for *εὐγένεια* a more intimate relation to *εὐδαιμονία* than that occupied by the other *ἀγαθά* mentioned with it; for it is defined as *ἀρετὴ γένους*—‘hereditary virtue’ (so also in *Pol.* Γ. 7. 1283 a. 37); and, as such, must contribute to the content of that *τελείᾳ ἀρετῇ* which manifests itself in the *ἐνέργεια* of *εὐδαιμονία*. *Εὐγένεια* is thus on a higher level than the ‘instruments’ or ‘ornaments’ of *εὐδαιμονία*.

*οὐ πάνυ εὐδαιμονικός*] ‘is not very likely to be happy.’ Peters.

b. 5. *ἢ φίλοι*] omitted by H<sup>a</sup>, NC, P<sup>2</sup>, Par. 1417, Par. 1853, Eustратius, Heliodorus. Accordingly Susemihl brackets the words. The reference to *φίλοι* is certainly not quite in place here, where the writer is speaking of the ornaments rather than of the instruments of *εὐδαιμονία*.

b. 8. § 17. *ἔτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν*] These words are regarded as spurious by Giphanius, Ramsauer, and Susemihl. But are they not necessary to account for the *ὅθεν* which follows in Ch. 9. § 1? I think that they are: see Grant, *ad loc.*—‘The word *ὅθεν* expresses the thread of connexion by which this new subject of discussion (*i.e.* *πότερον ἔστι μαθητὸν κ.τ.λ.*) is introduced. Since happiness seems to be a balance of two principles, an internal one, virtue, and an external one, circumstances, the question arises whether it is attainable by the individual through any prescribed means, or whether it is beyond his control. It seems chiefly, however, to be upon the word *ἀρετήν* that Aristotle goes off. The question of the day, *πότερον μαθητὸν ἡ ἀρετή*, comes before him in mentioning that some identify happiness with virtue. . . . The question forms an important point at issue in the ethical systems of Aristotle and Plato. The conclusion of Aristotle is directly opposed to that which is tentatively stated at the end of the *Meno* (99 E)—*ἀρετὴ ἀν οἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγίγνομένη ἀνεν νοῦ οἰς ἀν παραγίγνηται.*’ It

<sup>1</sup> The text of the passages quoted from Aristotle in the editions of the *de Nob.* (ch. 14) has no authority. The passages were inserted by J. C. Wolf, the first editor of the work. See Newman’s *Politics*, vol. ii. p. 68.

must be remembered, however, that, in the *Meno*, it is the *political* 1099 b. 8. *genius* of a Pericles or Themistocles which is ascribed to *θεῖα μοῖρα*; whereas in *E. N.* i. 9 Aristotle is speaking of the *εὐπραξία* of average citizens—*οἱ μὴ πεπηρωμένοι πρὸς ἀρετήν*.

## CHAPTER IX.

### ARGUMENT.

*The view that Happiness is Good Fortune—a gift bestowed by an external Power, Heaven or Fortune, upon certain favoured persons, is the very anti-thesis of our view that it is a function which the strenuous man, by his own efforts, learns to perform; and it may be useful here to compare the degrees in which two such opposite views of the origin of Happiness succeed in accounting for the facts of life.*

We may begin by admitting that if Heaven has any gift for man, Happiness may well be that gift: it is indeed a ‘Divine thing’: but this it surely may be in virtue of being the crown of man’s endeavour.

Again, if Happiness were a gift of Fortune, it would be something exceptional, not widely distributed as it is. Its being widely distributed corroborates our view that it is attained through exertions of which most men are capable.

And again, it is surely more in keeping with the ‘beauty’ of Happiness—that is, with the exquisite Harmony of the Happy Life, to ascribe it to the operation of a steady principle of causation, such as human agency, rather than to an aimless principle like Fortune or Chance. The organisms of the physical world are too beautiful, we think, and too definite, to be the results of Chance; but the life of the good man is far more beautiful and definite. Indeed this beauty and definiteness of the Happy Life are implied in our Definition, which thus throws much light on the question of the origin of Happiness now before us. We define it as a vital function manifesting excellence—implying thus that it is of a definite kind: and here we find ourselves in agreement with the doctrine laid down at the beginning of this Treatise—that the Chief Good is the end of Statesmanship; for the statesman’s principal care is to produce a certain definite character in his citizens, i. e. to make them good, and capable of well doing. With good reason, then, we do not speak of an ox as ‘happy’—for he cannot perform the functions in which Happiness consists; or a child (unless by anticipation)—for he cannot yet perform them. The performance of them needs, as we have said, perfect excellence and a perfect life: and often enough life is imperfect: many are the changes of fortune; the man who flourishes most may happen upon great misfortunes in his old age, like Priam; and no one would call a Priam ‘happy.’

1099 b. 9. § 1.] Cf. *E. E.* i. 1. 1214 a. 14 πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ πῶς κτητόν, πότερον φύσει γίγνονται πάντες εὐδαίμονες οἱ τυγχάνοντες ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, ὡσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χροιὰν διαφέροντες, ἡ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὕσης ἐπιστήμης τινὸς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἡ διά τινος ἀσκήσεως (πολλὰ γὰρ οὕτε κατὰ φύσιν οὕτε μαθοῦσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐθισθεῖσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαῦλα μὲν τοῖς φαύλως ἐθισθεῖσι, χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς), ἡ τούτων μὲν κατ᾽ οὐδένα τῶν τρόπων, δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον ἥτοι καθάπερ οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπινοίᾳ δαιμονίου τινὸς ὡσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἡ διὰ τὴν τύχην (πολλοὶ γὰρ ταῦτον φασιν εἶναι τὴν εἰδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν).

b. 11. §§ 2, 3.] Aristotle, while declining to regard Happiness as a special gift bestowed on a favoured few by anthropomorphic gods, is willing to allow the term *θεῖον* to be applied to it as an ornate epithet—as indeed the term may be applied to any beautiful result of the formative agency of Nature: cf. *E. N.* vii. 13. 6 πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον: *de An.* ii. 4. 415 a. 26 φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ζῶσιν ἔργων, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα ἡ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἔτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτὸν ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν, ἡ δύνανται πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὁργεῖται, κάκείνου ἔνεκα πράττει ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν πράττει: *E. E.* H. 14. 1248 a. 26 κινεῖ γάρ πως πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον.

b. 14. ἄλλης ἀν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον] Eustr. says τῶν περὶ προνοίας εἴη ἀν λόγων οἰκειότερον καὶ θεολογικῆς θεωρίας ἔχόμενον ἡθικὴ δὲ ἡ προκειμένη πραγματεία, καὶ ὅσον κατ' αὐτὴν ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰρημένον. The question, however, is not one which Aristotle cares to discuss even where, as in the *Metaphysics*, it might seem more in place than here. The passage, *E. N.* x. 8. 13, in which he comes nearest to seriously entertaining the question of a personal relation between the gods and men, on close examination, is seen to commit him to nothing more than an ornate use of the epithet *θεοφιλέστατος*.

b. 18. § 4. εἴη δ' ἀν καὶ πολύκοινον . . . ἐπιμελείας] There is a certain looseness in the reasoning here; indeed Grant describes the last clause, as it stands, as a *petitio principii*. The argument seems to be this:—If we suppose that Happiness is acquired διὰ ἀρετῆν καὶ τινα μάθησιν ἡ ἀσκησιν, *i.e.* by our own personal exertions, we not only are still at liberty to describe it as *ἄριστον*, *θεῖον*, and *μακάριον*, but we are able to explain the admitted fact that it is ‘common to many’ (*πολύκοινον*)—a fact which is irreconcileable with its being

*θεόσδοτος* or the *special* gift of the gods. ‘But it would seem also 1099 b. 18. to be common to many—a characteristic which can be explained (*γάρ*) only if we suppose that it may be acquired through study and diligence, by all who are not incapacitated for virtue.’ The importance of *τὸ πολύκουνον*, as enabling us to discriminate between the claims of an exceptional agency like *θεός*, *εὐφυΐα*, or *τύχη* on the one hand, and of man’s own personal exertion (*ἐπιμέλεια*, &c.) on the other hand, to be the source of Happiness, is well brought out in *E. E.* i. 3. 1215 a. 12 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γινομένοις ἡ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῆν ἔστιν, ἀνέλπιστον ἀν εἴη πολλοῖς (οὐ γάρ ἔστι δὶ’ ἐπιμελείας ἡ κτῆσις οὐδὲ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας)· εἰ δ’ ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν ποιὸν τινα εἶναι καὶ τὰς κατ’ αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἀν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ θειότερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείστῳ ἐνδέχεσθαι μετασχεῖν, θειότερον δὲ τῷ κείσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς αἵτοις παρασκευάζοντι ποιούσι τινας καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

§ 5.] On this section Ramsauer remarks, ‘jam enim missa est b. 20. omnis cogitatio de deorum beneficio. Nec deesset forsitan necessario τὸ πολύκουνον, si res ad deum referenda esse videretur; quod vero fortunae attribuitur spreta omni lege ne ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ quidem potest accidere.’ The fact that Happiness is ‘common to many’ certainly excludes the hypothesis of mere chance being its cause; but I cannot agree with Ramsauer in thinking that the same fact does not, in Aristotle’s mind, necessarily exclude the hypothesis of its being the gift of personal gods. We must remember that the popular conception of *εὐδαιμονία* which Aristotle has to correct is that embodied in the etymology of the word, and associated with such examples as Polycrates and Croesus, who, because *specially* favoured by Heaven, were also specially exposed to its *φθόνος*.

Michelet’s note on § 4 makes εἴη δ’ ἀν καὶ πολύκουνον disprove the intervention of the gods. ‘εἴη δ’ ἀν καὶ πολύκουνον’ nempe si exercitatione virtus comparatur. Jam autem concludit: Cum a multis possit acquiri, revera exercitatione comparatur. Sin vero a Diis mitteretur, paucis Deorum amicis contingere, ut admodum paucis Homeri heroibus, ex. gr. Menelao campi Elysii.’ I think that τὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πολύκουνον is intended to disprove the agency of *any exceptional* cause, whether God or Chance.

In illustration of the conception of *φύσις* contained in § 5 Zell and Michelet quote *Phys.* viii. 6. 259 a. 10 ἐν γὰρ τοῖς φύσει δεῖ τὸ

1099 b.20. πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ἐὰν ἐνδέχηται, ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον: *de Juv. et Sen.* 4. 469 a. 28 τὴν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν ἐν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ποιοῦσαν τὸ κάλλιστον.

The implication in the argument εἰ δ’ ἔστιν οὗτος βέλτιον ἢ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν κ.τ.λ. is that εὐδαιμονία, being man's perfection or the realisation of his φύσις, will, like other realisations of φύσις, manifest τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ πεπερασμένον—that definite structure and function, which cannot be the result of an indefinite principle, an αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, such as τύχη. On τύχη see *Met.* K. 8. 1064 b. 32 πᾶν δῆ φαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔξ ἀνάγκης . . . τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐτ’ ἀεὶ καὶ ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἔτυχεν . . . ἔστι δὴ τὸ συμβεβηκός ὃ γίγνεται μέν, οὐκ ἀεὶ δ’ οὐδὲ ἔξ ἀνάγκης οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ . . . τὸ δὲ ἐνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἔστιν. τύχη δ’ ἔστιν ὅταν τι τούτων γένηται κατὰ συμβεβηκός . . . ἡ τύχη δ’ αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἐνεκά του γιγνομένοις . . . τὰ δ’ αἴτια ἀόριστα ἀφ’ ὅν ἀν γένοιτο τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης. Cf. also *Phys.* ii. 4, 5, 6—*e.g.* 5. 197 a. 18 καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναι τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὀρθῶς· δ γὰρ λόγος ἡ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἡ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· ἡ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρὰ ταῦτα· ὥστε ἐπειδὴ ἀόριστα τὰ οὐτως αἴτια, καὶ ἡ τύχη ἀόριστον.

In *Phys.* ii. 8. 199 b. 13 the definite products of φύσις, the principle of organic growth, are contrasted with the haphazard results of chance—ἔδει καὶ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι γίνεσθαι ὅπως ἔτυχεν ὅλως δὲ ἀνάριψει δοῦτο λέγων τὰ φύσει τε καὶ φύσιν φύσει γὰρ ὅσα ἀπὸ τίνος ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχῆς συνεχῶς κινούμενα ἀφικνεῖται εἴς τι τέλος· ἀφ’ ἐκάστης δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸν ἐκάστοις οὐδὲ τὸ τυχόν· ἀεὶ μέντοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἐὰν μή τι ἐμποδίσῃ. *Phys.* ii. 8 is, indeed, the best commentary on the present §. It is argued in the present § that εὐδαιμονία, civilization, the perfect form of man's life, is too beautiful and definite an organism to be the result of chance; so in *Phys.* ii. 8 it is argued that the beautiful structures of plants and animals cannot be due to the working of the haphazard principle of τὸ αὐτόματον, with which 'the survival of the fittest' is mistakenly identified in the chapter—as in the following passage 198 b. 23. τί κωλύει οὗτος καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει, οἷον τοὺς ὄδόντας ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἀνατεῖλαι τοὺς μὲν ἐμπροσθίους δξεῖς, ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὸ διαιρεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους πλατεῖς καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν, ἐπεὶ οὐ τούτου ἐνεκά γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν. ὅμοιώς δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν οἷς δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἐνεκά του. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἄπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ κανὸν εἰ ἐνεκά του ἐγίνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὗτος, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ

ἀνδρόπρωρα. ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος, ὡς ἂν τις ἀπορήσειν, οὗτος, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος 1099 b. 20. τοιοῦτος ἐστιν· ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει ἡ ἀεὶ οὕτω γίνεται ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. Darwin quotes this passage at the beginning of the ‘Historical Sketch’ prefixed to his ‘Origin of Species,’ and adds—‘We here see the principle of natural selection shadowed forth, but how little Aristotle fully comprehended the principle is shown by his remarks on the formation of the teeth.’ Aristotle’s doctrine of *φύσις*, however, is not inconsistent with Darwinism—indeed, if teleology is to find a place at all in Darwinism, it must, I feel sure, be in that form in which it is conspicuous in Aristotle’s doctrine of *φύσις*. Aristotle’s mistake in the passage quoted by Darwin is to see chance, and not natural law, in *τὰ συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως*.

*πέφυκεν,*] Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater rightly place a b. 22. comma instead of a full stop after *πέφυκεν*.

§ 6. *τὰ κατὰ τέχνην*] *τέχνη*, like *φύσις*, is *τοῦ μέσου στοχαστική*—strives to realise that which is definite: cf. *E. N.* ii. 6. 9. It is directly opposed to *τύχη*, which is its *στέρησις*: cf. *Met. Δ.* 3. 1070 a. 6 ἡ γὰρ *τέχνη* ἡ *φύσει* γίγνεται ἡ *τύχη* ἡ *τῷ αὐτομάτῳ* ἡ μὲν οὖν *τέχνη* ἀρχὴ ἐν ἀλλῷ, ἡ δὲ *φύσις* ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ . . . αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἰτίαι *στερήσεις* *τούτων*.

*κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην*] *ἀρίστη* δὲ αἵτια τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐργαζομένων ἀρετὴ b. 23. ὡς κρείττων καὶ *τέχνης* καὶ *φύσεως*. Eustr. Cf. *E. N.* ii. 6. 9. 1106 b. 14 ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πάσης *τέχνης* ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστίν.

§ 7. *συμφανὲς . . . ζητούμενον*] ‘Light is thrown on the b. 25. question before us (*i. e.* how we attain Happiness) by our definition (of Happiness) also.’

*ποιά τις*] ‘of a certain definite kind,—*i. e.* realised under b. 26. definite conditions internal and external. Cf. Aristoxenus 18. 20 (Marquard p. 24) *τὸ ήρμοσμένον μέλος . . . προσδεῖται συνθέσεώς τινος ποιᾶς καὶ οὐ τῆς τυχούσης*. Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* ii. 4. 167 οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ στέρησις ποιότης οὐδὲ ποιόν, ἀλλ’ ἐρημία ποιότητος. So here, *εὐδαιμονία*, being an *ἐνέργεια ποιά τις*, cannot be the result of *τύχη*, for *τύχη* is the *στέρησις* or *ἐρημία ποιότητος*.

*τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν . . . δργανικῶν*] *i. e.* Happiness is essentially *ψυχῆς* b. 27. *ἐνέργεια*, but requires the other goods as the conditions of its realisation. (1) It requires *τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθά* as its *ὑλή*, matter,

1099 b. 27. or necessary substratum—(*τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον*. Cf. *Phys.* ii. 9. 200 a. 7 ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ἔνεκά του ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνεν μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔχοντων τὴν φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἡ ὡς ὑλην, ἀλλ' ἔνεκά του· οἶον διὰ τί ὁ πρίων τοιοσδή; ὥπως τοδί, καὶ ἔνεκα τουδί. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ἀν μὴ σιδηροῦς ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀρά σιδηροῦν εἶναι, εἰ πρίων ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως οὖν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τέλος· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὑλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον· τὸ δ' οὐ ἔνεκα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ)—health, vigour and longevity, goods of the body, are necessary to the Form of Happiness, as the matter in which it is realised. So, cutting the form of a saw is realised in the matter of iron, not of wood. This relation of Happiness or *ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια* to bodily excellence is indeed merely an extension of Aristotle's general doctrine of the relation of the *ψυχή* to the body: see *de An.* ii. 1. 412 a. 20, where *ψυχή* is defined as *εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει* *ζωὴν ἔχοντος*—the *ψυχή* is the form of the *σῶμα*, which is the *δύναμις* or matter. (2) Happiness requires *τὰ ἔκτὸς ἀγαθά* as instruments (*τὰ δὲ συνεργά καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν δργανικῶς*. Cf. *E. N.* i. 8. 15. 1099 a. 33 πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται καθάπερ δι' δργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως).

b. 31. § 8. *ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθούς*] καὶ ἀγαθούς is here epexegetical—‘of a certain definite character, *i.e.* good.’ Cf. Eustatius: ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἔργον ἔχει ἐπιμελέστατον ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ποιούς τινας ἥγουν ἀγαθούς καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. By the agencies of *μάθησις*, *ἄσκησις*, and *ἐθισμός*, *πολιτική* effects the Happiness of the citizens—a *definite* result.

b. 32. §§ 9, 10.] These sections are intended to strengthen the position, that personal exertion is the cause of *εὐδαιμονία*, by pointing to the absence of ability to make the exertion on the part of children and brutes, *ῶν οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονία λέγομεν*.

1100 a. 4. §§ 10, 11. δεῖ γάρ . . . πολλαὶ γάρ . . .] The first *γάρ* introduces a clause explaining why children cannot yet be called *εὐδαιμόνες*: the *πράξεις* in which *εὐδαιμονία* consists require *τελεία ἀρετῆ* and a *τέλειος βίος*. The second *γάρ* introduces (somewhat irrelevantly) a clause which explains why even those old and virtuous enough to be *πρακτικοί* may still fail to satisfy the requirement of the *τέλειος βίος*, regarded as a life free to the end from great misfortune. Thus the transition is made to the subject of the next chapter. See Ramsauer on §§ 10 and 11.

## CHAPTER X.

## ARGUMENT.

Are we then ‘to call no man happy while he lives,’ following Solon’s maxim ‘wait for the end’? If this means that ‘a man may be happy after his death,’ we who define Happiness as ‘a vital function’ can admit no such doctrine; but we need not suppose that Solon meant anything so absurd. He meant that when a man is dead he is beyond all chance of misfortune, and that we may then, if his life has been happy, safely say so. But can we really feel sure that even when he is dead a man is beyond the reach of good and evil fortune? A living man may be touched by good and evil fortune without being conscious of it; so perhaps the unconscious dead may be touched by the good and bad fortune of their children and remoter descendants. It would indeed be absurd to suppose that a dead man is so touched by posthumous fortune as to become now ‘happy,’ now ‘wretched’; but it would be equally absurd to maintain that he cannot be touched by it at all. Perhaps however the further examination of Solon’s maxim may throw some light on this question of posthumous fortune—Must we then ‘wait for the end’ before we venture to felicitate a man on his Happiness? Surely it is absurd to wait till Happiness is a thing of the past, before we venture to admit its existence—because, forsooth, it is a stable thing, whereas the fortune of man’s life is unstable to the end. So, let our answer to Solon be—This continual observance of the changes of fortune is a great error. Happiness does not consist in good fortune, although it requires its material assistance: nor does Wretchedness consist in bad fortune: it is in actions, good and bad, that Happiness and Wretchedness consist. And here we may note that our Definition of Happiness is corroborated by Solon himself. It is the stability of Happiness which strikes him most. How the stability which he regards as essential to Happiness can be predicated of a life which is still obnoxious to fortune, is his difficulty. Now the functions in which our Definition makes Happiness consist have more stability than aught else in human life. They are the man’s throughout life, even more than his knowledge and skill of hand. In the performance of the highest of them he lives continuously, identifying himself with them. Himself he still is both in prosperity and in adversity—a personality maintaining its identity through all changes. Slight changes do not influence him much; greater changes enhance his Happiness or mar it; but even where they do most to mar it by laying sorrows upon him and impeding him in the performance of his functions, his noble personality shines out: we see him bearing his misfortunes cheerfully, not because he does not feel them, but because he ‘has a heart aboon them a’! Such a man, whatever happened, could never become ‘wretched,’ for he could never perform the base actions in which Wretchedness consists; on the other hand it would be absurd to extol ‘the felicity of his life,’ if he ended his days like Priam.

From what has been said it is evident that the happy life is essentially uniform. The happy man is not easily moved from his Happiness by ordinary misfortunes: and if once moved somewhat from it by great misfortunes, is not

*restored to it in a short time, but, if at all, only after many years full of glorious achievements.*

*And now we may present our Definition in this final form—<sup>c</sup> The happy man is he who, being perfectly good, manifests his goodness in action, who has been sufficiently furnished with external good things, whose life embraces a definite, i. e. a perfect period—and (perhaps we should add), whose death is according to his life?*

1100 a. 10. *Introductory Note.]* In this chapter Aristotle shows how his conception of  $\psi\nu\chi\nu\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{e}r\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha \kappa\alpha\tau' \acute{a}\rho\acute{e}t\acute{\eta}\nu$  may, as  $\acute{a}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}$ , be applied to solve (cf. i. 7. 23 δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἡ ἡμισυ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δὶ’ αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων) what is undoubtedly the most pressing question which the moralist has to deal with. The question is—How can there really be such a thing as Happiness for living men, who are always exposed to terrible vicissitudes of fortune? Aristotle's answer is—Happiness does not depend essentially, as is popularly supposed, on the outer moment of Fortune, but is within a man, and is as abiding as his personality, of which it is the function. It is indeed affected by Fortune, but it is not the sport of Fortune. If, then, the Definition is correct with its  $\psi\nu\chi\nu\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{e}r\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha \kappa\alpha\tau' \acute{a}\rho\acute{e}t\acute{\eta}\nu$ , Happiness is possible. But further, the very circumstance that pessimism, or disbelief in the possibility of Happiness, prevails, is evidence in favour of the conception embodied in the Definition. Men are agreed that Happiness, if it exists at all, must be something stable and lasting; this is why, considering too exclusively the mutability of Fortune, they despair of Happiness. Their agreement that Happiness (did it actually exist) would be something stable, is a δόξα in favour of the correctness of  $\psi\nu\chi\nu\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{e}r\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha \kappa\alpha\tau' \acute{a}\rho\acute{e}t\acute{\eta}\nu$ , for such an  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{e}r\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$  is preeminently stable.

Having shown that Happiness is possible, because essentially  $\psi\nu\chi\nu\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{e}r\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha \kappa\alpha\tau' \acute{a}\rho\acute{e}t\acute{\eta}\nu$ , Aristotle is willing to concede to popular opinion a very important influence exercised by Fortune; and in making this concession even entertains the question, whether the influence of Fortune ceases for the individual at his death, or does not rather (as another popular belief will have it) affect even the dead through their descendants. His discussion of this question (resumed on ch. 11) is remarkable as leading to no definite statement of his own view. The discussion is conducted in the spirit of the dialectic which animates the Platonic 'Dialogues of Search.' Indeed, the disproportionate space occupied by the subject or sub-

jects of chapters 10 and 11 suggests the thought that in these 1100 a. 10. chapters we have part of an early Aristotelian *Dialogue* worked into the later and more dogmatic *Ethics*. Aristotle is reputed to be the author of a Dialogue *Εὐδημος ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς* treating of the immortality of the soul, fragments of which have come down to us (see Berlin Aristotle, p. 1479 sqq.). Cf. the conjecture of Blass (*Rhein. Mus.* vol. xxx. p. 481 sqq. 1875) that the Dialogue *περὶ φιλοσοφίας* was made use of in the composition of certain parts of the *Metaphysics* and *de Coelo*. Be this as it may, the point of interest for us here is that in the *Ethics* Aristotle thinks it worth while to discuss, at considerable length, without arriving at any positive expression of opinion, a question on which we know, from his other writings, that he had formed a positive opinion. The *ψυχή* he defines in the *de An.* ii. 1. 412 b. 10 as τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῳδὶ σώματι. Personal consciousness—all that is included in the designation *παθητικὸς νοῦς*, perishes with the body. The *ποιητικὸς νοῦς* is eternal, but it is cosmic not personal:—*de An.* iii. 5. 430 a. 17 καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀμιγῆς καὶ ἀπαθῆς τῇ οὐσίᾳ δὲν ἐνέργεια . . . χωρισθεὶς δέ ἔστι μόνον ὅπερ ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθίνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον· οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθὲς . . . ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός· καὶ ἄνευ τοίτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ—on which see Trendelenburg, *de An.* p. 491, who finds in οὐ μνημονεύομεν a denial of Plato's doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*. Even in the chapter before us (*E. N.* i. 10) 'one phrase occurs,' as Grant points out (*Eth.* Essay v. p. 302), 'in which the real feeling of Aristotle, for the moment at least, seems to be let out. He asks (*Eth.* i. 10. 2), "Can Solon have meant that a man is happy when he has died?" and replies, "This would be an absurdity, especially since we consider happiness to be *ἐνέργεια*" . . . it is clear that we have here a brief indication that death destroys those potentialities that result in happiness. It would seem then that the only immortality which is left possible by his belief is a Buddhist *nirvâna*' (see generally Grant's *Eth.* Essay v. pp. 295–303, where he discusses Aristotle's opinions as to the nature of a soul). Why, then, does Aristotle discuss the question of personal immortality as he does here? The form in which the question is raised seems to help us to an answer. 'How is the happiness of the dead affected,' he asks, 'by the fortunes and conduct of their descendants?' We immediately think of the importance attached in ancient societies to the performance by descendants of the ceremonial rites due to ancestors, the proper performance of which may almost be said to

1100 a. 10. have been the *raison d'être* of the family as a corporation to be perpetuated. The large place which the cult of ancestors held in the imagination and traditional practice of the ordinary Greek seems to explain the prominence here given by Aristotle to the discussion of a subject in which he had no scientific interest, and his unwillingness to commit himself to a conclusion which he knew would be λίαν ἄφιλον . . . καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον (i. 11. 1). It is to be noted, however, that he rationalises the issue put—It is the effect on dead ancestors, not of the ceremonial conduct, but of the fortunes of their descendants which he discusses. On ancient beliefs regarding the soul and death, and on the cult of the dead, see Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique* Livre i, chapters 1 and 2.

It is perhaps worth noticing in conclusion that in the Dialogue Εὔδημος ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς, an argument for the immortality of the Soul seems to have been drawn from the religious homage paid to the dead. Fr. 33, Berlin Arist. 1480 a. 11 ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοφυῶς πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ σπένδομεν χοὰς τοῖς κατοιχομένοις καὶ ὅμνυμεν κατ' αὐτῶν, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῷ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὅντι σπένδει ποτὲ ἡ ὅμνυσι κατ' αὐτὸν.

a. 11. § 1. κατὰ Σόλωνα] See Herod. i. 30–33 for the conversation between Solon and Croesus—οὗτοι δν, ὁ Κροῖσε, says Solon (ch. 32. § 6) πᾶν ἔστι ἄνθρωπος συμφορή· ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ καὶ πλουτέειν μὲν μέγα φαίνεαι καὶ βασιλεὺς εἶναι πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔκεινο δὲ τὸ εἴρεο με, οὕκω σε ἐγὼ λέγω (i.e. εὐδαίμονα), πρὶν ἀν τελευτήσαντα καλῶς τὸν πιῶνα πύθωμαι. . . . Again, § 12 πρὶν δ’ ἀν τελευτήσῃ ἐπισχέειν, μηδὲ καλέειν κω δλβιον, ἀλλ’ εὐτυχέα, and § 17 σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῆ ἀποβῆσεται. πολλοῖσι γὰρ δὴ ὑποδέξας δλβον ὁ θεός, προρρίζους ἀνέτρεψε. The result is given ch. 33 ταῦτα λέγων τῷ Κροίσῳ (ὁ Σόλων), οὐ κως οὔτε ἔχαρίζετο, οὔτε λόγου μιν ποιησάμενος οὐδενὸς ἀποπέμπεται· κάρτα δόξας ἀμαθέα εἶναι, ὃς τὰ παρεόντα ἀγαθὰ μετεῖς, τὴν τελευτὴν παντὸς χρήματος ὄραν ἐκέλευε. Plut. *Vita Solonis* ch. 27 Ἐλλησιν, εἰπεν, ὁ βασιλεὺς Δυδῶν πρός τε τὰλλα μετρίως ἔχειν ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκε καὶ σοφίας τιὸς ἀθαρσοῦς, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ δημοτικῆς, οὐ βασιλικῆς οὐδὲ λαμπρᾶς, ὑπὸ μετριότητος ἡμῖν μέτεστιν, ἡ τύχαις δρῶσα παντοδαπαῖς χρώμενον ἀεὶ τὸν βίον οὐκ ἔη τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀγαθοῖς μέγα φρονεῖν οὐδὲ θαιμάζειν ἀνδρὸς εὐτυχίαν μεταβολῆς χρόνον ἔχουσαν. ἐπεισι γὰρ ἐκάστῳ ποικίλον ἐξ ἀδήλου τὸ μέλλον· φ δὲ εἰς τέλος ὁ δαίμων ἔθετο τὴν εὐπραξίαν, τοῦτον εὐδαίμονα νομίζομεν. ὁ δὲ ζῶντος ἔτι καὶ κινδυνεύοντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ μακαρισμός, ὥσπερ ἀγωνιζομένου κήρυγμα καὶ στέφανος, ἐστὶν ἀβέβαιος καὶ ἄκυρος. The com-

mentators quote for the sentiment of this dictum attributed to 1100 a. 11. Solon—

Soph. *O. T.* 1528

ῶστε θυητὸν ὅντ' ἐκείνην τὴν τελευταίαν χρεών  
ἡμέραν ἐπισκοποῦντα μηδέν' ὀλβίζειν, πρὶν ἂν  
τέρμα τοῦ βίου περάσῃ μηδὲν ἀλγεινὸν παθών.

*Trach.* I

λόγος μέν ἔστ' ἀρχαῖος ἀνθρώπων φανεῖ,  
ὅς οὐκ ἀν αἰῶν' ἐκμάθοις βροτῶν, πρὶν ἂν  
θάνη τις, οὗτ' εἰς χρηστὸς οὗτ' εἴς τῷ κακῷ.

Eurip. *Androm.* 100

χρὴ δ' οὕτοις εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ὄλβιον βροτῶν,  
πρὶν ἀν θανόντος τὴν τελευταίαν ἵδης  
σπας περάστας ἡμέραν ἥξει κάτω.

*Troad.* 509

τῶν δ' εὐδαιμόνων  
μηδένα νομίζετ' εὐτυχεῖν πρὶν ἀν θάνη.

To these passages may be added *Διονυσίου τυράννου ἐκ Λήδας* (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. iv. 18, ed. Meineke)—

θυητῶν δὲ μηδεὶς μηδὲν ὄλβιόν ποτε  
κρίνῃ, πρὶν αὐτὸν εὑρετήσαντ' ἵδη  
ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ γάρ τὸν θανόντ' ἐπαινέσαι.

§ 2. *ἄτοπον*] See Grant's *Eth.* Essay v. p. 302, quoted in Introductory Note to this chapter.

§ 3. *μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται*] 'Solon's meaning' was evidently a. 15. *ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἀν τις ἀσφαλῶς κ.τ.λ.*, as may be seen from the accounts given by Herod. and Plut., not that 'a man is positively happy after death.'

*ἀσφαλῶς*] Cf. Dionysius quoted at the end of note on § 1.

a. 16.

ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα] Ramsauer points out that a. 17. *μέν* here is not followed by *δέ*, the opposition generally expressed by means of two clauses being implied in the single clause *ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα*—'ut si explicares "haec quamquam vera sunt tamen aliam admittunt controversiam."'

*δέ* at the beginning of § 4, *ἀπορίαν δέ*, has no relation to this *μέν*.

*δοκεῖ*] not to be taken as necessarily an expression of Aristotle's a. 18. own opinion.

1100 a. 19. εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ] ὁ σπερ κάν εἴ τις ζῷοι μὲν ἀγαθοῖς τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀγαθὸς ὡν, τῶν δὲ οἰκείων αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχοντων, καὶ αὐτῶν εἰς γνῶσιν οὐκ ἔρχοιτο καὶ δι' ἀποδημίαν ἵσται η διὰ χρόνιον καὶ σφιδρὰν ἀσχολίαν πρὸς ἔτερα, οὕτω καὶ τῷ τεθνεῶτι συμβαίνει πολλάκις γίνεσθαι μηδεμίαν αἰσθησιν ἔχοντι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ τοῖς οἰκείοις αὐτοῦ συμβέβηκεν—Eust. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 120) would place a comma after ζῶντι, on the ground that the words μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ cannot go with the conditional clause: the construction is δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ.

A dead man, it may be argued, is like a living man absent on a long journey, to whom, without his knowing it, good and evil may happen, in the matter of his estate, or in the persons of his relatives left at home. A dead man may thus perhaps be said ‘to participate unconsciously’ in the happiness or misery of his descendants. Aristotle says nothing here to lead us to suppose that he appropriates this view; indeed, he could not appropriate it, for it still assumes personal immortality, although in a highly attenuated form. Aristotle’s own doctrine is that ‘immortality’ belongs to the family or race, as distinguished from the individual: see *de An.* ii. 4. 415 a. 26 φυσικῶτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα, ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἔτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ἢ δύνανται . . . ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατεῖ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ταύτη καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ἢ δύναται μετέχειν ἔκαστον, κοινωνεῖ ταύτῃ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δὲ ήττον καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλ’ οἷον αὐτό, ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἐν, εἴδει δὲ ἐν. *Oecon.* i. 3. 1343 b. 23 ἄμα δὲ καὶ η φύσις ἀναπληροῖ ταύτη τῇ περιόδῳ τὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι· ἐπεὶ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν οὐ δύναται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος· οὕτω προώκονόμηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου ἔκατέρου η φύσις τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν.

a. 20. τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι] *i.e.* to himself.

a. 21. § 4. ἀπορίαν δέ] This is Bekker’s reading, followed by Bywater. I am inclined to follow Susemihl in reading δή: nothing new is going to be added: what has been said is going to be repeated in different words.

a. 23. κατὰ λόγον] ‘in accordance with his life’: Eustr. has κατὰ λόγον ητοι κατὰ ἀκολουθίαν καὶ ἀναλογίαν τῆς αὐτοῦ μακαριότητος.

a. 26. τοῖς ἀποστήμασι] ‘in their respective degrees of removal.’ Grant.

§ 5. μηδὲ ἐπί τινα χρόνον] ‘not even for a time’—*i.e.* for a short 1100 a. 29. time after the death of the γονεῖς.

On § 5 Grant remarks—‘The second part of this sentence, pronounced so strongly as it is, seems to contradict what one would have supposed to be Aristotle’s philosophical creed. But he is here speaking from the popular point of view, and states strongly the two sides of the difficulty that presents itself. For the nonce he accepts a common belief on the subject (cf. i. II. 1, i. II. 6), but modifies it so as to leave it unimportant.’

§ 6. τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν] viz. πότερον οὐδὲ ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων a. 31. εὐδαιμονιστέον ἔως ἂν ζῆ; § 1. The solution of this ἀπορία will help us to the answer of τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον, viz. πότερον συνικεῖται τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν; the discussion of which is resumed in the next chapter.

§ 7. ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι] Zell quotes *Phys.* iv. 14. 223 b. 24 φασὶ γὰρ 1100 b. 3. κύκλον εἶναι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα. Michelet quotes Herod. i. 207 κύκλος τῶν ἀνθρωπητῶν ἐστὶ πρηγμάτων.

§ 8.] Grant notes that the words χαμαιλέοντα καὶ σαθρῶς ιδρυμένον b. 6. form an iambic line, probably quoted from some play.

§ 9. ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς δρθόν;] This is b. 7. Solon’s error. He attaches too much weight to fortune. Happiness is essentially the virtuous life, which can maintain itself even in the midst of misfortunes.

With ἐπακολουθεῖν ταῖς τύχαις cf. Menander (*Stob. Ecl. Phys.* ii. 8, Meineke, *Fgr.* iv. 215)

δυσπαρακολούθητόν τι πρᾶγμ’ ἐστὶν τύχη.

§ 10. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν] To be taken b. 11. closely with what immediately precedes—‘Happiness does not consist in good fortune. Good fortune is only an external condition, not part of the essence, of Happiness. Happiness consists essentially in the performance of function: and (§ 10) this theory (τῷ λόγῳ) of Happiness is confirmed by the very difficulties themselves which we have reviewed.’ Τὸ διαπορεῖν is διέρχεσθαι τὰς ἀπορίας (see *Index Arist. s. v. διαπορεῖν*); consequently here τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν means ‘the result of the review of ἀπορίαι which we have concluded.’ The result of this review has been to bring out τὸ μόνιμόν τι εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν as the thought underlying the ἀπορίαι—‘How can εὐδαι-

1100 b. 11. *μονία*, which is *μόνιμόν τι*, be realised in the life of man, which is obnoxious to fickle fortune (§ 7)? Our Definition, which makes Happiness consist, not in good fortune, but in those functions which are the most stable elements in human nature, is thus confirmed by ‘the review of ἀπορίαι.’ The Paraph. Heliodorus explains this excellently—λέγομεν τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν, οὐδαμῶς ὁρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ἡ εὐδαιμονία συνίσταται, ἢ τονύνατίον· ἀλλὰ προσδέῖται μὲν τούτων πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἡ δὲ οὐσία τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οὐκ ἐν αὐταῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείᾳ συνίσταται, καθὼς εἴρηται. Μόνιμον γὰρ δεῖ εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· καὶ διὰ τούτο οὐ δυνατὸν αὐτὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τύχης συνίστασθαι· καὶ τούτῳ μαρτυρεῖ ἡ προκειμένη ἔγγησις· ἀπὸ τούτου γὰρ ἔλαβε τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ὑποκείσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν μόνιμον εἶναι.

b. 14. *μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι*] The contrast here is between deeply organised functions, whether *intellectual or moral*, involving the coordination of all parts of a man’s nature—*i.e.* between the display of intelligence and moral goodness, on the one hand, and special knowledge, involving the perhaps exclusive cultivation of one small part of human nature, on the other hand. An intelligent man will show intelligence on all occasions, a just man will always act justly; but an examinee may quite forget a branch of knowledge, after the reason for which he ‘got it up’ has ceased to exist.

b. 15. *τούτων δ’ αὐτῶν*] *i.e.* τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν κατ’ ἀρετὴν.

*αἱ τιμιώταται*] The exact force of this expression may be gathered from i. 12, which asks whether *εὐδαιμονία* is *ἐπαινετόν* or *τίμιον*. Things which are means are *ἐπαινετά*, but an end-in-itself, such as *εὐδαιμονία*, is *τίμιον*. Hence here *αἱ τιμιώταται* may be rendered—‘the highest,’ *i.e.* the most final. The *μακάριοι*—those who realise most perfectly that ‘humanity is an end-in-itself,’ not a means to something beyond itself, spend their lives in—identify themselves with the performance of functions which are ‘highest’ in this sense. We may take it, then, that *αἱ θεωρητικαὶ ἐνέργειαι* were in Aristotle’s mind when he wrote *τούτων δ’ αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται*.

b. 16. *καταξῆν*] Coraes suggests *ξῆν*: cf. the Paraph. δ:ὰ τὸ ξῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακάριους μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα. The compounded form *καταξῆν* is rare, but it is, I think, appropriate here: perhaps, however, the *κατα-* represents a dittograph of the preceding *-τατα*.

**αὐτάς**] the reading of Mb, CCC, NC, Vet. Int. adopted by 1100 b. 17. Susemihl and Bywater instead of **αὐτά**.

**λήθην**] Similarly in *E.N.* vi. 5. 8 **τέχνη** and **φρόνησις** are contrasted—**λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἔξεως** (*e.g. τέχνης*) **ἔστι**, **φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν**. **Τέχνη** implies the cultivation of a small part of a man's nature; whereas **φρόνησις** involves the organisation of the whole man, and he cannot 'forget' or lose his **φρόνησις** without becoming another being. Cf. Grant on the present § (i. 10. 10)—‘The **ἐνέργεια . . . is** our life and being, and it would be absurd to speak of forgetting this. It “is more abiding than the sciences,” *i.e.* than the separate parts of knowledge, which do not constitute the mind itself.’

**§ 11. τὸ ζητούμενον]** **τὸ ζητούμενον** **ἢν εὶ δύναται μένειν δὲ εὐδαίμων** b. 18. **μακάριος ἐν ταῖς τῶν τυχῶν μεταπτώσεσιν.** Eustr. So the Paraph.—**ὑπάρξει τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, τὸ μόνιμον δηλονότι αὐτῷ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν.**

**μάλιστα πάντων]** ‘mostly’—Grant; **πάντων** is neut.

b. 19.

**πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετήν]** Grant (note on § 10) points out that these words show that the opposition between **αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι** and **αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι** in § 10 is not the opposition ‘between the moral and intellectual **ἐνέργειαι**’.

**ὅ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου]** Zell, Coraes, b. 21. Michelet, and Grant refer to Plato, *Protagoras* 339 **λέγει γάρ που Σιμωνίδης . . . ὅτι**

**ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν  
χερσὶν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ  
τετράγωνον ἄνευ ψόγου τε-  
τυγμένον.**

Cf. *Rhet.* iii. ii. 1411 b. 25 λέγω δὴ πρὸ δημάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνειν οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον, μεταφορά ἀμφω γὰρ τέλεια, ἀλλ' οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν. Sopater, apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. ii. 222 (ed. Meineke), quoted by Zell, indicates the precise metaphor conveyed by **τετράγωνος**—**τίς οὖν οὗτος κατὰ τὸν Σιμωνίδου λύγον τετράγωνος**, ὃς κατὰ πᾶσαν τύχην καὶ πραγμάτων μετάστασιν ἀσφαλῶς ἐστήξεται. So Eustr. **τετράγωνος**, ἦτοι βεβηκὼς καὶ στάσιμος· ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν τοιούτων σχημάτων, ἀ ὅπως ἀν ριφέντα πεσῆται δρθια ἵστανται. Cf. Suidas *sub voc.* Δαμάσκιος—σεμνὸς δὲ ḥν καὶ εὐσχή-

1100 b. 21. *μων τὰ πάντα καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψύχου τετυγμένος, ὡς φάναι κατὰ τὸν Σιμωνίδην.*

b. 26. § 12. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.] *aὐτά* and *ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν* are distinguished. ‘In themselves they naturally help to lend a charm to life, and the use of them is noble and good.’

b. 30. *διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν]* Both Michelet and Grant remark on the Stoical tone of this passage. Grant compares *E.N.* iii. 9. 4, where the self-sacrifice of the brave man is described.

1101 a. 2. § 13. *ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων κ.τ.λ.] τὰς τύχας ἡ ὡς ὅργανα χρὴ ἡ ὡς ὕλας ὑποκειμένας λογίζεσθαι.* Eustr.

a. 6. § 14. *ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ’ ἀν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε κ.τ.λ.]* The distinction between *εὐδαίμων* and *μακάριος* is not carefully observed by Aristotle. We may perhaps say that the latter term is strictly applied to the man whose happiness is not marred in any way by circumstances: cf. the derivation given in *E.N.* vii. 11. 2 *τὸν μακάριον ὀνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν.*

a. 14. § 15.] In this § the words *ἡ προσθετέον* a. 16 . . . *πάντως* a. 19 are bracketed by Susemihl. Rassow had pointed out (*Forsch.* pp. 118, 119) that they (and also the words *εἰ δ’ οὖτω* a. 19 . . . *ἀνθρώπους* a. 21 in § 16) are inconsistent with the result gained by Aristotle from the discussion of Solon's dictum, although quite in harmony with the later peripatetic view of the *βίος τέλειος*. Rassow's words are—‘Was hindert uns also, fährt Aristoteles fort (§ 15), den glückselig zu nennen, der der vollkommenen Tugend gemäss thätig und mit äussern Glücksgütern hinlänglich ausgerüstet ist *μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον?* Schlösse hier die Untersuchung, so wäre nicht bloss die Ansicht des Solon zurückgewiesen, sondern man würde auch über die Frage, was man unter dem *βίος τέλειος* zu verstehen habe, keineswegs im Zweifel sein können. Denn wenn es denkbar ist, dass jemand die Eudämonie besitzt, verliert und wieder gewinnt, wie kann der Besitz derselben an das volle Menschenleben gebunden sein? (cf. note on i. 7. 16). Aber wider Erwarten erfolgt ein Zusatz, der zwar in der Form einer Frage auftritt, aber doch einer Frage, die eher zu Bejahung als Verneinung hinneigt. Es heisst: *ἡ προσθετέον . . . πάντως; εἰ δ’ οὖτω . . . δ’ ἀνθρώπους.* Wer so definirt

kann nichts einzuwenden haben gegen das Solonische Wort; denn 1101 a. 14. mag er auch auf die äussern Glücksfalle ein minderes Gewicht legen als Solon, so stimmt er ihm doch darin bei, dass es zur Glückseligkeit nicht eines gewissen Abschnittes des Lebens, sondern des ganzen Lebens bedürfe, und wer dies meint, wird Solons Vorsicht im Urtheil nur billigen können. (Oben ch. 10 § 7, war es als ein *ἄτοπον* bezeichnet, *εἰ ὅτ’ ἐστὶν εὐδαιμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸ ὑπάρχον.* Auch dies wird durch die Worte, *ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν* zurückgenommen). Die letztere Definition, die, wenn man auf die Fassung Gewicht legen darf, noch als fraglich hingestellt wird, scheint in der Schule des Aristoteles die herrschende geworden zu sein. Denn während er selbst noch Gründe gegen die Solonische Ansicht anführt, wird diese in der Eudemischen Ethik kurzweg als richtig bezeichnet und demgemäß der *βίος τέλειος* als das volle Menschenleben gefasst.'

Susemihl apparently differs from Rassow in regarding the words *εἰ δ’ οὔτω . . . μακαρίους δ’ ἀνθρώπους* § 16 as genuine. But surely, if the words *ἡ προσθετέον . . . πάντως*, with their references to the future (*βιωσόμενον* and *τελευτήσοντα*) are inconsistent with Aristotle's criticism of the Solonian dictum, the words *οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει* are equally so. Nor is the sentence *εἰ δ’ οὔτω . . . μακαρίους δ’ ἀνθρώπους* even consistent with itself. The writer of it evidently lays emphasis on *τῶν ζῶντων*, and intends to make a statement which shall embody what he conceives to be Aristotle's correction of Solon's *τὸ μὴ ζῶντ’ εὐδαιμονίζειν*: but he does not see that the words *καὶ ὑπάρξει* deprive the correction of meaning, Aristotle's objection to Solon being that Solon will not acquiesce in the present, but must needs wait for the future. Aristotle's view of Life is like his view of Pleasure. Both Life and Pleasure are perfect (*τέλεια*) *ἐν τῷ ἀτόμῳ νῦν*. We have not to wait for a *future τέλος*: if we had, Life would be a *γένεσις*, not an *ἐνέργεια*.

§ 16. *μακαρίους δ’ ἀνθρώπους*] Before *ἀνθρώπους* Γ, C C C, Eustr., a. 20. Paraph., corr. P<sup>1</sup> (*i. e.* Par. 2023), and perhaps Asp. (see Bywater) read *ώς*, which Michelet ascribes to Christian influences—as if the distinction intended were that between the imperfect happiness competent to man's fallen nature and the perfect felicity of God: whereas according to the true Aristotelian teaching, man, although

1101 a. 20. partially subject to the vicissitudes of fortune, has a region—that of thought—exempt from their influence. As exercising thought he enjoys a felicity which does not differ in kind from the divine; while, as a composite being, he enjoys a human happiness. Be this as it may, I cannot see how the so-called Christian distinction may not be got out of the words before us as well without as with ὡς. The meaning (with or without ὡς) seems however to be simple enough—we may call men *μακάριοι*, but we must remember that they are *men*. The difference between the happiness of man and of God is not in the kind of function which constitutes the happiness in each case, but in the continuity of that function: see *Met. A. 7. 1072 b. 13* ἐκ τοιαύτης ἥπα ἀρχῆς ἥρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις· διαγωγὴ δέ ἔστιν οὐαὶ ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν· οὗτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνό ἔστιν ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον . . . ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰών συνεχῆς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

Eustratius, although he perhaps writes under the influence, to some extent, of the Christian distinction, does not really misrepresent the Aristotelian teaching in his commentary on the words before us—*μακαρίους δέ φησιν ὡς ἀνθρώπους ἤτοι κατὰ τὸ ἀρμόζον ἀνθρωπίνη φύσει, οἷς ἡ ἐν βίῳ διαγωγὴ ἐν διηνεκεῖ ρύσει καὶ μεταβολῇ ἕπαρχει, ἐπεὶ τῆς νοερᾶς καὶ θείας φύσεως ἄλλο εἶδος μακαριότητος, ἐν στάσει τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντος καὶ μηδεμίαν ὑπομενούσης μεταβολήν.* I have great doubts, however, of the genuineness of the words *εἰ δ' οὗτοι . . . δὲ ἀνθρώπους.*

## CHAPTER XI.

### ARGUMENT.

*To return now to the question whether the dead are touched by the fortunes of living descendants and friends—That they are not touched at all is a cold doctrine opposed to most men's way of thinking, and therefore not one which we should be justified in maintaining dogmatically: but to make a critical examination of the particular cases, in order to estimate the probability of the dead being or not being touched in each, would take too long: a general statement on the subject must suffice; and let it be this—Different things whether happening to ourselves or to our friends affect us differently. Some things affect us deeply, other things lightly. This during our lives. But when we compare the way in which the dead are 'affected' with that in which the living are 'affected,' we must be prepared for a vast difference—much vaster than that in*

*the theatre between the effect of a messenger's tale of horror and crime and the effect of the crime itself in all its horror enacted on the stage before our eyes. Taking account then of this vast difference in the way in which the dead as compared with the living are 'affected'—if they are 'affected' at all (a doubt which we must not lose sight of either)—we may say that if aught of good or evil reaches the dead from the living world and touches them, it is so trifling, or they are so insensible to its influence, that it does not affect their Happiness if they are happy, or Wretchedness if they are wretched.*

§ 1.] On the subject of this ch. see introductory note to ch. 10. 1101 a. 22. He now returns to the *ἐπιχητούμενον* of i. 10. 6.

*λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον]* Remembering that a. 23. the treatment of the subject in this and the preceding chapter is *dialectical*, we may recognise in these words two marks of the legitimate dialectical *πρότασις* or *πρόβλημα*, as it is described in the *Topics*. (1) No *πρότασις* may be employed which deeply offends the religious and moral sentiments of men, *Top.* i. 11. 105 a. 3 οὐ δεῖ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλ' ἦν ἀπορήσειν ἂν τις τῶν λόγου δεομένων, καὶ μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποροῦντες πότερον δεῖ τὸν θεοὺς τιμᾶν, καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς ἀγαπᾶν ἢ οὐ κολάσεως δέονται, οἱ δὲ πότερον ἡ χιῶν λευκὴ ἢ οὐ, αἰσθήσεως. So, to call in question the consciousness of the Dead is a heartless proceeding (*λίαν ἄφιλον*) and not suited to Dialectic. (2) Another mark of a legitimate dialectical *πρότασις* seems to be indicated by the words *καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον*, viz. that, except where it is supported by very exceptional evidence, it must not conflict with popular opinion. See *Top.* i. 10. 104 a. 8 ἔστι δὲ πρότασις μὲν διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἐνδοξὸς ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις, μὴ παράδοξος\* θείη γὰρ ἂν τις τὸ δοκοῦν τοῖς σοφοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ ἐναντίον ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν δόξαις ἥ: and *Top.* i. 11. 104 b. 19 θέσις δέ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν\* οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης . . . τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφῆναμένου φροντίζειν εὑηθές ἔστιν. In a dialectical discussion, then, like the present, we must not call in question the widely entertained belief, that the dead *are* conscious, the denial of which moreover wounds the tenderest feelings of mankind. But while, for these reasons, unwilling here entirely to deny this popular belief, Aristotle does not scruple to *minimize* it—his dialectical conclusion being § 5 ἔσικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διϊκνεῖται πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτιον, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τούναντίον, ἀφαυρόν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι,

1101 a. 23. εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον.

a. 28. §§ 3, 4, 5.] We have here a double protasis εἰ δή a. 28 . . . . διαφέρει δέ a. 31, the apodosis beginning—συλλογιστέον δή a. 34.

a. 32. § 4. τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ή πράττεσθαι] ‘It makes a much greater difference whether a calamity happen to the living or to the dead, than it does whether a terrible crime be presupposed in the plot of a tragedy or enacted on the stage.’ Michelet appositely quotes Hor. A. P. 181

‘Segnus irritant animos demissa per aures  
Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus.’

There can be very little doubt that this is the meaning of the passage; but most of the commentators, beginning with Eustrat., miss the point, e.g. Coraes, with οἶνον ἐπὶ παραδείγματος, Οἰδίπους, τὴν μητέρα γαμῶν, τοὺς ὄφθαλμοὺς ἔκκοπτόμενος, τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἔκπιπτων, ὅτ᾽ ξῆη, διαφέρει τοῦ ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ ταύτῃ ταῦτα πάσχειν ὅποκρινομένου Οἰδίποδος.

a. 34. § 5. συλλογιστέον] ‘we must take into account.’

μᾶλλον δ’ ἵσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.] ‘or rather perhaps (we must take into account, συλλογιστέον understood) the fact that a question is raised about the dead etc.’ Grant. Lambinus suggested μᾶλλον δ’ ἵσως τόδε δεῖ διαπορεῖσθαι: but as Grant argues<sup>1</sup> ‘The alteration would really alter and spoil the context. Aristotle does not say “Perhaps after all we had better start the question anew, whether the dead are conscious of events.” This would contradict § 6. He only says, “While granting the hypothesis that they do feel, we must take into account the element of doubt which still continues to attach to the subject.”’ Rassow, however—(Forsch. p. 74), is of opinion that μᾶλλον δ’ ἵσως τόδε δεῖ ἀπορεῖσθαι is the correct reading. I cannot help thinking that the considerations urged by Grant against the conjecture of Lambinus tell equally against that of Rassow.

1101 b. 1. ἐκ τούτων] ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων—Aspasius: so Stahr, Peters, and Williams: but the Paraph. has—φαίνεται τοίνυν ὅτι, εἰ καὶ ἔρχεται τι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τούτων.

<sup>1</sup> After noting the rendering of the Paraph. as supporting Lambinus—σκεπτέον οὖν περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς· βέλτιον δέ ἐστι σκέψασθαι εἰ κοινωνοῦσιν κ.τ.λ.

εἰ δὲ μή] sc. ἀφανρόν τι καὶ μικρόν.

1101 b. 3.

§ 6.] Victorius thinks that this § is an ancient scholium which b. 5. has got into the text—‘ nihil enim novi tot verbis exponitur: nec solum sententia sed ne verba quidem variantur . . . sunt etiam libri nonnulli (which?) a quibus haec verba absunt.’ Stahr follows Victorius in regarding the § as an interpolation.

## CHAPTER XII.

### ARGUMENT.

*Let our next question be this—Is Happiness a thing which we praise, or is it not rather a thing which we revere? It must be either praised or revered; for it is actually good, not a mere possibility of good.*

*A thing is praised because it is a good means to some end: e.g. a virtuous character is praised because it produces virtuous actions. Where there is no reference to an end beyond, praise is misapplied: e.g. it is misapplied, and ridiculously so, to the Gods who exist for themselves not for man. It is plain then that the Chief Good is above praise: ‘that a good thing which is above praise must be the Chief Good’ was indeed the argument which Eudoxus used to prove that ‘Pleasure is the Chief Good’—and a very fine line of advocacy it was, in the opinion of many.*

*As for encomia—they are for performances such as feats of bodily strength or masterpieces of art: but the works of those who have made encomia their special subject may be consulted for details; our present subject is Happiness, and it is plain that Happiness is revered as an End. As a Beginning also or First Principle it is revered. All that is done by men is done for its sake: it is the Prime Mover or First Cause of all their actions. Such a Principle and Cause of Good we revere as divine.*

*Introductory Note.] Except that this chapter contains a further 1101 b. 10. attempt to show the agreement of the Definition with popular opinion and forms of speech, its connexion with the immediate context is not evident. The following passage in *E. E.* ii. 1. 1219 a. 40—b. 16, which gives an imperfect conspectus of the contents of several chapters of the *E. N.*, seems however to bring out the solidarity of the enquiry before us with the preceding discussions, especially with the question εἰ δεῖ τὸ τέλος ὄρāν:—ὅτι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὄρον αὐτῆς λέγομεν καλῶς, μαρτύρια τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. τό τε γὰρ εὖ πράττειν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν τὸ αὐτὸν τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὃν ἔκαστον*

1101 b. 10. *χρῆσίς* ἔστι καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις (καὶ γὰρ ἡ πρακτικὴ χρηστὴ ἔστι . . .) καὶ τὸ μήτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαιμόνα μήτε παῖδα μήθ’ ἥλικιαν πᾶσαν (διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς τὸ μὴ ζῶντ’ εὐδαιμονίζειν, ἀλλ’ ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος<sup>o</sup> οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτελές εὐδαιμονίου γὰρ δλον). ἔτι δ’ οἱ ἐπαινοὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων καὶ στεφανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλ’ οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν, μὴ νικῶντες δέ· καὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ὅποιος τις ἔστιν<sup>w</sup> ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται; ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τᾶλλα, ἢ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι ἢ τῷ μόρια εἶναι αὐτῆς. διὸ ἔτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἐπαινος καὶ ἐγκώμιον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ’ ἔκστον ἔργου δ’ ἔπαινος τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου δ’ εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους. It will be observed that the word *τίμιον* is not used here, the writer, true to his view—τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς τὸ μὴ ζῶντ’ εὐδαιμονίζειν ἀλλ’ ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος, ending the passage with δ’ εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους.

b. 10. § 1.] *εὐδαιμονία* is evidently not a *δύναμις* or mere potentiality of good: it is definitely and actually good. But is it actually good as a means or as an end? This question, which has already been answered over and over again, may be answered once more by reference to the popular distinction between *ἐπαινετά* and *τίμια*, the former being good means, and the latter good ends. The result of this reference is οἵδεις τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ ὡς θειώτερόν τι καὶ βελτιόν μακαρίζει (§ 4). Cf. *M. M.* i. 2. 1183 b. 20–37—a passage which fully explains what Aristotle understands here by *ἐπαινετά* (*οἷον ἀρεταῖ*) *τίμια* (*οἷον ψυχή, νοῦς, ἡ ἀρχή*) and *δυνάμεις* (*οἷον ἀρχὴ πλοῦτος ἵσχυς κάλλος*). Ramsauer, who has an important note here, points out that the conjunction *ἐπαινετά, τίμια, δυνάμεις* occurs only in the *Eth. Nic.* and the *M. M.*. In *Top.* iv. 5 τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ τὸ ποιητικόν is distinguished as δι’ ἄλλο αἴρετόν from τὸ *τίμιον*, which is δι’ αὐτὸν αἴρετόν, no mention being made of τὸ *ἐπαινετόν*<sup>1</sup>: (126 b. 4 [ὅραν δέ] καὶ εἴ τι τῶν δι’ αὐτὸν τιμίων ἢ αἴρετῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἔθηκεν<sup>x</sup> πᾶσα γὰρ δύναμις καὶ πᾶν τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ τὸ ποιητικὸν δι’ ἄλλο αἴρετόν), while in another passage, *Top.* iii. 1. 116 b. 37, *τίμια* and *ἐπαινετά* do not seem to be distinguished, *both* being ends or means—ἔτι τὸ κάλλιον καθ’ αὐτὸν καὶ τιμιώτερον καὶ ἐπαινετώτερον, οἷον φιλία πλούτου καὶ δικαιοσύνη ἵσχυσ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὰ τῶν

<sup>1</sup> The term *ἐπαινετόν* does not indeed occur in this passage; but its contrary *ψευτόν* occurs in the immediate context, 126 a. 30 ὅραν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ψευτῶν ἢ φευκτῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατὸν ἔθηκεν . . . : then follows 126 b. 4 καὶ εἴ τι τῶν δι’ αὐτὸν τιμίων ἢ αἴρετῶν εἰς δύναμιν . . . ἔθηκεν.

τιμίων καὶ ἐπαινετῶν, τὰ δ' οὐ καθ' αὐτὰ ἀλλὰ δι' ἔτερον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ 1101 b. 10. τιμᾶ τὸν πλοῦτον δι' ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἔτερον, τὴν δὲ φιλίαν καθ' αὐτό, καὶ εἰ μηδὲν μέλλει ἡμῖν ἔτερον ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐσεσθαι. All we can say is that here in the *Ethics* Aristotle finds that it suits his purpose to make a distinction between ἐπαινετά and τίμια which he does not make in the *Topics*.

§ 2. φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρός τι b. 12. πῶς ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι] When the possession of a good *quality* places a thing in a definite *relation to* something else we praise it on account of its relation to that something else (*γίνονται οἱ ἐπαινοὶ δι' ἀναφορᾶς* § 3). Cf. *Cat.* 7. 6 b. 2 ἔστι δὲ . . . τῶν πρός τι . . . ἔξις διάθεσις ἐπιστήμη αἰσθησις θέσις. πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἔστιν ἔτέρων εἶναι λέγεται . . . ἡ γὰρ ἔξις τινὸς ἔξις λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη κ.τ.λ. Cf. the last words of the present book of the *E.N.*: τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν. A good quality to be ἐπαινετόν, however, must be one which places its possessor in a *definite* relation. There are certain good qualities—various ἐπιστῆμαι or τέχναι (the *δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγου* of *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1) such as ρήτορική, διαλεκτική, ἰατρική, which may be used for good or evil indifferently, and therefore are not ἐπαινετά or, at least, not so without qualification. But moral ἔξεις (e.g. δικαιοσύνη) differ from such *δυνάμεις* in being the sources of good actions only, in this respect resembling the ἀλογοι *δυνάμεις* or natural properties of *Met.* Θ. 2, which always produce the same effects—the peculiar property of fire, e.g. always producing heat, that of snow, cold: cf. also *E.N.* v. 1. 4. These moral ἔξεις are ἐπαινετά without qualification, as they tend definitely to good; whereas many intellectual ἔξεις (and it will be observed that no intellectual ἔξεις are instanced by Aristotle in the section before us—i. 12. 2) belong rather to the class of *δυνάμεις* which are distinguished from τὰ ἐπαινετά in § 1. Eustatius seems to see this—τὰ μὲν θεῖα τίμια λέγομεν ὡς ὑπάρχοντα ὑπὲρ ἐπαινον. . . ἐπαινετὰ δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὡς τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι μὲν λειπόμενα, ἐπαίνων δὲ μόνον τυγχάνοντα. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἔτερα ἀνθρώπινα μὲν καὶ ταῦτα, ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα δέ, ὡς καὶ κατορθοῦν δύνασθαι καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυνάμεις λεγόμενα, ὡς τινας τῶν τεχνῶν ὑπάρχει εὑρεῖν, οἷον ἰατρικήν ἢ ρήτορικήν κ.τ.λ. These instances, it will be observed, differ from those given by the author of *M.M.* i. 2, who has τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις οἷον ἀρχὴν πλοῦτος ἴσχὺς κάλλος 1183 b. 28.

Besides the moral ἔξεις, there is another class of ποιότητες,

1101 b. 12. sufficiently definite in the direction of good to be ‘praised’ without qualification—viz. those described in *Cat.* 8. 9 a. 15 as τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικήν—οὐ γάρ τῷ διακεῖσθαι πως ἔκαστον τούτων λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικήν . . . τοῦ ποιῆσαι τι ῥᾳδίως . . . οἷον πυκτικοὶ ἢ δρομικοί (cf. the passage before us, § 2) λέγονται οὐ τῷ διακεῖσθαι πως ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικήν τοῦ ποιῆσαι τι ῥᾳδίως. To prevent misunderstanding it is proper to add that, although in the view of the passage before us (*Eth.* i. 12. 2) the qualities or ποιότητες regarded as ἐπαινετά *par excellence* are the moral ἔξεις and τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν λεγόμενα, still it is not implied that all intellectual ἔξεις are mere potentialities for good or evil, like ρήτορική, and therefore not properly ἐπαινετά. Those ἐπιστῆμαι which are concerned with necessary truth cannot be turned to evil account, and, *qua* ἔξεις, are accordingly ἐπαινεταί: similarly the intellectual ἔξεις of φρόνησις, although concerned with contingencies, is ἐπαινετή, being one of those οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα (*E. N.* vi. 6. 2). That Aristotle extended ἐπανος to intellectual as well as to moral ἔξεις is indeed plain from the last section of this book, where ἀρετή is described as ἐπαινετὴ ἔξεις, and the ἀρεταί are then distinguished as ἡθικαί and διανοητικαί. The tendency, however, which we have noticed in the passage before us (i. 12. 2) to regard the moral ἔξεις as preeminently ἐπαινεταί is developed by the writer of the *M. M.* into the doctrine that the intellectual ἔξεις are *not* ἐπαινεταί: see *M. M.* i. 5. 1185 b. 3 ἔστιν δ' ἡ ψυχή, ὡς φαμέν, εἰς δύο μέρη διηρημένη, εἴς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον. ἐν μὲν δὴ τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις ἀγχίνοια σοφία εὐμάθεια μνήμη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀλόγῳ αὖται αἱ ἀρεταὶ λεγόμεναι, σωφροσύνη δικαιοσύνη ἀνδρεία ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοῦ ἥθους δοκοῦσιν ἐπαινεταὶ εἶναι. κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας ἐπαινετοὶ λεγόμεθα· κατὰ δὲ τὰς τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται· οὕτε γὰρ ὅτι σοφός, οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται, οὕτε ὅτι φρόνιμος, οὐδὲ ὅλως κατά τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. This is not in itself Aristotelian, but Aristotle suggested it.

With the words which head this note—φαίνεται δή κ.τ.λ. cf. *Met.* Δ. 14. 1020 b. 23 μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχοντι προαιρεσιν: cf. also *E. N.* ii. 5, which turns on goodness (ἀρετή) being regarded as *the* ποιότης *par excellence*: hence an examination of the admitted forms of ποιότης—ἔξεις, δύναμις, πάθος (or παθητικὴ ποιότης), with the conclusion § 6. 1106 a. 11 λείπεται ἔξεις τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι.

b. 16. καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δέ] K<sup>b</sup>: accepted by Rassow (*Forsch.* 54). The

δέ serves to bring out clearly that there are *two distinct* classes 1101 b. 16. of ἐπαιετά—the ἀρετάι, and τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικήν: hence also the word πεφυκέναι here.

## § 3. γέλοῖοι] sc. οἱ θεοί.

b. 19.

τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει] i.e. τοὺς θεοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφέρεσθαι. Cf. b. 20. E. N. x. 8. 7 for Aristotle's view of the life of the Gods, which is θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια, holding itself entirely apart from admixture with the concrete, and consequently from interference in human affairs.

## § 4. ὄμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν] sc. τὰ θειότατα.

b. 25.

§ 5. Εὔδοξος] Said to have been one of Plato's pupils; chiefly b. 27. celebrated as an astronomer (*Met.* A. 8); made ἡδονή the summum bonum (E. N. x. 2). For references to the literature about him see Schwegler, *Met.* vol. iv. p. 310. Opposite the section before us there is a scholium on the margin of Par. 1854 (L<sup>b</sup>)—not however, so far as I could judge, one of those by the hand which wrote the text—throwing considerable light on this doctrine of Eudoxus: it is (see Cramer, *Anecdota Graeca* vol. i. Schol. Cod. Par. 1854, p. 1101 b. 27)—ἔλεγε γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπένεμεν αὐτῇ ὁ Εὔδοξος τὰ ἀριστεῖα. This expression ἐπέκεινα πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν suggests the view that the doctrine of Eudoxus was only a modification of Plato's theory of the *ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ*, and consequently by no means a 'hedonistic' doctrine, as Aristotle insinuates E. N. x. 1 ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς διαφερόντως γὰρ ἔδόκει σώφρων εἶναι οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. Here Aristotle speaks as if Eudoxus was better than his doctrine: but it is quite in Aristotle's manner to misrepresent the doctrines of the Platonists. See note on E. N. x. 1. 2. In the present § (i. 12. 5) it will be understood that Aristotle does not imply his approval of the conclusion drawn by Eudoxus.

§ 6.] ἐγκώμια are given to good acts or products as such; ἐπαινος b. 33. to the qualities in men necessarily resulting in such acts or products; while a Life spent in the systematic performance of all good acts is, taken as a whole, τίμιον and τέλειον. The editors refer to *Rhet.* i. 9. 1367 b. 26 ἔστι δ' ἐπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς . . . τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἔστι . . . διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιά-

1101 b. 33. ζομεν πράξαντας τὰ δὲ ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἔξεως ἐστιν ἐπεὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ μὴ πεπραγότα, εἰ πιστεύομεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. See also the passage from *E. E.* ii. 1 quoted in the introductory note to this chapter.

b. 35. § 7. τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις] In a list of Aristotle's works given by Hesychius we find τέχνη ἐγκωμιαστική (see Berlin Arist. 1469): cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 4 on the ἐγκωμιαστικὸν εἶδος.

1102 a. 2. § 8. ἀρχή] ἀρχήν Mb, Ob C C C, Ald., but ἀρχή is right; Zell quotes ii. 9. 1 τοιαύτη ἐστὶν (ἡ ἀρετὴ) διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι, and vii. 14. 5 ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδρὰ εἶναι.

The τέλος, or perfect adult form, is the ἀρχή which determines the growth, through all its stages, of a plant or animal (see *Met.* Δ. 8. 1073 a. 1 τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον); similarly, εὐδαιμονία—the τέλος, or perfect form of human nature, is, as καλόν, the ἀρχή, or principle of attraction, which moves states and individuals to the performance of noble actions.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### ARGUMENT.

Since Happiness is 'a vital function manifesting perfect excellence,' let us now, in order to get a clearer view of Happiness, examine the nature of 'excellence.' In doing so we shall only be following out the line of enquiry contemplated at the beginning of this Treatise, when we described our Science as a kind of Statesmanship; for the 'excellence' or 'goodness' of their citizens is what all true Statesmen (e. g. the great lawgivers of Crete, Sparta, and other states) have been most anxious about.

Of course it is man's excellence that we examine; and the excellence not of his body but of his soul; for we define Happiness as a vital function, i. e. a function of the soul. The Statesman then must know something about the soul as a whole, just as the physician must know the body as a whole: in each case no part can be known or treated aright except as part of the whole. But the Statesman's study of Psychology need not go into wearisome details, for its end is practical not scientific.

It will be enough then if we here borrow the main outlines of Psychology from other works in which the subject is treated—and first, let us borrow the division of the soul into (1) the irrational part and (2) the part which has reason—it does not concern us here whether these parts are really separate as hand and foot are in the body, or only separated in thought as convex and concave in the mathematical circumference. Then the irrational part is subdivided. First we have the vegetative part, the principle of nutrition and growth, which we see perhaps most plainly at work in the embryo; but it continues to

operate in the adult also. This principle is common to all living creatures and not peculiar to man. Thus it operates most in sleep when the difference between men as men, i. e. between good men and bad men, is least apparent: ‘during half their lives’ according to the saying ‘the happy are no better off than the miserable.’ And this is easily explained, for sleep is the non-activity of the soul qua principle of conduct—although the principle of conduct may sometimes be so far active in sleep as to make the dreams of the good man better than those of the bad man. But enough of this: let us pass on from the nutritive part whose excellence is not that of man as man, to the other subdivision of the irrational part—to ‘the principle which though irrational yet participates somehow in reason.’ In the continent man and in the incontinent man we see two principles, one that of reason which we praise, and another which opposes reason. This latter principle in the continent man at least obeys reason or participates in it. Thus the irrational part of the soul contains two principles—the vegetative principle which does not participate in reason at all, and the appetitive which does in the sense of listening to reason and obeying it. Admonition, reproof and exhortation all witness to its participation in reason; and if we wish on the strength of its ‘participation’ to say that it ‘has reason,’ there can be no objection to our saying so, and subdividing ‘the part of the soul which has reason’ into two parts—the part which has reason in the strict sense, i. e. in itself, like the father who directs; and the part which has it in a secondary sense, i. e. by derivation from another or participation, like the child who follows his father’s directions.

This subdivision underlies the classification of the ‘excellences.’ We distinguish them as those of the intellect (i. e. the part which has reason in itself) and those of the moral character (i. e. the appetitive part which follows reason). Wisdom, intelligence and prudence are excellences of the intellect; liberality and temperance of the moral character. When we are describing a man’s moral character we do not speak of him as wise or intelligent but as good tempered or temperate; whereas the wise man comes in for the praise appropriate to his habit, which belongs to the other division, that of the intellect. In both divisions an ‘excellence’ may be described as a ‘habit which we praise.’

§ 1. περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἀν εἴη] K<sup>b</sup>, Camb., and Asp., are 1102 a. 6. the authorities for ἀν εἴη, accepted by Bywater. The words ἀν εἴη, are not found in other authorities.

A new division of the *Ethics* begins here. After indicating, in this chapter, the psychological ground of the distinction between the διανοητικά and the ἡθικά ἀρετά, Aristotle goes on in Book ii, and Book iii chapters 1–5, to discuss the common characteristics of the ἡθικά ἀρετά. This discussion is summed up in iii. 5. 21 κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔιρηται: then follows a detailed account of the separate ἡθικά ἀρετά up to the end of Book v: while Book vi is devoted to a discussion of the διανοητικά ἀρετά.

§ 2. ὁ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός] Michelet compares *Pol.* iii. 5. a. 8.

1102 a. 8. 1280 b. 4 φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι τῇ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄνομαζομένη πόλει. Cf. also *E.E.* i. 5. 1216 a. 23 οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας. οὐ γάρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἔστι πράξεων προαιρετικός, αὐτῶν χάριν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἔνεκεν ἀπονται τοῦ ζῆν οὔτως.

a. 10. § 3. *Κρητῶν*] *Pol.* ii. 7.

a. 11. *Λακεδαιμονίων*] *Pol.* ii. 6. Grant remarks that 'Aristotle seems to have inherited the preference felt by Plato and Socrates for the Spartan constitution; not so much as a historical fact, but rather as a philosophical idea. It presented the scheme of an entire education for the citizens, though Aristotle confesses that this became degraded into a school for gymnastic.' The fault which Aristotle finds with the Spartan legislation is that it is based on a one-sided psychology—that it recognises only the virtues of the θυμοειδὲς μέρος. Cf. *Pol.* ii. 6. 1271 a. 41 καὶ ὡδὶ δὲ τῇ ἵποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμήσειν ἄν τις . . . πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἔστι, τὴν πολεμικήν· αὗτη δὲ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν τοιχαροῦν ἐσφύζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἕρξαντες, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν, μηδὲ ἡσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἀσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. Cf. *Pol.* Θ. 3. 1338 b. 9 νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν παιδῶν αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λωβώμεναι τά τε εἰδη καὶ τὴν αὐξησιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δὲ ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὕτε πρὸς μίαν . . . οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην, βλέποντα ποιητέον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν.

*εἰς τινες ἔτεροι*] Michelet suggests the Carthaginians, whose constitution is described, and on the whole favourably criticised in *Pol.* ii. 8. Eustr. has ὡς ὁ Σόλων Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἔτερων ἔτεροι.

a. 13. § 4. κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαιρέσιν] see *E.N.* i. 2. 5. Cf. i. 9. 8. The Par. has ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ζήτησις αὗτη ἀκόλουθος ἀν εἴη τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου σκοπῷ· ἦν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος περὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς πολιτικῆς.

a. 14. § 5. ἀνθρωπίνης] I transcribe Eustratius' note on this §, not as throwing much light on Aristotle's doctrine of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν, but as an interesting example of how Aristotelian doctrines fared under the combined influences of Neoplatonism and Christian asceticism: πολλὰ γένη ἀρετῶν εἰσῆγον οἱ παλαιοί, πολιτικὴν καθαρτικὴν

νοερὰν καὶ τὴν παραδειγματικὴν καὶ τὴν θεουργικήν τούτων δ' ἐκάστην 1102 a. 14. διῆρουν εἰς τέτταρα τὰ πρῶτα φρόνησιν ἀνδρείαν σωφροσύνην δικαιούνην, ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἔκαστον ἀποδιδόντες αὐτῶν, οἰκείως δηλονότι τῶν γενῶν ἔκάστον. ἀλλὰ νῦν ἡμῖν τὰ δύο ταῦτα συνέγνωσται γένη μάλιστα, ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ καθαρτική, ἡ μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς συμπραττούσης τῷ σώματι, ἡ δὲ χωριζομένης αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔχούσης ἀσυμπαθῶς πρὸς αὐτό, ὡς εἶναι τὴν μὲν μετριοπάθειαν μόνον κολάζουσαν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν παθῶν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου συντηροῦσαν τὴν κατὰ ταῦτα ἐνέργειαν, τὴν δὲ ἡ εἰς ἀπάθειαν ἄγουσαν ἐν τῷ ἔτι καθαίρεσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, ἡ καὶ ἡδη ἀπαγαγοῦσαν ὅτε ἡδη καὶ κεκάθαρται, καὶ ἀπροσπαθής πρὸς τὸ σῶμα γεγένηται. ἀνθρωπίνην τοίνυν ἀρετὴν φησὶ τὴν πολιτικήν, ὡς οὕσης τῆς καθαρτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπον ὅστον κατὰ τὸ συναμφότερον ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἥμερον καὶ συναγελαστικὸν καὶ κοινωνικόν ὅτε δὲ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον σῶμα κοινωνίαν ἀρνήσεται, ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπείαν τότε καθέστηκε σύνθεσιν, πᾶσαν ὑλικὴν ἀπηρημένος ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ἀνεπιστρόφῳ τῶν χειρόνων ψυχῆς καὶ νῷ καθαρῷ πρὸς τὰ κρείττω ἀναφερόμενος καὶ πρὸς τὴν θείαν ἀναπλούμενος ἔλλαμψιν.

§ 6. καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δέ] This clause introduced by καὶ . . . a. 17. δέ (on which see Eucken, *de Arist. dicendi rat. Pars Prima: de particularum usu* p. 32) stands to that immediately preceding it in the same relation in which the words καὶ γὰρ τάγαθόν κ.τ.λ. in § 5 stand to those immediately preceding them: accordingly, the Paraphrast's rendering is simply—ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἀρετὴ οὐ τοῦ σώματός ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς (καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν), κ.τ.λ.

§ 7. ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν (τὸ) σῶμα] a. 19. It seems best (with the Par., Victorius., Zell, Coraes, Grant, Stahr, Williams and Ramsauer) to govern καὶ πᾶν (τὸ) σῶμα by εἰδέναι, not by θεραπεύσοντα (with Eustr., Argyrop., Lamb., Michelet and Peters). ‘The statesman must know something about the nature of the soul, just as the practical oculist must have a general knowledge of the body’: δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πῶς ἔχει τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀφθαλμὸν θεραπεύειν, τοῦ σώματος παντὸς τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχειν ἀνάγκην. Paraph. This interpretation is strongly supported by Plato, *Charm.* 156 B, quoted by Coraes and Grant—ἡδη καὶ συ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἱατρῶν, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοῖς προσέλθῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσί που ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰασθαι, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἄμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν εἰ μέλλοι καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων εὖ ἔχειν καὶ αὖ τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἰεσθαι ἄν-

1102 a. 19. ποτε θεραπεῦσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἔαυτῆς, ἀνευ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος, πολλὴν ἄνοιαν εἶναι· ἐκ δὴ τούτου τοῦ λόγου διαιτais ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα [cf. Ramsauer's conj. (adopted by Bywater) πᾶν τὸ σῶμα for πᾶν σῶμα in *E. N.* i. 13. 7] τρεπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος ἐπιχειροῦσι θεραπεύειν<sup>1</sup>. This wide view of the relation of the special organ to the whole body, or of local symptoms to the general condition of the body, recalls the teaching of Hippocrates, to physicians of whose school we may suppose Aristotle to refer in the expression *τῶν ιατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες* § 7. In the Treatise *περὶ ἀρχαῖς ἱητρικῆς* 20, Hippocrates lays down, and in the *Prognostic* (see Littré, *Hipp.* ii. 96) and Treatise *περὶ διαιτῆς ὁξέων* (see Littré, *Hipp.* ii. 198) applies, the great principle—that we must study ὁ ἄνθρωπος, the concrete human organism, in all its rapports with external things, and ascertain the effects, healthy and morbid, which they produce upon it, instead of taking (as unscientific practitioners do) each symptom by itself, and pronouncing it to be a case of *ψυχρόν*, which must be met by the application of *θερμόν*, or of *ὑγρόν*, by the application of *ξηρόν*—a method which he derides in *περὶ ἀρχ. ἱητ.* 13, as ὁ τρόπος ὁ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. See *περὶ ἀρχ. ἱητ.* 20 (Littré vol. i. p. 622) ἐπεὶ τοι γέ μοι δοκέει ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὶ ἱητρῷ περὶ φύσιος εἰδέναι, καὶ πάνυ σπουδάσαι ὡς εἴσεται, εἴπερ τι μέλλει τῶν δεόντων ποιῆσειν, ὁ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ ἐσθιόμενα καὶ πινόμενα, καὶ ὁ τι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ ὁ τι ἀφ' ἐκάστου ἐκάστῳ ξυμβῆσται. Littré (vol. i. pp. 295, 296 *Introd.*) is of opinion that Plato has this passage (or one to similar effect at the beginning of the First Book *περὶ διαιτῆς*, see Littré vol. i. p. 300) in view in *Phaedrus* 270 C Σω. *Ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἵει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἀνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως;* Φαί. εἰ μὲν Ἰπποκράτει τε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πείθεσθαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἀνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης. Although Aristotle only once mentions Hippocrates by name (and that without any reference to his doctrines—*Pol. H.* 4. 1326 a. 15), traces of the influence of his teaching are, according to Littré (vol. i. p. 72), numerous in the Aristotelian writings. To the passages mentioned by Littré may be added *de Sensu* i. 436 a. 20 (quoted by Grant and Ramsauer to illustrate *τῶν ιατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες*), a passage which describes the method of physicians who observed a rule identical

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Aristocles peripateticus (*Suidas*. s. 'Αριστοκλῆς), apud Euseb. *Praefar. Evang.* xi. ch. 3 καθάπερ γάρ οἱ ιατροὶ μέρη τινὰ θεραπεύοντες, ἐπιμελοῦνται τῶν ὅλων σωμάτων πρῶτον, οὔτω κ.τ.λ.: see Mullach, *Fragm. Phil.* iii. 206, 299.

with that (*ἀναγκαῖον παντὶ ἱητρῷ περὶ φύσιος εἰδέναι*) laid down by 1102 a. 19. Hippocrates—σχεδὸν τῶν τε περὶ φύσεως οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τῶν ἱατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφωτέρως τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες οἱ μὲν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰ περὶ ἱατρικῆς, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀρχονται περὶ ἱατρικῆς. Medical specialists, (see Herod. ii. 84, for the length to which specialisation was carried in Egypt), must control their treatment of particular organs by a competent knowledge of the structure and functions of the whole organism; similarly, the statesman who has to educate a people must do so with a knowledge of human nature as an organic whole, otherwise he will fall into error like that of the Spartan Legislator who cultivated the warlike virtues of his people at the expense of the peaceful. Cf. *Pol. H.* 13. 1334 a. 6 αἱ γὰρ πλεῖσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι μὲν σώζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται . . . αἴτιος δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάξειν.

The interpretation offered by Eustr., Argyrop., Lamb., Mich. and Peters cannot, I think, be easily maintained against the evidence afforded by the parallels quoted above. Argyropylus referring καὶ τὰν σῶμα το θεραπεύσοντα, gives the following rendering—‘Quemadmodum et eum qui curaturus est oculos totumque corpus, de ipsis scire oportet’; which is thus explained by Michelet—‘ut politicum qui animo medetur animi naturam perspectam habere oportet, ita medicus qui oculum totumque corpus curat, id, quod semper curat, sive oculum sive corpus nosse debet. Virtus enim se habet ad animum ut sanitas ad oculum corpusve.’ The other interpretation, according to Michelet, ‘leaves us without a simile’;—‘nec dicere vult Aristoteles, animi virtutem spectanti majus quiddam animo investigandum esse, quemadmodum qui oculis mederetur totum corpus nosse deberet: istud enim de medico quidem et ipsum verum est, de politico autem nihil simile proferre possit.’ This objection we may answer by remarking that what Aristotle insists upon is that the statesman must have a knowledge of human nature as a whole, if he is to deal successfully with the education of *any of its particular* tendencies or capacities: *i. e.* that whenever he is engaged with one part of human nature he must think of the other parts: *e. g.* when he is dealing with a particular *ὄρεξις*, say the love of money, he must take it in connexion with other *ὄρεξις*, such as that for pleasurable indulgence; and further, must consider the relation of the *ὄρεκτικὸν μέρος* generally to the rational element: and the connexion of both *ὄρεξις* and *λόγος* with the *θρεπτικὸν μέρος*.

1102 a. 24. § 8. τούτων χάριν] τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔνεκα. Eustr.

a. 26. § 9. ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις] I think that it is best to render this expression quite generally—‘in other accounts,’ or ‘elsewhere,’ leaving it to be gathered from the context whether the reference, in this or that particular case, is to written or to unwritten opinions, to the opinions of Aristotle himself, or to those of others. That the reference is always to a definite class of *popular treatises* (as distinguished from the *abstruse treatises*—ἀκροατικοὶ λόγοι, see Strabo xiii. 609, Plut. *Alex.* 7, *adv. Colot.* 14, Aul. Gell. xx. 5) written by Aristotle himself was held by many of the older interpreters (*e. g.* by Victorius and Lambinus), but has been given up by most modern scholars. The literature of the subject is very extensive. The student may consult (in addition to the notes of Michelet, pp. 28–31 and p. 72, Zell, p. 56, and Ramsauer, p. 71), the following authorities—*Ind. Ar.* s. v. ἐξ. λογ.; Grant, *Ethics* (appendix B on ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι), Grote, *Aristotele* i. 63 sqq.—Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, Susemihl, *Neue Jahrbücher* vol. 129 (‘ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι bei Arist. u. Eud.’); his conclusion is that ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι = ‘ausserphilosophischen Erörterungen mit verschiedener Färbung in verschiedenen Stellen’), Thurot, *Études sur Aristote*, 1860, p. 223, Brandis, *Die Schicksale der Aristotelischen Bücher*, *Rhein. Mus.* i. 254, Stahr, *Aristotelia* vol. ii. 3 (über den Unterschied exot. u. esot. Schriften des Arist.), and Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* vol. ii. 2. p. 114 sqq. Zeller’s conclusion (p. 118 sqq.) is expressed thus—‘Wenn auch im allgemeinen jede Erörterung eine exoterische genannt werden kann, welche nicht zu der eben vorliegenden Untersuchung gehört, oder welche nicht tiefer in ihren Gegenstand eindringt, wenn ferner die “exoterischen Reden” nicht immer und nicht nothwendig eine bestimmte Klasse von *Schriften* bezeichnen, so finden sich doch Stellen, in denen wir allen Grund haben, sie auf solche zu beziehen.’ The present reference (*E. N.* i. 13. 9) Zeller thinks (p. 122), is most probably to the Dialogue *Eudemus*.

It is to be observed that the Paraphrast, in his note on the present passage, is careful to say that the reference is *not* to written works—περὶ ψυχῆς τοίνυν οὐ μόνον ἐν συγγράμμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ στόματος πρὸς τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ἀρκούντως εἴπομεν ἔντα· καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς.

a. 27. οὗτοι] = scilicet, videlicet. See *Ind. Arist.* and Ramsauer’s note.

Bernays (*die Dial. d. Arist.* p. 65) makes *οἶον* here = ‘zum Beispiel,’ 1102 a. 27. wrongly, I think.

§ 10. **τῷ λόγῳ**] As we might say—‘logically two, but really a. 30. (*πεφυκότα*, i.e. as really existing) indivisible.’ Cf. *Met.* M. 2. 1077 b.

13. The distinction marked by **λόγῳ** and **πεφυκότα** here is that elsewhere marked by **λογικῶς** and **φυσικῶς** (see note on vii. 3. 9). To explain a thing **λογικῶς** is to explain it by means of a formula more or less abstract and general: to explain it **φυσικῶς** is to explain it more concretely, taking account of its natural properties. It is evident that while only one exhaustive concrete view of an object can be taken, more than one abstract view may. Thus a **σύνολον** may be **λόγῳ δύο**. **Ψυχή**, which is the totality of the functions of the body, exists (*πέφυκε*) only as a totality. Reason does not exist without sense, or sense without the vegetative functions; but we can look at the **ψυχή** from various points of view—as rational, sensitive, vegetative; just as in mathematics we can look at a real line, which has a certain breadth as well as length, from the point of view of its length only.

**ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ**] Here the circumference formed by a line ‘with- a. 31. out breadth’ is *looked at* from two points of view—as concave and convex.

§§ 11-19.] The ‘psychology’ contained in these §§ is, with slight a. 32. differences of terminology, that already given in i. 7. 12-13, where see notes.

§ 11. **κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ**] The meaning of **κοινῷ** here is explained below, § 12—*ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινή τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται.* In *De An.* ii. 4. 415 a. 23 nutrition and reproduction are mentioned as the two functions of this ‘part of the soul’—ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ **ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμις ἔστι ψυχῆς, καθ' ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν. ἡς ἔστιν ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῆ χρῆσθαι.**

§ 12. **δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα**] The commentators 1102 b. 3. quote *περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἔγρηγόρσεως* I. 454 b. 32 τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόριον ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔγρηγορέναι· τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ αὐξάνεται τότε μᾶλλον, ὡς οὐδὲν προσδεόμενα πρὸς ταῦτα τῆς αἰσθήσεως. The natural connexion between sleep and nutrition is brought out in full detail in *περὶ ὕπνου* 3. ‘Der Zweck des Schlafs,’ says Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2. p. 550 (referring to *De Somno* 3), ‘ist die

1102 b. 3. Erhaltung des Lebens, die Erholung welche ihrerseits wieder dem höheren Zwecke der wachen Thätigkeit dient. Seine natürliche Ursache liegt in dem Ernährungsprocess.'

b. 7. § 13.] In the treatise *περὶ ἐνυπνίων* Aristotle explains dreams as caused by *κινήσεις*, similar to those made by the *αἰσθητά*, occurring in the organs of sensation in the absence of the *αἰσθητά*. He points to the phenomenon of 'after-images,' 2. 459 b, as illustrating the principle of the persistence of sense *κινήσεις*, and accounts for the dreamer's belief in the truth of his dream, while it lasts, by the fact that the *κίνησις* which constitutes the dream is not exposed to the lively criticism of other experiences, but has the *ἀρχή* (or conscious principle) of the dreamer all to itself, *δι' ἀργίαν τῶν κατὰ μόριον αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν*. The *ἀρχή* pronounces for the truth of any experience purporting to come from sense, unless a more authoritative experience be present to contradict the judgment —*περὶ ἐνυπνίων* 3. 461 b. 3 *ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἀφ' ἔκάστης αἰσθήσεώς φησιν ἡ ἀρχή, ἐὰν μὴ ἐτέρα κυριωτέρα ἀντιφῆ*. *Φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τὸ ἐπικρίνον κατέχηται ἡ μὴ κινήται τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν*.

b. 9. *πλὴν εἰ μή*] M<sup>1</sup>, Asp.—adopted, in place of the *πλὴν εἴ πῃ* of other sources, by Bywater, who makes the words *ὄθεν φασίν . . . φαύλη* parenthetical.

b. 10. *βελτίω*] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* ix. 571 C: also *Probl.* A. 14. 957 a. 23.

b. 13. § 15. *ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς*] *φύσις* here is equivalent to *δύναμις* or *μόριον*.

b. 14. *τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον*] In the *ἐγκρατής* or 'continent man,' and *ἀκρατής* or 'incontinent man,' there is a struggle between *ἐπιθυμία* and *λόγος*, with the result that, in the case of the *ἐγκρατής*, *λόγος* generally prevails, and, in the case of the *ἀκρατής*, *ἐπιθυμία*: i.e. both know that it is wrong to follow pleasure, but feel inclined to follow it; the *ἀκρατής*, however, yields to his inclination, whereas the *ἐγκρατής* does not. Distinguished from the *ἀκρατής* and *ἐγκρατής*, in whom a struggle takes place between *λόγος* and *ἐπιθυμία*, are the *ἀκόλαστος* or 'incorrigible,' and the *σώφρων* or 'temperate man,' in neither of whom there is a struggle—because, in the *ἀκόλαστος*, *ἐπιθυμία* has gained complete supremacy, and *λόγος*, in the *σώφρων*. The desires of the *σώφρων* cheerfully obey reason: the reason (or

conscience) of the ἀκύλαστος is either silenced or transformed into a <sup>1102 b. 14.</sup> ψευδῆς λόγος—a Flatterer of Desire.

ἐπὶ τάναντίᾳ γὰρ αἱ ὄρμαι τῶν ἀκρατῶν] Cf. iii. 2. 4, 5 καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς b. 21. ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐδὲ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μέν, ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ οὐδὲ καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἔναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμίᾳ δὲ ἐπιθυμίᾳ οὐδὲ: cf. also note *ad loc.* with reference to *Rēp.* 440, where Plato proves that the ἐπιθυμητικὸν and λογιστικὸν are distinct ‘parts,’ by pointing, just as Aristotle does here, to the ‘opposition’ between them.

§ 16. πῶς δὲ ἔτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει] i.e. πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ b. 25. τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια . . . ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἔστιν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα . . . οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν—§ 10 above.

§ 17. πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦ] sc. ὀρεκτικόν. b. 26. Aristotle seems here to offer a sort of apology for describing τὸ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ as μετέχον λόγου. See note on i. 3. 6 for an estimate of the λόγος τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ.

σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου] The σώφρων and ἀνδρεῖος are given as b. 27. examples of *confirmed* virtue. ἐγκράτεια is not properly ἔξις.

πάντα γὰρ ὄμοφωντι τῷ λόγῳ] Cf. ix. 4. 3 ὄμογνωμοντι ἔαντῳ (ό b. 28. σπουδαῖος) καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν. On the other hand, στασιάζει (τῶν μοχθηρῶν) ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων τὸ δὲ ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δὲ ἔκεισε ἐλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα—ix. 4. 9.

§ 18. φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν] i.e. as well as the ψυχή itself, which has already (§ 9) been divided into two parts—τὸ ἄλογον and τὸ λόγον ἔχον.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου] It is true that λόγος, as b. 29. *conscientia*—i.e. as a regulating principle within the individual of which he himself is conscious, does not interfere with his vegetative (or merely physiological) functions, as it interferes with his appetites and desires. At the same time we must remember that these vegetative functions are there because they are materially necessary, in the economy of the ψυχή, for the realisation of its end—the consciousness of λόγος. In this sense then they ‘participate in λόγος’: they must be defined in reference to it (όριζεται γὰρ ἔκαστον τῷ τέλει iii. 7. 6): except as ‘necessary in the economy of the ψυχή, for the conscious

1102 b.29. realisation of *λόγος*, they are meaningless—as the *oikia* is meaningless except as ‘materially necessary for the *πόλις*.’ We may say, then, that, although the *φυτικὸν μέρος* ‘has nothing in common with *λόγος*’—if *λόγος* be taken to mean (as it certainly means in this context) the individual’s *conscious* regulation of irrational tendencies, yet it ‘has all in common with *λόγος*,’ in so far as it is *δεκτικόν*, i.e. so constituted as to serve as material basis for the individual’s consciously realised *λόγος*. Again, although the conscious *λόγος* of the individual cannot step in suddenly to modify his own vegetative, or merely physiological functions, as it can to modify his appetites and desires, the conscious *λόγος* of the ‘legislator’ does, in the long run, modify the vegetative, or merely physiological functions of the individuals belonging to the race over whose development he presides. In the interest of the particular form of culture which it is his ‘end’ to realise in his citizens, ‘the legislator’ will see that the suitable physique is at last produced in them. But, after all, we need not look so high as ‘the legislator’ to find conscious modification of vegetative functions. The results of ‘sexual selection’ are evidence for the reaction of ‘consciousness,’ even among the lower animals, on the vegetative part. However, to limit the reference to the human race—we can say *τὸ μὲν φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου* only if we take *λόγος* in the restricted sense of the reason of the individual, and forget that *νόμος* which is *λόγος ἀπό τυπος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ* (*E. N.* x. 9. 12) takes measures which, in the history of the race, profoundly affect ‘the vegetative part.’

b. 30. *τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὄλως δρεκτικόν*] i.e. *τὸ δρεκτικόν* is the generic term: see *De An.* iii. 3, 414 b. 2 (quoted by Ramsauer) *ὅρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ θυμῷ καὶ βούλησις.*

b. 31. *οὕτω δὴ . . . μαθηματικῶν*] The Paraph. has—λέγομεν γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων λόγου ἔχειν τὸ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ οἷς κελεύοντις ἔξακολουθεῖν· λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν λόγου ἔχειν τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ καὶ γνῶσιν τινα καὶ ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν ἔχειν. The phrase *ἔχειν λόγου* has a double meaning: *ἔχειν λόγου τῶν μαθηματικῶν* is ‘to have the theory or demonstration of mathematical propositions’ in one’s own mind—i.e. to understand it for oneself: to take it on authority would not be to ‘have it,’ in this sense of ‘having’: *ἔχειν λόγου τοῦ πατρὸς* is, idiomatically, to ‘have regard to one’s father’—to pay attention to his advice; but here the reader is asked to lose sight, for a moment, of the idiomatic sense of the phrase, and contrast

'having the *λόγος* of one's father' with 'having the *λόγος* of mathematical propositions.' 'Having the *λόγος* of one's father' is having it as borrowed from him; 'having the *λόγος* of mathematical propositions' is having it in the strict sense of 'having'—having it in one's own right, for the *λόγος* of the *μαθηματικά* is the *λόγος* of the *μαθηματικός* himself—*ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀνευ ὑλῆς τὸ αὐτό ἔστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον*: *De An.* iii. 4. 430 a. 2.

It is difficult to express in English the double entendre of the Greek; but the meaning is that one is 'rational'—*ἔχει λόγον*—in two senses—as yielding to the good advice of another, and as grasping scientific truth by one's own effort.

§ 19. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ’ ὕσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι] The *ἄλογον* has been shown to be *διττόν*—viz. *τὸ φυτικόν* and *τὸ ὄρεκτικόν*. *Τὸ ὄρεκτικόν* has, *qua κατήκοον λόγου*, been described as *μετέχον λόγου*. Aristotle now goes on—'If we are to say that the *ὄρεκτικόν* also (*καὶ τοῦτο*), as well as the *λόγον ἔχον* proper, *ἔχει λόγον* in virtue of its being *μετέχον λόγου*, then the *λόγον ἔχον* also will be *διττόν* as well as *τὸ ἄλογον*. We shall have the *λόγον ἔχον* subdivided into (1) *τὸ λόγον ἔχον κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ*—that which 'has reason,' in the strict sense of 'having,' *i.e.* 'has it in itself,' and (2) *τὸ λόγον ἔχον*, where *ἔχον=μετέχον*—that which 'has reason,' not in its own right, but by derivation or participation. An illustration may make this clearer: Animals are divided into (1) rational—man, and (2) irrational—the lower animals. Of the lower animals some (*a*) *e.g.* bats, do not allow themselves to be directed by man's reason: others (*b*) *e.g.* dogs, do: and if we may call (*b*) 'rational,' then (1) will have its two divisions, as well as (2), (*b*) being counted under both (1) and (2).

*ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν]* See note on i. 12. 2. a. 8.

## *BOOK II.*

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### CHAPTER I.

#### ARGUMENT.

*Excellence being of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral, the former owes its origin and development, for the most part, to teaching, and therefore needs time and experience, the latter comes from habit (έθος—hence its name in Greek ηθική). This being so, it is plain that the various forms of Moral Excellence, i.e. the various Moral Virtues, are not naturally implanted qualities in us; for habit cannot alter any natural quality: e.g. it is the nature of a stone to fall, and you cannot habituate it to rise by throwing it up into the air ever so often. The Virtues, then, are not naturally implanted qualities; but this does not mean that their presence in us is ‘contrary to nature.’ It is our nature to be capable of acquiring them; but it is by habit that we do actually acquire them.*

*Further, where a natural endowment is concerned, the order in time is (1) faculty, or organ, e.g. eyes, and (2) employment of faculty, or organ, e.g. seeing: we did not acquire our eyes by often seeing, but first had eyes, and then saw with them; whereas in the case of the Virtues the order is reversed: we acquire them by acting, even as we acquire the Arts—we become builders by building, just men by doing just acts. To understand how true this is, we have only to look at the procedure of law-givers. Wishing to make their citizens good, they provide laws under which their citizens are habituated to perform good actions. A good constitution differs from a bad one in the success with which it habituates the citizens to perform good actions.*

*Again, the analogy of the Arts, referred to above, will help us to understand another point, viz.—that it is in the same, not in different circumstances, with the same, not with different opportunities, that one man, by repeatedly acting well, acquires a Virtue, and another man, by repeatedly acting badly, falls away into the opposite Vice. In the same circumstances one man becomes a good builder, or musician, and another man a bad builder or musician, according as the one repeatedly builds, or plays, well, and the other badly: so, it is in the same business that one trader becomes just, and another unjust, in the same service that one soldier acquires the Virtue of courage, and another falls away into the Vice of cowardice. To sum up: it is from the repeated performance of similar acts that a Habit is formed. Hence the importance of seeing that the acts are of the right kind; for according as they are good or bad, so will the Habit be good or bad. It thus makes all the difference to a man’s character, whether the acts, which he has been habituated from youth upwards to perform, are good or bad.*

§ 1. τὸ πλεῖον] The Paraphrast has—καὶ ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ ἔχει μὲν 1103 a. 15. καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν (δεκτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπιστήμης) καὶ ἀπὸ ἔθους αὐξῆσιν λαμβάνει τινά· τὸ δὲ πλέον ἀπὸ τῆς διδασκαλίας καὶ τὴν γένεσιν· καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν ἔχει. For an account of the relation of ἐμπειρίᾳ to the ἀρχαῖ of ἐπιστήμη see *An. Post.* ii. 19.

ἡ δὲ ἡθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους] Grant quotes Plato, *Legg.* 792 E πᾶν ἥθος a. 17. διὰ ἔθος. Cf. also *E. E.* ii. 2. 1220 a. 9, and *M. M.* i. 6. 1186 a. 1, and Plutarch *De Virt. Mor.* ch. 4 (quoted by Zell)—διὸ καὶ καλῶς ὠνόμασται τὸ ἥθος· ἔστι μὲν γάρ, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ποιότης τοῦ ἀλόγου τὸ ἥθος· ὠνόμασται δέ, ὅτι τὴν ποιότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔθει λαμβάνει τὸ ἀλόγον ἵππο τοῦ λόγου πλαττόμενον, οὐ βουλομένου τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν (οὔτε γὰρ δυνατὸν οὔτε ἀμεινον) ἀλλὰ ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν ἐπιτιθέντος αὐτῷ, καὶ τὰς ἡθικὰς ἀρετὰς, οὐκ ἀπαθείας οὖσας, ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας παθῶν καὶ μεσότητας, ἐμποιοῦντος ἐμποιεῖ δὲ τῇ φρονήσει τὴν τοῦ παθητικοῦ δύναμιν εἰς ἐξιν ἀστείαν καθιστάς.

\**Ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, as such, comes ἐξ ἔθους:* but ἔθος requires a certain εἰφυία to work upon (see Grant *ad loc.*). The children of a civilized community inherit tendencies to virtue which make habituation easy.

§ 2. οὐδεμία τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀζετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται] i.e. only a. 19. those ἀρεταὶ are called ἡθικαὶ which result from training under νόμος; for there are φυσικαὶ ἀρεταὶ (see *E. N.* vi. 13). The difference, however, between φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ and ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ is that the former does not, like the latter, involve *the whole man*. A man may have ‘natural,’ or constitutional, courage without possessing other good qualities; whereas, if he possess ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ, his nature has become a unity and a system in perfect adjustment to the complex external system represented by νόμος, or the law and fashion of the society in which he lives. When man is said to be φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶν, it is not meant that he is produced by Nature in ready-made correspondence with a complex social environment. His correspondence is only the final result of prolonged contact with society; but he has a *natural tendency* to correspond. In other words, the uncivilized man is not civilized already, but *has it in him* to become civilized—οὗτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταὶ, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόστι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους (§ 3).

Φύσις, like many other leading terms, has both a generic and a specific sense in Aristotle—a circumstance which often involves the philosopher himself, as well as his interpreters, in considerable

1103 a. 19. confusion. In its generic sense it = 'laws of nature'; in its specific sense, 'laws of *organic* nature,' or 'biological laws,'—*i.e.* laws of nature which result in the production and maintenance of definite living structures. It is in connexion with this narrower sense of the term that we must take all Aristotle's most characteristic statements about *φύσις* (as in *Phys.* ii)—οὐδὲν μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ—τέλος καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ἡ φύσις—ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ—ἀεὶ τὸ βέλτιον, &c. In the present section, however, *φύσις* is used in the wider sense, which includes all 'laws of nature,' organic and inorganic. Of course, it is true only of the laws of inorganic matter that they are not changed by habituation (οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὅντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται); for in the sphere of biology τὰ φύσει ὅντα change in relation to, adapt themselves to, or 'habituate' themselves to, changes in the environment.

The distinction therefore drawn in *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1—αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταὶ αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι μία ἐνός—does not properly discriminate between man's conscious life on the one side, and nature, whether organised or unorganised, on the other; but rather between organised nature (including man's conscious life) on the one side, and inorganic nature on the other. The expression *μετὰ λόγου* by itself is wide enough to include all organisms. Only organisms exhibit *λόγος* or *ratio*. Inorganic nature is essentially *ἄλογος*.

a. 28. § 4. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον] Grant observes (*Ethics* Essay iv. vol. i. p. 240, note 34) that 'this doctrine is opposed to some of the modern discoveries of psychology, as, for instance, Berkeley's "Theory of Vision."' Taking his stand on οὐθὲν τῶν φύσει ὅντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, Aristotle fails to see that the senses are really 'habits' organised in the race, and that the difference between the senses and the moral virtues—both being viewed as adaptations to environment—is that the former are adaptations of very long standing, deeply organised in the race, whereas the latter are, so to speak, adaptations of yesterday's date, and not yet perfect in the race—*i.e.* not inherited except in the vague form of *εὐφυΐα*.

'We need only compare,' says Grant (note on § 2 of this chapter), 'the theory of Virtue in this book with the discussions in the *Meno* of Plato, to see how immensely Moral Philosophy had gained in definiteness in the mean time.' Virtue and knowledge are, indeed, no longer confused together. Virtue is no longer said to be pro-

duced by ‘teaching,’ like knowledge, but to result from ‘acting in 1103 a. 28. correspondence with *nómos*, or the social environment.’ This was certainly a great advance in definiteness of theory. But yet, the ‘social environment,’ as Aristotle understands it, lacks continuity in time; every man has to begin his adaptation *almost* at the beginning. The peripatetic doctrine of catastrophes, or *φθοραί* (see *Pol.* ii. 5. 1269 a. 5, 6, and Newman’s notes), whereby all except a few human beings were periodically destroyed, civilization having to begin afresh on each occasion (see Bernays, *Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit* p. 39), finds its parallel in Aristotle’s theory of the growth of moral virtue, in which Heredity is not recognised *sufficiently*<sup>1</sup> by the side of Habituation, or individual adaptation.

§ 5. *νομοθέται*] Aristotle, in common with his contemporaries, b. 3. had not adequately grasped the truth that ‘constitutions are not made but grow.’ He shows a tendency to personify social influences, and make them emanate from a definite legislator in the past. The foundation of colonies, under ready-made laws, doubtless gave plausibility to this view, which in itself however is quite in keeping with the peripatetic doctrine of discontinuous civilization alluded to in the last note.

§ 6. *ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.*] i.e. ‘The circumstances and acts b. 6. are generically the same, only differing as to well and ill.’ Grant. Repeated *προαιρέσεις*, good or bad (bad *προαιρέσεις* not being easily distinguishable from mere *όρεξις*) transform an original *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων* into a fixed *ἔξις*, good or bad, which resembles the *ἄλογος δύναμις* of *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1 in being *μία ἐνός*. See *Met.* Θ. 5. 1048 a. 8 *ἐκεῖναι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων [ποιητικά]*, *ώστε ἀμα ποιήσει τάνατία· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον* ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον· λέγω δὲ τοῦτο *όρεξιν* ἢ *προαιρέσιν*: and *E.N.* v. 1. 4 *δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἔξις δὲ ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ.*

§ 7. *καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὅμοιών ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται*] ‘It b. 21. will be observed that why an act tends to reproduce itself Aristotle does not inquire’—is Grant’s remark here. But it need not sur-

<sup>1</sup> Not that Aristotle did not make valuable first contributions to a just view of the importance of Heredity in morals and politics—in his doctrine of *φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ* and *εὐφνία*, and of *εὐγένεια* defined as *ἀρετὴ γένους* in a fragment of the Dialogue *De Nobilitate* (preserved by Pseudo-Plut. *de Nob.* 14 [but cf. Newman’s *Politics* vol. ii. p. 68] and Stob. *F.* vol. iii. p. 166 ed. Meineke: see note on i. 8. 16. b. 3], and in *Pol.* iii. 7. 1283 a. 37.

- 1103 b. 21. prise us that Aristotle does not stop to put this question, for if it is a legitimate question at all, it is, at any rate, a very wide and vague one. To ask why acts tend to reproduce themselves—why they become easier instead of more difficult—why, in short, habits are formed, is tantamount to asking why there is such a thing as life, or the continuous correspondence of organism with environment. For further considerations relating to this subject see note on ii. 6. 17.
- b. 22. § 8. *ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι*] ‘*tales reddere*’—Michelet. ‘Wherefore we must see that the acts are of a certain kind.’ For the Aristotelian use of *ἀποδιδόναι* see *Index Arist.* and Cope, *Rhet.* i. 1. 7. 1354 b. 3, note. Cope quotes the δεῖ τὰς ἐνέργειας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι of the present § and says—‘*τὰς ἐνέργειας ἀποδιδόναι* is not simply “to produce” but to produce energies that are due to *the system*, energies *corresponding* to the faculties from which they spring.’ Instead of ‘*corresponding to the faculties from which they spring*’ he ought to have said—‘*corresponding to the faculties which it is desired to produce*’—*i.e.* fitted to produce certain faculties or habits.
- b. 23. *ἀκολουθοῦσιν*]. For the technical meaning of this term see *E. N.* vii. 12. 1 b. 26, note.

## CHAPTER II.

### ARGUMENT.

*The way then in which the acts are performed being so important, we must now enquire what is the right way, for this Treatise is intended to be practically useful. The right way is the way which the Right Reason prescribes—let this be taken as the most general answer which can be given, and let us start from it: we will examine afterwards the nature of the Right Reason and its relation to the Virtues.*

*But before proceeding, let us remind the reader again that we agreed that a theory of conduct ought to be an outline, not an exact system; theories being always conditioned by subject matter, and the subject matter of our present inquiry—‘all that relates to Conduct’—being one which presents no absolutely fixed conditions, in this respect resembling the subject matter of medical science—‘all that relates to Health.’ With such a subject matter, our Theory, as a*

whole, must be a tentative outline; still more tentative must be any narrower generalizations which we may make within its compass; for the particular cases which such generalizations attempt to explain are cases which fall under no art, and are provided for by no set of traditional rules, but must be dealt with, as the special occasions require, by the agents themselves, just as the exigencies of a particular case of illness must be dealt with by the doctor, or those of a particular storm, by the pilot, as he judges best at the time.

But we must not despair. We must do what we can to help our ‘theory of conduct’ in its evil plight. Let us then venture upon the generalization, that, as in eating and drinking, so in conduct, excess and defect are injurious, and the mean salutary—that e. g. it is by fearing dangers too much and too little, that men become cowardly and rash; by avoiding these extremes, that they become courageous. It is in the same circumstances, then, and with the same opportunities, that one man, by repeatedly acting well, acquires a virtue, and another, by repeatedly acting badly, falls away into the opposite vice. To this we must now add, that the virtue or vice, once fully formed, will manifest itself in the continued performance of the acts, good or bad, in which it originated—herein following a law observable in the case of acquired bodily qualities also: men become strong by taking much food and exercise; and strong men show their strength in taking much food and exercise. So, men become temperate by denying themselves pleasures; and temperate men show their temperance in denying themselves pleasures.

§ 1. ὁσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι] The θεωρητικαὶ φιλοσοφίαι are three—1103 b. 27. μαθηματική, φυσική and θεολογική. See Met. E. I. 1026 a. 18.

ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 55), followed by b. 29. Bywater and Sus., reads ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι for Bekker’s ἀναγκαῖον ἔστι σκέψασθαι, on the ground that ἀναγκαῖον does not, except very rarely, occur with ἔστι in the Aristotelian writings. Rassow is supported by L<sup>b</sup>, CCC, B<sup>1</sup>, B<sup>2</sup>.

§ 2. κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον] ‘In the present passage it seems best b. 32. to avoid translating κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον “according to right reason,” as is usually done, (1) because of the article which seems to show that *λόγος* is used in a general sense here, and not to denote a particular faculty of the mind; (2) in reference to the train of associations which must have been in Aristotle’s mind of “standard,” “proportion,” “law,” &c.’—Grant *ad loc.* Organic potentialities—*ai μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις*—may result in structures, or habits, variously fitted to correspond with the environment. Where the correspondence is an exact one, the organisation, or *λόγος*, is said to be *όρθος*. In ἡθικὴ ἀρετή human nature realises itself as a system or organism (*όρθος λόγος*), capable of withstanding the disintegrating influences of pleasure and pain. The process

1103 b. 32. which results in *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή* is the *εἰδοποίησις καὶ μάρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων* (Eustr. *ad vi.* 13. 1). If a *faculty* of *ὁρθὸς λόγος* is to be distinguished from the proportion, or orderly arrangement, which is its *object*, it can be distinguished only logically; for the two are really one. The *ὁρθὸς λόγος* is the personality, or orderly nature, of the virtuous man, of which he is necessarily conscious. ‘According to the right ratio’ renders *κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον* adequately in most places.

b. 33. [ἢ στερον] Book vi, or what may have corresponded to it in the original Nicomachean Treatise.

b. 34. [τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς] *ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος* is not coordinate with the *ἀρεταῖ*, any more than the whole body is coordinate with the hand or head. The hand is a hand only because it belongs to a body which has a head and all other necessary parts. The *ἀρεταῖ* are *ἀρεταῖ* only because they coexist in a definite system or *λόγος*. Courage without all the other virtues is a mere abstraction, like a hand belonging to no body: *οὐ χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταῖ* *E. N. vi.* 13. 6.

1104 a. 4. § 3. οὐδὲν ἔστηκὸς ἔχει] Not being *ἔξι ἀνάγκης*, they vary; but they vary within the limits fixed by the conditions of human existence. *Tὰ δίκαια* are not *νόμοι*, but *φύσει*: *i.e.* they are suitable to human nature, which is regulated by certain *uniform biological laws*, not to be confounded, however, with the *necessities* of mathematics or metaphysics. After all, however, the expression *οὐδὲν ἔστηκὸς ἔχει* is too strong, and is apt to mislead. Perhaps ‘nothing *absolutely fixed*’ would express what we ought to understand.

a. 5. § 4. τοιούτου δ' ὅντος τοῦ καθόλου κ.τ.λ.] The most general statement that can be made in morals (the definition of *εὐδαιμονία*) is, even as a general statement, lacking in definiteness. It is only a *περιγραφή* (*i. 7. 17*) or rough sketch, of that which is essentially contingent: something very different from the absolutely definite *ὅρισμοι* of ‘things which cannot be otherwise,’ which stand as the *ἀρχαῖ* of mathematics. But indefinite as the highest generalisation of morals is, it is more definite than the lower generalisations, which relate to special duties. When we descend from the *περιγραφή* of Life as a whole, to the details of Life—to the duties of Kallias in his particular circumstances, we are indeed ‘immersed

in matter'—we no longer look for ἀκρίβεια—not of course for 1104 a. 5. mathematical ἀκρίβεια—for that did not belong to our περιγραφή—but not even for the ἀκρίβεια of the skilled workman. Rules of conduct for Kallias cannot be turned out like shoes.

§ 5. βοηθεῖν] Still, something may be done in the way of a. 11. supplying a rule applicable to all cases—‘Do not run into extremes.’

§ 6.] The parenthesis δεῖ γάρ . . . χρῆσθαι, follows δρῶμεν in Coraes’ text, and the same order appears in two MSS. noticed by that editor, and in Argyropylus, and the Paraphrast. At any rate the parenthesis contains the reason for adducing the illustration ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἴσχυος κ.τ.λ. Ethical phenomena are ἀφανῆ and must be illustrated by physical phenomena which are φανερά. Zell, however, *ad loc.*, refers to instances in which the clause containing the reason stands before that containing the statement for which the reason is given.

τά τε γάρ ὑπερβάλλοντα κ.τ.λ.] Grant remarks that this is perhaps a. 15. taken from Plato *Erasiae* 134. Cf. *M. M.* i. 5. The doctrine that medical treatment ought to aim at the mean had been laid down by Hippocrates Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἡτρικῆς, ch. 9 (Littré, i. 588). Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν ἀπλῶς, ὥσπερ ὑφηγέεται, ὅσα μὲν ἦν ἴσχυρότερα ἔβλαπτεν, ὅσα δὲ ἦν ἀσθενέστερα ὀφέλεέ τε καὶ ἔτρεφε τὸν κάμνοντα καὶ τὸν ὑγιείνοντα, εὐπετὲς ἀνὴρ τὸ πρῆγμα· πολλὸν γάρ τοῦ ἀσφαλέος ἀνὴρ τοῦ ἔδει περιλαμβάνοντας ἄγειν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀσθενέστατον. νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἀμάρτημα, οὐδὲ ἡστον λυμαίνεται τὸν ἀνθρωπον, ἦν ἔλασσον καὶ ἐνδεέστερα τῶν ἰκανῶν προσφέρηται· τὸ γάρ τοῦ λιμοῦ μέρος δύναται ἴσχυρῶς ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ γυιῶσαι (lame or weaken) καὶ ἀσθενέα ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἔτεροια μὲν τῶν ἀπὸ πληρώσιος, οὐχ ἡστον δὲ ἄμα δεινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ κενώσιος· δι’ ἀν πολλὸν ποικιλώτερά τε καὶ διὰ πλέονος ἀκριβής ἐστί (‘ainsi la médecine a bien plus d’une face, et exige une précision de plus d’un genre.’ Littré). δεῖ γάρ μέτρου τινὸς στοχάσασθαι· μέτρον δέ, οὐδὲ σταθμόν, οὐδὲ ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἄλλον, πρὸς ὃ ἀναφέρων εἴσῃ τὸ ἀκριβές, οὐκ ἀν εὑροίης ἀλλ’ ἢ τοῦ σώματος τῶν αἰσθησιν· διὸ ἔργον οὕτω καταμαθεῖν ἀκριβέως, ὥστε σμικρὰ ἀμαρτάνειν ἔνθα ἢ ἔνθα· κανὸν ἐγὼ τοῦτον τὸν ἡτρὸν ἴσχυρῶς ἐπαινέοιμι τὸν σμικρὰ ἀμαρτάνοντα· τὸ δὲ ἀκριβὲς ὀλιγάκις ἐστὶ κατιδεῖν· ἐπεὶ οἱ πολλοὶ γε τῶν ἡτρῶν ταῦτα μοι δοκέοντι τοῖσι κακοῖσι κυβερνήτησι πάσχειν· καὶ γάρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν ἐν γαλήνῃ κυβερνῶντες ἀμαρτάνωσιν, οὐ καταφανέες εἰσίν· ὅταν δὲ αὐτοὺς κατάσχῃ χειμῶν τε μέγας καὶ

1104 a. 15. ἀνεμος ἐξώστης, φανερῶς ἥδη πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισι δι' ἀγνωσίην καὶ ἀμαρτίην δῆλοι εἰσιν ἀπολέσαντες τὴν ναῦν. There is much in the above passage (especially the remarks about τὸ ἀκριβές, and the illustration from κυβερνητική) to suggest that Aristotle retained a reminiscence of its drift when he wrote §§ 3, 4, 5, and 6.

a. 24. § 7. οἱ ἄγροικοι] In ii. 7. 13 the ἄγροικος is adduced to exemplify another ἔλλειψις—viz. that περὶ τὸ ἥδον τὸ ἐν παιδιᾳ.

a. 30. § 8. οῖον ἐπὶ τῆς ἴσχύος] Here Aristotle may almost be said to explain the formation of moral habits by the principle of ‘the survival of the fittest’—γίνεται γὰρ [sc. ἡ ἴσχυς] ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἀν δύναιτ’ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν δὲ ἴσχυρός. οὕτω δὲ ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. This is one of those very important passages in the *Ethics* which remind us that the author was a great biologist.

## CHAPTER III.

### ARGUMENT.

*According as the performance of certain acts is attended by pleasure or by pain, we may infer that the habit of performing them has or has not been acquired. Thus he who faces danger and feels pleasure, or at least no pain, in so doing, is habitually courageous; while he who feels pain in so doing, is cowardly. Indeed we may go so far as to describe the field of moral virtue as ‘Pleasures and Pains’—for*

(1) *It is Pleasure that tempts us to do wrong, and Pain that makes us hold aloof from noble deeds. True education is being trained from childhood to like and dislike aright, as Plato says.*

(2) *Pleasure or Pain attends every action and every feeling, and it is with actions and feelings that moral virtue has to do.*

(3) *Moral correction is effected by the remedial influence of Pain.*

(4) *Every thing is naturally related to, and concerned with, that which naturally affects it for good or evil. Now, we are affected for evil, i.e. made worse, by Pleasures and Pains unduly pursued and avoided. And this is so true, that some have been induced to go the length of defining Virtue, as insensibility to the influence of Pleasure or Pain. But this is too unqualified a statement; for it ignores the distinction between due and undue influence.*

(5) *Again, there are three objects of choice, the honourable, the useful, and the pleasant, and three of aversion, the dishonourable, the injurious, and the painful: now, the good man tends to act rightly in relation to all these objects, and the bad man tends to err, but chiefly in relation to Pleasure—for Pleasure enters most largely into the composition of human nature: it belongs not only*

*to man's merely sentient nature which he shares with the lower animals, but attends the pursuit and attainment even of the distinctively human objects of choice, the honourable, and the useful.*

(6) *Again, the liking for Pleasure has grown up with us all from our childhood. It has sunk like a dye into the fibre of our lives, and is not to be easily rubbed out.*

(7) *And not only do we estimate our feelings according to the Pleasure or Pain attending them: even to our actions we all, more or less consistently, apply the same standard. To bring this personal standard into harmony with what is objectively right—to make the individual 'like and dislike aright,' is the all-important object to which the Moralist must exclusively devote himself.*

(8) *Lastly, it is the glory of Art and Virtue to conquer difficulties. What more difficult conquest than that of Pleasure could be set before Moral Virtue and the Art of Virtuous Living?*

*We have now established the following points—that Virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains: that, according as the same opportunities are repeatedly used for the performance of good actions, or repeatedly used for the performance of bad actions, a man acquires a virtue or falls away into the opposite vice: and that the formed virtue or vice manifests itself in the continued performance of the good or bad actions in which it originated.*

§ 1. σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξεων τὴν ἐπιγνομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ 1104 b. 3.  
λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις] If certain acts are attended by pleasure, we may generally take it that the habit of performing them has been contracted; as long as they remain painful, we can infer that the habit has not been contracted.

It is to be noted that the term *ἐπιγνομένην* occurring here is employed in *E.N.* x. 4. 8 to express the relation of pleasure to action: *τελειοῦ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ή ἡδονή οὐχ ὡς ή ἔξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγνόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ή ὥρᾳ.* Transferring the simile to the present passage, we may say that pleasure is the sign of the perfect habit, as the bloom of beauty is the sign of youthful prime.

ὅ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων b. 5.  
σώφρων] Aristotle here lays it down that the good man does good actions easily and with pleasure. But it may be urged—‘The greater the difficulty, the greater the merit. There is no merit in doing good actions mechanically.’ Surely this is a narrow view to take of a good action. A good action is not a *tour de force*. We must not allow the sense of pride and victory felt when a difficulty has been overcome, to influence our judgment. The important point is that a good action has been done, not that something has occurred to stimulate *amour propre*. A difficult action is not so likely to be repeated as one which is done easily, and it is of im-

1104 b. 5. portance, in estimating the value of a good action, to know whether it is likely to be repeated, or is merely an isolated ἐπίδειξις.

b. 8. περὶ ὑδονῶν γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἔστιν ἡ ἡθικὴ ἀρετή] The rest of this chapter contains *eight* Considerations in support of the statement that moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains.

b. 9. Consideration (1) is—διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ὑδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα] A distinction seems to be drawn here between the ways in which we are influenced by pleasure and by pain respectively. Under the influence of pleasure we directly seek what is bad, not recognising it as bad (see the analysis of ἀκρασίᾳ in *E.N.* vii. 3), whereas pain makes us desist from doing what we clearly see to be right.

Particular pleasures and pains are the influences which tempt men to perform acts involving excess or defect—*i.e.* to sacrifice their permanent welfare to something unenduring. The *μεσότης*, or *ὁρθὸς λόγος* (right ratio), is that definite organisation of the moral nature, which has grown up in response to *νόμος*, and withstands the disintegrating influence of particular pleasures and pains. But the life *κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον* has its own pleasure. All acts which subserve the maintenance of the *ὁρθὸς λόγος* are pleasant to the good man, and habitually performed; while acts which tend to destroy that *λόγος*, however ‘pleasant’ they may once have been, have ceased to be pleasant to the good man, and are no longer performed. We are thus brought to the old distinction between ‘good and bad pleasures,’ *i.e.* between pleasures attending acts which conduce to the maintenance of the *μεσότης*, or *ὁρθὸς λόγος* (right ratio), and those attending acts which, on account of their kind or degree, hinder the establishment and maintenance of the *λόγος*. ‘*Ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*’ is the final result of that education, or adaptation, which enables a man to distinguish between ‘good and bad pleasures,’ and choose the good.

b. 11. § 2.] Zell, Michelet, and Grant quote Plato, *Legg.* 653.

b. 13. § 3.] Consideration (2). The virtues have to do with *πάθη* and *πράξεις*, which are all attended by pleasure and pain: cf. *E.N.* x. 4. §§ 6-9, referred to by Michelet. *ai*, omitted by Bek., should be read before *ἀπέραι* (see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 55); K<sup>b</sup>, CCC, and Cambr. have *ai*.

b. 16.. § 4.] Consideration (3). Punishment, one of the great agencies

of moral improvement, consists in the infliction of pain applied as **1104 b. 16.** a contrary to vice which is pleasant. The Paraphrast has—*καθάπερ ἐκείναις (i.e. ταῖς ιατρεῖαις) ἐναντίαι αἱ ρόσοι ἀς θεραπεύουσι, καὶ ἐὰν ἴδωμεν ιατρὸν ψυχρὰν προσάγοντα θεράπειαν γινώσκομεν εὐθὺς τὴν νόσον ἀπὸ θέρμης συστῆναι, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κολάσεων δόσυνηρῶν οὔσων γινώσκομεν ὅτι θεραπευόμεναι κακίαι ἀπὸ ἡδονῆς γίνονται.* Zell, Michelet, and Grant refer to Hippocrates, *Aph.* xxii. § 2, for the doctrine *αἱ δὲ ιατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων.* There is a passage however in his work *περὶ ἀρχαῆς ιητρικῆς* (13. Littré i. 598), in which Hippocrates ridicules the *application*, at least, which the doctrine receives from ordinary practitioners, who follow what he calls *ὁ τρόπος ὁ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.* This *τρόπος* or Method juggles with certain *notiones temere a rebus abstractae*, simply directing the practitioner *βοηθεῖν τῷ μὲν θερμῷ ἐπὶ τῷ ψυχρῷ,* and so on with the other *ἐναντία.* But let us test this Method in a concrete case: A patient has a complicated illness occasioned by eating unwholesome food. Is his condition *θερμόν*, or *ψυχρόν*, or *ξηρόν*, or *ὑγρόν?* Hippocrates asks derisively: And where shall we find the remedy likely to cure him under the contrary category? See also note on *E.N.* i. 13. 7.

**§ 5.]** Consideration (4). Pleasures and pains make us worse; **b. 18.** hence some have gone the length of defining virtue as insensibility to their influence. But this is going too far; for virtue is not *λόγος* in the abstract, but an *ἔννοια λόγος*—the result of an *εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων.* It is the order of the *πάθη*, not *ἀπάθεια.* So Plato (*Philebus* 60 D, E) says that the Best Life must have both *ἡδονή* and *φρόνησις.* The peripatetic view is well expressed by Plutarch in the following passage (*De Virtute morali*, 12)—διὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, τὴν ἄγαν ἀφαιρετέον ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀμύνας, τὴν ἄγαν μισοπονηρίαν. οὕτω γὰρ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάλγητος, ἀλλὰ σώφρων, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος, οὐκ ὥμος οὐδὲ πικρὸς ἔσται. τῶν δὲ παθῶν παντάπασιν ἀναιρεθέντων, εἰ καὶ δυνατόν ἔστιν, ἐν πολλοῖς ἀργύτερος ὁ λόγος καὶ ἀμβλύτερος, ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης πνεύματος ἐπιλιπόντος. ταῦτα δὲ ἀμέλει καὶ οἱ νομοθέται συνιδόντες, ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ ζῆλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ σάλπιγξι καὶ αὐλοῖς ἐπεγείρουσι καὶ αὔξουσι τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ μάχιμον. Cf. ch. 4 of the same treatise quoted above in note to ii. 1. 1, a. 17.

**πρώην]** Bywater, following K<sup>b</sup>, for the *πρότερον* of all other authorities. I confess that I do not like *πρώην*. It does not appear in the *Ind. Arist.* In a course of oral lectures its occurrence

- 1104 b. 18. would not surprise us, as its ordinary meaning (especially in the phrase *χθὲς καὶ πρότην*) seems to be 'the day before yesterday.'
- b. 21. **φαῦλοι]** The reading of K<sup>b</sup> L<sup>b</sup> M<sup>b</sup>, Camb., NC, is obviously right (see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 55). Bekker reads *φαῦλαι*.
- b. 23. **ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου]** 'by,' or 'in the definition,' or 'formula.'
- b. 24. **ἀπαθεῖας κ.τ.λ.]** See the notes of Zell and Michelet. The Cynics seem to be specially referred to here: Socrates may also be intended, for he is elsewhere (*E. N.* vi. 13) accused of making the *ἀρεταί, φρονήσεις*, or *λόγοι*: and Speusippus held *στοχάζεσθαι τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀοχλησίας* (see Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.*: *Speusippus*): Democritus also is stated to have held a similar view (see Ritter and Preller: *Democritus*).
- b. 27. **§ 6. ὑπόκειται . . . πρακτική]** The Paraph. has—*ὑπόκειται ἄρα ή ἀρετὴ εἶναι ή ἔξις ή οὕτως ἔχουσα περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας καθὼς προσδιωρισμέθα—i.e. ὅτε δεῖ, ὡς δεῖ, κ.τ.λ.*, thus taking *ἡ τοιαύτη* closely with *περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας*. Grant has—'we may begin by assuming then . . . that this kind of excellence (*i.e.* moral) is concerned with pleasures and pains.' So Williams and Peters. I think that the Par. is right.
- b. 29. **§ 7.]** Consideration (5). There being three generally recognised objects of *αἰρεσις*—viz. *τὸ καλόν, τὸ συμφέρον* and *τὸ ἡδύ*, the last is involved in the first two. The *καλόν* is *τὸ εὖ ζῆν*—the Noble Life, the conception of which serves as a regulative principle. The *συμφέρον* is (in the strict sense of the term) that which is recognised as a means to the attainment of some end, whether that end be the realisation of the Noble Life, or some subordinate end. The *ἡδύ* is something desired irrespectively of its goodness or utility. In seeking the *καλόν* and the *συμφέρον* a man is conscious of a system of things; whereas in following the *ἡδύ*, as such, he has to do with merely isolated particulars. The pursuit of the *καλόν* and of the *συμφέρον* is, however, pleasant, because it is a pursuit; to pursue successfully and to feel pleasure being practically identical.
- γένοιτο δ' ἀν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν]** Here Bywater restores *ὅτι* from K<sup>b</sup>, in place of the *ἢτι* of all other authorities. I think that *ἢτι* is right, and that *καὶ ἐκ τούτων . . .*

ἘΤΙ = ἐκ τῶνδε. Φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν would = φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ ἡθικὴ 1104 b. 29. ἀρετή ἔστι περὶ ἥδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν: but throughout this chapter περὶ is used with the accusative of the terms denoting the circumstances or environment of ἡθ. ἀρετή. I think that here περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν can mean only ‘about the same things,’ i. e. about ἀρετή and κακία mentioned in the two immediately preceding lines. I should like, however, to read περὶ αὐτῶν for περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. The recurring -τῶν or -ων terminations in the immediate context—αὐτῶν τριῶν γὰρ ὅντων τῶν—would easily lend themselves to clerical error.

**τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἱρεσιν]** ‘The subjects of choice’—i. e. the three b. 35. subdivisions mentioned under the head of αἱρεσις.

§ 8.] Consideration (6). The love of pleasure is innate, in- 1105 a. 1. grained in our nature, and hard to rub out. ‘χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι . . . ἐγκεχρωσμένυν] the metaphor,’ says Grant (following Gifanius and Zell), ‘though not its precise application, seems taken from Plato, *Rep.* iv. p. 429 D, where the effects of right education are compared to a dye with which the mind is imbued, so as to resist the deterersive effects of pleasure and pain.’

Consideration (7). Pleasure and pain are the tests which we apply to actions *also* (*sc.* as well as to feelings). Michelet appropriately quotes Diog. Laert. x. § 129, speaking of Epicurus—*ταύτην (ἥδονὴν) γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἵρεσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν, ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.*

§ 10.] Consideration (8). It is very difficult to contend against a. 7. pleasure and pain; the contest therefore is worthy of the great Art of Life.

**Ἡράκλειτος**] See the notes of Zell, Coraes, Michelet and Grant: a. 8. cf. also Bywater’s *Heracliti Eph. Reliquiae*, cv. p. 41. Heraclitus spoke only of the difficulty of contending with θυμός, as is recognised in *Pol. Θ.* 9, 1315 a. 30, and in *Eth. Eud.* ii. 7. 1223 b. 23. His words, according to Bywater, were θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅ τι γὰρ ἀν χρητῇ γίνεσθαι ψυχῆς ὠνέεται.

**ἀρετῆ]** ἡθικὴ read by M<sup>b</sup>, rc. L<sup>b</sup>, NC, Paris 1853, B<sup>3</sup> and some a. 11. other inferior MSS.

## CHAPTER IV.

## ARGUMENT.

But here a difficulty may be raised—*A man becomes just by performing just acts: but surely, if he performs just acts, he is already just: if a man writes correctly, he surely can write.* To this we may answer, that the inference is not certain in the case of the man who writes correctly, any more than in the case of the man who performs just acts. A man may write something correctly by chance, or at the suggestion of another person. We do not know that he can write, till we know that he has written something as only a person who can write could—i.e. from his own knowledge of the art of writing. So much for the analogy between an art and a virtue, appealed to by the promoters of the difficulty before us. The analogy, even so far as it holds, is evidently not in favour of their suggestion, but against it. It is, however, where the analogy breaks down entirely, that we see the best opening for a decisive refutation—and it breaks down here: a work of art has its artistic merit in itself: it is enough in the realm of art if a work, with certain good qualities in it, has been produced—we say ‘What a beautiful work!’ But in the realm of conduct we do not say ‘Well done!’ as soon as we see an action, with certain good qualities in it, performed. Before we pronounce, we look at the agent also, and ask—‘How did he perform it?’ (1) Did he know that he was performing it? (2) Did he choose deliberately to perform it, and that, because he thought it right, not because he thought it would lead to some ulterior pleasure or profit? and (3) Did he perform it as the result of a fixed and unchangeable habit in him? Unless these conditions in the agent be fulfilled, we do not speak of the moral value of actions: but works of art have their artistic merit independently of any such conditions in the artist, except of course that of his having knowledge. With the acquirement of the virtues knowledge, such as is required in the artist, has little or nothing to do; but the other conditions mentioned are all-important, realised as they are in consequence of the frequent performance of good actions.

Actions, then, are said to be just or temperate, when they are such as the just or temperate man would perform; but it does not necessarily follow that if a man performs these actions he is just or temperate. More is needed: to be just or temperate he must perform them as just or temperate men perform them.

We have good reason for saying, then, that it is by performing just or temperate acts that a man becomes just or temperate. Nay, how could it be otherwise? Who, if he omits to perform such acts, has the least chance of ever becoming good? And yet the majority of men omit to perform them, and take refuge in talk, and think that they have a philosophy of life which will make them good. They are like patients who listen attentively to their physician, but do not follow his prescriptions. Foolish patients! foolish moralists!

§§ 1-3.] This *ἀπορία* we may resolve by pointing out (which 1105 a. 17. Aristotle does not do explicitly) that *τὰ δίκαια* before the formation of the Habit are, so far as the agent is concerned, only *δημωνύμως δίκαια*. They are only apparently *his* just acts; really, *qua* just, they are expressions of the wise intention of the law-giver, or ruler, who enjoins and enforces them. The moral agent himself has to begin by acting under the compulsion of the law, until by repetition a habit is formed, and he performs the acts in question *proprio motu*, the habit bringing with it an insight, more or less clear, into the significance of the acts, and a belief that they are good. Then they are really the agent's own just acts—*i.e.* they are 'just' in the strict, and not in an equivocal sense. Thus the analogy between *ἀρετή* and *τέχνη*, appealed to by the promoters of the *ἀπορία* (which, it may be observed, is an *ignava ratio* in morals—or excuse for inactivity—see § 6 of this chapter)—similar to that in science refuted in the *Meno* 80 E—οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὕτε ὁ οἰδέν οὕτε ὁ μὴ οἰδεῖ οὕτε γάρ ἀν ὁ γε οἰδεῖ ζητοῖ· οἴδε γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως. οὕτε ὁ μὴ οἰδεῖ οὐδὲ γάρ οἰδεῖ ὁ, τι ζητήσει) does not help them. A just act may be just in an equivocal sense, as a word correctly written (*γραμματικόν τι*) may be 'correctly written' merely in an equivocal sense, and is no sure sign that a man *can* write. The analogy only makes it clearer that the difficulty about 'becoming just by doing just acts' is to be met by pointing out that the acts are not really 'just' at first, but 'must and can' be *made just* by the strenuous practice of the agent himself. It is this 'must and can' which *οἱ ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες* (§ 6)—the promoters of this *ἀπορία*—ignore.

But, after all, there is no real analogy (for the purpose of the present discussion) between the *ἀρεταί* and the *τέχναι*—ἔτι οὐδὲ *δημοιόν* ἔστιν ἐπί τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν (§ 3, a. 26). The goodness of a work of art is something quite different from that of a moral action. The goodness of the work of art is a quality which we see at once in the work *itself*—Hermes is dug up at Olympia, and we find him beautiful as soon as we see him. But the goodness of a moral action is not a quality in the action itself, which we can appreciate apart from the goodness of the agent. The reason of this is that the real object of the moral judgment is not the isolated action, but *the system of conduct to which it belongs*; and this we can get at only through a knowledge of the *way in which* the agent performed the given action. If we find that an

1105 a. 17. action, belonging *prima facie* to a noble system of conduct, has, as a matter of fact, been performed by the agent deliberately in the interest of that system, and performed also easily and with pleasure, as being an action with which he identifies his own good, then we venture to speak of ‘the goodness of the action.’ We know that it is a good action which we can count on the agent to repeat. It is only actions which will be repeated that are morally significant. An action, however useful and even well-intentioned, which is not likely to be repeated, because the agent finds it difficult and unpleasant, is not an important factor in that correspondence with the environment which is the ultimate object of the moral judgment. Of course it is true that there are actions which from their very nature are exceptional, because intended to meet exceptional circumstances—actions involving heroic self-sacrifice, which take a position analogous to that of great works of art, and demand unhesitating and immediate applause, although performed by a man of whose disposition we otherwise know nothing; but in the vast majority of cases it is unsafe to estimate an action thus from the outside, judging of its moral value from its splendour or immediate utility; before we come to a decision, we ought to know the state of the agent—whether he is aware that he performs the act, whether he chooses it because it is right, and that, of fixed habit, having often performed it before, and therefore being likely to perform it often again.

a. 28. § 3. ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι] I prefer *aὐτά* given by L<sup>b</sup> and NC.

a. 31. πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς κ.τ.λ.] i.e. (1) it must not be done δι' ἄγνοιαν, otherwise it would be involuntary, i.e. not his act at all, but a mere accident without moral significance (see *E.N.* iii. 1. 3); (2) it must not be the result of unregulated θυμός or ἐπιθυμία, but of βούλευτικὴ ὅρεξις, i.e. προαιρεσις (see *E.N.* iii. 3. 19), and the βούλευσις must be directed to the good end, τὸ καλόν, τὸ εὖ ζῆν, for it is possible to employ apparently good actions as means to an unworthy end. This seems to be the sense of προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά—viz. ‘choosing means for the sake of the good end which one appears to choose them for’: ‘choosing them *as being what they are—good: i.e. good means to a good end*’: e.g. a man must choose to perform a charitable act for the sake of the public good which such acts promote, not for the sake of personal popularity.

In the latter case his ‘charitable act’ would be such only in 1105 a. 31. appearance. *Προαιρέμενος δι' αὐτά* cannot signify ‘choosing them, i.e. the particular acts, for their own sakes, as ends-in-themselves,’ for *προαιρέσις* is the choice of *means* (see *E. N.* iii. 2. 9). Good choice treats particular acts as means to the realisation of *εὐδαιμονία*, the chief end. (3) Not only must an act, to be morally good, be chosen in the way described above, but the choice of it must be habitual and practically inevitable. The *προαιρέσις* of means, to be good, must be guided by the *βούλησις* (*E. N.* iii. 2. 9) of an End, or Life, to which the whole nature of the moral agent has been perfectly adapted.

τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν κ.τ.λ.] ‘This,’ Grant remarks, ‘is b. 2. a reaction against the Socratico-Platonic doctrine that virtue consists in knowledge.’ Aristotle uses *εἰδέναι* in two senses in the present context, in one of which he affirms, and in the other seems to deny, its necessity in morals. A man must *know that he is doing* an act, if the act is to have any moral significance at all. This is an indispensable condition (*πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς*), as we have seen above. But, this condition fulfilled, a man may act well without *a theory of action* (*τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι*), if his moral habits are good; whereas correct theory without good habits would avail nothing. The statement, however, *τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἴσχυει*, even as thus explained, is too strong from Aristotle’s own point of view. Without a *theory*, conduct could not long maintain itself as a system. Aristotle concedes this in his doctrine of the *πρακτικὸς νοῦς*, and in his view that the moral agent ought to become *νομοθετικός* (*E. N.* x. 14). After all, if allowance be made for difference of philosophical language, Plato and Aristotle hold essentially the same view about the place of knowledge in morality. It may be pointed out in passing that the distinction drawn in § 3 between a work of art which has its good in itself, and an action which must be interpreted in the light of the agent’s character, is the distinction of *Met. Θ.* 8, between *ἐνέργειαι* which have an *ἔργον παρ' αὐτάς*, and those which have not—1050 a. 30 *ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἔτερόν τι ἔστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἔστιν, οἷον ἡ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ κ.τ.λ. . . . ὅσων δὲ μή ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὄρωντι, καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι.* The excellence of Homer is embodied in his *ἔργον*, and remains there for all time;

- 1105 b. 2. but a good action is only a glimpse which we get of a good life. On the one hand, it is the Iliad, and not its author that is important; on the other hand, it is the orderly beautiful life, of which the action is a symptom, that is precious.
- b. 3. τὰ δ' ἄλλα . . . ἀπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν . . . περιγύνεται] The *ἄλλα* are *τὸ προαιρεῖσθαι δὶ' αὐτά* and the *ἔξις*, both of which come from acting, not from philosophising.
- b. 5. § 4.] Good actions are only then morally good, *i.e.* really what they appear to be, when they are done by a good man: and a good man is a man who performs good actions easily and in the interest of a noble system of conduct.
- b. 9. §§ 5, 6.] show that the remark *πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς* [*sc. ἔχειν*] *τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν η̄ μικρὸν ισχύει* (§ 3) is directed, not so much against Plato, as against Sophists like Isocrates, who professed (or were accused, by those who did not themselves take fees, of professing) to teach conduct by a course of lectures—cf. *E. N.* x. 9. 20.

## CHAPTER V.

### ARGUMENT.

*We have assumed the concrete existence of Virtue, and tried to show how it is practically acquired: let us now try to find its formal definition; and first let us ask—What is its Genus?*

*The qualities which manifest themselves in the Soul are three—Feelings, Capacities, Habits; and Virtue will be one of the three.*

(1) *Feelings:* e. g. desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, emulation, pity—these, and all other feelings, being accompanied by pleasure or pain.

(2) *Capacities:* being capable of experiencing these feelings—e. g. being capable of feeling anger or pity.

(3) *Habits:* the relations, good or bad, in which we stand to our various feelings, e. g. if we are disposed too much or too little to anger, it is a bad habit; if moderately, a good habit.

*The Virtues and Vices then are not feelings, because we are not said to be good or bad for our mere feelings, or praised or blamed for them, whereas we are praised for our Virtues, and blamed for our Vices. Again, we experience a feeling, e. g. anger or fear, without choosing to experience it, but the virtues involve Choice. Moreover we are said to be ‘moved’ by our feelings, but ‘disposed,’ not ‘moved,’ by our Virtues and Vices.*

*Nor are the Virtues and Vices capacities, for we are not said to be good or bad, and we are not praised or blamed, because we are capable of experiencing certain feelings. Further, we are endowed by nature with these capacities; but it is not nature which makes us good or bad, as was pointed out before.*

*If then the Virtues are neither feelings nor capacities, it remains that they are habits.*

§ 1. τί ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετή] What is its *γένος*. It seems to be a reversal of the natural order to enquire first (as Aristotle has done in the previous chapters of this Book)—How Virtue is acquired; and then (*μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα*) to ask—What Virtue is. This is surely the order which Socrates finds fault with Meno for wishing to adopt (*Meno* 86 C, D). Perhaps we may answer for Aristotle that it is only the man who has acquired *ἀρετή* for himself who can understand its *τί ἔστι*. The present enquiry therefore follows a natural course, when starting from *ἀρετή*, as something concretely known, it first tries to show how it is practically acquired, and then tries to find its formal definition.

τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἔστι κ.τ.λ.] As Michelet and other commentators point out, the phenomena in the Soul are here said to be three, because *ἀρετή*, or goodness, *the quality* (*ποιότης*) *par excellence* (cf. *E. N.* i. 9. 8 αὐτη δὲ [*i. e.* ἡ πολιτική] πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούσι τίνας καὶ ἀγαθούς τὸν πολίτας ποιῆσαι: and *Met.* Δ. 14. 1020 b. 23 μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχονσι προαιρεσιν]), suggests the accepted threefold division (so far as the *ψυχή* is concerned) of *ποιότης* into *ἔξις*, *δύναμις*, and *πάθος*. See *Cat.* 8. 8 b. 25 sqq., and Grant's note. Zell quotes Plutarch, *De Virt. Mor.* 4 τρία γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα φασι περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν, δύναμιν, πάθος, ἔξιν· ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑλὴ τοῦ πάθους, οἷον ὀργὴς, αἰσχυντηλία, θαρραλεότης· τὸ δὲ πάθος κίνησίς τις ἥδη τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον ὀργή, αἰδώς, θάρσος, ἡ δὲ ἔξις ἴσχυς καὶ κατασκευὴ τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄλογον δυνάμεως ἐξ ἔθους ἐγγιγνομένη, κακία μὲν ἀν φαύλως, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀν καλῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παιδαγωγηθῆ τὸ πάθος.

§§ 2-6.] A *πάθος* is an isolated feeling or affection, and a *δύναμις* is the capacity for experiencing such a feeling. A capacity of this kind, with the resulting feeling, is *natural*, *i.e.* independent of education, and, in itself, is *neither praised as good, nor blamed as bad*. Moreover, a feeling is a *motion* (*κατὰ τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα*) which arises out of a capacity *independently of choice* (*ἀπροαιρέτως*).

1105 b. 21. These characteristics of *πάθος* and *δύναμις* exclude the possibility of ἀρετή being a *πάθος* or *δύναμις*: for ἀρετή is a *disposition* (*κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς διακεῖσθαι πῶς λεγόμεθα*) not a motion; it *implies choice*; and it is *praised* as good; besides, it is *acquired by education*. But these are the characteristics of *ἔξις*. Accordingly *λείπεται ἔξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι*.

In other words, the ‘Qualities’ of the *ψυχή* are either affections (*πάθη*) or capacities (*δυνάμεις* and *ἔξις*). Virtue is not an isolated affection. It is therefore a capacity. But it is not a natural capacity. Therefore, it is an acquired capacity, *i.e.* a *ἔξις*: and a *ἔξις* for which we are praised.

**§ 2. πάθη]** It is to be observed that the doctrine of this section is considerably simpler than that of the corresponding passage in *Cat. 8*. In this latter passage *παθητικὰ ποιότητες* and *πάθη* are distinguished (9 a. 28). *Παθητικὰ ποιότητες* are permanent qualities, such as a pale complexion, or madness, whether congenital or caused by disease; whereas *πάθη* are transient qualities (if the term *qualities* be admissible), such as paleness suddenly produced by fear, or excitement by pain—9 b. 19 ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων συμπτωμάτων (μελανία, ὡχρότης: and the same remarks are afterwards applied to psychical conditions, such as *μανικὴ ἔκστασις*) ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παραμονήμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε, *παθητικὰ ποιότητες λέγονται*: ποιοὶ γάρ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα . . . ὅσα δ' ἀπὸ ράδιων διαλυμένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται, πάθη λέγεται, *ποιότητες δὲ οὖν*. οὐ γάρ λέγονται ποιοὶ τινες κατὰ ταύτας οὔτε γάρ δὲ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυνθῆναι ἐρυθρίας λέγεται: οὔτε δὲ ὡχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβηθῆναι ὡχρίας ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τις ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, *ποιότητες δὲ οὖν*. Here the writer says that *πάθη* are not *ποιότητες*: but above (9 a. 28) he has said—*τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικὰ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη*. The difference between a *παθητικὴ ποιότης* and a *δύναμις* according to *Cat. 8* is that, while the former is the permanent manifestation or induration, as it were, of a *πάθος*, the latter is a natural capacity of doing or resisting something: see *Cat. 9 a. 18 δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἡ ἀδύναμιαν τοῦ πυῆσαι τι ράδιως ἡ μηδὲν πάσχειν*. The *δύναμις* of the *Categories* thus differs from that of the *Ethics*, which is *καθ' ἓν παθητικὸς τούτων* (*i.e.* τῶν παθῶν) λεγόμεθα. Indeed the *δύναμις* of the *Ethics* stands very close to the *παθητικὴ ποιότης* of the *Categories*. The manner in which the notion of *παθητικὴ ποιότης*, or permanent manifestation of a *πάθος*, naturally passes into

that of δύναμις καθ' ἥν παθητικοί (τοῦ πάθους) λεγόμεθα is easily seen in 1105 b. 21. the case of psychical παθητικὰ ποιότητες, where the manifestations generally admit of degrees; thus the παθητικὴ ποιότης of μανικὴ ἔκστασις, or insanity, is not always violently manifested; and the violent outbursts, when they occur, appear as πάθη, or κινήσεις, arising out of the normal ἔκστασις, which thus comes to be regarded as a capacity, rather than as a manifestation. If we compare the parallel passage in the *Eudem. Ethics* (ii. 2) with *Cat.* 8 we can see how close παθητικὴ ποιότης and δύναμις stand to each other, where τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν at least are concerned. In the *Categories* the ὀργίλος is said to have a παθητικὴ ποιότης (*Cat.* 8. 10 a. 2 ποιὸι γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας [sc. τὰς παθητικὰς ποιότητας] λέγονται, ὀργίλοι κ.τ.λ.); in the *Eth. Eud.*, to have a δύναμις (*Eth. Eud.* ii. 2. 1220 b. 12 λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον κ.τ.λ. . . . καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι ποιότης, ἀλλὰ πάσχει· κατὰ δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις, ποιότης· λέγω δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις καθ' ἄς λέγονται κατὰ πάθη οἱ ἐνεργοῦντες· οὗν ὀργίλος κ.τ.λ.).

In the foregoing remarks I have purposely omitted, as irrelevant, reference to such παθητικὰ ποιότητες as *sweetness*, so called because they are qualities which produce πάθη in us—*Cat.* 8. 9 b. 5 τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἔκαστην τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικὰ ποιότητες λέγονται.

**λυπηθῆναι]** Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 88) seems to make out a good b. 25. case for his conjecture φοβηθῆναι. After quoting the § from λέγω δὲ πάθη down to ἐλεῆσαι, he says: ‘Affecte nenne ich Begierde, Zorn, Furcht u.s.w., überhaupt alles, womit das Gefühl von Lust und Unlust verbunden ist. Wer so definiert, kann unmöglich die λύπη selbst als Affect bezeichnen. Dennoch wird unmittelbar darauf λυπηθῆναι als Beispiel eines solchen angeführt. Ich vermuthe φοβηθῆναι, denn φοβεῖσθαι wird neben ὀργίζεσθαι wiederholt in diesem Abschnitte als Beispiel gebraucht. Z. 31 κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὕτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα, οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργίζομενος. p. 1106 a. 2 ἔτι ὀργίζομεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως. Die grosse Ethik, die diesen Abschnitt fast wörtlich wiedergiebt, hat in ihrem Text bereits λυπηθῆναι i. 7. 1186 a. 15: dagegen hat Stobaeus *Ecl. Eth.* p. 85 Meineke φοβεῖσθαι: δυνάμεις καθ' ἄς παθητικοὶ τούτων εἶναι λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἄς ὀργίζομεθα φοβούμεθα ξηλοῦμεν κ.τ.λ.’

**ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ἄς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς]** Cf. *E. E.* ii. 2. 1220 b. 18 ἔξεις δέ εἰσιν, ὅσαι αἴτιαι εἰσι τὸν ταῦτα (i.e. τὰ πάθη) ἢ κατὰ λόγον ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἔναντίως. The *ἔξις* of virtue is the result of the

1105 b. 25. εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων (Eustratius) effected by moral training.

b. 29. § 3. οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι] Because, as is explained in *Cal.* 8, the *πάθη* are not properly *ποιότητες*: we are not *ποιοί τινες* in consequence of them. It is thus evident that it is only on account of their close connexion with *παθητικὰ ποιότητες*, of which they seem to be at once the causes and the results, that *πάθη* are considered under the head of *ποιότης* at all. In themselves they are *κινήσεις* (see § 4 of this chapter), or *ἐνέργειαι*—not *ποιότητες* (see *E. N.* x. 3. 1). This is recognised in *E. E.* ii. 1. 1218 b. 35 τῶν δὲ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ μὲν ἔξεις ἢ δυνάμεις εἰσὶ, τὰ δὲ ἐνέργειαι καὶ κινήσεις.

1106 a. 3. § 4. *προαιρέσεις*] As Grant points out, there has been no proof of this yet. Aristotle, however, has probably in his mind the doctrine of *Met. Θ.* 2 and 5, according to which *ὅρεξις* or *προαιρέσις* determines (as *τὸ κύριον*) which of the two contraries open to a *δύναμις μετὰ λόγου* shall be manifested. He therefore assumes here as a settled point, that the *ἀρεταί*, having been acquired in circumstances in which the development of the contrary *κακία* was possible, are *μετὰ προαιρέσεως*. It is true that the *δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγου* of *Met. Θ.* 2 and 5 are identified with the properly *intellectual* potentialities, or abilities, *i.e.* with the *τέχναι* and *ἐπιστῆμαι*: but the doctrine of *Eth. Nic.* iii. 5—that, if the performance of good acts is *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, then the performance of bad acts is equally *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*—enables us, or rather obliges us, to extend the notion of *ἡ μετὰ λόγου δύναμις ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐσία* so as to include *moral* potentiality also—*i.e.* the power of acting well or ill in given circumstances, which man, in virtue of his *λόγος*, possesses. Indeed, the notion may be even farther generalised, so as to include all Life (physical as well as moral), *i.e.* all cases in which an *organism* may, or may not, succeed in doing what is for its advantage in given circumstances: and this generalisation of the notion would be in strict conformity with the meaning of *λόγος*=orderly arrangement of parts, or organisation. All organisms, in that they can so behave as to survive or perish, possess *δυνάμεις τῶν ἐναντίων*: whereas in the inorganic world there is no ‘adaptation to an environment, or failure in adaptation’: there are only *ἄλογοι δυνάμεις*, operating in one direction.

a. 6. διακεῖσθαι πως] Except, apparently, for the alliteration, this might have been *ἔχειν πως*. The *ἀρεταί* are *διαθέσεις* which have

become fixed, *i.e.* ἔξεις—see *Cat.* 8. 9 a. 8 διαφέρει ἔξεις διαθέσεως 1106 a. 6. τῷ τὴν μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι τὴν δὲ πολυχρονιωτέραν καὶ δυσκινητότεραν. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἔξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκ ἔξεις ἀνάγκης ἔξεις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔξεις ἔχοντες καὶ διάκεινται γέ πως κατ' αὐτάς· οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι οὐ πάντως καὶ ἔξειν ἔχοντιν. Examples of a διάθεσις are *ψυχρότης, νόσος.*

## CHAPTER VI.

### ARGUMENT.

*So much for the genus of Virtue—it is a Habit. But what is its differentia? What sort of Habit is it?*

Let us begin with the statement, that a virtue or excellence gives perfection both to the condition and to the function of that of which it is the virtue or excellence. Thus the excellence of the eye makes the eye itself and its sight good. So man's excellence or virtue will be a habit which makes him good, and causes him to perform his peculiar function well. The differentia then which we are looking for is contained in the words—‘which makes him good and causes him to perform his peculiar function well.’ We have already said, in passing, that Goodness is preserved by the Mean, and that ‘performing well’ consists in avoiding extremes and choosing the Mean. Accordingly, if we now explain fully what ‘choosing the Mean’ is, we shall explain the true differentia of Virtue.

Wherever a measurable whole can be divided into two parts, we can subtract a part which is ‘greater than,’ or a part which is ‘less than,’ or a part which is ‘equal to,’ the part which we leave. Here ‘equal to’ is the arithmetical mean between any two unequal parts into which the whole may be divided; it is the absolute mean, or ‘half of the thing,’ which is the same for all men. From this absolute mean, however, we must distinguish the relative mean, or ‘mean for me,’ which is not the half of the thing and the same for all men, but that amount which is neither too much nor too little for me—that amount which exactly suits me in my particular circumstances: e.g. let two pounds of meat a day be too little, and ten too much for me during my training: it does not follow that the arithmetical mean between two and ten—the half of their sum, i.e. six pounds, will suit me. Whatever quantity between the extremes two and ten suits me is the mean for me, and will be prescribed by my trainer. And the rule which the trainer here observes is that which all artists follow. They all look to this, not to the arithmetical mean: i.e. they all aim at what is simply enough in the circumstances, avoiding excess and defect. Thus we say of a master-piece of art—‘you could not take from it, or add to it, without spoiling it.’ And if Art achieves her triumphs by observing this golden rule, much more carefully will Virtue observe it, inasmuch as her

triumphs are greater: for the Virtuous Character is like one of the organisms which Nature brings forth—it is more fitly contrived and more beautiful than any work of art. When we say that Virtue observes the mean, we refer only to Moral Virtue, for it is acquired in a region—that of feelings and actions—where excess and defect are possible. Thus, take the feeling of anger: if we are too angry, or not angry enough, we err and are blamed; but if we are angry at the proper time, and at the proper things, and with the proper persons, and with the proper effect, and in the proper way, we hit off ‘the happy mean,’ and do what we are praised for, and what is right. But where ‘we are praised,’ and ‘do what is right,’ Virtue is concerned. It is Virtue therefore which makes us ‘hit off the mean’: indeed we may perhaps even say that ‘Virtue is itself a kind of mean.’ Again, there are many wrong ways (evil is something indefinite as the Pythagoreans opined, good something definite), but only one right way. Hence it is easy to miss the mark, difficult to hit it—another reason why we assign the mean—for it is difficult—to Virtue, and the extremes to Vice—for they are easy.

Moral Virtue may then be defined, as ‘A Habit involving Choice, lying in a Relative Mean fixed by Reason, that is, as the Prudent Man would fix it.’

But it is only as formally defined, that Virtue ‘is a mean,’ or ‘lies in a mean,’ between two vices, choosing the middle course between their extremes. This ‘middle course,’ we must remember, is likewise the Best Course: and as choosing what is Best virtue is ‘supreme excellence.’

It is not to every action, however, and every feeling that the formula of the mean applies. Some feelings, e.g. envy, some actions, e.g. theft, are seen, as soon as named, to imply evil. It is never possible to have such feelings, or perform such actions, ‘in the right way.’ To suppose it possible would indeed be as absurd as to suppose that acting unjustly or acting intemperately could have its excess, defect and mean, or that the exact mean point of justice or temperance could be resolved into excess and defect. In short there is no mean in excess and defect, and no excess and defect in the mean.

1106 a. 15. § 1. ποία τις] Having in the last chapter shown ὃ τι ἔστι τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, viz. that it is a ἔξι, Aristotle now proceeds to declare its differentia—ποία τις.

§§ 2, 3.] Taken, as Grant points out, from Plato, *Rep.* 353 B.

a. 25. § 4. ποία τις ἔστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς] Its differentia is that it is ἐν μεσότητι.

a. 26. συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ] Continuous and discrete quantity—i.e. magnitude (*μέγεθος*) and number (*πλῆθος*), according to Grant, who quotes *Cat.* 6. 4 b. 20 τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἔστι διωρισμένον τὸ δὲ συνεχές . . . ἔστι δὲ διωρισμένον, οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος, συνεχὲς δὲ οἷον γραμμὴ ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος. It will be observed, however, that in this passage from the *Categories* the

term used is διωρισμένον not διαιρετόν. Is διαιρετόν in the *Ethics* 1106 a. 26. equivalent to διωρισμένον in the *Categories*? Against an affirmative answer we have *De Coelo* i. 1. 268 a. 6 συνεχὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά: and *Met. Δ.* 1020 a. 10 λέγεται δὲ πλῆθος μὲν τὸ διαιρετὸν δυνάμει εἰς μὴ συνεχῆ, μέγεθος δὲ τὸ εἰς συνεχῆ, from which passages it would appear that both μέγεθος and πλῆθος, *i.e.* both the συνεχὲς and the μὴ συνεχὲς are διαιρετά. If διαιρετόν then is to be distinguished from τὸ διωρισμένον, which undoubtedly stands for πλῆθος, we must translate συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ by ‘continuous and at the same time capable of division’—the rendering rejected by Grant, but supported by the Paraphrast, who has—ἐν παντὶ συνεχεῖ, οἷον γραμμῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ, σώματι, ἢ λόγῳ ἢ χρόνῳ, καὶ ὅλως ἐν παντὶ δυναμένῳ διαιρεθῆναι<sup>1</sup>. The writer of the parallel passage in *E. E.* ii. 3 certainly understood the reference to be to the συνεχές alone, and not to the συνεχές and διωρισμένον. His words are, 1220 b. 21 ἐν ἄπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστιν ὑπεροχή καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον· καὶ ταῦτα ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἡ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οἷον ἐν γυμναστικῇ ἐν ἱατρικῇ ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν ὅποιασδήποτε πράξει καὶ ἐπιστημονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονικῇ, καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀτέχνῳ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχές· ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις. The Ald. Sch. follows the lead of Eudemus. He says—πρόδηλον ὅτι πάσῃ πράξει παρακολουθεῖ χρόνος, οὐκ ἔλασσον δὲ περὶ πράξεις ἡ πάθη ἡ ἀρετῆ· καθ' ὃ οὖν ἐν χρόνῳ, δὲ χρόνος ἐν συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὴ τὴν διαιρεσιν λήψεται.

§§ 4-8.] It is unfortunate that Aristotle, in introducing the subject of the ethical mean, gave such prominence to the συνεχές καὶ διαιρετόν *i.e.*, to Quantity simply as Quantity. He therèby invited scholastic explanations like that by which Eudemus attempts to show how moral action falls under the head of the συνεχές—*E. E.* ii. 3. 1220 b. 26 ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχές· ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις: and laid his Theory open to the (really false) charge of recognising only a quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice. As a matter of fact, however, he is careful to distinguish between the μέσον τοῦ πράγματος and the μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς. The μέσον τοῦ πράγματος, as such, has no place in morals, being confined to departments in which the ‘middle,’ or ‘half,’ of something can be exactly measured, or counted. The μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς, with which

<sup>1</sup> It is fair to add, however, that the Paraphrast passes, a few lines below, from the ‘continuous’ to the ‘discrete’—but uses the term διωρισμένον, not διαιρετόν. Aspasius is defective here.

1106 a. 26. alone we have to do in morals, is that ὁ μῆτε πλεονάζει μῆτε ἐλλείπει, i.e., that which enables a particular person to correspond successfully with his social environment. Here account must be taken of complicated organic conditions, of complicated external circumstances, and of intricate actions and reactions between these organic and external factors: and the division of a συνεχές throws little light upon the problem. This Aristotle sees clearly. It seems probable that, having arrived at a satisfactory result in the preceding chapter by looking at ἀρετή in connexion with the Category of ποιόν, he next turned to that of ποσόν for help, and so stumbled upon τὸ συνεχές, of which his commentators have unfortunately made so much.

When we have found τὸ μέσον τὸ τοῦ πράγματος, we have found a quantity simply. But in τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς we have a quantity, as it is related to a quality. From σχῆμα, the fourth kind of ποιότης (see *Cat.* 8. 10 a. 11), we may obtain an illustration of the way in which quantity is related to quality. Let us suppose that a disc is ‘of no use’ with a diameter of 10 inches, and that it must be enlarged till it becomes a disc ‘of a useful size.’ In adding matter (e.g. copper) to it, it is true that we must not add ‘too much or too little’; but, more than this, ‘the due amount’ which we add must have the *quality of shape suitable to a disc*; the same ‘amount’ with another quality of shape would not help us. This *due amount thus circularly qualified* might be called τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς τὸν κύκλον. It is clear then that τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, although it has its quantitative aspect, is essentially that which is qualitatively suitable to the moral character in the circumstances in which it is placed<sup>1</sup>.

The analogy between the moral character and the definite well-balanced forms of organic nature, and of art, was always present to Aristotle's mind; indeed we have to look no farther than the 9th section of this chapter to find it mentioned. Living organisms, and works of art, are *σχῆματα*, definite after their kinds, which Nature and Man respectively form by qualifying matter. The

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Trendelenburg *Logische Untersuch.* i. 358 sqq.: he remarks that Aristotle's virtuous μεσότης is not a mere *quantum*, but keeps in view the qualitative peculiarity of virtue: and that when Plato extols measure in the moral, natural, and artistic worlds, he understands not measure *per se*, but measure in relation to a qualitative *end*. It is in the end which it subserves that measure has its ethical value.

quantity of matter used in any case is determined by the form 1106 a. 26. subserved; the size of a particular organ, or part, is determined by its form, which again is determined by the form (limiting the size) of the whole organism, or work. Thus animals and plants grow to sizes determined by their particular structures, habitats, and conditions of life<sup>1</sup>, and each separate organ observes the proportion of the whole to which it belongs. The painter or sculptor considers the symmetry of the whole composition in every detail of his work. The conductor of a choir is forced to exclude a voice which surpasses all the others conspicuously in beauty—*Pol.* iii. 8. 1284 b. 8 οὐτε γὰρ γραφεὺς ἔστειν ἀν τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ζῷον, οὐδὲ εἰ διαφέροι τὸ κάλλος· οὐτε ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεώς· οὐδὲ δὴ χοροδιδάσκαλος τὸν μεῖζον καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χόρου φθεγγόμενον ἔάστει συγχορεύειν. In all cases Form dominates matter, quality quantity. Similarly, the moral character is a definite Form which maintains itself as such, the *μέσον*, so-called, which it observes in various circumstances being that course of action which is best fitted in the circumstances to secure its continued maintenance. The less we think of the ‘middle,’ or ‘half’ of *τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ διαιρετόν*, in such a connexion, the better. When an insect escapes capture by resembling the colour of the leaves or bark on which it lives, its development of that particular shade of colour and no other, has as much right to be described as an observance of the *μέσον*, as the temperance which protects the citizen from extremes disastrous to himself and others.

§ 7. τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν] otherwise ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης— a. 35. defined by Nicomachus Gerasenus (ἀριθ. εἰσαγωγή i. 23, p. 124, ed. Hoche): ἔστιν οὖν ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης, ὅταν τριῶν ἢ πλειόνων ὅρων ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις κειμένων ἢ ἐπινοούμενών ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ ποσότητα διαφορὰ εὑρίσκηται μεταξὺ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχουσα, μὴ μέντοι λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ὅροις πρὸς ἀλλήλους γίνηται, οἷον α, β, γ, δ, ε. ἐν γὰρ τῇ φυσικῇ ταύτη ἐκθέσει τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ συνεχῶς καὶ ἀνυπερβάτως ἔξεταζομένῃ εὑρίσκεται πᾶς ὀστιστοῦν ὅρος δυὲν ἀνὰ μέσον τεταγμένος τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς διασώζων μεσότητα· ἵσται γὰρ αἱ διαφοραὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκατέρωθεν τεταγμένους, οὐ μὴν ἔτι καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς σώζεται ἐν αὐτοῖς. Cf. also Archytas apud Mullach *Fragm. Phil.* ii. 119.

The ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης answers to *the average* as found by

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Spencer's *Biology*, part ii. ch. 1 on Growth.

1106 a. 35. statistics. Statistics give us the average amount of beer, *e.g.*, consumed per head in a city: but it is only by accident that this amount happens to be that good for a particular person.

b. 7. § 8. *μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς*] Morality and art have nothing to do with the *μέσον τοῦ πράγματος as such*. When we say that they seek the *μέσον*, we mean by that term *τὸ μέτριον* (as used by Plato in the *Politicus*)—*the qualitatively suitable quantity*, which may of course, in some cases, *happen to be τὸ μέσον τὸ τοῦ πράγματος*. Thus corrective justice seeks to effect *τὸ ἵσον* (or *μέσον*) *τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν* (see v. 4. 3)—but only because that *ἵσον* or *μέσον* is qualitatively suitable: *the end of justice is best served*, if the parties are treated as equals who have been made unequal by the *βλάβος*, and the arithmetical mean is struck between them.

b. 8. § 9.] *τέχνη, ἀρετή, and φύσις* are principles which produce definite forms. The forms which *τέχνη* produces in matter do not, however, *penetrate* the matter, as do those produced by *ἀρετή* and *φύσις*. The sculptor shapes only the outside of the marble. But a living being is organised throughout its matter, as deep down as the microscope can reach<sup>1</sup>. Similarly, a virtuous character is no mere external accomplishment, but the personality of the man. For this reason *ἀρετή* is said to be *πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων*. It is a beautiful organism in which nothing is *μάτην*, as distinguished from a product of workmanship, necessarily rough and imperfect.

What Aristotle somewhat unfortunately calls the *μέσον* in nature, art, and morals, Plato called more happily the *μέτριον*. In three passages in the *Politicus* he anticipates all that is valuable in Aristotle's doctrine, and even stumbles in one place upon the use of the term *μέσον*, only however to drop it. In the first passage (*Politicus* 283 E-284 A) he says that good and bad men are chiefly distinguished by their different relations to the *φύσις τοῦ μετρίου*, and that all the arts produce their good and beautiful results by observing *τὸ μέτριον*. In the second passage (*Politicus* 284 D) he distinguishes between the sciences which have to do with number and magnitude as such, and those which regard *τὸ μέτριον, τὸ πρέπον, τὸν καιρόν, τὸ δέον*, thus dividing *ἡ μετρητική* into

<sup>1</sup> As Leibnitz says—‘Machinae naturae *h.e.* corpora viventia sunt adhuc machinae in minimis partibus usque in infinitum. Atque in eo consistit discrimen inter naturam et artem, hoc est inter artem divinam et nostram.’

two parts. Aristotle's distinction between the *μέσον τοῦ πράγματος* 1106 b. 8. and the *μέσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς* involves the same division. It is in this passage that Plato happens to use the term *μέσον*. In the third passage (*Politicus* 310) Plato makes a practical suggestion with regard to the *realisation* of *τὸ μέτριον* in the character of the community, which shows us how deeply he has penetrated into the meaning of this great principle of Life. The *μέτριον*, he suggests, may be realised by the *intermarriage* of opposite natures. Naturally, from *ῥάστωνη*, like seek like; *ἀνδρεῖοι* do not mix with *σώφρονες*. The result is that after many generations the former become savage, and the latter unable to hold their own. It is for wise legislation to weave together opposite tendencies, and produce a race which may be compared to a web, *λείου καὶ, τὸ λεγόμενον, εὐήτριον* (with a fine warp). Again, *μετριότης* or *ξυμετρία* is the principle of good, beauty, and survival in an interesting passage in the *Philebus* 64 D, E.

§ 10. Λέγω δὲ τὴν ἡθικήν ἡθικὴ ἀρετή is ἐν μεσότητι, because it is b. 16. a form concretely realised in the *ὑλη* of the pleasures and pains which attend actions and feelings. It is an *ἐνυλος λόγος* effected in this *ὑλη with difficulty*. It is said to be *ἐν μεσότητι* in relation to the tendencies to disorder which it withstands. But *διανοητικὴ ἀρετή* is the Principle of Form or *λόγος* viewed *per se* as incompatible with the irregularity of excess or defect. Thus *φρόνησις* is the Principle of Form in relation to the *ὑλη* of *τὰ πρακτά*. This Principle *itself* is not said to be *ἐν μεσότητι*, but the *concrete* form, or moral order, which it produces in our passions (*i.e.* the *ἐνυλος λόγος* of *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*) is, because that concrete form may fail (by reason of *ὑπερβολὴ* and *ἔλλειψις*) to be produced. Where, however, failure is impossible—in the region of the *αἱλοι λόγοι*, or *rationes*, of science and speculation, truths in the pursuit of which there is no *πλάνη* and no temptation from the side of pleasure or pain<sup>1</sup>—it would be unmeaning to use the expression *ἐν μεσότητι*, which connotes success in circumstances in which failure is possible.

Thus the faculties by which we apprehend such truths—the purely intellectual *ἔξεις*—*σοφία* and *ἐπιστήμη*—are not described as *ἐν μεσότητι οὖσαι*—for two reasons: first because they are phases of

<sup>1</sup> *E.N.* vi. 5. 6 οὐ γὰρ ἄπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἥδν καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὁρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν.

1106 b. 16. the Principle of Form, which *in itself* is incompatible with *ὑπερβολή* and *ἐλλειψις*: secondly because they are concerned with *objects* which offer no obstacles to the reception of the form of reason. Hence the broad distinction which must be kept in view for the right understanding of the present section:—That in its *practical* exercise—in dealing with matter, or, as we should say, with ‘an environment,’ *λόγος*, or the Organising Principle (though *in itself* incompatible with *ὑπερβολή* and *ἐλλειψις*), is surrounded by difficulties and dangers, which it surmounts and avoids by ‘doing the best in the circumstances’—by ‘adaptation’—*τῷ τοῦ μέσου στοχάξεσθαι*: whereas in its *scientific* exercise (as Aristotle understood its scientific exercise), the Principle of Reason has not to impress its form upon an alien and rebellious matter, but finds itself face to face with itself in its object, and, being dominated by nothing beyond itself, cannot fall into error: cf. *Met.* Δ. 10. 1075 a. 3 οὐχ ἔτέρον οὖν ὅντος τοῦ νοούμενου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὑλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸν ἔσται, καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νοούμενῷ μία.

Admitting fully the importance in Metaphysics and Ethics of this doctrine of the infallibility and autonomy of Reason, I think that it causes Aristotle to overlook the fact that there are properly scientific operations which closely resemble moral actions in the dangers and difficulties by which they are surrounded. The scientific operation of *ἐπαγωγή*, for example, consists in the slow and difficult formation of a conception out of the manifold of confused sensations. At every step of this process the intellect is liable to be deceived by present appearances, while memory often plays it false: above all, the feelings affect its point of view—*Intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est*. To form a true conception, or *καθόλου*, out of many *αἰσθητά* is as closely connected with adaptation to the environment, as the formation of a good habit of acting is, and attended by difficulties perhaps as great, though not of the same kind. The *καθόλου* therefore which embraces just the most important points in the *αἰσθητά*, omitting those which are not important, might with truth be described as apprehended or ‘held’ by a *ἔξις* lying *ἐν μεσότητι*. But Aristotle, although he gives a very good account of *ἐπαγωγή*, and the formation of universals, prefers, in contrasting moral virtue and science, to look at the latter as engaged with the abstract truths of mathematics and metaphysics, which the Greek mind pursued with so much success. If the difficulties of concrete

scientific investigation had been more fully appreciated by him, he 1106 b. 16. would not have drawn the line so sharply as he seems to do in this section, between *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή* and *διανοητικὴ ἀρετή*. It is to be noticed however that *τέχνη*, which he has correctly described as *τοῦ μέσου στοχαστική*, is the *ἀρετή* of the *ποιητικὴ διάνοια*: see *E. N.* vi. ch. 2 and ch. 4. Indeed it is implied in the definition of *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή* (§ 15) that *φρόνησις* also is *στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου*. The same is, as I have tried to show, true of other intellectual *εἶξις*, in so far as they also are modes of our adaptation to a difficult environment. There is therefore little value in the limitation apparently implied in the words *λέγω δὲ τὴν ἡθικήν*, except in so far as attention is called to the much greater influence of pleasure and pain in the moral than in the scientific sphere of human activity. All thinking, even the most abstract, is ‘a mode of adaptation’—*i.e.* is ‘practical.’ Aristotle admits this in the opening words of the *Metaphysics*—*πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι δρέγονται φύσει*. A belief is honest which we are prepared to *act upon*; and a belief which leads to hurtful action is not *true*. The avenues of knowledge, the special senses, do not give the whole truth about the universe, but only so much as enables us to live. Their truth is relative to conduct. The practical curiosity of the eye of sense, which sustains the intelligence of the lower animals, becomes in man the theoretical curiosity of the ‘mind’s eye’—*Met. A. 2. 982 b. 12 διὰ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρώτον ἥρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν*.

§ 11. *μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον*] The *via media* which *ἀρετή* takes is b. 22. also the *best way*—*i.e.* the only right way in the circumstances. Cf. below, § 17.

§ 12. *ὅμοιώς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις*] as well as *περὶ τὰ πάθη*, e.g. b. 23. *φοβηθῆναι*, mentioned in § 10.

ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις [ψέγεται] ] Rassow b. 25. (*Forsch.* 33) suggests ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται καὶ ἀμαρτάνεται—on the ground that both predicates (*ἀμαρτάνεται* and *ψέγεται*) belong to each of the extremes. Bywater brackets *ψέγεται*.

§ 13. *στοχαστικὴ γε*] Ramsauer has—‘Particulā γε adjectā ex- b. 28. cusatur quasi audacia loquendi qua nova vox μεσότης ἡ ἀρετή modo proposita est; neque enim prorsus certum virtutem ideo quod sit τοῦ μέσου vel στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου, necessario ipsam esse μεσότητα.’

1106 b. 28. § 14. ἔτι τὸ μὲν κ.τ.λ.] There are many wrong ways of doing a thing, but only one right way. Therefore (καὶ διὰ ταῦτ’ οὖν) ὑπερβολή and ἐλλειψις, involving as they do many ways of doing a thing, are characteristic of vice, and *μεσότης* is characteristic of virtue. The Paraphrast has—φαίνεται ἄρα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν μὲν ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλλειψιν τῆς κακίας εἶναι (ἀόριστα γὰρ ἐκάτερον) τὴν δὲ μεσότητα τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὡρισμένην καὶ μίαν οὖσαν.

b. 30. Πιθαγόρειοι] See Grant, *Ethics*, Essay iv. (vol. i. p. 253), and Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* *Doctrina Pythagoreorum*, in primis *Philolai*.

b. 32. χαλεπόν] Cf. Theognis (*Poet. Gnom.* p. 14, ed. Tauchnitz):  
Μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν πάντων μέσ' ἀριστα, καὶ οὔτως  
Ἐξεις, Κύρν', ἀρετὴν ἦν τε λαβεῖν χαλεπόν.

b. 35. ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ.] Spengel (*Aristotelische Studien* I. *Nic. Eth.* p. 205) would place this line after ἐπιτυχεῖν, b. 33.

b. 36. § 15.] This is the final definition of ἡθικὴ ἀρετή. The parts of it which have not been already explained are—ώρισμένη (dat.) λόγῳ, and ὡς [Bywater reads φῷ] ἀν δ φρόνιμος δρίσειεν.

The *μεσότης* is ‘rationally determined,’ or ‘determined according to the proper ratio or proportion<sup>1</sup>.’ This ratio is, of course, that of the organisation which meets most successfully the conditions of human life. The man who realises this ratio most perfectly, and is most clearly conscious of it, is termed the *φρόνιμος*. In the Sixth Book which treats largely of *φρόνησις*, we are told (ch. 13. 6) that it is *φρόνησις* which raises *φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ* into *κυρίᾳ ἀρετῇ*. There exist, independently of education, in the children of a civilised community, certain natural tendencies to feel pleasure and pain in connexion with the right objects. Without these natural tendencies to work upon, *νόμος* would have difficulty in making a beginning of moral education. Thus *θυμός* is the natural source of ἀνδρεία, αἰδώς of *σωφροσύνη*, and *νέμεσις* of *δικαιοσύνη* (see especially *E. E.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 24 sqq.). These natural tendencies *νόμος* limits in relation to one another, producing a *συμμετρία* of the whole man. The

<sup>1</sup> No apology is needed for sometimes rendering *λόγος*, or δ ὁρθὸς *λόγος*, by *ratio* or *proportion*, rather than by *Reason*; for the object of Reason is ratio or system, and the faculty of Reason and its object are identical, according to a far-reaching tenet of Aristotle, upon which he often insists. ‘Ο δρθὸς λόγος is the moral constitution of man, of which he is conscious in his λόγος, φρόνησις, or νοῦς πρακτικός.

difference between *θυμός* and *ἀνδρεία*, for instance, is that *θυμός* is 1106 b.36. a fitful principle, depending upon accident for its manifestation, incapable of originating a consistent course of behaviour in the presence of danger, and not necessarily bound up with any other good tendency, but often existing alone—as in the case of the Spartans and other purely warlike nations: whereas *ἀνδρεία* implies all the other virtues, being a member of the indivisible organism of the moral character; not a fitful principle of action, but mediating acts ultimately determined by the man's whole moral nature, and not by the accident of the moment which might arouse his *θυμός*. A man's *ἀνδρεία* is not a *feeling* which is born on the battle-field, but the spirit shown on the field by one who, not only has had experience of danger, but has cultivated the peaceful virtues of *σωφροσύνη*, *δικαιοσύνη*, *ἔλευθεριότης*, *μεγαλοπρέπεια*: and similarly, the spirit of *ἀνδρεία* is necessary to these peaceful virtues. *Νόμος* (which is *νοῦς ἄνευ ὀρέξεως* *Pol.* iii. ii. 1287 a. 32) perceiving the relation which ought to subsist between the tendencies of human nature, endeavours to effect it in the young, by encouraging some tendencies, and discouraging others. At first the subjects of this educational process are not aware of what is being really done; but in course of time they begin to see for themselves the relation which has been gradually effected. *Φρόνησις*, or the consciousness of the proper relation (*ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος*), dawns in them, and aids *νόμος*, and gradually supersedes it in the function of preserving and perfecting the *συμμετρία*. Unless, on the one hand, the wayward tendencies were first regulated in relation to one another by the constraining force of *νόμος*, we should never become conscious for ourselves of the proper relation in which they ought to stand to one another, as members of a whole; but, on the other hand, unless this consciousness supervened in us, our virtue would remain at the level of the mere good behaviour of children, who do what is right without knowing why, simply because they are told to do it: *οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως* (vi. 13. 6). With *φρόνησις*, a man is *κύριος*—his own master; and conscious of the systematic unity of his nature in all its parts—*ἄμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾶς ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρχουσιν αἱ ἀρεταί*. With Aristotle's theory of the relation of *φρόνησις* to *κυρία ἀρετή* may be compared Shaftesbury's view, that *Virtue*, as distinguished from mere *Goodness*, is impossible without *Reflection* (*Inquiry concerning Virtue*, Book i. Part ii. Section iii), and Kant's doctrine, that kind actions prompted by a good-natured temperament have no moral value.

1106 b. 36. The virtuous habits produced by the external agency of *νόμος*, and maintained and perfected by the *φρόνσις* at last awakened in the subject himself, are severally termed *μεσότητες*. In this Book, and the two following Books, each of these *μεσότητες* is treated separately in connexion with its own special extremes, and little care is taken to remove the very natural impression that its relation is *only* to these specified extremes—that, for instance, the nature of *ἐλευθεριότης* is exhausted when we have defined it as the mean between *ἀσωτία* and *ἀνελευθερία*. Moral virtue thus seems to be presented as a *σμήνος ἀρετῶν*. But closer attention shows that this is not the impression which Aristotle intends to convey—that the separate treatment of the virtues, in relation to special extremes, is intended only to bring out into clear light, one after another, a number of important *aspects of the same moral agent*, as he is placed in different circumstances: that we have to do, not with so many *individuals*—the *ἀνδρεῖος*, *σώφρων*, &c.—but with *points of view* obtained by analysis, the intention of the analysis being to enable us at last to clothe the concrete agent more fully with his attributes. Against the separate or analytical treatment of the various *μεσότητες* in succession, we must set the statement *οὐ χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταὶ* (vi. 13. 6). The various virtues, although for greater clearness they may be treated separately, are not separately existent, but each exists only as all the others exist, and form an *ὅρθις λόγος*, or system, which is different (within limits) for each man. Each man has, as it were, his own moral centre of gravity, and all the virtues, related to one another in a particular way, are necessary to his stability; but his moral stability may be assailed in different ways, in different circumstances. On the field of battle the emotions of fear and over-confidence are its special assailants, and its maintenance against them is courage. Other circumstances have other special temptations, and the maintenance of stability receives other names. But the centre of gravity remains the same in all, being that particular *λόγος*, or organisation, of his whole nature which is best for the particular man. The one vice of cowardice, or of rashness, would amount to the demoralisation of the whole nature. We cannot conceive of the magnificence of the rash man, or of the temperance of the coward.

These considerations show how mistaken the objection is to Aristotle's theory of the virtuous mean, that it makes merely a quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice. This objection

can be felt only by one who thinks of courage, for instance, merely 1106 b. 36. in connexion with its specified extremes—cowardice and rashness. But courage is only a particular manifestation of *ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή*: and cowardice, or rashness, is only a particular symptom of *total demoralisation*. Cowardice, or rashness, therefore differs from courage as the confusion differs from the order of the whole nature. If this is not a *qualitative* difference, it will be difficult to point to any that is.

The various Virtues described in this Book and in the two following Books may be taken, then, to be illustrations, more or less striking, of the function of *φρόνησις*, or the consciousness of the ‘right ratio,’ in preserving that ratio against the various assaults to which it is exposed through the sensibility. As *ἀνδρεία* is the preservation of the right ratio in the presence of danger to life in battle, so *σωφροσύνη* is its preservation amid the temptations of bodily pleasure; *μεγαλοπρέπεια* its preservation in the midst of great wealth and state; *ἔλευθεριότης*, in the midst of the daily calls upon one’s purse; *πραότης*, amid the irritations of social intercourse; *εὐτραπελία*, amid its gaieties. In these and all other circumstances of temptation there is no occult quality, no separate faculty, which deals with each kind of temptation—the man indivisible deals with each, preserving in the particular circumstances of each temptation a moral balance, which has been preserved so long, under such various assaults, that its preservation in any circumstances whatsoever is no longer doubtful.

But is not this all too vague? How shall a man know that he is really preserving his ‘moral balance,’ or character? The *E. N.* refer us to the *φρόνιμος* or *σπουδαῖος*, and the *E. E.* end by referring us to the *σκυπὸς τῆς καλοκάγαθίας*, explained (*E. E. H.* 15. 1249 b. 20) as *τὸν θέὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν*—all that hinders this is evil; all that promotes it, good. This may be taken to mean that we must regulate our lives in accordance with *νοῦς*—*τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον*, that we must not allow ‘the sensibility’ to dominate our conduct. But ‘regulate our lives in accordance with Reason’ is a formula which conveys no information as to the real requirements of Reason; for, although it is plain that we are to restrain the sensibility, how far we are to do so we are left without means of judging. How is a man to know when a particular *πάθος*, admitted, disturbs the poise of his whole moral nature, and when not? If he be *καλὸς κάρυαθός*, Eudemus seems to answer, he will know. Still, it would be

1106 b. 36. desirable that those who have not yet attained to the height of *καλοκάγαθία* should know, at least approximately, the proportions of the moral *κρᾶσις*, which, when fully achieved, is doubtless very hard to disturb. But Eudemus gives us no further information on this point. Aristotle tells us to observe the proportions of the *φρόνιμος* or *σπουδαῖος*: but still we are not told what these proportions are. We are told that his nature is ‘intelligible,’ not a mere bundle of sensations: that it is *ώρισμένη λόγῳ*—but we are not told more. Evidently, then, Aristotle will have us look *for ourselves* at the *σπουδαῖος* in the concrete, and watch how he actually tempers his nature. This is undoubtedly to refer us to a standard of great practical value, albeit to one which, being merely empirical, is apt to be misinterpreted. It must be admitted, however, that even those moral systems, which profess to give an ultimate standard, are obliged to acknowledge that the *σπουδαῖος*, or man who acts up to the requirements of the ultimate standard, is indispensable as a *representative standard*, which the bulk of mankind can easily see, and will, from a natural tendency to imitate social types, probably conform to. So far, then, Aristotle’s *σπουδαῖος*—the good man whom we admire and wish to imitate—is an excellent moral agency, not only representing the standard of right actions, but supplying a strong motive to perform them. On the other hand, the Eudemian *σκοπὸς τῆς καλοκάγαθίας*—*τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν* is a mere formula—‘Live according to Reason’—not a concrete example of the rational life successfully achieved, which may serve at least as an empirical rule of conduct likely to be followed.

But how shall we know the *σπουδαῖος*, or *φρόνιμος*, when we see him? Aristotle’s answer to this really vital question is nowhere given in so many words, but is not difficult to gather from the general drift of his *Ethics* and *Politics*. We recognise the *φρόνιμος* when we see him, because we have ourselves received an education similar in kind to that which he has received and perfected. This education is that of correspondence with the *νόμος*—the law, custom, fashions, and social conditions generally—of the State into which we have been born, and in which we live. The *φρόνιμος* corresponds with these conditions in an eminent manner. In all his actions he shows himself at home in his own city, and worthy of it. The maintenance, then, of a beautiful everyday life, according to Hellenic traditions—a life in whose varied activities one takes a personal, but not a self-aggrandising part—is Aristotle’s

standard of Virtue. It has the advantage of being a standard 1106 b. 36. which it is not very difficult to keep in view. It is easier to see whether a particular action is in harmony with the tone of the society in which one has been brought up, than to see whether it promotes the ‘greatest good of the greatest number.’ But it will be said—‘The tone of the society in which one has been brought up may be bad: this is not an *ultimate* standard which Aristotle gives us.’

Perhaps not: but we must answer on behalf of Aristotle, that he knew nothing better than the limited society of the Hellenic city. The culture of the few, according to the Hellenic pattern, was his standard. He was a stranger to political and economic considerations, which, in modern times, have made ‘society’ co-extensive with ‘the greatest number’; he was a stranger also to that philanthropy which gives up ‘culture’ with its *πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρεταῖ*, and leads what he must have considered a *μονόκωλος βίος* in order to help the miserable.

The *δρθὸς λόγος*, then, which the virtuous man preserves in all circumstances is ‘correspondence with his social environment.’ It is a ‘correspondence’ which ‘extends in space and time’—*i.e.* it is an adaptation to the environment *as one whole*. The man whose habits have been determined by the conditions of peace, but not by those of war, or *vice versa*, is a man who does not correspond with his environment as one whole, and his correspondence even with one set of conditions is more apparent than real, because peace and war cannot be sharply separated; in war he must look forward to peace; and when he has obtained the blessings of peace, he must be ready to defend them. Thus the warlike and the peaceful virtues of the good man do not refer simply to war and peace respectively. The rule which his *φρόνησις* or social and moral tact lays down for him is—‘So act in any particular case, that you heighten your power of acting well in any other case.’ This rule implies a highly developed adaptation. Every stimulus is received as being what it is, because the whole environment is what it is. The moral nature of such a man is like a highly organised animal, which acts in response to a particular stimulus in a manner which promotes the good of the whole organism as exposed in the present and future to a whole system of stimuli.

*Φρόνησις*, or the ‘Practical Reason,’ does not appear fully in a

1106 b. 36. man till ‘good habits’ have been formed—till the manifold of his sensible nature has been reduced to the  $\delta\rho\theta\delta\lambda\gamma\sigma$ . Reason grows with its object. It is evolved as the moral agent takes increased pleasure in good actions—called ‘good’ at first only by anticipation, in relation to a future  $\delta\rho\theta\delta\lambda\gamma\sigma$  in him, or still latent Reason. Reason is thus the Habit of Habits. It may be that this supreme Habit of the moral life reveals its existence, in the experience of some men, suddenly, like the light-bringing idea which flashes all at once in the mind of a man of science, after years of patient study. This is the moral experience which Kant prefers to dwell on, maintaining that the recognition of Duty ‘is not to be effected by gradual *reform*, as long as the Principle of a man’s actions remains impure, but requires a *revolution* in the mind, and he can only become a new man by a kind of new birth, as it were, by a new creation and a change of heart.’ And again—‘Virtue is described by some as a long practice (in observing the law) by which a man has passed from the propensity to vice, by gradual reform of his conduct and strengthening of his maxims, into an opposite propensity. This does not require a *change of heart*, but only a change of *morals*.’ We must not suppose, however, that passages like the foregoing are intended to condemn habituation, which no moralist could refuse to regard as the great practical agency in the formation of Virtue. The difference between Kant and Aristotle is not really one of principle, but of detail. Kant confines himself almost entirely to the description of the pure Form of Virtue, and leaves nearly untouched the practical question of its actual super-induction upon sensible beings; while Aristotle applies himself largely to this latter question. But Aristotle’s Habituation (which Kant doubtless refers to in the passages quoted above) is misrepresented, when it is implied that it is a process which can go on while all the time the ‘Principle of action remains impure.’ ‘The long practice in observing the Law’ is possible, Aristotle would tell us, only because there is, in the subject of it, a principle of rational personality ( $\tau\delta\pi\rho\alpha\rho\nu\mu\nu\nu\nu$ ) which, *aided* doubtless by ‘the Law,’ can and does set aside mere  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\theta\nu\mu\acute{\alpha}$ . Virtue is a  $\acute{\epsilon}\xi\acute{\iota}s\pi\rho\alpha\rho\nu\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ .  $\Pi\rho\alpha\rho\nu\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\iota}s$  is an ‘autonomous’ principle. It is absurdly wrong to class Aristotle among those ‘who recognise only ‘heteronomy’—‘Will ruled by appetites’—in morals.  $\Pi\rho\alpha\rho\nu\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\iota}s$  is  $\beta\omega\lambda\epsilon\nu\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\acute{\delta}\rho\acute{\epsilon}\xi\acute{\iota}s$  (iii. 3. 19)—a Principle which reaches forth to take, or refrains from taking, after deliberation,

as distinguished from *ἐπιθυμία* which rushes blindly at its object. 1106 b. 36. The *σπουδαῖα προάρεσις* which, as organising principle, builds up the virtuous character, reaches forth or refrains in the interest of the whole moral organism or Personality, and sets aside the solicitations of the separate parts as such. Aristotle's insistence on the unity of the virtues in *φρόνησις* disposes at once of the suggestion that he founds morality on 'heteronomy.' He would have no difficulty in agreeing with Kant in distinguishing between 'true and merely habitual morality.' Good natural tendencies (*φυσικὰ ἀρεταῖ*) may be confirmed into habits, apparently good, but yet forming no parts of a moral organism. A collection of such independent habits would be 'habitual virtue,' as distinguished from a 'virtuous character.' The man who has merely 'habitual virtue' is virtuous because, being a man of naturally good disposition, he happens also to have lived all his life in contact with certain good influences: but his nature has no system. He is perhaps honest enough, but illiberal; temperate enough, but not courageous. This would be a case of 'heteronomy.' But where a habit—e.g. *σωφροσύνη*—exists in a man, just as the *δρθὸς λόγος* of *his whole moral nature* requires it to exist—so that all the other virtuous habits coexist with it in perfection—we have the 'autonomy of the Will.' The actions which proceed from such a habit are determined 'formally'—i.e. by the consciousness of the whole moral organism, or *δρθὸς λόγος*. They are 'formally,' not 'materially,' determined because they proceed from, or are the expression of, the man as an *eidos* or Form—a system of related parts grasped by Reason; and are not merely due to the susceptibility of a single part placing itself in material isolation. As man is concretely constituted, all his moral actions must be *occasioned* by stimuli conveyed through the parts—i.e. by particular feelings, pleasant, or painful. But in some cases, in the moral, as in the physical organism, the external stimulus acts merely as a local irritation, provoking, as it were, a reflex movement of merely local significance; while in other cases, it is answered by a deliberate movement, resulting from the reaction of the whole organism, and subserving its highest interest.

There seems, therefore, to be no real antagonism between Aristotle's doctrine of Habituation, and Kant's doctrine of the Autonomy of the Will<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> According to Kant, man has two characters—an 'intelligible' and a 'phe-

1106 b. 36. The close connexion which Aristotle's philosophical definition of ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ establishes between the *μεσότης* and *φρόνησις* recalls the kinship popularly recognised between τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν and τὸ γνῶθι σεαυτόν—as, for example, in the following passage in Plutarch's *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, 28—δύ' ἔστι τῶν Δελφικῶν γραμμάτων τὰ μάλιστ' ἀναγκαιότατα πρὸς τὸν Βίον, τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν, καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἥρτηται καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα. ταῦτα δέ ἔστιν ἀλλήλοις σύμφωνα καὶ συνωδά, καὶ διὰ θατέρου θάτερον ἔσικε δηλοῦσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν. ἐν τε γὰρ τῷ γινώσκειν ἑαυτὸν περιέχεται τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ γινώσκειν ἑαυτόν. Διὸ καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων φησὶν ὁ Ἰων οὕτως  
 τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν, τοῦτ' ἔπος μὲν οὐ μέγα,  
 ἔργον δ', ὃσον Ζεὺς μόνος ἐπίσταται θεῶν.  
 ὁ δὲ Πίνδαρος,  
 Σοφοὶ δέ, φησί, καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν ἔπος αἰνῆσαν περισσώς.

1107 a. 3. § 16. καὶ ἔτι τῷ] i.e. καὶ ἔτι μεσότης ἔστι τῷ. . . . Ramsauer says 'Suppletur notio jam satis adumbrata (καὶ ἔτι). Dativo enim infinitivi circumscribitur qua ratione vel quibus in rebus sit virtus id quod modo explicatum est: ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ . . . μεσότης τῷ. Quo in supplemento sumnum est ut referatur virtus et vitia illi opposita ad τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις.' Of course it is no new point which is thus introduced by καὶ ἔτι. It has already been brought forward in § 10 αὗτη γάρ ἔστι περὶ πάθη and πράξεις and in § 12.

a. 6. § 17. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν κ.τ.λ.] See Grant's excellent note *ad loc.* and his *Essay* iv. p. 260. 'This passage,' he says (in his note), 'implies that the term *Μεσότης* is an abstract and metaphysical expression for the law of virtue, estimated by the understanding (though doubtless the deepest view attainable); but that viewed in relation to the good, or (as we should say) from a moral point of view—virtue is no mean state lying between vices (as if virtue were a little less vice, and vice a little more virtue), but an extreme, that is, utterly removed from, and opposed to vice.' In other words—

nomenal.' In virtue of the former he is free: in respect of the latter, he is part of nature, and subject to its necessary laws. This distinction seems to me to be, at bottom, that between the individual organism, on the one hand, and its genealogical antecedents and its environment, on the other hand. When the organism 'corresponds with its environment,' the functions which it performs are *its own* functions—they are performed in accordance with its own constitution, and we may call them *free*: and yet they are *necessary*, because its constitution and the external stimuli which act on its constitution are products of the necessary laws of the Universe. Cf. note on *E. N.* iii. 1. 2.

*μεσότης* δύο κακιῶν is a scientific formula, which describes the virtuous 1107 a. 6. character in relation to the difficulties which surround it in its 'struggle for existence.' It describes Virtue, as the Darwinian theory describes the forms of vegetable and animal life—with special reference to the πολλὰ ἴδεαι θανάτου which they manage, in various ways, just to evade. But Virtue, like these other forms, is something more than the negative 'that which just manages to avoid fatal error.' It must contain some positive reason for its existence. It does not exist simply because it does not happen to perish. The scientific formula, however, takes no account of this positive reason, but confines itself to τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (see *Phys.* ii. 9. 199 b. 34 sqq.)—'If virtue is to be realised, such and such extremes must be avoided': so Darwinism—'If the butterfly is to live, it must have such and such spots.' But why Virtue (or the butterfly) should take the trouble to struggle for existence, is a question to which the formula contains no answer. Indeed no *scientific* answer can be given to such a question. We can only say with Aristotle that Virtue exists *because it is a beautiful and excellent thing* (see iii. 7. 6), just as plants and animals exist because it is 'better' that they should live than not live—see *De Gen. Anim.* ii. 1. 731 b. 24 ἐπεὶ γάρ ἔστι τὰ μὲν ἀίδια καὶ θεῖα τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον αἴτιον ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τοῦ βελτίους ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀίδιον, ἐνδεχόμενόν ἔστι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν καὶ τοῦ χείρονος καὶ τοῦ βελτίους, βελτιον δὲ ψυχὴ σώματος τὸ δ' ἐμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου διὰ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν τοῦ μὴ ζῆν, διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας γένεσις ζώων ἔστιν.

Regarded scientifically, then, as a form constituted in a certain way out of certain elements, Virtue is a Mean suggesting Extremes. The Extremes represent the prevalence of that matter which Virtue reduces to form; and a scientific account of Virtue must describe the manner in which it accomplishes this achievement. But the achievement itself is not the manner of its accomplishment. So, Phidias, in executing his work, must be alive to all the various treacheries of his material and subject; but when the work is finished, it stands a god.

Plutarch (*De Virt. Mor.* 5) glosses this passage in a manner which shows that he did not allow the doctrine of *μεσότης* to suggest 'a merely quantitative difference between Virtue and Vice'—ἀρετὴ . . . οὐκ οὖσα φθορὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδὲ ἀναιρεσίς, ἀλλὰ τάξις καὶ διακόσμησις, ἀκρότης μέν ἔστι τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι, τῷ ποσῷ δὲ μεσό-

1107 a. 6. της γίνεται, τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἔξαιροῦσα καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον. Cf. also with this §, iv. 3. 8 ἔστι δὴ δ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος.

On τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι see *Met.* Z. 4 and 17: Trendelenburg, *Rhein. Mus.* 1828, vol. ii. pp. 457–483: Trendelenburg, *De An.* i. I. 1, note, and iii. 4. 7, note: Trendelenburg, *Kategorienlehre*, pp. 34 sqq.: Biese, *Phil. des Arist.* vol. i. 243, 366, 427, ii. 35: Waitz, *Organ.* 67 b. 12, 94 a. 11, &c.: Schwegler, *Met. Excursus* i.

The τί ἦν εἶναι, defined in *Met.* Z. 7. 1032 b. 14 λέγω δ' οὐσίαν ἀνεύ πλησίου τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, is the law, or principle, in accordance with which a thing is constituted, and is what it is. It thus answers nearly to Bacon's *Forma*. A doctor's prescription is a formula which states the τί ἦν εἶναι of the dose which is made up in accordance with it: the architect's plan, realised in bricks and wood by the builder, is the τί ἦν εἶναι of the house: the structural type which an animal conforms to is its τί ἦν εἶναι.

a. 8. § 18. οὐ πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.] i.e. there are *πράξεις* and *πάθη* which cannot be so modified as to form parts of an orderly character and life, but must be eradicated by education. Thus *ἀναιρεχυτία*, being a natural tendency towards vice in relation to bodily pleasures, must be eradicated, as its contrary *αἰδώς*, which is a natural tendency towards virtue in relation to these pleasures, and the source of *σωφροσύνη* (see *E. E.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 32), must be fostered in the young. Again, *φθόνος* contributes to *ἀδικία* (see *E. E.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 30)—i.e. it is a natural tendency to grudge our neighbour his due share. This natural tendency cannot be organised into a virtuous character, or turned to good use, but must be eradicated, if possible, by education. For the relation of *φθόνος* to *ἀδικία* cf. Chares (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. ii. 47. ed. Meineke),

ἀδικώτατον πρᾶγμ' ἔστι τῶν πάντων φθόνος,

and Hippothoon (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. ii. 48),

φθόνος κάκιστος κάδικώτατος θεὸς

κακοῖς τε χαίρει κάγαθοῖς ἀλγύνεται.

a 12. λέγεται] Bekker and Susemihl read *ψέγεται* on the suspicious authority of Mb alone.

§§ 18–20.] These sections show clearly that Aristotle does not make ‘a merely quantitative difference between virtue and vice’<sup>1</sup>—

<sup>1</sup> It would not be necessary to notice this view of Aristotle's doctrine, had it not been advanced by Kant. There are other indications pointing to the conclusion that Kant's study of Aristotle was not very careful.

οὐκ ἔστι σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις—i.e. ἀκολασίᾳ 1107 a. 12. and ἀναισθησίᾳ do not differ from σωφροσύνῃ in a merely quantitative manner, nor θρασύτης and δειλία from ἀνδρείᾳ: θρασύτης e.g. is not the ὑπερβολή of ἀνδρείᾳ—the two are qualitatively different. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of the μεσότης of an ἄκρον—and the μέσον is in a sense an ἄκρον, an indivisible point which cannot be resolved into mean and extremes. We cannot speak of 'moderation in moderation.' Or otherwise—an ἄκρον is a quality not a quantity: cf. Plutarch's expression quoted in note on § 17 ἀκρότης μέν ἔστι τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ARGUMENT.

*Now let us draw up a Diagram to show in detail that our formula 'Excess—Mean—Defect' applies to particular cases. We shall thus give reality to a theory which, left in its general form, would be too vague.*

[For the 'Diagram' of ἔξεις (§§ 2-13) see text.]

*In the foregoing Diagram (§§ 2-13) it is in the Habits of the Characters in the middle column, i. e. in the ways in which they are disposed towards actions or feelings, that the mean is realized. But (§§ 14, 15) it is sometimes realized also in feelings themselves and their immediate accompaniments. Thus, although Shame is not a virtuous habit, 'the man who has a sense of Shame' is praised. He occupies the mean; while one extreme is occupied by 'the Bashful Man,' who is always covered with Shame, and the other by 'the man who is without any sense of Shame.' Again the feeling of Indignation is the mean between Envy and Malignant Joy. But we shall have an opportunity afterwards of discussing these matters.*

[Monro (*Journ. of Philol.* vi. pp. 185 sqq., 1876) brings forward what seem to be strong reasons for regarding this Chapter as an interpolation. Its terminology agrees rather with that of the *E. E.* and *M. M.* than with that of *E. N.* iv. The discrepancies will be pointed out in the notes on Book iv.]

§ 1. *κουνότεροι*] So Bywater. Bekker and Sus. read *κενώτεροι*. 1107 a. 30. The reading of the majority of MSS. is *κουνότεροι*. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus *ad loc.* and *E. E.* appendix p. 164. Manuscript authority, however, is nearly useless in the cases of *κουνός*, *κενός*, and *καινός*, and Bekker, I think, was right in neglecting it here, and

1107 a. 30. going on internal evidence, which seems to be in favour of *κενώτεροι*. See the passages adduced by Zell, Michelet, and Grant, and by Zeller *Ph. d. Gr. (Arist.)*, p. 171. n. 2 (3rd German Edition), especially *de Gen. Anim.* 748, a. 7 οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος καθόλου λίαν καὶ κενός· οἱ γὰρ μὴ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν λόγοι κενοί. The reading *κενώτεροι*, as the antithesis of *ἀληθινώτεροι*, is supported by a line of Menander preserved in the Florentine MS. (Laurent. 22. 8) of Johannes Damascenus (see Meineke's *Stobaeus: Flor.* iv. p. 242)—

ἀληθὲς εἶναι δεῖ τὸ σεμνόν, οὐ κενόν.

a. 33. διαγραφῆς] ὑπογραφή in *E. E.* ii. 3. 1220. b. 37.

§ 2.] See Michelet's important note, the gist of which is as follows—we have here *four* extremes round *ἀνδρεία* thus—

Defect of Fear— <i>ἀφοβία</i> .	Excess of Fear <i>ἀνδρεία</i> .	Excess of Fear } <i>δειλία</i> .
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Excess of Confidence—*θρασύτης*. Defect of Confidence}

There is this difference between the two sides, as the Ald. Schol. notes, that excess of fear and defect of confidence are never disjoined, but always make together a single vice, of which they are, as it were, the moments; whereas the 'moments' on the other side—viz. defect of fear and excess of confidence, may exist apart, and give rise to two distinct vices, the defect of fear constituting what Michelet calls *Intrepidity*—a passive vice; the excess of confidence constituting *θρασύτης*, rashness—an active vice. Hence it results that *two vices* are opposed to *ἀνδρεία* on one side—'intrepidity' and rashness; and only one vice on the other side—cowardice. Further, as cowardice is a vice of defect, the writer of this chapter is led to speak of *both* the vices on the other side as vices of excess: hence the expression ὁ τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ὑπερβάλλων, instead of ὁ τῷ φόβῳ ἐλλείπων. The Ald. Schol. explains how Intrepidity is distinguished from *θρασύτης*—πρόσεστι δὲ καὶ τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τῷ ἀφόβῳ καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἴτητικὸν πρὸς τὰ δεινά· καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ἐν τῷ θάρρειν ἀφοβος, οὐκ ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀφοβος θρασύς. See also Grant's note *ad loc.* Grant acutely recognises this complicated treatment of *ἀνδρεία* as 'a sign that Aristotle is here only working his way to the theory of the mean.' He probably thought out his theory first in connexion with *ἀνδρεία*. It is to be noted, however, that in § 4 of this chapter a similarly complicated account of *ἐλευθερώτης* is given, and appears also in iv. 1, just as the refinement with regard to *ἀνδρεία* appears also in iii. 7. 7.

§§ 2-16.] The virtues, with their extremes, enumerated in this 1107 a. 33. chapter, are all described in detail in Books iii and iv—where see notes.

§ 4. δ' ἐν αὐταῖς] Bywater, for Bekker's δ' ἑαυταῖς L<sup>b</sup>. καὶ αὐτάς b. 11. is the reading of CCC, αὐτάς pr. Camb., δ' ἑαυτάς NC. Perhaps δ' ἑαυτοῖς: see note on viii. 4. 2. 1157 a. 19.

§ 8. <τῷ> περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν] Bywater adopts the τῷ from b. 25. Ramsauer. I should like to read τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ οὖσαν.

§ 9. κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον] Either τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίον (§ 5), 1108 a. 3. or (as the Paraphrast takes it) ζητοῦντες ἐν ἔκάστῳ τὴν μεσότητα καὶ τὰ ἄκρα: see the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant. ‘According to the method which has hitherto guided us’—Grant.

§ 11. πειρατέον . . . αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποεῖν σαφηνείας ἔνεκα κ.τ.λ.] a. 17. ‘Aristotle’s method,’ says Grant, ‘consists partly in accepting experience as shown in common language, &c., partly in rectifying it, or re-stating it from his own point of view; partly in finding new expressions for it, so as to discover men’s thoughts to themselves. He usually rather fixes the meaning of words, than creates new ones. For instance, he here assigns a peculiar and limited meaning to ἀλήθεια and φιλία. His influence upon the forms of language of civilised Europe can hardly be overrated. It is far greater than has ever been exercised by any one man beside.’

§ 12. προσποίησις] See note on iv. 7. 15. b. 26.

a. 21.

§ 14. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες] a. 30. αἰδὼς and νέμεσις, being πάθη, are not μεσότητες in the strict sense; but are here called μεσότητες, as it were by anticipation, because they represent tendencies which can be easily cultivated into ἀρεταῖ. They are the natural sources, or the physical basis, of σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη respectively according to Eudemus (*Eth. Eud.* iii. 7), who describes them, together with φιλία, σεμνότης, ἀλήθεια, and εὐτραπελία, as παθητικαὶ μεσότητες—praiseworthy, but not ἀρεταῖ (nor are their contraries κακίαι), for they are without προαιρεσίς. These praiseworthy πάθη, being φυσικά (i.e. natural in the sense of being independent of education), contribute to the φυσικαὶ ἀρεταῖ. Now, each perfectly developed virtue has its *natural* counterpart, out of which it has been evolved by φρόνησις—*Eth. Eud.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 29 ἔκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως. Thus, αἰδὼς

1108 a. 30. contributes to *σωφροσύνη*, and *νέμεσις* to *δικαιοσύνη*, and each may be called a *μεσότης* by anticipation. In Plutarch, *De vita et poesi Homeri* 132, the peripatetic doctrine of the relation of these *πάθη* to Virtue is touched upon as follows—*τῶν περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην ἀστεῖα πάθη ἡγουμένων τὴν νέμεσιν καὶ τὸν ἔλεον (τὸ γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν δάκνεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς πλησίον, εἰ παρ’ ἀξίᾳ εὐτυχοῦσι, νέμεσις καλεῖται· τὸ δὲ λυπεῖσθαι εἰ παρ’ ἀξίᾳ δυστυχοῦσιν, ἔλεος λέγεται)*. Perhaps we may say that *αιδώς* is a *παθητικὴ μεσότης*, or a *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*, when (*in the young*) it takes the fixed form of a *παθητικὴ ποιότης*, as distinguished from a mere *πάθος* (see *Cat.* 8. 9 b. 33 sqq.).

*Νέμεσις* is not again discussed. The Fourth Book ends with *αιδώς* (the last section seems to be a later addition), and is probably defective<sup>1</sup>.

*Νέμεσις* (*νέμω*) properly means the distribution of what is due. Personified, it becomes the Goddess of Justice (see the *περὶ κόσμου* 401 b. 12 *Νέμεσιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκάστῳ διανεμήσεως*), especially of just retribution, who humbles the overweening. Without personification, it is the feeling of righteous indignation. We can thus easily understand why Eudemus regards *νέμεσις*, the feeling of indignation naturally aroused by the sight of undeserved success, as ‘contributing to’ justice, which is essentially *διανεμητικὴ κατ’ ἀξίᾳ*. Although *νέμεσις* is not discussed in the Fourth Book of the *Nic. Ethics* as we have it, it is fully treated in *Rhet.* ii. 9, and its relation to *δικαιοσύνη* made very plain.

a. 33. ὁ δ’ ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ] Rassow (*Forsch.* 74), following Coraes, and followed by Susemihl, inserts ὁ δ’ ἐλλείπων· καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων before ὡς. For Bekker’s ὁ μηδέ in the following line he reads μηδέν with Kb (*Forsch.* 55): and compares 1104 a. 20, where μηδέν occurs in a clause of similar structure. Bywater reads μηδέν for ὁ μηδέ.

a. 35. § 15. *νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας*] According to Grant *φθόνος* and *ἐπιχαιρεκακία* are ‘only different forms of the same state of mind,’ and cannot be opposed as two extremes. The true contrary of *φθόνος* is *ἀναισθησία τις*. This is recognised, he thinks, by Eudemus, who has ‘*φθόνος—ἀνώνυμον—νέμεσις*’ in his *ὑπογραφή* (*E. E.* ii. 3. 1221 a. 3), and by Aristotle himself in *Rhet.* ii. 9. 1386 b. 34 ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφ’

<sup>1</sup> The end of iv may have disappeared along with the Nicomachean v, vi, and vii.

ῳ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ 1108 a. 35. στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν.

The passage quoted from the *Rhetoric* is certainly in favour of Grant's view that *φθόνος* and *ἐπιχαιρέκακία* cannot properly be opposed as contraries; but if we turn from the *ὑπογραφή* of Eudemus to the detailed description, we find that it is only the *ἔξις* which he leaves nameless: the *ἔχων* is plainly the man called *ἐπιχαιρέκακος*, he tells us: and then he proceeds to contrast the *ἐπιχαιρέκακος* with the *φθονερός*, just as the writer of *E. N.* ii. 7. 15 does. Grant is wrong, then, in supposing that the 'mistake (in ii. 7. 15) is set right by Eudemus.' The following are the words of Eudemus (*E. E.* iii. 7. 1233 b. 18) οἷον δὲ φθονερὸς καὶ ἐπιχαιρέκακος· καθ' ἄς γὰρ ἔξεις λέγονται, δὲ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ' ἀξίαν εὐ πράττουσιν ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαιρεκάκου πάθος [ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ] ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔχων δῆλος, ἐπὶ τὸ (?) χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις· μέσος δὲ τούτων δὲ νεμεσητικὸς καὶ δὲ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις.

The writer of the *M. M.* follows *E. N.* iii. 7. 15 and Eudemus in thus making *φθόνος* and *ἐπιχαιρέκακία* contraries, although he differs from Eudemus in making the pain and joy of the *φθονερός*, and *ἐπιχαιρέκακος* respectively, independent of the good or ill fortune being deserved or not, and in making *νέμεσις* exclusively *λύπη τις*. His words are (*M. M.* i. 27. 1192 b. 18) νέμεσις δέ ἔστιν μεσότης φθονερίας καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας· . . . ἔστι δέ ἡ νέμεσις περὶ ἀγαθὰ ἢ τυγχάνει ὑπάρχοντα ἀναξίῳ ὅντι, λύπη τις. νεμεσητικὸς οὖν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λυπητικός. καὶ δὲ αὐτός γε πάλιν οὗτος λυπήσεται, ἂν τινα ἵδη κακῶς πράττοντα ἀνάξιον ὅντα . . . δέ γε φθονερὸς ἐναντίος τούτῳ. ἀπλῶς γάρ, ἂν τε ἀξιός τις γένηται τε μὴ τοῦ εὐ πράττειν, λυπήσεται. δροίως τούτῳ δὲ ἐπιχαιρέκακος ἡσθήσεται κακῶς πράττοντι καὶ τῷ ἀξίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀναξίῳ. δέ γε νεμεσητικὸς οὐ, ἀλλὰ μέσος τις ἔστι τούτων. The writer of the *M. M.* is certainly right in not ascribing to characters like the *φθονερός* and *ἐπιχαιρέκακος* the power of discriminating between deserved and undeserved fortune. He is also certainly right in making *νέμεσις* exclusively *λύπη*.

**[ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, δὲ δὲ ἐπιχαιρέκακος]** Rassow (*Forsch.* 74) b. 4. adopts, with much approbation, the suggestion of Sauppe (*Dionysius und Aristoteles* p. 22)—to insert after *λυπεῖται* (1108 b. 5) the words καὶ δὲ μὲν νεμεσητικὸς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακῶς πράττουσι λυπεῖται. Of

1108 b. 4. course it is possible that a clause ending with *λυπεῖται* may have fallen out; but I cannot help thinking that it is awkward to characterise the *νεμεσητικός* in two closely adjacent clauses, instead of once for all; and I do not see why we should not be allowed to give its natural weight to the word *ἐπιχαιρέκακος*, and mentally supply *ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς κακῶς πράττοντι* after *χαίρειν*. A Greek, I feel sure, could not think of the *ἐπιχαιρέκακος* ‘rejoicing at the *success*’ of any one, good or bad: hence Grant’s objection falls to the ground—‘Again, the *ἐπιχαιρέκακος* cannot be said *τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπειν ὥστε κ.τ.λ.*, for he does not rejoice at the success of the good,’ &c. I therefore think that Sauppe’s clause is unnecessary. Of course the confusion, pointed out by Grant, of contrasting *φθόνος* and *ἐπιχαιρεκακία* as two extremes is not denied, but is perhaps not so great as Grant supposes. The *φθονερός* is pained by the good fortune of other people: the *ἐπιχαιρέκακος* rejoices at the ill fortune of other people: the *νεμεσητικός* is pained by undeserved good or ill fortune. The *φθονερός* and *ἐπιχαιρέκακος* may indeed be *ὁ αὐτός* (*Rhet.*), but there is a logical distinction.

b. 7. § 16. οὐχ ἀπλῶς] i. e. πλεοναχῶς v. I. 7.

b. 8. ἔκατέρας] i. e. universal and particular justice v. I. 8.

b. 9. δόμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν] Grant (followed by Ramsauer) brackets this clause, ‘because of the term *λογικαί*, which never occurs elsewhere in Aristotle or Eudemus, as applied to the *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ*—secondly, because of the sense, since Aristotle could not possibly say that he meant to show how the intellectual excellences were *μεσότητες*—thirdly, because of the extreme likelihood of an interpolation here.’

## CHAPTER VIII.

### ARGUMENT.

*The two vices, that of Excess and that of Defect, and the virtuous Mean, are all three opposed in a certain way to one another—i. e. the two extremes are opposed as contraries, both to the mean, and to each other. Now the mean, standing in contrary opposition to each of the extremes, may be quantitatively expressed as an ‘equal’ which is ‘greater’ than ‘the less’ of the defective extreme, and*

'less' than 'the greater' of the excessive extreme. But here the man who actually lives in an extreme becomes the victim of a moral illusion. In 'greater than' or 'less than,' as applied to the mean in its relation to the extreme in which he lives, he sees 'too great,' or 'too little.' The coward calls the courageous man rash, and the rash man calls him a coward—each as it were pushes the man in the virtuous mean away from the middle place towards the other extreme. The contrariety is greater between the two extremes than between each and the mean, for each is more distant from the other than from the mean. But the mean is not always equally distant from each of the extremes, for one extreme sometimes resembles the mean after a fashion; e.g. Rashness bears a certain resemblance to Courage. Hence it is the defect, Cowardice, and not the excess, Rashness, which is regarded as the proper opposite of the mean, Courage, or as more distant from it: but in other cases it is the excess, e.g. Intemperance, which is so regarded, and not the defect, e.g. Insensibility.

When one of the extremes is thus the opposite par excellence of the mean, we have to explain the circumstance in either of two ways: (1) We may have to refer to the nature of the particular extremes themselves: thus ordinary observation makes it plain that Rashness, as a formed Habit, stands closer to Courage, and resembles it more nearly, than Cowardice does. This is the reason why we make Cowardice the opposite par excellence of Courage. It is a reason connected with a difference in the formed habits themselves. Or (2) we may have to refer to a difference, not in the formed habits themselves, but in our own tendencies, making it easier for us to acquire the one habit than the other. Thus our natural tendency to seek pleasure makes it easier for us to acquire the extreme habit of Intemperance than its opposite, the extreme habit of Total Abstinence. This is why Intemperance is the opposite par excellence of Temperance.

§ 1. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ 1108 b. 13.  
δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις] Cf. Cat. 11. 13 b. 36 sqq. ἐναντίον δέ ἔστιν ἔξ  
ἀνάγκης ἀγαθῷ μὲν κακῷ τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ' ἔκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον  
ὑγείᾳ νόσος καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλίᾳ, ὅμοιας δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κακῷ δὲ ὅτε  
μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον, ὅτε δὲ κακόν τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ κακῷ ὅντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ<sup>1</sup>  
ἐναντίον κακὸν ὅν. ὅμοιας δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντίᾳ ἐκατέρῳ, οὐσα ἀγαθόν.  
ἐπ' δλίγων δ' ἀν τὸ τουοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ  
κακὸν ἐναντίον ἔστιν. In Cat. 6. 6 a. 17 τὰ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα  
τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει is quoted as a definition of ἐναντία: but that the  
writer regards it as too narrow is plain from a subsequent passage  
(Cat. 11. 14 a. 19) ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἡ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι  
ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἡ αὐτὰ γένη εἴωι. λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλαν  
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (χρῶμα γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ γένος), δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν  
τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν (τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆ, τοῦ δὲ κακία τὸ γένος). ἀγαθὸν  
δὲ καὶ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τινῶν ὅντα. Cf.  
also Met. Δ. 10. 1018 a. 25 sqq.

§ 2.] ὁ μέσος, i.e. ὁ φρόνιμος ορ σπουδαῖος, alone is in a position to b. 15.

1108 b. 15. judge correctly. See iii. 4. 5 διαφέρει πλείστον ἵσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ ἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὅρῳ, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὁν. The ἄκροι do not possess, as it were, the αἰσθητικὴ μεσότης. Ramsauer appositely compares *de An.* ii. 11. 11. 424 a. 4 ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος οὗσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά· τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων—*i. e.* Sense is affected because it is a mean between contraries—because *e.g.* it is not so cold as τὸ ψυχρόν and colder than τὸ θερμόν. If it were as cold as τὸ ψυχρόν, it could not be affected by it: and, not affected by τὸ ψυχρόν, it could not be affected by the contrary θερμόν. Similarly, if it were as hot as τὸ θερμόν, it could not be affected by τὸ θερμόν—or by the contrary ψυχρόν. The difficult words γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων (which may be compared with ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασύς φαίνεται κ.τ.λ. here) are thus explained by Philoponus (quoted by Trendelenburg)—πῶς τὸ μέσον γίνεται τῶν ὑπερβολῶν κριτικὸν ἔδειξε. τὸ γὰρ ἐν μεσότητι τινῶν δὲν πρὸς ἑκάτερον τῶν ἄκρων θάτερόν πως ἐστίν. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τὴν οἰκείαν αὐτοῦ θερμότητα ψυχρόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὴν ψυχρότητα ὑπερβάλλον θερμόν.

b. 27. § 4.] πλείστη ἐναντιότης] Bywater restores πλείστη in place of Bekker's πλείων. The MSS. are practically unanimous in favour of πλείστη. Was the original reading πλείων ἢ?

b. 31. § 5. ὅμοιότης] Both the θρασύς and the ἀνδρεῖος face the foe; but the δειλός runs away; both the ἄσωτος and the ἐλευθέριος spend money; but the ἀνελεύθερος does not. Further, θρασύτης and ἄσωτία represent the prevalence of tendencies which, if properly directed, would have become ἀνδρεία and ἐλευθερότης respectively; whereas δειλία and ἀελευθερία represent tendencies which could not be made to lend themselves to the formation of these virtues. Cf. iv. 1. 31, where it is said of the ἄσωτος that he is εὐίατος, and ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν.

b. 35. §§ 6-8.] For the two grounds on either of which one of the extremes rather than the other may be opposed to the mean as its contrary *par excellence*, see *Argument* of this chapter.

1109 a. 16. § 8. κοσμιότητα] ἀναισθησίαν—the *vice* opposed to ἀκολασία is what we should have expected (the Paraph. has ἀναισθησίαν), but Aristotle perhaps wished to avoid the unusual word. At any rate κοσμιότης here does not stand for ἀναισθησία, but rather for σωφρο-

*σύνη.* The conjunction *κόσμιος καὶ σώφρων* is too close in Greek 1109 a. 16. usage to make it possible to take *κοσμιώτης* as ‘prudery.’

[*ἡ ἐπίδοσις*] not ‘our inclination’ but ‘our advance.’ See the a. 17. notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant. Grant’s rendering is—‘we call those things more contrary to the mean, in which we run to greater lengths.’

## CHAPTER IX.

### ARGUMENT.

*That Moral Virtue then is a mean state of a certain kind between two vices, that of excess and that of defect; and that it is a mean state because it can hit off the mean in feeling and action—all this we have explained sufficiently. Now let us draw a practical conclusion from the Theory which we have set forth. Our practical conclusion is shortly this—It is a difficult thing to be good. Hitting off the mean in conduct is like finding the centre of the circle—to do it, a man must know how. It is easy to open one’s purse and give away money; but to give to the right man, the right amount, at the right time, for the right object, in the right manner—that is indeed difficult, and few can do it. All praise and honour therefore to those who can. Since then it is so difficult to hit off the mean exactly at first, we must begin by avoiding the extreme which is the more contrary to the mean, i. e. the more dangerous extreme, ‘steering far from foam and breakers’ like Odysseus, adopting the proverbial ‘second best course,’ and choosing the lesser evil. In order to do this, we must ascertain what things tempt us as individuals most—individuals are differently constituted—and, measuring the strength of the temptation by the pleasure which the thing gives us, draw ourselves away from that course to which we are constitutionally most inclined; for, by thus drawing ourselves far away from our evil bent, like people who straighten timber, we shall reach the mean. But on all occasions it is Pleasure which we must guard against most carefully. We ought to feel towards Pleasure as the elders felt towards Helen, and echo their saying; for if we ‘send the enchantress away,’ we shall be the less tempted to sin. These are the general rules for hitting the mean; but it is a difficult matter at best to hit it, especially where a multitude of details are concerned: thus, it is a difficult matter to lay down any rule about anger, which shall determine the way in which, the persons with whom, the class of things at which, and length of time during which, one ought to be angry: indeed, so far is there from being a rule, that we sometimes praise the man who is deficient in the feeling of anger, and call him good-tempered, and sometimes the man who waxes wroth, and say that he has a manly spirit. In short, the man who deflects only a little from the right course, whether towards the side of excess, or towards that of defect, is*

*not blamed; only the man who deflects far, for he attracts notice: but how far he must deflect, to attract notice, and incur blame, it is not easy to determine theoretically: indeed the question is not really a general one at all, but relates to this, that, and the other particular case, and such particular cases elude theory; only sense can pass judgment upon them as they arise.*

*Thus much then is plain, that the middle state is praiseworthy, but that it is sometimes by leaning to the side of excess, and sometimes by leaning to that of defect, that we shall more easily reach the mean, or that which is right.*

1109 a. 29. § 2. διόπερ τὸ εὖ] This is the reading of Kb, Ald., B<sup>1</sup>, B<sup>2</sup>, B<sup>3</sup>, and CCC (all except Kb insert ἐστὶ after διόπερ), and must be accepted as right, because M. M. i. 9. 1187 a. 4 has τὸ δὲ μέσον χαλεπόν, καθ' ὁ ἐπαινούμεθα διὸ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ σπουδαῖον. All other authorities (including NC, Cambr., and Par. 1853) have ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ. Michelet, reading ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ, takes the words as parenthetical, and connects καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν, as predicates, with τὸ δ' φ . . . καὶ ὡς.

a. 31. § 3. ἡ Καλυψώ] The editors point out that Aristotle is wrong here. It was Circe not Calypso who gave the advice to Odysseus (*Od.* xii. 109): but the line quoted is uttered by Odysseus himself afterwards (*Od.* xii. 219), when he gives directions to his pilot. CCC has ἡ Κίρκη Καλυψώ: B<sup>1</sup> and B<sup>2</sup> have ἡ Κίρκη.

a. 33. τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἀμαρτωλότερον κ.τ.λ.]—for the reason given in § 8 of last chapter.

a. 34. § 4. κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν] The meaning of this proverb seems to be placed beyond doubt by a fragment of Menander preserved by Stobaeus (*Flor.* vol. ii. p. 349, ed. Meineke) Μενάνδρου ἐκ Θρασυλέοντος,

ο δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δήπου λεγόμενος,  
ἀν ἀποτύχῃ τις οὐρίου κώπαισι πλεῖν.

Thus the Scholiast on Plato, *Phaedo* 99 D, is wrong with παροιμίᾳ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσφαλῶς τι πραττόντων, παρ' ὅσον οἱ διαμαρτόντες κατὰ τὸν πρότερον πλοῦν ἀσφαλῶς παρασκενάζονται τὸν δεύτερον. The proverb occurs in *Pol.* Γ. 8. 1284 b. 19, in the *Phaedo* 99 D, and elsewhere.

§§ 4, 5, 6.] The doctrine of the μεσότης here suggests to Aristotle a valuable practical rule. ‘Find out the things you have a weakness for, and avoid them as much as you can.’

b. 8. § 6. ἀδέκαστοι] ‘unbribed.’ δέκαζειν means ‘to bribe’ (ety-

mology apparently unknown). Λύκου δεκάς was the name for 1109 b. 8. bribed jurymen at Athens. See *Liddell and Scott* s. v. δεκάζειν. Cf. Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ ch. 27 ἥρξατο δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ δεκάζειν, πρώτου καταδείξαντος Ἀνύτου . . . κρινόμενος γὰρ . . . δεκάσας τὸ δικαστήριον ἀπέφυγεν.

‘Ελένην] *Il.* iii. 156 sqq.

b. 9.

§ 7. οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον διορίσαι κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (*Forsch.* 16) points b. 14. out that the passage beginning here, and extending to the end of the Book, occurs again almost *verbatim* in iv. 5. 13, 14. He regards the Second Book as the original locus of the passage.

§ 8. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ b. 20. ἀφορίσαι] The twin clause in iv. 5. 13 shows that παρεκβαίνων must be understood here after πόσον.

ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις] αἰσθήσις is a κριτικὴ δύναμις (*An. Post.* ii. b. 23. 19. 99 b. 35), because a μεσότης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως (*de An.* ii. 11. 11. 424 a. 4). Here it stands for the faculty by which the good man, as μέσος, discriminates, with the accuracy required by the particular occasion, between the good and the evils contrary to it in the extremes. Cf. τὸ δῆμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας of vi. 11. 6. See note on ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις iv. 5. 13, for the force of *ἐν* in the phrase.

## *BOOK III.*

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### CHAPTER I.

#### ARGUMENT.

*It is only for what is voluntary that men are praised or blamed; for that which is involuntary they are pardoned and sometimes even pitied. The distinction between the Voluntary and the Involuntary is therefore a vital one for the theory of conduct; it is one also about which the practical legislator, who has to assign rewards and punishments, would do well to be clear.*

*Acts which are either (1) forced upon us, or (2) caused by ignorance, are involuntary.*

*Where the moving principle is external, i.e. of such a kind that the man contributes nothing to the result by his action or feeling, the result is forced upon him; e.g. the motion of a man who is carried off by brigands is forced upon him.*

*But is an act ‘forced upon him’ which a man performs when a painful alternative is offered to him, such as the alternative of his own dishonour, or the death of those dear to him, and he brings himself to accept one of the two evils? Is it voluntarily or involuntarily that he accepts his own dishonour? Is it voluntarily or involuntarily that he consents to the death of those dear to him? The parallel case of the man who throws his goods overboard in a storm will help us to an answer. In ordinary circumstances a man does not throw his goods overboard voluntarily; but, to save his own life, and the lives of the crew, a man of sense will always do so. Let us then call acts of this kind mixed acts, i.e. they are both voluntary and involuntary; but more voluntary than involuntary; for an act is what it is to the agent, at the time when, and in the circumstances in which, he performs it; and these mixed acts, at the time when they are performed, are chosen as being the best in the circumstances, by an agent who has in himself the power of setting his limbs in motion to perform them, and who uses that power, although he could have refrained from doing so. But although a mixed act is thus voluntary as actually performed in given circumstances, it is not in itself the kind of act which a man would choose to perform apart from the given circumstances; and in this sense may perhaps be described as ‘except in given circumstances involuntary,’ or ‘in itself involuntary’—this, however, by a stretch of language, for voluntary and involuntary properly describe acts as*

they are to the agent when performed. That mixed acts are voluntary as actually performed is shown by the fact that we even sometimes praise a man for such acts; e.g. when a man submits to disgrace or pain in a noble cause we praise him, whereas if he submit without good reason we blame him. Sometimes however the disgrace which he submits to, and the acts which he brings himself to perform, may be of such a kind that we cannot indeed praise him, but pardon him in consideration of pressure too great for human nature to withstand: although, again, there are things which nothing—not even the prospect of the most terrible death—should compel a man to do: thus the Alcmeon of Euripides ‘compelled to kill his mother’ is a ridiculous figure. It is hard sometimes to decide which is the alternative one ought to prefer; but harder far to abide by one’s decision once made; for generally the choice is between pain to be endured, and bringing oneself to do or submit to something disgraceful. [This is why blame or praise is given according as one does, or does not, bring oneself to accept the disgraceful course.]

How then shall we describe an act which is forced upon a man? In the strict sense of the expression, that is forced upon a man which results from a cause lying outside himself, and is entirely independent of his own cooperation: whereas that which in given circumstances is chosen as the lesser evil, and carried out by an agent who has the principle of its initiation in himself, is not forced upon him (however ‘involuntary in itself,’ i.e. generally undesirable it may be), but is his voluntary act.

So much for painful alternatives: we cannot properly speak of a man being forced to act where they are concerned.

As for the contention that pleasant things, and things which are honourable and good, force us to act, exerting external pressure upon us—it is obviously absurd, for it implies that all our actions are forced upon us—all that we do being for the sake either of pleasant things, or of things which are honourable and good. Moreover, when we are forced to do something, we do it with pain, whereas, when we pursue something pleasant or good, we feel pleasure. It is ridiculous then to blame pleasant things, and not our own susceptibility to their influence—to take credit indeed to ourselves for our good actions, but to throw the blame for our discreditable actions upon pleasant things.

[That then is ‘forced upon a man’ which results, without his cooperation, from a cause external to him.

An act which is ‘caused by ignorance’ is always ‘non-voluntary’; but it cannot be called ‘involuntary’ unless the man is sorry for it when he finds out the harm which it has done. If he is not sorry, it is best to describe his act simply as ‘non-voluntary.’

But there is a difference between acts ‘caused by ignorance,’ and acts ‘performed in ignorance.’ The man who is drunk or in a rage acts indeed ‘in ignorance’—he does not know what he is doing; but we do not say that ignorance is the cause of his misdemeanours or crimes: we ascribe them to intoxication or anger as the case may be. Indeed whenever a man commits an offence, he may be said to act ‘in ignorance’ of what he ought or ought not to do; and the effect of repeating such offences is that he becomes an unjust or bad man—he acquires a character. Now we blame character, thus showing that we consider the man a voluntary agent in its formation, i.e., a voluntary agent in

the performance of acts done ‘in ignorance’ of what he ought or ought not to do: or to put it otherwise—blindness of choice, or not knowing what one ought to do, does not make one’s acts involuntary; on the contrary, it makes them bad, and, becoming chronic, amounts to a character for which one is blamed. It is only when a man’s ‘ignorance,’ instead of being due to his own passions and character, is a mere accident of the circumstances of a particular case, that the acts arising from it are involuntary. Thus a man, without any fault of his own, may not know what he does, e.g. that he is revealing a secret, or whom his act affects, e.g. he may mistake a friend for an enemy in the dark, or he may not know how his act will take effect, e.g. sparring he may hurt. Here it is not the man’s disposition, temporary or chronic, but the mere accident of his not knowing a particular circumstance, which is the true cause of his act. His act then is involuntary—that is to say, if he is sorry for it afterwards.

Acts forced upon a man and acts caused by ignorance being involuntary, voluntary acts will be those which have their origin in the man himself, he being fully aware of all the material circumstances surrounding their performance. This being so, it follows that acts caused by passion or desire are not to be described as involuntary. If such acts are involuntary, the lower animals, and even children, are incapable of voluntary action. And further—what about good actions caused by passion and desire? Are they involuntary? Or is it only bad actions thus caused that are involuntary, the good ones being voluntary? It would be ridiculous surely to draw such a distinction between the effects of a single agency. And then the absurdity of having to say that we are involuntary agents when we are moved to action by feelings which ought to move us! for we ought to feel angry sometimes; we ought to feel a desire for health and knowledge. Moreover, what we do or suffer involuntarily is painful, whereas that which accords with our desire is pleasant. Again, what is gained by saying that a fault proceeding from desire, as distinguished from one proceeding from deliberate calculation, is involuntary? The important point is that they are both wrong and to be avoided. Indeed the irrational feelings are as much part of the man’s nature as his calculating faculty; it is absurd therefore to talk of acts prompted by these feelings being involuntary.

1109 b. 30. § 1.] The discussion of the *έκούσιον* and *ἀκούσιον* connects itself with the subject of *ἀρετή*, because *ἀρετή* is—(1) *ἔξις ἐπαινετή* (i. 13. 19, cf. ii. 9. 9), and—(2) *ἔξις προαιρετική* (ii. 6. 15). We praise what is voluntary; and *choice* (*προαιρεσίς*, iii. 2) is the special form under which the voluntary principle appears in man, as a rational being, and therefore as capable of acquiring *ἀρετή*. ‘*Ἀρετή* is a ‘praiseworthy habit’ produced by the repetition of acts of which a man himself is the cause, i.e. of voluntary acts. How a man is an *ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων* Aristotle does not say in the *Ethics*. He contents himself with pointing to the fact that he is. The author of the *Eud. Eth.* (ii. 6) and the author of the *M. M.* (i. 10. 11) discuss the subject of man’s voluntary agency with an evident wish to fathom its metaphysical import, but, after all, leave us where Aristotle leaves us—

with the unexplained fact that man *is* a cause. They point out 1109 b. 30. that all *oὐσίαι* or *φύσεις* are *ἀρχαί*, *i.e.* generative of other *oὐσίαι* or *φύσεις* like themselves: *e.g.* ἀνθρωπος γεννᾷ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷον ζῷα καὶ φυτὸν φυτά. But man is distinguished from other generative principles, animate or inanimate, by being the author of another class of effects, viz. *πράξεις*:—see *E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b. 15 sqq. *The ἀρχή*, properly so called (*κύρια*), is that *ὅθεν πρῶτον ἡ κίνησις*. Such is God. Mathematical *ἀρχαί* are not properly *ἀρχαί* (*ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς ἀρχαῖς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κύριον*), because they are not causes of motion; *δ* *δ'* ἀνθρωπος *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως τινός* *ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις κίνησις*. Where the effects are contingent (*ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μή*—such as may either happen or not), the *ἀρχαί* must be contingent also. Human actions are contingent; therefore man is a contingent cause—*E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b. 41 *εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἔνια τῶν ὄντων ἐνδεχόμενα ἐναντίως ἔχειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τοιαύτας . . . ὅστιν πράξεων ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ κύριος, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μή*.

The view thus set forth by the author of the *E. E.* and the author of the *M. M.* is based on the doctrine of *Met. Θ. 2* and *5*—that *αἱ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις*, being *τῶν ἐναντίων*, must be dominated by something external to themselves, which shall determine in which of the two contrary ways they shall actualise themselves; *ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον* λέγω *δὲ τοῦτο ὅρεξιν ἡ προαίρεσις* (*Met. Θ. 5. 1048 a. 10*). That which is *κύριον par excellence* in man, making him a moral agent—*αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων*, is *βουλευτικὴ ὅρεξις*, or *προαίρεσις*. It is by choosing certain acts, and performing them, that we acquire a certain *Habit*. *Προαίρεσις* converts the *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων* into a definite *ἔξις*, which results in acts of one kind only: cf. *E. N. v. 1. 4.* Ἀρετή is a *ἔξις προαἰρετική* (ii. 6. 15), *i.e.* a habit which was produced by, and is productive of, certain deliberately chosen acts.

[*ἴσως*] See Zell *ad loc.* and on i. 1. 1. Δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, *ἴσως*, σχεδόν, b. 33. are often employed, ‘quoniam in re certa . . . partim ex communi Atticorum consuetudine, partim ex Aristotelis philosophandi ratione, praesertim in his libris de vita et moribus hominum quae res accuratam subtilitatem non admittunt.’

§ 2. *χρήσιμον δὲ κ.τ.λ.*] ‘It must not be supposed,’ says Grant b. 34. (*Plan of Book iii*), ‘that the present disquisition on the Voluntary is a disquisition on Free Will. The latter question Aristotle would certainly have assigned to *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, or Metaphysics, and

1109 b. 34. would have thought out of place in a system of Ethics. . . . The ensuing chapters assume that a man is an *ἀρχή* of his own actions, and, with this assumption, treat of the Voluntary under its various aspects in relation to virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment. From this practical point of view these chapters furnish to some extent a psychology though not a metaphysic of the Will.' Again (note on iii. 1. 1-2): 'It is plain that the discussions on the Will are never metaphysical. An appeal to language and common opinions sums up nearly the whole. The scope of the argument is limited to a political, as distinguished from a theological, point of view—*ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι.*' And: 'In asking what is the Voluntary, Aristotle does not pursue a speculative method of enquiry. Such a method might have commenced with the deep-lying ideas of personality and consciousness, of the individuality of the subject, &c. But he is content with defining the Voluntary by a contrast to the common notions (*δοκεῖ* § 3) of what constitutes an Involuntary act. It might be said that this is giving a merely negative conception of freedom. But in fact the conception given is positive, only the analysis of it is not pushed very far. The voluntariness of an act Aristotle represents to be constituted in this—that the actor is in every case the *ἀρχή* or cause of his actions, except in cases of compulsion, where there is really a superior *ἀρχή* . . . or of ignorance, where he does not know what his action is, and can only be held to be the cause of what he meant to do. In what sense, and how, the individual is an *ἀρχή* is the point where Aristotle stops short in the enquiry.'

On this I would remark—that if Aristotle 'stops short in the enquiry,' perhaps his theory of 'in what sense, and how' is thereby conveyed. I think it is. This enquiry is about *Responsibility*; and 'Responsibility,' he gives us to understand by 'stopping short' where he does, is meaningless except as resting with the *immediate* cause of an act—*i. e.* with the concrete individual, whose function the act is. The individual is 'responsible' for acts which can be assigned to his *character* as immediate cause. 'Free,' applied to an act, means, 'caused immediately by a character'—the character, of course, performing its functions, like every other organism, in a definite environment, not *in vacuo*. In short, it is only the *individual, as affected by particular circumstances*, who can put forth acts, and be 'responsible' for them, *i. e.* come in for their conse-

quences. This is Aristotle's *theory* of 'freedom'; and I believe 1109 b. 34. that, by thus taking its stand upon 'the concrete individual putting forth acts in his environment,' it suggests the best possible solution of the famous difficulty—How to reconcile 'freedom' and 'necessity,' which modern speculation has—to some extent, needlessly—raised for itself. The solution which Aristotle's theory suggests may be put thus—The ancestral, or other, antecedents of the concrete individual cannot be saddled with 'responsibility': *ατία θομένων θεός ἀνάτιος*. The individual is 'responsible' for acts which can be assigned to his *character*, as immediate cause. His character is itself, as we now believe, the necessary product of the universe, and the circumstances which stimulate his character to put forth acts are likewise necessary products of the universe: but this does not relieve him of 'responsibility' and make his acts not 'free,' for 'free,' applied to an act, means 'caused immediately by a character performing its functions in its environment.' Only 'the individual character in its environment' can put forth acts, and be 'responsible' for them—*i. e.* come in for their consequences. The universe, which brings forth individuals, is not itself an individual to be held responsible: 'Natur lebt in lauter Kindern; und die Mutter—wo ist sie?' The question of the efficiency, freedom, or responsibility of the individual must not be mixed up with the question of the *origin* of the individual.

It will thus be seen that man as *ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων* is merely a particular aspect of man as living being; for, to be a living being is to be 'responsible' (whether in a physical or in a political environment) for 'free' acts, *i. e.* for 'acts put forth by an organism.' But the organism must not be abstracted from the universe, and made a 'free agent' in the sense of initiating acts with the production of which the laws of the universe have nothing, or not everything, to do. That would be to set up more universes than one. It is as subject of a *libera necessitas*—to employ Spinoza's powerful phrase—that we must conceive the 'free agent.'

When we say, then, that Man is an *ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων* we are face to face with the (for morals) ultimate fact that he is a living being. All living beings, plants as well as animals, the irrational animals as well as man, perform certain functions by which they maintain their own existence. To perform these functions is to be a living being. Man's moral *πράξεις*, by which he corresponds with his distinctively human, *i. e.* his 'political,' environment, proceed from habits of his

1100 b. 34. nature, just as his bodily functions proceed from organs of his nature. Moral *πράξεις* and bodily functions are necessary for the maintenance of his nature as a whole; and are, on exactly the same grounds, said to be *his πράξεις* and *his* bodily functions respectively. Biologically considered, bodily functions differ from moral *πράξεις* in depending upon structural adaptations of older standing. The performance of moral *πράξεις* being thus more precarious than the performance of bodily functions, and, moreover, affecting others, *praise* is accorded when the *πράξεις* are rightly performed. The praise is accorded *not because they are more truly the agent's own acts* than are the unerring perceptions of his eye or ear, or the regular movements of his heart, for which he is not 'praised' at all; but *because they are apt not to be performed rightly*. A man's virtue is praised and rewarded, but not his health, because, as a matter of fact, his virtue grows up in correspondence with an environment which makes itself felt by means of praise and blame, reward and punishment. Those vital functions which we distinguish as voluntary acts are those which proceed from sources within a man, which are capable of being modified, during the lifetime of the individual, in relation to his environment, especially to that very complex part of it of which praise and blame, reward and punishment, are the chief exponents. Such 'sources within a man' are the *πάθη*, belonging as they do to that part of human nature which is characterised as *μετέχον λόγου, κατίκον λόγου καὶ πειθαρχικόν*—*i.e. still capable of being organised* in relation to *νόμος*, or the rational environment. From the *πάθη* proceed (1) actions neither more nor less the man's *own* actions than are the movements of his heart or lungs, but distinguished from these latter movements by the circumstance that they affect other people's interests directly or indirectly, and accordingly elicit praise or blame, or otherwise call forth social influences, in relation to which they suffer modification—are encouraged or repressed. From the *πάθη* proceed also (2) actions which do not affect other people's interests, and therefore do not elicit praise or blame, but are called voluntary because they do not proceed from their sources in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of their *not* proceeding from them under certain conditions. Whenever, in short, an act proceeds not inevitably from an inherited organ, but with some degree of hesitation from a state of feeling which, in the history of the individual, can be (or could have been) affected

(even to the extent of being sometimes rendered entirely inoperative) 1109 b. 34. by other feelings, whether self-regarding or altruistic, we call the act voluntary. As, however, man's true personality consists in his consciousness of social relations, and his readiness to be modified in correspondence with social requirements, acts which meet these requirements and acts which disregard them are 'voluntary' in the truest sense. Acts which affect the agent alone, although proceeding *contingently* from their sources, and therefore voluntary, are so in the lower sense in which we speak of the actions of children and brutes as voluntary. From the way in which Aristotle connects 'the voluntary' with 'praise and blame' here, and in other passages, we can see that he practically identifies *man's* 'efficiency' with his correspondence, or failure, by reason of the prevalence of selfish feelings, to correspond with the social environment. As it is only the *πολίτης* who is truly *αὐτάρκης* (see *E. N.* i. 7. 6), so it is only the *πολίτης* who is *truly* an *ἀρχὴ πράξεων*. The term 'voluntary' however in its general sense is applicable to any act which results from a feeling or desire contingently, *i.e.* so results that it *may* be prevented by the operation of another feeling or desire. In carrying back the explanation of voluntary action to the possession by man of a *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων*—*i.e.* of tendencies still capable of modification, and in connecting it so closely with the sanctions of a social system, the high complexity of which he fully recognised, Aristotle gives prominence to the same considerations as have led a modern evolutionist, like Spencer, to speak of 'Will as coming into existence through the increasing complexity, and imperfect coherence of automatic actions'—(*Psych.* i. 498–499; cf. whole chapter on *The Will*, Special Synth. ch. ix).

§ 3. *τὰ βίᾳ ή δι' ἄγνοιαν*] ‘Cum spontaneum id sit, cuius b. 35. principium in eo sit qui agat, non ignorante singulas circumstantias, invite factum exstat simulatque una ex ambabus conditionibus, quas requirit spontaneum, abest.’ Michelet *ad loc.* A voluntary act in one of which the *ἀρχὴ* is in the agent himself, he being at the same time aware of the several circumstances of his act. These are the two conditions of a voluntary act. An act is involuntary when either of these two conditions is absent: *i.e.* if the agent, while knowing all the circumstances of his act, is forced to act by an external constraining power, *οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποιήσῃ ἀνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες* (§ 3); or if, while he is under no external constraint, he is ignorant

1109 b. 35. of the circumstances—*e.g.* one who administers poison, thinking it to be medicine, because it has been put, through no fault of his own, into a bottle labelled ‘medicine,’ is not held to be the ‘cause’ of the consequent poisoning, or to have poisoned ‘voluntarily.’ His act is one δι’ ἄγρουν γιγνόμενον.

The remarks of Eudemus (*E.E.* ii. 8) on the *βίαιον* are very instructive. Τὸ *βίαιον* and ἀνάγκη, he says, are terms employed to mark a force which interferes with the law governing the behaviour of an object inanimate or animate; a stone is moved upwards *βίᾳ*, fire downwards *βίᾳ*. When these inanimate objects move in their own natural direction—κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν καθ’ αὐτὰ δρμήν (1224 a. 18), they are not said to move *βίᾳ*, nor yet are they ἔκοντα. There is no name to characterise their movement. Similarly, in the case of animals, we see many motions or acts which are *βίᾳ*—viz. those done ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ δρμήν ἔξωθεν τι κινῇ (1224 a. 22). In the case of inanimate objects it is easy to see the external ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως which interferes with the law of their nature. It is also easy in the case of irrational animals. They live τῇ ὀρέξει. Everything which thwarts their ὀρέξις is *βίαιον*. But in the case of man a difficulty arises. He has two equally internal principles—λόγος and ὀρέξις, which thwart each other. Does λόγος exert *βίᾳ* in the case of the ἐγκρατής, or ὀρέξις in the case of the ἀκρατής? No. Both λόγος and ὀρέξις are internal, and *βίᾳ* is exerted only by external agencies. An act done from prudence, and on rational grounds, is neither more nor less ‘voluntary’ than one done from the mere appetite of the moment,—ἢ δὲ ὅτι ἔκοῦσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦ πράττει, *βίᾳ* δὲ οὐδέτερος (1224 b. 26). We must not abstract a man’s motives (whether high or low, whether due to tendencies acquired during his own lifetime, or to those inherited from his ancestors) from *himself*, and say that they are external to him and force him (*βίαια*). If later controversialists had seen this as clearly as Aristotle and the peripatetics did, we should have been spared many profitless discussions about the ‘Freedom of the Will’ and ‘Moral Responsibility.’

1110 a. 4. § 4. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβου μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος] A tyrant with power over the lives of a man’s family commands him to do something base. He may do it from fear of greater evils—διὰ φόβου μειζόνων κακῶν, *i.e.* the death of his family; or he may refuse to do it because honour forbids (διὰ καλόν τι).

In either case he does something most painful to himself; and the **1110 a. 4.**  
question is: Does he act voluntarily or involuntarily?

**§§ 5, 6.]** The answer is given in these sections. Such actions a. 8.  
are *μικταί*. Except under very exceptional circumstances no one  
performs them voluntarily—έκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ’ ἵσως ἀκού-  
σια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀν ἔλοιτο καθ’ αὐτὸν τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. But there are  
exceptional circumstances in which men perform them. In these  
exceptional circumstances, at the time at which they are performed,  
they are voluntary—they proceed from an internal *ἀρχή*, from a  
desire to perform them in the agent; but in any other circum-  
stances, as a matter of fact, no one would perform them. In dis-  
cussing therefore the voluntariness of a given action we must look  
at it strictly in connexion with the circumstances in which it takes  
place, for ‘the end or motive of an act is that which is in view at  
the time’ (Peters)—τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐστιν—e.g.  
the *τέλος* or object which a man has in view when he throws his  
goods overboard is not the infliction of loss on himself, but the  
lightening of the ship. The question is whether such an act is  
*voluntary* or *involuntary*; not whether it is *wise* or *unwise* in the  
particular circumstances, or *likely to be matter of regret* when the  
danger has passed. I see no reason for holding with Grant that  
‘the phrase τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως is general, not referring only to  
the cases under dispute, but to action universally’—or that ‘τέλος  
is used here in a peculiar sense to denote the moral character of  
an action.’ It seems better to take *τέλος* in the passage before us  
in the sense in which it is afterwards employed in chap. 5. § 17 of  
this Book, as ‘the object specially contemplated by a particular  
action’—e.g. the lightening of the ship. In discussing the question  
of the voluntariness of a disagreeable action, let us not lose sight  
of ‘the object specially contemplated by the given action,’ and  
wander into the irrelevancy of considering the feelings with which  
such actions are regarded in the abstract.

It may be remarked in passing with regard to the instance of  
a *μικτὴ πρᾶξις* given in § 5—that cases arising out of *ai ēn τοῖς χειμῶ-*  
*σιν ἐκβολαῖ* were probably well known in the law courts: cf., for the  
*Lex Rhodia de jactura*, *Digest.* xiv. 2. 1—‘lege Rhodia cavetur ut si  
levandae navis gratia jactus mercium factus est, omnium contri-  
butione sarciatur quod pro omnibus datum est’;—i.e. the principle  
of the ‘general average’ is to be applied.

1110 a. 17. § 6. ὅν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ή ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μή] This statement, taken as an aphorism by itself, would be too general. The functions of the heart proceed from an *ἀρχή* which is strictly *ἐν αὐτῷ*, *i. e.* is involved in the *φύσις* of the individual (cf. ή δὲ *φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ Met. Δ. 3. 1070 a. 7*) and yet cannot be described as *ἐπ' αὐτῷ*.

a. 19. § 7. ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίστε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται] ‘which shows that the acts are regarded as voluntary’—Peters, note *ad loc.*

a. 28. § 8. ’Αλκμαίωνα] The anonymous scholiast on this Book (Ald. ed.) has the following note here—καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου ’Αλκμαίωνα τὸν Ἀμφιαράου παῖδα, τοῦτον φόρο πατὴρ ἀνελεῖν τὴν μητέρα (Eriphyle) ἐπέσκηψεν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔσται τὸν πατέρα λυπῶν· δε οὐδὲ ἀξίας αἰτίας ποιῶν τοῦτο ἰστορεῖται. ἄλλως παρατίθεται τὸν παρ' Εὐριπίδη ’Αλκμαίωνα ως δι' εὐτελῆ τιὰ ὑπομείναντα μητροκτονῆσαι· λέγει γὰρ παρ' αὐτῷ δὲ ’Αλκμαίων μᾶλιστα μὲν μὲν ἐπῆρεν ἐπισκήψας πατὴρ δοθὲ ἄρμα(τ') εἰσέβαινεν εἰς Θήβας ἵων·

διὰ γὰρ τούτων ἐντολὰς τοῦ πατρὸς διηγεῖται, ως ἐντειλαμένου αὐτοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι τὴν μητέρα, καὶ καταρασμένου αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ ἀποκτενεῖ, ἀκαρπίαν τε γῆς καὶ ἀτεκνίαν, καὶ διαβολὰς τιὰς λέγει τῆς μητρός, ὃν οὐδὲν ἦν ἄξιον τηλικοῦτον κακὸν ἀναγκάσαι ποιῆσαι τινα.

a. 32. § 9. ἀναγκάζονται] We have here the influence of an internal *ἀρχή*—of motives, not of external force, and the term *ἀναγκάζονται* is perhaps improperly used. But it may be that Aristotle draws a distinction between *ἀνάγκη* and *βία* (cf. § 8 ἔνια δ' ἵστως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι—where *βιασθῆναι* would have been absurd); motives of painful cogency being *ἀναγκαῖα*, though, as internal principles, not *βίαια*. The writer of the *M. M.* discusses *τὸ βίαιον* and *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον* in separate chapters (*i. 14* and *15*); and, although he says *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐν παντὶ, ἀλλ' ἦδη ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός*, his example shows that he is thinking of the effect produced on the mind of the agent by an external occurrence, not of physical compulsion—*M. M. i. 15. 1188 b. 21* οἷον ἡναγκάσθην συντομώτερον βαδίσαι εἰς ἀγρόν εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπολωλότ' ἀν εὑρον τὰ ἐν ἀγρῷ. In short, very painfully cogent motives may be called *ἀναγκαῖα*, as distinguished from pleasures, which cannot be called *ἀναγκαῖα* however pressing—*M. M. i. 15. 1188 b. 15* τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον οὐ πάντως οὐδὲ ἐν παντὶ λεκτέον ἔστιν, οἷον ὅσα ἥδονῆς ἔνεκεν πράττομεν. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἡναγκάσθην τὴν τοῦ φίλου γυναικα διαφθεῖραι ὑπὸ τῆς ἥδουνῆς, ἄτοπος ἀν εἴη.

§ 10. τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια ;] This question, following immediately upon the words *περὶ τὸν ἀναγκασθέντας ή μή*, and the terms in which it is answered, support the view that Aristotle, like the writer of the *M. M.*, distinguished technically between *ἀναγκαῖα* and *βίαια*. In the case of the *ἀναγκαῖον* it is true that *ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἔκτος ἐστιν*, but not true that *ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλλεται*. The external occurrence operates through the medium of the painful feeling which it produces. On the other hand, *τὸ βίαιον* is distinguished from *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον* by the *differentia* *όπότ’ ἀν ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται*. The external agency determines a man's act without the effective intervention of his feelings.

αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἔκαστα, ταῦτα δ’ ἔκούστα] ‘For acts b. 6. fall within the sphere of particulars; and here the particular thing that is done is voluntary’—Peters: *i. e.* in discussing the *voluntariness* of an act done under painful circumstances, we must take the act by itself as ‘a particular’—in connexion merely with the temporary state of mind out of which it immediately springs; we must not raise the general question of its wisdom or goodness.

ἀποδοῦναι] syn. *δρίζειν*: see *Ind. Arist. s. v. ἀποδιδόναι*—‘it is not b. 8. easy to say.’

§ 11. εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ κ.τ.λ.] The Aldine Scholiast b. 9. seems to have read *λυπηρά* for *καλά*. He says—*τούτων γὰρ χάριν τουτέστι τῶν ἡδέων καὶ λυπηρῶν, τὰ μὲν φεύγοντες τὰ δὲ διώκοντες τὸ δὲ πάντες, δηλονότι χωρὶς τῶν ἀγαθῶν λέγει καὶ σπουδαίων*. But *καλά* (*bona, honesta, formosa*) are regularly coupled with *ἡδέα*, as *e.g.* in *E. N.* ii. 3. 7, *τὸ συμφέρον* (not mentioned here) being the means to either. See Grant's note here. Having shown that acts done from feelings produced by painful circumstances are *voluntary*, and are praised and blamed in various degrees, Aristotle goes on in the present section to show that acts proceeding from states of mind produced by pleasant objects, or by the contemplation of what is good and honourable, are also voluntary. The parenthetical words *ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὅντα* are to be understood as describing the position of those (*εἰ δέ τις . . . φαίη*) whose view he is arguing against. Cf. *M. M.* i. 15. 1188 b. 17 *εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἡναγκάσθην τὴν τοῦ φίλου γνωμήκα διαφθεῖραι ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἀπόπος ἀν εἴη*. Pleasant things, and things that are good and honourable, cannot be said to force us, or to be the causes of involuntary actions; for (1) if they

1110 b. 9. were so, then *all* actions would be compulsory and involuntary; since it is for the sake of pleasant things, or of things that are good and honourable, that we do all that we do: (2) those who act under compulsion, and involuntarily, act with pain; those who act for the sake of the pleasant, or the good and honourable, act with pleasure: (3) this doctrine that pleasant things force us ‘leaves out of account,’ as Grant expresses it, ‘the internal susceptibility of the agent (*αὐτὸν εὐθῆρατον ὅντα*)’, and, in fact, is merely an excuse for bad actions, which are generally done for the sake of pleasant things. We take credit to ourselves for good actions, and blame pleasant things for our bad actions.

The sum of Aristotle’s teaching here is that we must not abstract a man’s motives, whether good or bad, from himself, and say that they are external to him, and force him. The later doctrines of Necessitarianism and Free Will, both apparently now defunct, equally erred in making the abstraction deprecated by Aristotle.

b. 10. πάντα ἀν εἴη αὐτῷ βίαια] Bekker reads οὔτω for αὐτῷ: but the authority for αὐτῷ—K<sup>b</sup>, L<sup>b</sup>, M<sup>b</sup>, NC, Cambr.—(accepted by Bywater) is stronger.

b. 18. § 13. οὐχ ἔκουσιον] ‘Non-voluntary.’

b. 22. τοῦ δὴ δὶ’ ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δέ] τοῦ is apparently masc. —cf. iv. 6. 9 τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δέ. There is an apparent inconsistency between the doctrine of this §, according to which the *μὴ μεταμελόμενος* is not to be called *ἄκων*, and the doctrine of § 6 above,—καὶ τὸ ἔκουσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον δὲ πράττει λεκτέον.

b. 24. § 14. ἔτερον δ’ ἔσικε καὶ τὸ δὶ’ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα] ‘Through ignorance’ . . . ‘in ignorance.’ After ἀγνοοῦντα Bekker has *ποιεῖν*, given by Γ and NC. The distinction is that between acting from unavoidable (*τὸ δὶ’ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν*), and acting in avoidable ignorance (*τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα πράττειν*). The unavoidable ignorance which can be pleaded in excuse of an action, by an agent who regrets what he has done (*μεταμελόμενος* § 13), and which constitutes (equally with *βία*) the action in question *ἀκούσιον*, is that of mere particulars (*ἢ καθ’ ἔκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἢ πρᾶξις*); e.g. (to take the example of *ἀρύχημα* given by the Paraphrast in his note on v. 8. 7)—a sportsman, shooting at a distance from the haunts of

men, kills a man who lies concealed in a thicket. He kills the man 1110 b. 24.  
 merely from ignorance of the particular fact that someone is there concealed. He possesses no general principle from which he could possibly have inferred this fact. The fact stands entirely by itself, being of so exceptional a kind that he could not have foreseen it. His ignorance therefore is described (§ 15) as *ἡ καθ' ἔκαστα*, and counts as an external cause co-ordinate with *βίᾳ*, the preposition *διά* in the phrase *δι' ἀγνοιαν πράττειν* expressing, as Michelet remarks, an agency distinct from himself, *i.e.* ignorance not due to his own carelessness or other bad habits. But if, (to take the Paraphrast's example of a *ἀμάρτημα* v. 8. 7), the sportsman shoots too near a frequented highway and unwittingly kills a passer-by, we do not acquiesce in his ignorance of the fact that someone was passing by; we go back to the cause of this ignorance—his own carelessness. We hold him responsible for his ignorance of a fact which he might have, and ought to have, inferred as probable from the general principle in his possession—that highways are frequented by travellers. His ignorance is not due to the exceptional nature of the fact, as in the first case, but to his own disposition. It is not really ignorance of a particular fact which we have here to deal with, but rather a state of ignorance—a general tendency not to notice a certain class of facts. Hence this state of ignorance, whether it consists in the non-application, or in the non-possession, in the temporary obscuration, or in the entire absence, of principles of good conduct, is described as *ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει, οὐ καθόλου ἀγνοια* (§ 15). It is not an accident external to the man. It is part of himself and whatever it causes he causes. Being *a quality in the agent*, it is, as Michelet remarks, well expressed by the participle *ἀγνοοῦντα* agreeing with the subject of *πράττειν*. But not only is it *his* ignorance, just as his health is *his* health. This would not make him socially responsible for its results. He is responsible because it supervenes although it *need not necessarily* supervene, or is not removed, when it *might* be removed. Thus a man is responsible for mistakes committed in temporary states of ignorance induced by drunkenness or passion, because to pass into these states is contingent not necessary: cf. *E. N.* iii. 5. 8 *καὶ γὰρ ἐπ'* *αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, εἴαν αἴτιος εἴναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύοντι διπλά τὰ ἐπιτίμια· η γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δὲ αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας.* For the same reason, he is responsible for acts proceeding from an established vicious cha-

1110 b. 24. racter—from total blindness to the true end of human endeavour—what Plato calls ‘the lie in the soul.’ Similarly, ignorance of a law which has been published and is easy to understand is ignorance for which a man is responsible. Hence the principle of Jurisprudence *Ignorantia juris nocet*; *ignorantia facti non nocet*. Cf. *E.N.* iii. 5. 8 καὶ τὸν ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἢ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἔστι, κολάζοντιν, ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δὶ’ ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ὃν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι.

There is of course some confusion in calling *the acts themselves* which are done δὶ’ ἀγνοιαν non-voluntary or involuntary. Strictly, the acts themselves are voluntary, but their *results* are such as the agent could not possibly have foreseen, and he is not held responsible for results which he did not contemplate and now regrets. It would be more correct to say that a man is not held responsible for such results, than that the acts are involuntary. The sportsman shoots voluntarily into the thicket, being ignorant of the fact that, contrary to all probability, a man lies concealed there. He kills the man; but is not held responsible for this unforeseen result of his voluntary act.

b. 27. διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων] διὰ μέθην καὶ ὥργην.

b. 28. ἀγνοεῖ . . . § 15 περὶ ἢ η̄ πρᾶξις] If we follow Michelet in sharply distinguishing η̄ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοια and η̄ καθόλου ἀγνοια, we may explain this passage thus—τὸ συμφέρον<sup>1</sup> is that which is useful as a means: η̄ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοια is ignorance in the choice of means to the attainment of an end, and hence is equivalent to ignorance of the συμφέρον—cf. iii. 2. 9 η̄ δὲ προαιρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος. Now this ignorance in the choice of means is not an external accident, but a condition of the agent, which he has brought upon himself by yielding to his πάθη. Hence it is not the cause of involuntary but of voluntary actions—indeed it is the cause of those reprehensible actions the repetition of which eventually establishes an evil character—μοχθηρία: οὐ γὰρ η̄ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκονσίου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας.

*Μοχθηρία* is thus the same as η̄ καθόλου ἀγνοια—ignorance of the true end itself—for it is the moral character which gives the end: iii. 5. 20 τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα. Thus, as Giphanianus observes, η̄ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοια is characteristic of the

<sup>1</sup> Bywater reads τὰ συμφέροντα given by K<sup>b</sup>, Asp., and NC.

ἀκρατής, who knows the end, but is tempted by his passions to stray 1110 b. 28. from the path of duty leading to it: while ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια is characteristic of the ἀκόλαστος, who has become permanently blind to the end. A man is responsible for both kinds of ἄγνοια—for the ἄγνοια of temporary passion, and for that of an established vicious character.

But, although Aristotle undoubtedly distinguishes in this Book *προαιρεσίς*, as concerned with the means, from *βούλησις* the wish for the end, and although it is reasonable to suppose that, in here using the term *προαιρεσίς*, he has in view the technical meaning which he is about to give it; it does not therefore follow that in using the expression ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια he has in view something as distinct from ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια as *προαιρεσίς* itself is distinct from *βούλησις*: for in iii. 3. 16 he tells us that the objects of *βούλευσις*, and therefore of *προαιρεσίς*, are not mere particulars, thus implying that they are particulars in which the *general law or rule* of conduct is seen. Hence ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια, which is equivalent to ἀγνοεῖν τὰ συμφέροντα, or ἀγνοεῖν ἀ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὅν ἀφεκτέον, is essentially ‘an ignorance of the end,’ or ‘a general ignorance,’ ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια, and, as such, is distinguished from the excusable ἡ καθ’ ἔκαστα ἄγνοια—the thought of this latter expression, as about to be used, having determined Aristotle to translate ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια into the equivalent ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια for the sake of the antithesis. ‘Η ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια is thus distinguished from ἡ καθ’ ἔκαστα ἄγνοια as being a *state*, inchoate, or established, of the *agent*, producing acts which are so far from being involuntary that they are morally evil, and confirm the evil tendency—*μοχθηρία*, from which they spring: i.e. ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια may stand either for the state of the ἀκρατής who is said to act from *ἐπιθυμίᾳ* and not with *προαιρεσίς* (iii. 2. 4)—his ἄγνοια being, in fact, the prevalence of *ἐπιθυμίᾳ* where *προαιρεσίς ought to prevail*; or for that of the ἀκόλαστος, or ὅλως κακός, who is said to act *προαιρούμενος* (vii. 7. 2), i.e. calmly and without passion choosing means to the bad end which his character sets up—the ἄγνοια being, in this case, that confirmed moral blindness to the good end which makes it possible for him ‘to choose means’ to the bad end.

‘Η ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια, accordingly, meaning ignorance which is a state or tendency inchoate or established of the agent, may, in relation to the numerous ἀμαρτίαι which flow, or are likely to flow, from it, be described as a *general ignorance*. Hence follow the

1110 b. 28. words οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου . . . ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἔκαστα—‘that is, it is not general ignorance, but particular ignorance, which makes an act involuntary.’ Here all turns on the point whether οὐδ’ necessarily distinguishes ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια from the ἄγνοια previously mentioned, or admits of being rendered as above—‘*that is*, it is *not* general ignorance,’ &c. The Paraphrast, Grant, Ramsauer, and Peters do not distinguish ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια and ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια: and, with some hesitation, I agree with them, against Michelet, for the reasons I have given, and because I believe that οὐδ’ can be legitimately rendered as above. The Paraphrast’s comment is—ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἰτία τῶν κακῶν, οὐκ ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας· οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθόλου περὶ τῆς μέθης ἄγνοεν ὅτι πονηρὸν αἴτιον γίγνεται τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄγνοησαι μερικῶς τήνδε τὴν μέθην, οἷον, φέρε εἰπεῖν, οὐκ εἰδότα μέχρι πόσου πιόντας ἐνι μεθύειν.

One further point however—Does the writer of *E. E.* ii. 9 throw any light on the present passage? Has he it in view at all? and if so, is the distinction which he draws the same as that which Michelet finds here in § 15? His words are—1225 b. 11  
 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διττόν, ἐν μὲν τὸ ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ὁ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς δικαίως ἄν ἄγνοῶν λέγοιτο, ἐστι δὲ ὡς οὐ δικαίως, οἷον εἰ δὲ ἀμέλειαν μὴ ἔχρητο. ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγοιτο ἄν, εἰ δὲ ῥάδιον ἡ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, μὴ ἔχει δὲ ἀμέλειαν ἡ ἡδονὴν ἡ λύπην. Is ὁ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δέ the man whose ignorance is ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει—Michelet’s ‘ignorance in the choice of means,’ and ὁ μὴ ἔχων the man whose ignorance is ἡ καθόλου—‘universal,’ i.e. ‘of the end’? cf. the οὐδ’ ἡ καθόλου (*ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε ταύτην*) of the *E. N.* with the ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγοιτο ἄν of the *E. E.*

1111 a. 1. § 15. ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ] ‘Ignorance of the particular occasion and circumstances of the act’—Peters. Better—‘the persons and things affected by the act’: see below, notes on § 18.

a. 4. § 16. περὶ τί ἡ ἐν τίνι] ‘On what object or person?’

a. 9. § 17. λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς] Liddell-and-Scott has ‘ἔξεπεσέ με—it escaped me unawares, Arist. *Eth. N.* 3. 1. 17,’ but quotes no other instance of the usage. Ramsauer defends the usage—‘Ἐκπίπτει με alienum a Graecae linguae indole non dixerit qui meminerit legi ἐκβαίνειν, ἔξελεῖν χώραν.’ The Paraphrast, how-

ever (perhaps reading λέγοντας), seems to make the subject of 1111 a. 9. ἐκπεσεῖν the persons—λέγοντας γάρ περὶ ἄλλων συγχυθῆναι φασι, καὶ τι καὶ περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων παραφθέγξασθαι, μὴ συνορῶντας δὲ λέγοντι, η̄ καὶ ἀγνοοῦντας ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν—i.e. ἐκπεσεῖν (=συγχυθῆναι) means ‘to be confused,’ ‘put out,’ as we might say. The Ald. Schol., again, has—οἶν λέγοντός μου ἔξεπεσέν μοι τοιοῦτον ῥῆμα—as though he read λέγοντας, and understood the clause to mean, ‘they say that, in the course of their talk, the word escaped them.’ Aspasia has—τὸ δὲ τί ἔστιν τὸ πραττόμενον, ὅπερ ἐκπεπτώκεναι ⟨λέγοντι, Heylbut⟩ αὐτούς, ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά.

**Αἰσχύλος]** Tried and acquitted by the Court of Areopagus: see a. 10. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* ii. 387, Ael. *V. H.* v. 19, and the Ald. Schol.

**ἡ Μερόπη]** The Ald. Schol. has—καὶ ἔστι παρ’ Εὑριπίδη ἐν τῷ a. 12. Κρεσφόντη ἐπιβουλεύοντα Κρεσφόντη τῷ νιῷ ὡς πολεμίῳ δὶ’ ἄγνοιαν. Cf. *Poet.* 14. 1454 a. 5 ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντη ἡ Μερόπη μέλλει τὸν νιὸν ἀποκτεῖνεν ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ’ ἀνεγνώρισεν. Cf. *Plut.* περὶ σαρκοφαγίας 2. 5 (quoted by Coraæs) σκόπει δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ Μερόπην ἐπὶ τὸν νιὸν αὐτὸν ὡς φονέα τοῦ νιὸν πελεκυν ἀραμένην καὶ λέγονταν

ὅσιωτέραν δὴ τήνδ’ ἐγὼ δίδωμι σοι  
πληγήν—

ὅστον ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ κίνημα ποιεῖ.

**ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ]** λελογχωμένον δόρυν ἔστι τὸ ἔχον ἐπ’ ἄκρου σιδήριον ὁξύν, τὴν καλουμένην λόγχην, χρήσιμον εἰς τὰς μάχας· ὅπερ οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι γυμνασίας ἔνεκα καὶ οὐ μάχης ἥβλυνον, σφαιροῦντες ἡ σκυτοῦντες, οἵα εἰσι τὰ παρὰ τοῖς Γάλλοις καλούμενα *fleurets*. Coraæs.

**ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας]** This is the certain emendation of Bernays a. 13. (accepted by Susem. and Bywater) for the *παίσας* of the codd. *Πιπίσκειν* is ‘to give to drink.’ The illustrations in the parallel passages—*E. E.* ii. 9, and *M. M.* i. 16—bear out the emendation.

**θεῖαι]** restored by Susem. and Bywater in place of the *δεῖξαι* of a. 14. most MSS.

**ἀκροχειριζόμενοι]** explained by the Ald. Schol.—ἔστι τὸ πυκτεύειν a. 15. ἡ παγκρατιάζειν πρὸς ἔτερον ἀνευ συμπλοκῆς ἡ ὄλως ἄκραις ταῖς χερσὶ μετ’ ἀλλήλων. ‘It is what we call “sparring”,’—Grant.

The various forms that ἡ ἄγνοια ἡ καθ’ ἔκαστα may take are thus illustrated in the present section in the order in which they are

- 1111 a. 15. enumerated in section 16. Ignorance (1) of the thing done (*τι*)—Aeschylus and the Mysteries, the catapult accident: (2) of the object of the act (*περὶ τί ἡ ἐν τίνι*)—Merope's mistake: (3) of the instrument (*τίνι*)—the pointed spear, the stone mistaken for pumice-stone: (4) of the result of the act (*τὸ οὖ ἔνεκα*)—killing by a potion intended to cure: (5) of the manner (*πῶς*)—when in sparring a man hits harder than he supposes or wishes.
- a. 16. § 18. *ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις*] bracketed by Ramsauer, l. 16. In line 18 the same expression occurs in a specific sense,—the persons affected by the act.
- a. 18. *κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὐδὲν ἔνεκα*] ‘The most important circumstances are the objects of the action and its result’—as the Paraphrast explains, *τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ τὸ ἔργον*. The *οὐδὲν ἔνεκα* here is not, as usual, the *intention* of the doer, for he cannot be ignorant of what he intends to do; but the *outcome* or *result* of what he actually does, which is the opposite of his intention. See Grant *ad loc.*
- a. 24. §§ 20, 21.] In the words *ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἡ ἐπιθυμίαν* it is implied that the position *ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἡ ἐπιθυμίαν* is inconsistent with the definition of *τὸ ἑκούσιον* just laid down. This position must be examined, for if it is correct, the definition will require modification, *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* being *ἀρχαὶ ἐν αὐτῷ*.
- a. 27. § 23.] Here, as elsewhere in this Book, Aristotle maintains the necessity of keeping the question of the *voluntariness* of actions distinct from that of their *goodness or badness*. Popular thought tended to merge these two questions. All actions, Aristotle argues, proceeding from modifiable feelings and states of the agent, are voluntary; it matters not, so far as the voluntariness of the actions is concerned, whether the feelings and states are morally good or bad, *i.e.* are the causes of morally good, or of morally bad actions. Further, in this section, Aristotle makes it clear that he regards *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* as the sources of *τὰ καλά*. In his system, the passions are not abolished, but regulated. *Ἄρετή* is the result of the *εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων* (Eustrat.). The passions supply the motive power in action; *διάνοια δ' αὐτῇ οὐθὲν κινεῖ* (vi. 2. 5).

ἔνος γε αἰτίου ὅντος] ‘As one man is the author of both’—Peters. 1111 a. 28.  
Better—ἐν γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον, θυμὸς ἡ ἐπιθυμία—Par.

§ 24. ὃν δεῖ δρέγεσθαι] Θυμός and ἐπιθυμία are two species of the a. 30. genus ὄρεξις, the third species being βούλησις (see *E. E.* ii. 7. 1223 a. 26), not as yet mentioned. Θυμός and ἐπιθυμία elicited by proper objects (ὃν δεῖ δρέγεσθαι) are surely not causes of involuntary actions. To hold that they are would be to maintain the position, which nobody apparently wishes to maintain, that τὰ καλά are involuntary.

§ 26.] The Paraph. has—εἰ ἀκούσια ἦν τὰ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα, a. 33. διέφερεν ἀν τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ λογισμοῦ ἀμαρτανομένων, κατὰ τὴν ἔκουσίον καὶ ἀκουσίον διαφοράν διαφέρει δὲ οὐδέν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ὄμοιως ἐκείνοις φευκτά, ὃ τοῦ ἔκουσίον ἐστί, καὶ ψύγων ἄξια οὐδὲν ἥττον· ὅπερ οὐκ ἀν ἦν, εἰ διέφερεν ὡς ἔκουσίον ἀκουσίον. The force of the section may be brought out thus—‘Further, do the faults of anger differ from those of calculation in being involuntary? Surely not. Faults of both kinds should be avoided, and the irrational passions seem to be no less part of human nature than the reason.’

§ 27.] ὕστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου *(αἱ)* ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ b. 1. ἐπιθυμίας] K<sup>b</sup> and Γ give ὕστε καὶ αἱ, and the αἱ before ἀπό is a conjecture adopted by Byw. from Susemihl. Τοῦ ἀνθρώπου thus becomes the predicate in correspondence with ἀνθρωπικά in the line above. The other authorities (followed by Bekker) instead of ὕστε καὶ αἱ give αἱ δέ. This latter was evidently the reading which the Paraph. had: his words are—ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἄλογα πάθη καὶ ἀνθρώπινα εἰσιν ὥσπερ ὁ λογισμός· ἀπὸ τούτων δὲ τῶν παθῶν, θυμοῦ δηλονότι καὶ ἐπιθυμίας, πᾶσαι αἱ ἀνθρώπιναι γίνονται πράξεις.

The writer of the *E. E.* discusses the relation of τὸ ἔκουσιον and τὸ ἀκούσιον to ἐπιθυμία and θυμός in ii. 7. His first position is 1223 a. 33 τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρόν (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἥδεος). ὕστε βίᾳον καὶ ἀκούσιον τὸ ἄρα κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἔκουσιον. His second position takes the form of an ἀπορία, through which he eventually passes to the solution of the problem of the nature of τὸ ἔκουσιον. 1223 b. 3 ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτων δόξειεν ἀν τὸ κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἔκουσιον εἶναι, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε τούναντίον. ἀπαν γὰρ ὁ ἔκών τις πράττει, βούλόμενος πράττει, καὶ ὁ βούλεται, ἔκών. βούλεται δ’ οὐθεὶς ὁ οὔεται εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος οὐχ ἁ βούλεται ποιεῖ τὸ γὰρ παρ’ ὁ οὔεται βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστίν. ὕστε ἄμα συμβήσεται τὸν αὐτὸν ἔκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν τοῦτο δ’ ἀδύνατον.

1111 b. 1. Wish (*βούλησις*) is voluntary; but the *άκρατής*, who acts *κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν*, acts contrary to his wish; therefore to act *κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν* is to act involuntarily. But, as the writer points out in the next chapter (*E. E.* ii. 8), this *ἀπορία* owes its existence to an unwarranted abstraction. We are not entitled to look at *ἐπιθυμία* by itself as constituting the man, and to say that in the *έγκρατής* it is forced by *λογισμός*, or at *λογισμός* by itself, and say that in the *άκρατής* it is forced by *ἐπιθυμία*—1224 b. 26 ἡ δ' ὅλη ἔκοῦσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἔγκρατοῦς πράττει, βίᾳ δ' οὐδέτερος. *'Ἐπιθυμία*, in short, is as much the man as *λογισμός*, and action consequent upon either is voluntary. The same remarks apply to *θυμός*.

In the *Rhetoric* i. 10. 1368 b. 32 seven causes of action are enumerated—*τύχη*, *φύσις*, and *βία* of involuntary, and *ἔθος*, *λογισμός*, *θυμός*, and *ἐπιθυμία* of voluntary actions:—*πάντες δὴ πάντα πράττουσι τὰ μὲν οὐ δἰ' αὐτοὺς τὰ δὲ δἰ' αὐτούς*. τῶν μὲν οὖν μὴ δἰ' αὐτοὺς τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττουσι τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τῶν δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν βίᾳ τὰ δὲ φύσει, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα μὴ δἰ' αὐτοὺς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δὲ βίᾳ. ὅσα δὲ δἰ' αὐτούς, καὶ ὡν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δἰ' ἔθος τὰ δὲ δἰ' ὄρεξιν τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ δἰ' ἄλογον ἔστιν δ' η μὲν βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ' η ὅταν οἰηθῇ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἄλογοι δ' ὄρεξεις ὄργη καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττειν δἰ' αἰτίας ἐπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, δἰ' ἔθος, διὰ λογισμόν, διὰ θυμόν, δἰ' ἐπιθυμίαν.

## CHAPTER II.

### ARGUMENT.

*Let us now discuss Choice: for its connexion with moral virtue is intimate, and it is a better criterion of character than overt action is.*

*Choice falls as a species under ‘the voluntary,’ i. e. ‘the voluntary’ is of wider extent, for (1) while children and brutes are as capable of voluntary action as adult men are, they are incapable of choice: and (2) the sudden acts of adult men are voluntary acts, but not acts of choice.*

*Some have identified choice with desire or passion: but (1) the lower animals have desire and passion, without having the power of choice: and (2) the acts of the incontinent man result from desire, not from choice, those of the continent man from choice, not from desire: (3) there is a contrariety between desire and choice; for desire is related to things simply qua pleasant and painful, but choice is not related to its objects qua pleasant and painful, but qua good and bad.*

The difference between choice and passion is even more marked than that between it and desire—acts which we perform in a passion we are very far from waiting to choose.

Others again have identified choice with wish. The two are closely connected, but there is a difference: for we never choose an impossibility, although we may wish it, e.g. we may wish never to die. Again, we often wish for results which we have no power to bring about, e.g. that a certain competitor may get the prize; whereas we only choose what we can ourselves bring about. Further, wish is properly of the end, e.g. we wish health; choice of the means, e.g. we choose to do this, that, and the other thing conducive to health, in all cases the objects of choice being things which lie within our power.

Nor is choice opinion, for we may have opinions about all things in heaven and earth, not merely about things which lie within our power; and opinions are distinguished as true or false, whereas choice is good or bad. But if we may not for these reasons identify choice with opinion generally, perhaps we may identify it with opinion about right and wrong in conduct. No: for choosing rightly or wrongly makes us good or bad men; but having opinions about right and wrong does not. And it is correct to say ‘we choose to do something,’ but not to say ‘we have an opinion to do something.’ It is ‘about something’ that we have an opinion. Again choice is praised for having a good object; opinion, for being true; and what we choose is that which we consider good; but we form an opinion about a thing independently of any such consideration. Nor do we always find good choice and true opinion going together. There are some people with excellent opinions who have bad characters, and choose as they ought not. It is another question, which does not concern us, whether an opinion precedes, or attends, an act of choice: at any rate we have shown that the two are not to be identified.

What then remains after all these exclusions? In choosing, as we have seen, we always act voluntarily; but in acting voluntarily we do not always wait to choose—we sometimes act on the spur of the moment, from mere desire. It remains therefore that, in acting from choice, we act voluntarily, not on the spur of the moment, but deliberately; consequently the object of choice is a voluntary act, about which a man has deliberated. After going through a process of reasoning he prefers that which he ‘chooses.’

§§ 1-14. περὶ προαιρέσεως] This chapter treats of *προαιρέσις* or 1111 b. 5. deliberate choice (late Latin *electio*: see Victorius *ad loc.*). *Προαιρέσις* is a species of τὸ ἔκούσιον—§ 2 ή *προαιρέσις* δὴ ἔκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτὸν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἔκούσιον—i.e. τὸ ἔκούσιον is of wider extent, for (1) children and brutes have τὸ ἔκούσιον, but not *προαιρέσις*: (2) sudden acts are ἔκούσια but not κατὰ *προαιρέσιν*. Again *προαιρέσις* is not ἐπιθυμία or θυμός, for (1) irrational animals have ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, but not *προαιρέσις*: (2) ἐπιθυμία and *προαιρέσις* must be distinct principles, for the supremacy of the one or the other constitutes the different character of the ἀκρατής or of the ἐγκρατής respectively: (3) the opposition between *προαιρέσις*

1111 b. 5. and *ἐπιθυμία* is something very different from that between one *ἐπιθυμία* and another: (4) the relation of *ἐπιθυμία* to pleasure and pain is very different from that of *προαιρεσίς* to pleasure and pain: (5) the difference between *θυμός* and *προαιρεσίς* is even more striking than that between *ἐπιθυμία* and *προαιρεσίς*. Acts done from *θυμός* are the very opposite of acts from deliberate choice. Again *προαιρεσίς* is not the same as *βούλησις*, *wish*, for (1) *προαιρεσίς* is of things in our power, *βούλησις* often for impossibilities: (2) *βούλησις* has properly to do with the end, *προαιρεσίς* with the means. Again *προαιρεσίς* is not the same as *δόξα*, for (1) *δόξα* is about all things—impossibilities as well as things in our power: (2) *δόξαι* are distinguished as true or false, not as *good* or *evil*. Nor is *προαιρεσίς* the same as *δόξα τις*, *i.e.* an opinion on matters of conduct (cf. *E.E.* ii. 10. 1226 a. 4 οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὅντων πρακτῶν δόξα, ἢ τυγχάνομεν οἴόμενοι δεῖν τι πράττειν ἢ οὐ πράττειν)—for such opinions, however sound, do not affect the character as a series of *προαιρέσεις* does: (3) we ‘choose to take or avoid’; but we do not ‘opine to take or avoid’: (4) *προαιρεσίς* is praised for its goodness, *δόξα* for its truth: (5) we choose what we have reason to consider good, but form opinions about things quite irrespectively of this consideration—ἀ οὐ πάντις ἵσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα (but see note *ad loc.* § 13): (6) it is not always the same men who choose best and who have the best views or opinions on matters of conduct, for some choose through wickedness what they speculatively disapprove.

The point that *δόξα* precedes, or attends, *προαιρεσίς* is not controverted in the foregoing arguments, which are directed merely against the view that *προαιρεσίς*, and *δόξα*, or *δόξα τις*, are identical.

In iii. 3. 19 Aristotle defines *προαιρεσίς* as *βουλευτικὴ ὥρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν*. It is the choice of things in our power, after deliberation; as he says in § 17 of the present Chapter—it is *μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας*, *i.e.* it *implies* the exercise of the reasoning faculty. It is not an irrational impulse, like *ἐπιθυμία* or *θυμός*, and, at the same time, it is not purely intellectual, like *δόξα*, but belongs to the appetitive side of our nature (*ὥρεξις*). For the Eudemian account of *προαιρεσίς* see note on vi. 12. 8.

b. 5. § 1. οἰκειότατον κ.τ.λ.] Cf. *E.E.* ii. 11. 1228 a. 2 ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποιός τις τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ τίνος ἔνεκα πράττει, ἀλλ' οὐ τί πράττει . . . ἔτι πάντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν προαιρεσίν βλέποντες μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα· καίτοι αἱρετώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς . . .

ἔτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι ἵδεν τὴν προάρεσιν ὅποια τις, διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν 1111 b. 5. ἔργων ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν ποῖος τις. αἱρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἐπαινετώτερον δ' ἡ προάρεσις. Cf. *E. N.* x. 8. 5. The doctrine of the present section is already involved in Aristotle's definition of ἀρετή as ἔξις προαιρετική κ.τ.λ.

**§ 2. τὰ ἔξαιφνης**] Ramsauer compares what is said in iii. 8. 15—b. 9. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἡ ἐν τοῖς προδῆλοις ἀπὸ ἔξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἡττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἄν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προελοιτο, τὰ δ' ἔξαιφνης κατὰ τὴν ἔξι.

According to both passages, apparently, *τὰ ἔξαιφνης* are not *κατὰ προάρεσιν*: but according to the later passage the *ἔξις* of *ἀνδρείᾳ* is specially shown in them. How is this to be reconciled with the definition of *ἀρετή* as *ἔξις προαιρετική*? By pointing out that the virtuous *ἔξις* is the organic result, as it were, of many acts of rational choice, which, at first hesitating and difficult, have at last become 'secondarily automatic.' In the first passage Aristotle contrasts sudden acts in general with those chosen after deliberation; in the second passage he has specially in view the sudden emergencies which call for prompt action on the part of the courageous man; and he says, in effect, that the truly courageous man, *having organised his deliberation*, will be ready for these emergencies; that, in relation to them, he will show how well organised his *προαιρετική ἔξις* of courage is; whereas *τὰ προφανῆ* may be faced, after deliberation, by one whose deliberation is not yet organised—has not yet become 'secondarily automatic.'

**§ 4.]** Peters' translation here is—'The continent man, on the b. 13. other hand, deliberately chooses what he does, *but does not desire it.*' Better—'the continent man acts from deliberate choice, not from mere desire,' for we must remember that *προάρεσις* is *βουλευτικὴ ὅρεξις* (*E. N.* iii. 3. 19), and involves appetite and desire.

**§ 5. καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ** b. 15. *οὐ*]  
This does not mean that one desire is never *opposed* to another (cf. Ald. Schol. *ad loc.* δοκεῖ καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντία, οἷον εἴ τις δόξῃ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ, ὃν τὸ μὲν δεῖται δαπάνης, ὁ χρηματισμὸς δὲ φειδοῦ περιγίνεται χρημάτων), but that the opposition is not of the nature of *contrary* opposition; whereas deliberate choice and desire are opposed as contraries (*ἐναντία*), if opposed at all. Two desires

1111 b. 15. relating to *two different* objects may indeed clash and wrangle; but deliberate choice and desire, relating to *the same* object, are opposed in a much more definite manner. Desire seeks to possess it, because it is pleasant; deliberate choice, keeping in view the permanent welfare of the whole man, declines it. The opposition between desire and deliberate choice is, in fact, that between desire and reason—between the tendency to disorder and the principle of order—a definite and standing opposition, very different from the accidental, and often temporary, opposition which obtains between two desires. An illustration may help to make this great difference clear. Two disorderly and self-seeking factions in a state may oppose each other bitterly, or may join hands against the orderly government which strives to repress them both. Their opposition to each other is accidental, not necessary. But the opposition of orderly government to faction is a necessary one, as long as the state, in the proper acceptation of the term, lasts. In the *Republic*, Plato has sketched the décadence of a state, in which order, or *λόγος*, has ceased to assert itself, and various *ἐπιθυμίαι* assume in turn the functions of government. A strong passion, such as that for honour, or wealth, may, for a time, preserve order in its own interest, and maintain the semblance of a state, but is soon overpowered by a coalition of other passions, which, having obtained mastery over it, begin to wrangle among themselves, till a passion stronger than the rest—personified as the demagogue-tyrant—vaults into supremacy. (*Rep.* 545 sqq.) No one *ἐπιθυμία* is necessarily and always opposed to another. Each has its own object, which may, or may not, at a given time, be compatible with that of another. But so far as all *ἐπιθυμίαι*, as such, seek objects which stand out of relation to an orderly system, they are essentially opposed to reason, the principle of order, and therefore to its exponent, deliberate choice. Reason is the permanent personality of the man, which distinguishes itself from every passing desire. It coexists with the desire, and distinguishes itself from it. But one desire does not really *coexist* with another: *i.e.* two desires do not quarrel about the possession of the *same* thing. Each merely seeks its own object, and is unconscious of, and careless of, the object of the other. The technical meaning of the word *ἐναντιοῦται* thus gives the key to the interpretation of the passage before us, as the Ald. Schol. seems to have seen. His words are—*ἀδύνατον τὸν αὐτὸν ἄμα ἐπιθυμεῖν τοῦ τε τραφῆναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ*

*τρ.φῆναι*: οὗτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἐναντία τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ δτι περὶ τὸ αὐτό. 1111 b. 15.  
*Cf. Met. Δ. 10. 1018 a. 25* ἐναντία λέγεται τά τε μὴ δυνατὰ ἄμα τῷ αὐτῷ παρεῖναι τῶν διαφέροντων κατὰ γένος, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν ταύτῳ δεκτικῷ, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ὅν ἡ διαφορὰ μεγίστη ἡ ἀπλῶς ἡ κατὰ γένος ἡ κατ' εἶδος. Contrariety (*ἐναντιότης*) is between things in relation to the same quality, or circumstance, not in relation to different qualities, or circumstances; e.g. *ἐπιθυμία* urges a man to drink, and *προαίρεσις* restrains him from drinking: *ἐπιθυμία* and *προαίρεσις* are here opposed (as contraries, *ἐναντία*) on the common ground of drinking. But there is no such common ground on which two *ἐπιθυμίαι* can be opposed. One *ἐπιθυμία* does not urge the man to drink, and another restrain him. He does not ‘desire’ at the same moment to drink and not to drink. The ‘opposition’ between *ἐπιθυμίαι* is of a less definite kind than this: e.g. the desire of drink may be ‘opposed’ to that of money; but this is not ‘contrary’ opposition (*οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται*), because *ἐναντία* are properly the most distant extremes within the same class, and the desire of drink and the desire of money fall under different classes. But to desire to drink, and to choose not to drink are ‘contraries,’ both falling under the class of attitudes towards drinking.

The special explanation of the term *ἐναντίον* given in *E.N.* ii. 8, 8 also throws light on the passage before us. The extreme which represents a naturally strong desire is there said to be ‘more contrary’ to the mean, or good choice, than the extreme which represents a naturally weaker desire; i.e. it is more difficult, and more painful, to avoid the extreme which represents a naturally strong desire; for, as desire is of pleasure, the opposition to desire must involve pain. Hence *προαίρεσις* μὲν *ἐπιθυμία* *ἐναντιοῦται*. But if one *ἐπιθυμία* conquers another, it is because we like it better—no pain is involved—*ἐπιθυμία* δ’ *ἐπιθυμία* οὐ.

The contrariety of *λογισμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* is discussed in *Rep.* 440, q. v.

καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία . . . οὕθ' ἥδεος] The Paraph. has—*ἔτι* ἡ μὲν b. 16. *ἐπιθυμία* λυπηρά ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἥδον ἀεὶ ἀντικείμενον ἔχει (*πρὸς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἀεὶ φέρεται*), ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις οὕτε λυπηρά ἔστιν οὕτε τὸ ἥδον ἀντικείμενον ἔχει. He seems to have had before him the reading *ἐπιλυπός* (Cod. Victor.), ἡ προαίρεσις δ’ οὕτε λυπηρὰ (N b) οὕθ' ἥδεος. Adopting the reading of Bekker's and Bywater's texts, we may explain the state-

1111 b. 16. ment thus—*ἐπιθυμία* is concerned directly and exclusively with pleasure, which it seeks, and pain, which it avoids—the two being very intimately connected, since the pain which it avoids is that of the emptiness which it seeks to fill with pleasure (cf. *E. N.* vii. 12. 2). The Paraphrast's reading *ἐπιλυπός* was evidently intended to bring out this meaning, which, however, is sufficiently plain in the better supported reading *ἐπιλύπον*.

But *λυπηρά* for *λυπηροῦ* involves a blunder in Aristotelian doctrine. *Προαιρεσίς*, when, in the *έγκρατής*, it declines an importunate pleasure, or, in the *ἀνδρεῖος*, chooses wounds and death in a noble cause, of course involves pain: see *E. N.* iii. 9, §§ 2-5 διὸ καὶ ἐπιλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία κ.τ.λ. So, we cannot read ἡ προαιρεσίς δ' οὐτε λυπηρὰ οὖθ' ἥδεος. But it is true to say that 'deliberate choice is not concerned with the painful or the pleasant.' Its object is the *καλόν*, *συμφέρον*, or *ἀγαθόν* generally. It does not seek merely to get present pleasure, and avoid present pain, as *ἐπιθυμία* does, but it looks at *πράξεις* and *πάθη* in their relations to an end. It has to do with the selection of means, irrespectively of the immediate pleasure obtained, or pain avoided, in the course of the selection. The end, of course, whether high or low, is regarded by the agent as good and pleasant. The text followed by the Paraphrast, though obviously corrupt in the form in which he had it, may, however, represent the source from which the writer of the parallel passage in the *Eudemian Ethics* (ii. 10. 1225 b. 30), derived his—ἕτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ θυμός ἀεὶ μετὰ λύπης προαιρούμεθα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἀνευ λύπης—a statement which is true.

- b. 18. § 6.] Cf. the comparison of *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* in vii. 6. 1-5.
- b. 19. § 7. *βούλησις*] not will, but *wish*.
- b. 23. *ἀθανασίας*] merely 'exemption from death.' The question of the 'immortality of the soul' is not raised here: see Zell and Grant.
- b. 26. § 9. *τέλους ἔστι μᾶλλον*] 'Again we are more properly said "to wish the end," "to choose the means."'-Peters. This brings out correctly the force of *μᾶλλον*. The words in iii. ch. 3, § 20-ch. 4, § 1 seem to imply that the proper use of both terms is perfectly definite—that as *προαιρεσίς* is only of means so *βούλησις* is only of the end,—ἡ μὲν οὖν προαιρεσίς τύπω εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποιά ἔστι καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τελη. ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἔστιν εἴρηται. Eude-

mus is equally explicit with regard to προαιρεσις—*E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 1111 b. 26.  
 a. 7 οὐθεὶς γὰρ τέλος οὐδὲν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. But with  
 regard to βούλησις he says βούλεται δέ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος (1226 a.  
 13), and βούλεσθαι μὲν καὶ δόξα μάλιστα τοῦ τέλους, προαιρεσις δ' οὐκ  
 ἔστιν (1226 a. 16)—which may be thought to suggest the propriety  
 of limiting the reference of μᾶλλον in the passage before us (*E. N.*  
 iii. 2. 9) to βούλησις, notwithstanding the absolute statement in *E. N.*  
 iii. 4. 1 ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἔστιν εἴρηται. The Paraphrast  
 however has—ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἔστιν ἀεὶ, ἡ δὲ προαιρεσις τῶν  
 πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερόντων.

βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν] *sc.* ὅτι βουλόμεθα εὐδαιμονεῖν. Ramsauer. b. 28.

§ 10. περὶ τὰ ἀίδια] We are to understand that δόξα may *pro-* b. 32.  
*pounce upon* *upon* ἀίδια, as upon anything in heaven or earth (*cf.* vii. 3. 4  
 δῆλοι δ' Ἡράκλειτος); but only ἐπιστήμη has them as its *true objects*:  
 see vi. 3. 2.

§ 11. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τινί] An opinion on moral matters—as is made 1112 a. 1.  
 clear by the parallel passage *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 a. 4 οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ τῶν  
 ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων πρακτῶν δόξα γῆ τυγχάνομεν οἰόμενοι δεῖν τι πράττειν η̄ οὐ  
 πράττειν. The Ald. Schol. has—οὐδὲ τινί οἶν τῇ περὶ τούτων περὶ ἡ̄ ἡ  
 προαιρεσις· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν προαιρεσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν η̄ κακῶν ποιὸι ἔσμεν· η̄ γὰρ  
 ἀγαθοὶ η̄ κακοὶ· κατὰ δὲ τὴν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων δόξαν οὐκέτι ἀγαθοὶ η̄  
 κακοὶ· οὐ γὰρ ὁ δοξάζων ὅτι η̄ ἀνδρία ἀγαθὸν η̄ η̄ δικαιοσύνη ηδη καὶ ἀν-  
 δρεῖος η̄ ἀγαθός· ὁ προαιρούμενος δέ· τοῦ γὰρ ἀκρατοῦς δόξα μὲν ὄρθη, προαιρε-  
 σις δ' οὐ. We can gather from this section what Aristotle would  
 have thought of the tendency to estimate a man's character by his  
 speculative belief.

§ 12. φυγεῖν [ἢ] τι] Bywater brackets η̄. It is omitted by Kb. a. 3.

οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν] 'We never opine.' πάνυ intensifies the nega- a. 5.  
 tive, as in the next section—ἀ οὐ πάνυ ἵσμεν (*sc.* ἀγαθὰ ὄντα).

§ 13. η̄ τῷ ὄρθωσ] η̄ is here equivalent to η̄τοι, and introduces a. 6.  
 words explanatory of οὐ δεῖ. A comma between μᾶλλον and η̄, as in  
 Coraes' text, would prevent a natural misunderstanding of the con-  
 struction.

ἀ οὐ πάνυ ἵσμεν] *sc.* ἀγαθὰ ὄντα. It is necessary to supply these a. 8.  
 words in order to give the argument force. Ramsauer, who fails  
 to supply them, is aware that the argument, as he conceives it, is a  
 weak one; for he says—'parum in sexto hoc arguento ponderis:  
 ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζοντιν, ἀλλ' οἶονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι (vii.  
 3. 3). Poterit igitur nihilominus η̄ προαιρεσις esse δόξα τις.' Aristotle

1112 a. 8. means to say here that we choose what we have reason to consider good, but form opinions about things quite irrespectively of this consideration. Here an important difference is noted between choice and opinion: the former relates to the good, the latter does not. The Paraphrast's note I accordingly regard as wrong—*ὅτι προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἀ σφόδρα γινώσκομεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἀ οὐ πάντα γινώσκομεν ἀληθῆ εἶναι.*

a. 10. § 14. *ἐνιοι]* οἱ ἀκρατεῖς, see vii. 3 on the relation of *ἀκρασία* to *δόξα*.

a. 11. § 15. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως κ.τ.λ.] That opinion precedes (and accompanies) choice is undoubtedly Aristotle's opinion, see iii. 3. 17 τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκριθὲν προαιρετόν ἔστι. Cf. *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 b. 9 ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἔστιν ἡ προαιρεσίς: cf. also *E. N.* vii. 3. 9 where the premisses of the Practical Syllogism are described as *δόξαι*: and *de An.* iii. 10. 433 b. 27 ὁ ὄρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτη αὐτοῦ κινητικόν ὄρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἡ λογιστικὴ ἡ αἰσθητική.

For the use of the term *παρακολουθεῖ* Ramsauer quotes *E. E.* ii. 10. 1225 b. 21 μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρά τινων, καὶ ξητοῦντι δόξεις δ' ἀν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον ἡ προαιρεσίς, ητοι δόξα ἡ ὄρεξις ἀμφότερα γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολούθουντα. *Προαιρεσίς* is not identical with either *ὄρεξις* or *δόξα*, but 'involves' both.

a. 16. § 17. *μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας*] Both terms mark an intellectual process, as distinguished from an intellectual act—they mark an association of ideas, a train of thought, a review of the circumstances of the case in their relation to the possibility and advisableness of taking action. 'Choice implies reasoning, and a process of thought.' That 'association of ideas,' 'train of thought,' 'intellectual process' is one of the prominent meanings of *λόγος* is shown by the fact that it is frequently used for *συλλογισμός*: while, in its dominant sense, *διάνοια* is the faculty of *joining* and *separating νοήματα*—see passages quoted in notes on vi. 2. 2, 3; cf. also vi. 9. 3 where *διάνοια* is said not to be an assertion, or finished intellectual result—*διανοία ἄρα λείπεται (όρθοτητα εἶναι τὴν εὑβουλίαν) αὗτη γὰρ (i.e. διάνοια) οὕπω φάσις.*

a. 17. *πρὸ ἔτέρων αἱρετόν]* 'προαιρεσίς, lit. "choosing before." Our "preference" exactly corresponds here, but unfortunately cannot always be employed.' Peters.

## CHAPTER III.

## ARGUMENT.

*What then is Deliberation? And what are the things about which we deliberate?—for plainly we do not deliberate about everything. In the first place, not about things which a fool or madman might think fit to ‘deliberate about’—nor about the eternal and immutable verities of the Universe and of Mathematics—nor yet about those changes, whether produced by necessity, or nature, or however produced, which take place uniformly, like the changes of the seasons—nor about those events which occur without uniformity, like rains and droughts—nor about chance events, such as the discovery of a buried treasure—nor yet about all which concerns the conduct of human life, for example no Lacedaemonian thinks of deliberating how the blessings of good government may be conferred upon the Scythians.*

*It remains then that we deliberate about things which lie within our own power. We have nothing to do with things which are accomplished by other causes than Man’s efficiency, i. e. nothing to do with things produced by Nature, Necessity, and Chance, the other causes commonly enumerated.*

*Every man deliberates about those things which he has it in his power to accomplish—but not where he has the guidance of an exact Science or Art. He does not deliberate, for example, how to shape letters, and spell words—for there can be no doubt about that—but where the things, which it is in his power to accomplish, or affect, are not uniformly the same, but vary according to circumstances, as, for example, the things which a doctor or merchant has to deal with vary according to circumstances. Thus, there is more room for deliberation in navigation than in gymnastic, navigation being a less exact system than gymnastic. For the same reason there is wider scope for deliberation in matters of opinion than in matters of scientific knowledge. We deliberate, in short, where results can be predicted with more or less probability, but not with certainty; and where great issues are involved, we try to get other people to join with us in our deliberations, because we fear that by ourselves we shall not be able to come to a right decision.*

*It is not about the end that we deliberate, but about the means. We set an end before ourselves, and then enquire how, and by what means, we can reach it: if there are more ways than one of reaching it, we enquire which is the best and easiest way; if there is only one way, we review its steps in the backward direction, till we come to the first step, which is the last to be thought of, but the first to be actually taken.*

*Here the man who deliberates may be compared with the man who solves a*

geometrical problem by analysing an assumption into simpler and simpler elements, till he comes to something sufficiently evident to serve as the starting-point of the synthetic process by which he is conducted to the solution. If, in the course of his deliberative analysis of the successive steps, a man comes upon a step which he sees cannot be taken—e.g. a step impossible without money which cannot be procured—he gives up the idea of trying to reach the end; but if all the steps seem possible, he takes the matter in hand. By ‘possible’ we mean able to be effected by himself, for that which is effected for him through the instrumentality of his friends may be said to be effected by himself, inasmuch as he is the cause of the actions of his friends. His friends are his instruments, and an important part of deliberation is always about instruments—what instruments are at my disposal, and how shall I use them?

*Man is a Principle or Cause of Actions. Deliberation is about Actions, i.e. about means (for actions are means), not about the end. But, although thus concerned with particulars, deliberation is not concerned with them as sense is, which takes each by itself, and merely says—‘this is white,’ ‘that is sweet.’ Deliberation reviews certain particulars as members of a definite system—as conspiring to the end, and is thus a process with clear limits, although concerned with particulars.*

What deliberation considers, and choice selects, is the same step viewed at different times. Before anything is settled the step is simply ‘under deliberation’; but when, as the result of deliberation, it is once for all preferred to other steps, it is ‘chosen.’ A man comes to the end of his review of practical steps when he reaches the point at which his own efficiency begins, i.e. when he brings the matter to where he, with his leading principle, or power of choice, can do something. Thus in the Homeric constitution the deliberation of the chiefs ended with the practical decision announced by them to the people.

Choice then may be defined as the deliberate reaching-forth towards things which lie within our power.

- 1112 a. 18. § 1.] *Βούλευσις*, or *Βούλη*, Deliberation, is not about (1) things a madman or fool would deliberate about, nor (2) about eternal and immutable laws, such as those of the Universe and of Mathematics, nor (3) about uniform changes whether due to Necessity or Nature or any other principle of causation, e.g. the rising of the sun, nor (4) about variable events, e.g. drought and rain, nor (5) about chance events, e.g. the finding of a treasure, nor (6) about all human affairs, e.g. not about the government of Scythia (which a Greek could not influence). After all these exclusions, there remain as the objects of deliberation, τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ πράκτα, and these are not ends but means. Assuming an end as good, we look about for means, till we arrive at one which it is immediately in our power to produce or supply—τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον of § II. Having used this means, we are then in a position to use a further means, and so on.

2. ὑπὲρ οὗ] for περὶ οὐ —an infrequent use of ὑπέρ in Aristotle, 1112 a. 20 but more frequent in the *Ethics*, *Topics*, and *Rhetoric* than elsewhere, according to Eucken (*Sprachgebrauch des Arist.* p. 47). In the *Nic. Eth.* it occurs five times—i. 5. 7, i. 6. 13, here iii. 3. 2, viii. 1. 7, and x. 1. 2 (see notes on these passages). Nor is this use of ὑπέρ frequent in the majority of those books in the Aristotelian Corpus which are plainly not by Aristotle himself. In the *M. M.* however it is very frequent, occurring between 80 and 90 times, and is even more frequent in the *Rhet. ad Alex.*

§ 3. περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀιδίων . . . οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου] Cf. *de Coelo* a. 21. ii. 14. 296 a. 33 ἡ δέ γε τοῦ κόσμου τάξις ἀιδίος ἐστίν. This order of the Universe which is said to be ἀιδίος depends upon, or is the expression of, an eternal immaterial principle, described in various parts of the *de Coelo* and *Metaphysics* as—οὐσία ἀιδίος ἀκίνητος—ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως—τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν οὐ κινούμενον—θεός: e.g. *Met.* Λ. 6. 1071 b. 4 ἀνάγκη εἶναι τινα ἀιδίον οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον—and Λ. 7. 1072 a. 21 ἐστι τι μὲν κινούμενον κίνησιν ἀπαυστον, αὕτη δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ δῆλον. ὥστ’ ἀιδίος ἀν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος οὐρανός. ἐστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὁ κινεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν καὶ μέσον, ἐστι τοίνυν τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀιδίον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐσία. κινεῖ δὲ ὅδε τὸ δρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν [κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα]. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γάρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλητὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ δύν καλόν. . . . ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸν ἀκίνητον ὅν, ἐνέργεια ὅν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ γάρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὅν καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή. τὸ γάρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσαυταχῶς, τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὄρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς. ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἥρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. διαγωγὴ δὲ ἐστὶν οἷα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτως γάρ αἰεὶ ἐκεῖνο (ἡμῖν μὲν γάρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἰσθησις νόησις ἡδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα. ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν τοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. ἑαυτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γάρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταῦτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γάρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς. ἐνέργει δὲ ἔχων. ὥστ’ ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον τούτου ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θείου ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἡδιστον καὶ ἀριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ως ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὕδε, καὶ ζωὴ δέ γ’ ὑπάρχει· ἡ γάρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωὴ, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀιδίος. φαμὲν

1112 a. 21. δὲ τὸν θεὺν εἶναι ζῷὸν ἀίδιον ἄριστον, ὡστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰών συνεχῆς καὶ ἀίδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

As Alexander in his commentary on this chapter (*Met. A. 7*) puts it (p. 667, ed. Bonitz) ἡ τοῦ ἥλιου σφαῖρα, and the *σφαῖραι* of the other planets, are moved by ἡ ἀπλανῆς σφαῖρα, or *πρῶτος οὐρανός*, which is τὸ κινούμενον-καὶ-κινοῦν, and intermediate (*μέσον*) between τὸ πλανώμενον (*i. e.* ἡ τοῦ ἥλιου σφαῖρα and the other planetary *σφαῖραι*), which it moves, and τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν οὐ κινούμενον, by which it is itself moved. Not only is the Prime Mover described as *ἀίδιος*, but the *πρῶτος οὐρανός* is similarly described (*Met. A. 7*), as are also the sun, and other bodies of the planetary spheres—*Met. Θ. 8. 1050b. 20* sqq. and *Met. A. 8. 1073 a. 26–39*. From the last passage referred to we learn that the eternal motions proper to the sun and other planets are caused by an equal number of ἀκίνητοι καὶ ἀίδιοι οὐσίαι, which we must regard, not as independent principles, but as *special manifestations* of the *πρῶτον κινοῦν*, which primarily manifests itself in the circular motion of the *πρῶτος οὐρανός*. (See Alex. *Met.* p. 682; each planetary sphere, he says, has its *ψυχή* in subordination to the *πρῶτος νοῦς*, as the spheres themselves are subordinate to the *ἀπλανῆς σφαῖρα*.) The circumstance that the path of each planet is the resultant of its own proper motion and the motion of the containing sphere next above it explains the phenomena of natural growth and decay. The sun and other planets, by variously approaching and receding from different parts of the earth at different seasons, cause the alternations of γένεσις and φθορά which take place in our sublunar region (cf. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* p. 469, sqq., 3rd ed.)—See *de Generat. et Corrupt. ii. 10. 336 a. 26* sqq.—φανερὸν ὅτι μᾶς μὲν οὖσης τῆς φορᾶς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι ἀμφοῦ διὰ τὸ ἐναντία εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ὠσαύτως ἔχον ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πέφυκε ποιεῖν. ὡστε ἡτοι γένεσις ἀεὶ ἔσται ἡ φθορά. δεῖ δὲ πλείους εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις καὶ ἐναντίας, ἡ τῇ φορᾷ ἡ τῇ ἀνωμαλίᾳ· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τάναντία αἴτια. διὸ καὶ οὐχ ἡ πρώτη φορὰ αἴτια ἔστι γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, ἀλλ’ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λοξὸν κύκλον· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεχές ἔστι καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι δύο κινήσεις· ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἴ γε ἀεὶ ἔσται συνεχῆς γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ἀεὶ μὲν τι κινεῖσθαι, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιλείπωσιν αὗται αἱ μεταβολαί, δύο δ’, ὅπως μὴ θάτερον συμβαίνῃ μόνον. τῆς μὲν οὖν συνεχείας ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φορὰ αἴτια, τοῦ δὲ προσιέναι καὶ ἀπιέναι ἡ ἔγκλισις· συμβαίνει γὰρ ὅτε μὲν πόρρω γίνεσθαι ὅτε δ’ ἐγγύς. ἀνίσου δὲ τοῦ διαστήματος ὅντος ἀνώμαλος ἔσται ἡ κίνησις· ὡστ’ εἰ τῷ προσιέναι καὶ ἐγγύς εἶναι γεννᾶ, τῷ ἀπιέναι ταῦτὸν τοῦτο καὶ πάρρω γίνεσθαι φθείρει, καὶ εἰ τῷ πολ-

λάκις προσιέναι γεννᾶ, καὶ τῷ πολλάκις ἀπελθεῖν φθείρει· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων 1112 a. 21. τάνατία αἴτια. See Schwegler, *Met.* vol. iv. pp. 255, 256. Cf. also *de Coelo* ii. 6. 288 a. 26 sqq.—ἡ γὰρ ἀνωμαλία γίγνεται διὰ τὴν ἀνεστιν καὶ ἐπίτασιν. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπό τινος κινεῖται, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν γίγνεσθαι τῆς κινήσεως ἡ διὰ τὸ κινοῦν ἡ διὰ τὸ κινούμενον ἡ δὶ’ ἄμφω· εἴτε γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει κινοῖ, εἴτε τὸ κινούμενον ἀλλοιοῦτο καὶ μὴ διαμένοι τὸ αὐτό, εἴτε ἄμφω μεταβάλλοι, οὐθὲν κωλύει ἀνωμάλως κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον. οὐθὲν δὲ τούτων δυνατὸν περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι τὸ μὲν γὰρ κινούμενον δέδεικται ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ ὅλως ἀμετάβλητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν πολὺ μᾶλλον εὔλογον εἶναι τοιοῦτον· τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τὸ ἀπλοῦν τοῦ ἀπλοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγένητον τοῦ ἄφθαρτου καὶ ἀγενήτου κινητικόν ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ κινούμενον οὐ μεταβάλλει σῶμα ὅν, οὐδὲ ἀν τὸ κινοῦν μεταβάλλοι ἀσώματον ὅν. ὥστε καὶ τὴν φορὰν ἀδύνατον ἀνώμαλον εἶναι.

Now to return to the passage before us, *E. N.* iii. 3. 3—we do not deliberate about the eternal constitution of the *κόσμος*, because we cannot alter it—it is the expression *an οὐσίᾳ ἀΐδιος ἀκίνητος*, ‘an Eternal not ourselves.’ Nor about the eternal relations of mathematics, *e.g.* the incommensurability of the diagonal and side of a square. From the words with which § 4 begins—ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, it is plain that Aristotle thinks of the *ἀΐδια* here, in § 3, as *ἀκίνητα* (Ramsauer suggests that he has forgotten to add the words *καὶ ἀκινήτων* l. 21). Now, it is strictly true that the objects of *pure mathematics* are *ἀκίνητα* (see *Met.* E. I. 1026 a. 13 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ ἀχώριστα μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἔνια [*i.e.* pure mathematics, as distinguished from optics and astronomy: *Alex. ad loc.*] περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δ’ ἵσως, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐν ὑλῃ̄· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα): but, as we have seen, in the *κόσμος*, *an οὐσίᾳ ἀΐδιος ἀκίνητος* manifests itself in *ἀΐδιοι κινήσεις*. We must suppose then that, in using the words *περὶ τῶν ἀΐδιων οἷῶν περὶ τοῦ κόσμου*, he is thinking only of the *πρῶτον κινοῦν* or *οὐσίᾳ ἀκίνητος*, which is the cause of eternal motion, but is not itself motion; this cause alone is the true object of *θεολογική* or *ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, the motions in their various spheres produced by it falling under the provinces of *ἀστρολογία* and *φυσική*. This is obviously the conception of the province of *θεολογική* which he entertains in *Met.* E. I partly quoted above; for the passage continues—1026 a. 15 ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα μὲν τὰ αἴτια ἀΐδια εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα ταῦτα γὰρ αἴτια τοῖς φανεροῖς τῶν θείων—*i.e.* *πρώτη φιλοσοφία* is concerned with *τὰ αἴτια*,

1112 a. 21. the causes of the visible motions of the heavenly spheres. The motions themselves fall under ἀστρολογία and that part of φυσική which may be entitled περὶ κινήσεως *par excellence*: see *Phys.* ii. 7. 198 a. 27 [ἔστι τοῦ φυσικοῦ εἰδέναι] ὅλως ὅσα κινούμενα κινεῖ ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὐκέτι φυσικῆς οὐ γάρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχοντα κίνησιν οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀκίνητα ὄντα.

a. 23. § 4. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει . . . ἀνατολῶν] These, as distinguished from the ἀἰδία καὶ ἀκίνητα (objects of θεολογική and μαθηματική), are the objects *partly* of ἀστρολογία—a branch of applied mathematics dealing with the ἀἰδίοι κινήσεις of the various heavenly spheres, which present such phenomena as those of τροπαὶ καὶ ἀνατολαί, here described as ἐξ ἀνάγκης (*i. e.* ἐξ ἀνάγκης . . . ἦν λέγομεν τῷ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως *Met.* E. 2. 1026 b. 29: cf. Δ. 5. 1015 a. 34); *partly* of φυσική—a science which deals with uniformities of sublunary motion manifesting themselves in the phenomena of (*a*) inorganic and (*b*) organic nature—for this is what the distinction made in *de gen. anim.* i. 4. 717 a. 15—πᾶν ἡ φύσις ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον practically amounts to. The motions of inorganic nature (manifesting themselves in such phenomena as those of gravitation, heat, light, electricity, chemical combination) are said to proceed ἐξ ἀνάγκης, because, although they differ from the *eternal* motions of the heavenly spheres in being capable of suspension (as when a stone is not allowed to move downwards), still, when they do take place, they *always* take place in one way (see *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 4 αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου [δυνάμεις] πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταὶ αἱ δὲ ἀλογοι μία ἐνός· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δὲ ἱατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγείας).

The other class of natural motions comprises those that proceed ἐνεκά του. These are organic processes, or biological laws, resulting in the production and maintenance of the various definite forms of vegetable and animal life, in which all separate parts and functions conspire in the interest of the whole. It is these organic processes, and the resulting organisms, rather than the phenomena of inorganic nature, which Aristotle has in view in describing φύσις as he does in the following passages which are typical of many others—*Phys.* ii. 8. 199 b. 15 φύσει γάρ, ὅσα ἀπό των ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχῆς συνεχῶς κινούμενα ἀφικνέσται εἴς τι τέλος· ἀφ' ἐκάστης δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάστοις οὐδὲ τὸ τυχόν, ἀεὶ μέντοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἀν μή τι ἐμποδίσῃ . . . ἀπόπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οὔεσθαι ἐνεκά του γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευ-

σάμενον. καίτοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ 1112 a. 23. ναυπηγική, δομοίως ἀν φύσει ἐποίει· ὥστ' εἰ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ἔνεστι τὸ ἔνεκά του, καὶ ἐν φύσει. μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἴατρεύῃ αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἔσικεν ἡ φύσις. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἰτία ἡ φύσις, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἔνεκά του, φανερόν. *Phys.* ii. 1. 193 a. 28 ἔνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἐκάστῳ ἵποκειμένη ὕλη τῶν ἔχοντων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον . . . καὶ μᾶλλον αὕτη φύσις τῆς ὕλης . . . ἡ μορφὴ φύσις. *Phys.* ii. 2. 194 a. 28 ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὖν ἔνεκα—and the frequently recurring οὐδὲν μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ. This is Aristotle's dominant conception of φύσις. It is evidently taken from the phenomena of organic nature, being in fact that noted in *Met. Δ.* 4. 1014 b. 16 φύσις λέγεται ἔνα μὲν τρόπον ἡ τῶν φυομένων γένεσις, οἷον εἴ τις ἐπεκτείνεις λέγοι τὸ υ. At the same time, as has been pointed out above, he distinguishes τὰ φυσικά as inorganic (τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης) and organic (τὰ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἔνεκά του)—viz. in *de Gen. An.* 717 a. 15 quoted above, and in *An. Post.* ii. 11. 94 b. 36 ἡ μὲν ἔνεκά του ποιεῖ φύσις, ἡ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἡ δὲ ἀνάγκη διπτή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὴν ὁρμήν, ἡ δὲ βίᾳ ἡ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, ὥσπερ λίθος ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω φέρεται, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀνάγκην. It will be remembered that this same downward motion of the stone, which is here described as ἐξ ἀνάγκης, is said to be φύσις in *E.N.* ii. 1. 2. Cf. Grote's *Aristotle*, i. 355: 'Nature produces effects of finality, or with a view to some given end, and also effects of necessity, the necessity being either inherent in the substance itself, or imposed by extraneous force. Thus a stone *falls* to the ground by necessity of the first kind, but *ascends* by necessity of the second kind.'

The whole field of φυσική is mapped out in the following passage, *Phys.* ii. 1. 192 b. 8 τῶν ὅντων τὰ μέν ἔστι φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει δέ φαμεν εἶναι τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλά τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆν καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα [ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν]. πάντα δὲ τὰ ῥθέντα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα· τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἔκαστον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχει κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ' αὐξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοιώσιν.

'Η φύσις ἡ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιοῦσα—law of inorganic nature, and ἡ φύσις ἡ ἔνεκά του ποιοῦσα—biological law, may then be distinguished as the two coordinate species of the genus φύσις. But biological laws realise their ends—certain vegetable and animal organisms, by conforming to certain definite conditions imposed, as we say, by the

1112 a. 23. environment. If organisms are to come into being and exist at all, it is necessary for them to conform to certain conditions. Hence we must distinguish from ἡ φύσις ἡ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιοῦσα (which is co-ordinate with ἡ ἔνεκά του), τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον, οր τὸ ὡς ὅλη λεγόμενον ἀναγκαῖον, which is the condition to which ἡ φύσις ἡ ἔνεκά του ποιοῦσα must conform, if it is to realise its end: see *Met.* Δ. 5, where τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἀπλοῦν, i. e. in the strict sense, as τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, is distinguished from τὸ οὐ ἄνευ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ζῆν ὡς συνατίου . . . καὶ οὐδὲ ἄνευ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἡ εἶναι ἡ γενέσθαι. Cf. *Phys.* ii. 199 b. 34 τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἡ καὶ ἀπλῶς; νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἴονται τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει, ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ τις τὸν τοῖχον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς, διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ τὰ θεμέλια, ἡ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μᾶλιστα τὰ ἔνδιλα<sup>α</sup> κουφότατα γάρ. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τούτων γέγονεν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα πλὴν ὡς δι' ὅλην, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τοῦ κρύπτειν καὶ σώζειν. ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσιν, ἐν δοσοῖς τὸ ἔνεκά του ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔχόντων τὴν φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἡ ὡς ὅλην, ἀλλ' ἔνεκά του, οἷον διὰ τί ὁ πρίων τοιοῦτος; ὅπως τοδὶ καὶ ἔνεκα τουδί. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι, ἀν μὴ σιδηροῦς ἢ<sup>β</sup> ἀνάγκη ἄρα σιδηροῦν εἶναι, εἰ πρίων ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δὴ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τέλος<sup>γ</sup> ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὅλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δ' οὐ ἔνεκα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ . . . φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ ὡς ὅλη λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ κινήσεις αἱ ταύτης. καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡ τίνος ἔνεκα<sup>δ</sup> αἴτιον γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὅλης, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτῇ τοῦ τέλους<sup>ε</sup> καὶ τὸ τέλος τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρισμοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην, ἐπεὶ ἡ οἰκία τοιόνδε, τάδε δεῖ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ ὑγεία τοδί, τάδε δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ὑπάρχειν. οὕτως καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ταδί<sup>ζ</sup> εἰ δὲ ταδί, ταδί. Thus τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ορ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ὡς ὅλη λεγόμενον, is that suitable environment (constituted for the most part by the operation of the necessary laws of inorganic nature—ἡ φύσις ἡ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιοῦσα as explained above), which is the necessary condition of the successful operation of the laws of organic nature. Looking at an organism *per se*, we see that its vital functions are conditioned by mechanical and chemical laws; looking at it in relation to its external environment, we see that its life is maintained in correspondence with laws regulating the inorganic phenomena of gravitation, heat, light, electricity, &c.

<sup>α</sup> Η φύσις ἡ ἔνεκά του ποιοῦσα, then, is ‘biological law’; <sup>β</sup> η φύσις ἡ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιοῦσα is ‘law of inorganic nature’; while τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἐξ

*ὑποθέσεως* expresses the relation in which ‘biological law’ stands 1112 a. 23. to an environment constituted for the most part by phenomena of ‘inorganic nature.’ Organisms, and works of human intelligence, are produced only under definite conditions or limitations imposed by this environment.

Thus the *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*—‘according to the laws of inorganic nature,’ and the *φύσει* of the present section (*E. N.* iii. 3. 4) cannot be regarded as mutually exclusive expressions. A stone is said to fall both *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*, and *φύσει*. On the other hand, if we give *φύσει* its dominant sense of ‘according to biological laws,’ we can distinguish it from *ἐξ ἀνάγκης*—‘according to the laws of inorganic nature.’ We must remember, however, that ‘biological laws’ operate only as the *ἀνάγκη* of the environment permits.

§ 5. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως] From the examples given here a. 26.—οἰον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὅμβρων—we may perhaps identify these with *τὰ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος* of *Phys.* ii. 8. 198 b. 35 πάντα τὰ φύσει ἡ ἀεὶ οὕτω γίνεται ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τῶν δ' ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ' ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ὕειν πολλάκις τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀλλ' ἔαν ὑπὸ κύνα οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνα, ἀλλ' ἀν χειμῶνος.

οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης] *τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης* are distinguished as a. 27. occurrences directly affecting man, not to be foreseen by him, because exceptional, from *τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου*—occurrences, or phenomena, not conceived as affecting man, which contradict the ordinary laws of nature: see *Met.* Λ. 3. 1070 a. 6 ἡ γὰρ τέχνη ἡ φύσει γίγνεται ἡ τύχη ἡ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ αἴτιαι στερήσεις τούτων: i. e. τύχη is the *στέρησις* of τέχνη (or, more generally, of *νοῦς* καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου § 7). Its sphere is *τὸ ἄδηλον* in human affairs: *τὸ αὐτόματον*, in its specific sense, is the *στέρησις* of φύσις—it is the spontaneous, or that which contradicts uniform law in the domain of nature—especially of organic nature: see *Met.* Κ. 8. 1065 a. 26 τὸ δὲ ἔνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἡ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐστίν. τύχη δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τι τούτων γένηται κατὰ συμβεβηκός ὁσπερ γὰρ καὶ ὃν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὕτω καὶ αἴτιον. ἡ τύχη δ' αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαιρεσιν τῶν ἔνεκά του γιγνομένοις. διὸ περὶ ταῦτὸ τύχη καὶ διάνοια προαιρεσις γὰρ οὐ χωρὶς διανοίας. τὰ δ' αἴτια ἀόριστα ἀφ' ὅν ἀν γένοιτο τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης διὸ ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ καὶ αἴτιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐδενός. In *Phys.* ii. 6. 197 a. 36, however, *τὸ αὐτόματον* is presented as the

1112 a. 27. genus of τύχη—διαφέρει δ' ὅτι τὸ αὐτόματον ἐπὶ πλειόν ἔστι· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἀπὸ τύχης πᾶν ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου, τοῦτο δ' οὐ πᾶν ἀπὸ τύχης. ἡ μὲν γάρ τύχη καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης ἔστιν ὅσοις καὶ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ἀν ὑπάρξειν καὶ ὅλως πρᾶξις. διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην σημεῖον δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἡτοι ταῦτὸν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἡ ἐγγύς, ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις τις· εὐπρᾶξία γάρ. ὥσθ' ὄπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πρᾶξι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιῆσαι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὕτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὕτε θηρίον οὕτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαιρεσιν· οὐδὲ εὐτυχία οὐδὲ ἀτυχία ὑπάρχει τούτοις, εἰ μὴ καθ' ὅμοιότητα.

Human intelligence, and natural organisms, attain to their various ends on condition of utilising and adapting themselves to the necessary laws of ‘matter’ or ‘the environment.’ As a rule (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) they succeed in doing so—ἢ λη or τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἔξ ὑποθέσεως appears as τὸ συναίτιον. But not always. Sometimes the formative principle is unequal to the task of comprehending the complexity of the material environment, and results follow which, as it were, take the designer or the organism by surprise. These are τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης in the region of human deliberation, τέρατα in the animal and vegetable worlds. Τύχη and τὸ αὐτόματον thus represent the mistakes and failures of intelligence and of the organising principle in nature, in their relations to the material environment. This seems to be the fair inference from Aristotle's statement that they are στερήσεις of διάνοια and φύσις, as well as from his adoption of the description of τύχη as ἀδηλος αἴτια ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ. Material conditions, once ascertained, are found to remain always the same (αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι δυνάμεις μία ἐνός), but organising principles may fail to ascertain them, or use them, and so may miscarry: cf. *Phys.* ii. 6. 197 b. 29 οὕτω δὴ τὸ αὐτόματον κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα ὅταν αὐτὸ μάτην γένηται. Τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, and τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου represent then the mistakes and failures of organising principles. These mistakes and failures are their own mistakes and failures (as a man's bad acts are his own acts), not freaks of a positive ‘principle of mistake or irregularity’ in the ἕλη, or external world, which is otherwise regulated by necessary laws—*Phys.* ii. 8. 199 b. 1 εἰ δὴ ἔστιν ἔνια κατὰ τέχνην ἐν οἷς τὸ ὄρθως ἔνεκά του, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀμαρτανομένοις ἔνεκα μέν τινος ἐπιχειρεῖται ἀλλ' ἀποτυγχάνεται, ὅμοίως ἀν ἔχοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, καὶ τὰ τέρατα ἀμαρτήματα ἔκεινον τοῦ ἔνεκά του. I cannot think that Grote (*Arist.* i. 165) is right when he speaks of ‘the independent agency’ of Chance and Spontaneity. These are not positive agents, but στερήσεις.

§ 6. Σκύθαι] In *E.E.* ii. 10. 1226 a. 29, and *M.M.* i. 17. 1189 a. 20, 1112 a. 28, 'Ινδοί (brought within the Greek horizon by Alexander's conquest) are substituted for Σκύθαι.

§ 7. ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου] See *Rhet.* i. 4. 1359 a. a. 32. ΖΟ πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον περὶ ποίᾳ ἀγαθὰ ἡ κακὰ ὁ συμβουλεύων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἄπαντα ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μή. ὅσα δὲ ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἡ ἔστιν ἡ ἔσται ἡ ἀδύνατον ἡ εἶναι ἡ γενέσθαι, περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή. οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἀπάντων ἔστιν γάρ καὶ φύσει ἔνια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου τὸ συμβουλεύειν ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἔστιν τὸ βουλεύεσθαι. τοιαῦτα δὲ ἔστιν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστιν μέχρι γάρ τούτου σκοποῦμεν, ἐως ἦν εὑρωμένη εἰς ἡμῖν δυνατὰ ἡ ἀδύνατα πρᾶξαι. Below, in the same Chapter (*Rhet.* i. 4), Aristotle enumerates five objects of deliberation —(1) revenue, (2) peace and war, (3) defence, (4) imports and exports, (5) legislation. These are all δι' ἀνθρώπου.

τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἔκαστοι βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν] a. 33. Added lest the reader should misinterpret the words πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. The object of deliberation *generally* is πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου : but the *individual* can deliberate only about that part of τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου which is δι' αὐτοῦ.

§ 8. ἀκριβεῖς] As Grant remarks, not 'exact' in the sense in b. 1. which we speak of the 'exact Sciences,' but rather 'fixed'—as may be gathered from the example, the art of writing.

καὶ αὐτάρκεις] explains ἀκριβεῖς. The ἀκριβεῖα of a science which has its own principles within itself (which is αὐτάρκης) is greater than that of one which has to borrow them from another science: see *An. Post.* i. 27. 87 a. 31.

§ 9. μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας] τέχνη, as b. 6. Grant notes, is here distinguished from ἐπιστήμη, although in § 8 ἐπιστήμη has just been used as equivalent to τέχνη.

§ 10. ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] See note on i. 3. 4. b. 21. b. 8.

καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον] Ramsauer suggests καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἀδιόριστον : b. 9. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 75), following the ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς ἥδη ἀόριστόν ἔστι τὸ ὡς δεῖ of *M.M.* i. 17. 1189 b. 24, suggests καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ ὡς δεῖ ἀδιόριστον. It is pretty plain that the writer of the *M.M.* had before him both the *E.N.* and the *E.E.* (ii. 10. 1226 a. 33 sqq.) when he wrote 1189 b. 18-26; he reproduces the διχῇ γινομένης τῆς

1112 b. 9. *ἀμαρτίας* which is peculiar to the *E. E.*, and the *ἀδιόριστον* which is peculiar to the *E. N.*. But he uses the word *ἀόριστον*, which is less appropriate in the context than *ἀδιόριστον*, for *ἀόριστον* is that which has *no* limits (and therefore would elude intelligence, and could not be the subject of any forecast whatsoever) whereas *ἀδιόριστον* is that which has *no very definite* limits: see Waitz on *Anal. Pr.* i. 4. 26 b. 14. It may be conjectured that the writer of the *M. M.* found in his copy of the *E. N.* καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ δεῖ (sc. πράττειν) *ἀόριστον*, a reading which might easily spring from an original καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ δεῖ (sc. πράττειν) *ἀδιόριστον*<sup>1</sup>.

b. 11. § 11. *βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν*] It sometimes happens, however, that deliberation about the means to a contemplated end results in our seeing that the end is not worth the means, and that *another* end is preferable. We sometimes cannot be sure that an end is desirable, *i. e.* is really an end for us, till we have ascertained what means it necessitates. But the ends instanced by Aristotle in this section are those more obvious ends which may be accepted as ends *before* deliberation.

b. 18. *κάκεῖνο*] ‘refers to *ἐνός* and *διὰ τούτον*’—Grant.

b. 19. *τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον*] *i. e.* the step which must be first taken (*πρῶτον ἐν τῇ γενέσει*), which, however, is the last to be thought of in the review of the steps (*ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει*). A wishes to obtain an appointment: he can obtain it through the influence of B: he must get an introduction to B: C can give him an introduction: he must write to C: what is C’s address? He must look it out in the directory: there is a directory in the club: he must go there: he must call a cab. Here ‘calling a cab’ is the *πρῶτον αἴτιον*.

b. 20. *ἀναλύειν . . . ὕσπερ διάγραμμα*] Cf. *Top.* i. 16. 175 a. 27 *συμβάνει δέ ποτε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλύσαντες ἐνίοτε συνθεῖναι πάλιν ἀδυνατοῦμεν.*

We must suppose that the reference is to what is known as the Analytical Method of proof in Geometry—a Method which Plato is said by Proclus (ed. Friedl. p. 211) and Diogenes Laertius (iii. 24) to have invented, although there are traces of its employment before his time (see Gow, *History of Gk. Mathematics* p. 176).

<sup>1</sup> As regards the admissibility of  $\ddot{\alpha} \delta\epsilon\dot{\iota}\tau\iota \delta\epsilon\dot{\iota}$ , I am indebted to Prof. Cook Wilson for references to *Ind. Arist.* 532 b. 14, and Kühner’s Gk. Gr. § 562. 4, 2nd ed.

It consists in assuming as true the proposition to be proved, and deducing from it, as principle, the necessary consequences to which it leads (see D. Stewart, *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, Part ii. chap. 4, § 3. I. Preliminary observations on the Analysis and Synthesis of the Greek Geometricalians)—‘If in this deduction,’ says D. Stewart, ‘I arrive at a consequence which I already know to be true, I conclude with confidence that the principle from which it was deduced is likewise true. But if on the other hand I arrive at a consequence which I know to be false, I conclude that the principle or assumption on which my reasoning has proceeded is false also. Such a demonstration of the truth or falsity of a Proposition is called an Analytical Demonstration. According to these definitions of Analysis and Synthesis those demonstrations in Euclid<sup>1</sup> which prove a proposition to be true by showing that the contrary supposition leads to some absurd inference, are properly speaking Analytical Processes of Reasoning. In every case the conclusiveness of an Analytical Proof rests on this general maxim—that *truth* is always consistent with itself; that a supposition which leads by a concatenation of mathematical deductions to a consequence which is true must itself be true; and that which necessarily involves a consequence which is absurd or impossible must itself be false. It is evident that when we are demonstrating a Proposition with a view to convince another of its truth the synthetic form of reasoning is the more natural and pleasing of the two, as it leads the understanding directly from known truths to such as are unknown. When a Proposition, however, is doubtful and we wish to satisfy our own minds with respect to it, or when we wish to discover a new method of demonstrating a theorem previously ascertained to be true, it would be found far more convenient to conduct the investigation analytically.’

Themistius in his commentary on *An. Post.* i. 12 (vol. i. pp. 41–43, ed. Spengel) has remarks on ἀνάλυσις which are worth careful attention in the present connexion. They bring to light an important difference between βούλευσις and γεωμετρικὴ ἀνάλυσις, here roughly compared by Aristotle. He begins by defining ἀνάλυσις—p. 42 (fol. 6 b) ἀναλύειν δὲ λέγω νῦν τὸ τεθέντος τιὸς ἀληθοῦς συμπεράσματος τὰς προτάσεις ἐξευρίσκειν δι’ ὧν συνήχθη. But

<sup>1</sup> ‘The *reductio ad absurdum* is a kind of theoretic analysis. This is the only analysis that Euclid admits.’ Gow, *Hist. of Gk. Mathematics* p. 177, note 2.

1112 b. 20. true *προτάσεις* may be inferred, as consequences, from a false assumption. Is not this a circumstance which must seriously affect the value of the Geometer's *ἀνάλυσις*? Themistius meets this difficulty by simply pointing out (after Aristotle: see *An. Post.* i. 12, 78 a. 10) that, as a matter of fact, the Geometer *does not infer his true consequences from false assumptions*; and that he can be sure that he does not, because the objects of intuition with which he deals in his *ἀνάλυσις* are so simple and so limited in number—p. 41 (fol. 6 b) ἐν δὲ τοῖς μαθήμασιν . . . οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ παραλογισμός . . . ὥρισται γὰρ ἔκαστον, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἔκαστου σχεδὸν δεῖξις ἔστι· τὸν γὰρ κύκλου ἀκούσας εὐθὺς ὅρâ γεγραμμένον ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ οὐ φέρεται ἐπ' ἄλλο τι σημαινόμενον. In non-mathematical reasoning, on the other hand, *i.e.* in *διάλογοι*, the *προτάσεις* are indefinite in number and lend themselves to various ambiguities—p. 42 εἰ δ' οὐκ ἦν δυνατὸν ἐκ ψεύδους ἀληθὲς δεῖξαι, ῥάδιον ἀν ἦν τὸ ἀναλύειν . . . χαλεπὸν τὸ ἀναλύειν ἐν ἀπείροις γὰρ ή ζήτησις τῶν προτάσεων. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτη διαφέρει τὰ μαθήματα τῶν διαλόγων, ὅτι ῥάδων ἐν ἔκεινοις ή ἀνάλυσις, αἴτιον δέ οὐδὲν γὰρ ψεύδος λαμβάνοντιν εἰς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. The non-mathematical reasoner can never be sure that his *προτάσεις* are not false. But the mathematician sees that his are true; and, as true premisses can give only a true conclusion, he thus demonstrates the supposition with which he began his analysis by the reverse process of synthesis. According to this view, the plainness to the eye of the *προτάσεις* obtained by the *ἀνάλυσις* of *διαγράμματα* has evidently much to do with the conviction that the conclusions synthetically built upon them ‘cannot be otherwise.’ An assumption is resolved into its elements. These elements are necessarily few, and their nature, and their connexion with the whole, plain to the eye. They are evidently true premisses, hence the conclusion (*i.e.* the original assumption) must be true. But in concrete enquiries, as in that about the cause of *τὸ φυλλορροεῖν* (see *An. Post.* ii. 16), there is no such visible evidence; we can never be sure that we have analysed rightly; hence the conviction of their *necessity* is wanting to our synthetic reasonings on such matters. The writer of the *M. M.* has also a passage in which he dwells on the difference between *γεωμετρικὴ ζήτησις* and *βούλευσις*—*M. M.* i. 1189 b. 6–19.

The *ἀνάλυσις* of the present section is not to be confounded with the *διαιρεσις* of *Met.* Θ. 9. 1051 a. 21, where Aristotle says that theorems and problems are solved by ‘division,’ *i.e.* by

drawing lines. Thus the Theorem ‘ $\tau\acute{\rho}\gamma\omega\nu\nu$  = two right angles’ 1112 b. 20. is proved by so ‘dividing’  $\tau\acute{\rho}\gamma\omega\nu\nu$ —by so drawing the lines which may be drawn in relation to  $\tau\acute{\rho}\gamma\omega\nu\nu$  (or, otherwise, the lines ‘which are ‘potentially in  $\tau\acute{\rho}\gamma\omega\nu\nu$ ’) that at last angles =  $\tau\acute{\rho}\gamma\omega\nu\nu$  are obtained which are *plainly seen* to be also = two right angles. The three angles of  $\tau\acute{\rho}\gamma\omega\nu\nu$  are at last made into angles which can easily be pieced together so as to make two right angles—1051 a. 21  $\epsilon\nu\rho\nu\kappa\varepsilon t\varepsilon$  δὲ καὶ τὰ διαιράμματα (here = demonstrations: see Bonitz *ad loc.*) ἐνεργείᾳ διαιροῦντες γὰρ  $\epsilon\nu\rho\nu\kappa\varepsilon t\varepsilon$  σκουσιν. εἰ δὲ ἦν διηρημένα, φανερὰ ἀν ἦν· νῦν δὲ ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὄρθαι τὸ τρίγωνον; δτι αἱ περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι ἵσαι δύο ὄρθαις. εἰ οὖν ἀνήκτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν, ἰδόντι ἀν ἦν εὐθὺς δῆλον. διὰ τί ἡ ἐν ήμικυκλίῳ ὄρθη καθόλου; διότι ἐὰν ἵσαι τρεῖς, η τε βάσις δύο καὶ η ἐκ μέσου ἐπισταθεῖσα ὄρθη, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἔκεινο εἰδότι. ὥστε φανερὸν δτι τὰ δυνάμει ὅντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀναγόμενα  $\epsilon\nu\rho\nu\kappa\varepsilon t\varepsilon$ . The two proofs given here are of course ‘synthetic,’ and in *An. Post.* ii. 11 Aristotle selects the latter of them for reduction to syllogistic form. The angle in the semicircle is ‘divided’ and so proved to be = one right angle; it is not *assumed* to be = one right angle, which would be the case if the proof were ‘analytical.’ For a criticism of Euclid’s Synthetic Method see Schopenhauer *die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* i. 82–87. Schopenhauer’s contention is that Euclid’s Synthetic Method involves the substitution of *logical* for *intuitive* evidence. It is *intuitive* evidence, I take it, which Euclid *always* offers (the evidence of superposition in the last resort): but often not in the most direct way. The issue is not, as Schopenhauer will have it, between intuitive evidence on the one side, and the Synthetic Method on the other; but between the Analytic Method and the Synthetic Method. Schopenhauer may or may not be right in holding (against Euclid) that the Analytic Method is better than the Synthetic for the purpose of teaching Geometry. This is a practical question in *Paedeutik* upon which I am not competent to give an opinion; but I think that he is certainly wrong in supposing that Euclid’s evidence is ‘logical, *not intuitive*.’ Euclid marshals intuitive evidence according to the Synthetic Method. The passage quoted from *Met. Θ.* 9 shows that the Synthetic Method of  $\delta i\alpha\rho\varepsilon\sigma i\sigma$  is fully consistent with the appeal to intuition at every step. As an instance of the confusion into which Schopenhauer falls, the fact may be mentioned that, while blaming Euclid for his neglect of the Analytic Method and of the appeal to intuition,

1112 b. 20. (the two seem to be identified by Schopenhauer), he singles out the apagogic proofs for special condemnation, as relying on *Logical* as distinguished from Intuitive evidence. But competent authorities tell us that these apagogic proofs are the only examples of the Analytic Method in Euclid!

b. 23. § 12. καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον . . . γενέσει] The Paraphrast has—*τρόπον τινὰ ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος καὶ ὁ μαθηματικὸς ἀναλύει· καὶ ὁ ἔσχατον εὑρίσκεται ἀναλύοντι, τοῦτο ἔργον πρῶτον γίνεται τῷ βουλευομένῳ· καθάπερ ὁ μαθηματικός, πρὸς ὁ ἔσχατον ἀφίξεται ἀναλύων, τοῦτο ὑποτίθεις, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου διὰ τῶν ἀλλων ὁδεύων, ἀποδείκνυσι τὸ προκείμενον.* Καὶ ἄμφω δέ, εἰ ἀναλύοντες ἀδυνάτοις ἐντύχοιεν, ἀφίσανται τοῦ ζητήματος.

b. 24. § 13. κἄν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται] The parallel in *μαθηματικὴ ζήτησις* to such a case in *βούλευσις* would be the *ἀδύνατον* to which the *ἀνάλυσις* conducts in apagogic demonstration: cf. καὶ ἄμφω δέ in the passage quoted from the Paraphrast in last note.

b. 30. § 14. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς . . . διὰ τίνος] This clause comes in awkwardly. What are the *λοιπά*? How does the διὰ οὐ—whether masc. (Michelet) or neut. (Grant)—differ from the *ὅργανα* just mentioned, and the *πῶς* from ἡ *χρεία αὐτῶν*? The *πῶς* καὶ διὰ τίνων of § 11 seems to make it necessary to take ἡ διὰ *τίνος* here as epexegetic of *πῶς*, and therefore to regard *τίνος* as neut. If *τίνος* is neuter, it will be reasonable to suppose that οὐ is masculine.

b. 31. § 15. καθάπερ εἴρηται] Ramsauer notes that the exact phrase *ἀνθρωπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων* has not been used before, although *νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι᾽ ἀνθρώπου* has been given (§ 7) as one of the *αἴτια*. Καθάπερ εἴρηται, he thinks, would be strictly in place only if some such words had been used as we find in *E.E. ii. 6. 1222 b. 18 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁ γ' ἀνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινών ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ξών.* Perhaps, however, ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν, § 13, may be considered sufficient to justify *καθάπερ εἴρηται*.

Ramsauer has another difficulty. He thinks that the words *ἀνθρωπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων* are unnecessary to the argument which follows. The ‘conclusion’ *βουλευτὸν τὸ πρὸς τὸ τέλος* is derived from the premisses ἡ δὲ *βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρακτῶν*, and *αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἀλλων ἔνεκα*: but these premisses, he thinks, do not need *ἀνθρωπος ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων* to rest upon. Strictly not: but surely these latter words have this bearing on what follows, that they

serve to introduce (or reintroduce) the *τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν* and the 1112 b. 31. *πράξεις*, which are, in Ramsauer's view, necessary to the 'conclusion.' If, however, we follow Bywater in adopting the *οὐ γὰρ ἀν εἴη βουλευτόν* of K<sup>b</sup> in place of the old *οὐκ ἀν οὖν εἴη β.*, Ramsauer's difficulty will not arise.

*αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἔνεκα]* Πράξεις here are *τὰ αὐτῷ πρακτά, τὰ καθ'* b. 33. *ἔκαστα* (iii. 1. 10 *αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστα*), or *λοιπά*, which are done for some end (iii. 5. 18 *τὸ τέλος . . . φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες πράττουσι*). Ramsauer finds the statement *αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἔνεκα* too general, and inconsistent with the doctrine of i. 1, that some *ἐνέργειαι* or *πράξεις* are their own *τέλη*. But it must be remembered that properly it is only *ἐνπράξια*, or a systematic life of *καλαὶ πράξεις*, which is its own *τέλος*. Each individual *πρᾶξις* in the system is correctly described as *ἄλλου ἔνεκα*, cf. iii. 7. 6 *καλοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα δ ἀνδρεῖος πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν*.

*§ 16. οὐ γὰρ ἀν εἴη]* This, the reading of K<sup>b</sup> alone, seems to be right: *οὐ βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη* has already been laid down in § 11: whereas the old reading *οὐκ ἀν οὖν* would make it a 'conclusion' now independently reached. It must be remembered, however, that in these writings a conclusion is sometimes proved, in the most formal manner, more than once in adjacent passages. Grant quotes *Rhet.* i. 6. 1362 a. 17, for the doctrine—*βουλευτὸν τὸ πρὸς τὸ τέλος*.

*οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα]* These words are added to prevent b. 34. a possible misunderstanding. *Τὰ αὐτῷ πρακτά*, with which *βουλή* is concerned, are indeed *καθ' ἔκαστα*: but *βουλή* is concerned with *τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα* in a different way from *αἰσθησις*. *Αἰσθησις* is concerned with *καθ' ἔκαστα as such*, i. e. separately—with 'this is red,' 'this is sweet,' 'this is heavy'; but *καθ' ἔκαστα as such* are not the objects of *βουλή*: only *καθ' ἔκαστα* in so far as they may turn out to be means to some end: e. g. *αἰσθησις* says this piece of cloth is scarlet: *βουλή* decides that it is a bad colour for a uniform.

It follows (*δή*) from *τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη* being the objects of *βουλή*, that *τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα per se*, as well as *τὸ τέλος* (this is the force of *οὐδέ*) are beyond its scope.

*εἱ δὲ ἀεὶ βουλεύσεται* (sc. *τις*), *εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει]* Grant says that 1113 a. 2. *ἥξει* is impersonal: but the analogy of *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 b. 2 *εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξουσι* suggests that *τις* should be supplied.

I do not think that this clause ought to be taken very closely

1113 a. 2. with the immediately preceding words: it rather refers to *τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη*, and says that in tracing back the series of means (*τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων*) we must stop somewhere, and begin to act. *Οἶνον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἡ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ* are, as Ramsauer observes, questions of fact. With such questions deliberation has indeed nothing to do; but it is not suggested, I think, by the words *εἰς ἀπειρον* *ἥξει* that deliberation would never reach its goal *if* it tried to deal with them. It simply cannot deal with them; but, within its own sphere of *τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος* it may prolong the review unduly. It must be noted, however, that the writer of the parallel passage in the *E. E.* (ii. 10. 1226 b. 1) understands by the regression *εἰς ἀπειρον* an examination of the data of *αἰσθησις* themselves. So also the Paraphrast—*οὕτε τούννυ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ βουλευτόν, οὕτε τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅσα καθ' ἔκαστα· οἶνον, εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο, εἰ πέπεπται, εἰ πεποίηται ὡς δεῖ· ταῦτα γὰρ αἰσθήσει γινώσκομεν, οὐ βουλῆ καὶ κρίσει· εἰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἀπειρον* *ἥξει*.

a. 3. § 17. *πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἥδη τὸ προαιρετόν]* ‘Except that the thing chosen is, as such, set apart,’ *i.e.* it is the same step, which is first ‘under deliberation,’ and then ‘chosen,’ set apart, or fixed upon. We cannot review steps *εἰς ἀπειρον*: we must eventually choose one of them.

a. 5. *ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν]* Cf. *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 b. 12 *βουλευόμεθα πάντες τοῦτο ἕως ἣν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγωμεν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν ἀρχήν.*

a. 6. *τὸ ἡγούμενον—τὸ προαιρούμενον]* Schol. ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς. Cf. vi. 2. 5.

a. 8. § 18. *οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἢ προείλοντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δῆμῳ]* The Paraphrast’s note is—“Ομηρος . . . εἰσάγει τοὺς βασιλεῖς μετὰ τὴν βουλὴν τὸ προκριθὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντας τῷ δῆμῳ, ὥσπερ τῇ προαιρέσει, ὥστε πραχθῆναι.” Here *ὅρεξις* might be substituted for *προαιρέσει* to the advantage of the Paraphrast’s interpretation, according to which then the *βασιλεῖς* would represent *βούλευσις*, the *δῆμος* would represent *ὅρεξις*, and the result would be the adoption of a line of public action—a *προαιρεσίς*. But if we turn to Aristotle’s text we see that this can hardly be the true interpretation. If the *δῆμος* supplies the active element of *ὅρεξις*, while the *βασιλεῖς* supply the *βούλευσις*, how are we to explain *ἢ προείλοντο οἱ βασιλεῖς?* It does not seem likely that we can have a careless proleptic use of this

word, in a passage which contains the definition of *προαιρεσις*. 1113 a. 8. We must believe, I think, that *οἱ βασιλεῖς*, representing, as they do, *τὸ ήγούμενον*, also represent *τὸ προαιρούμενον*, and are therefore the sources of *βουλευτικὴ ὅρεξις*. What place then has the *δῆμος* in the comparison? Merely, I think, that of *δραγανικὰ μέρη*, which can be set in motion by the *προαιρεσις*.

§ 19. *βουλευτοῦ δρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν*] Here *τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν* is a a. 10. partitive genitive—‘the object of choice is that among things in our power which we seek to take after deliberation’: whereas in the next line it is a genitive depending on *ὅρεξις*. It is a very careless style of writing which permits *δρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν* to stand so close to *ὅρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν*.

*ἐκ τοῦ . . . βούλευσιν*] M<sup>b</sup> has *βούλησιν*: but *βούλευσιν* is certainly a. 11. right: cf. vi. 2. 2. The *λόγος* of vi. 2. 2 is the *βούλευσιν* of the present passage.

## CHAPTER IV.

### ARGUMENT.

*Choice then is of means, wish of the end. But is the end wished the really good, as some suppose, or, as others suppose, only that which the wisher thinks good? Each view has its difficulties. If we say that the really good is the object of wish, we must draw the conclusion that the man who makes a wrong selection, and ‘wishes something bad,’ does not ‘wish’ at all; while if we say that whatever a man thinks good is the object of wish, we must be prepared to maintain that there is no such thing as a natural or absolute object of wish, but that all is relative to the feeling of the individual.*

*Perhaps we may avoid this dilemma by saying that the really good is the object of wish in the strict and true sense of the expression ‘object of wish,’ but that what each of us thinks good is the object of wish for each of us, i. e. object of wish in a relative sense; so that, if a man is really good, that which is really good will be ‘his object of wish,’ and, if he is bad, that which is bad—just as the healthy man finds an ordinary ‘healthy diet’ good for his health, while an invalid finds the diet of the sick room good for his.*

*In all matters the good man judges rightly, and what things really are he thinks them to be. Every man looks at things in his own way, according to his disposition; but the good man is the normal man, with whose measure the divergencies of other men must be compared. His distinguishing characteristic is that he sees things as they truly are: other men are deceived by pleasure. They think that it is good, although it is not. They seek after it as good, and shun pain as evil.*

1113 a. 15. § 1. ἡ δὲ βούλησις . . . τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν] Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 467 D ἐάν τις τι πράττῃ ἐνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὁ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὐ ἐνεκα πράττει.

δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τάγαθοῦ εἶναι] τάγαθοῦ is the reading of Γ, Asp., CCC, NC, Cambr., Ald., and is accepted by Bywater and Susem. The other authorities have ἀγαθοῦ. Grant has a good note here in which he quotes Plato, *Gorgias* 466 sqq., where the doctrine τάγαθοῦ ἡ βούλησις is maintained: see also passages collected by Bonitz (note, p. 497, on *Met.* Δ. 7. 1072 a) in which Aristotle describes the general tendency of Nature as towards the good—*de Gen. et Corr.* ii. 10. 336 b. 27 ἐν ἀπασιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βελτίους ὄρεγεσθαί φαμεν τὴν φύσιν—*de Part. Anim.* iv. 10. 687 a. 15 εἰ οὖν οὗτω βέλτιον, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖ τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ διὰ τὰς χειράς ἐστιν δὲ ἀνθρωπος φρονιμώτατος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζῴων ἔχει χεῖρας. Cf. also *de Inces. Anim.* 2. 704 b. 15, and passages quoted in note on *E. N.* i. 9. 5.

In all creatures there is αἱ θεῖόν τι which directs their efforts towards that which is naturally good. This instinctive tendency to conform to the objective law of the environment is often thwarted by influences of subjective origin; but the continuance of life proves it to be the strongest principle—τὸ κράτιστον. ‘It rules the world,’ because, after all, it ‘has might as it has right.’

a. 16. τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ] Grant refers to *Met.* K. 6. 1062 b. 13 καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος (Protagoras) ἔφη πάντων χρημάτων εἶναι μέτρον ἀνθρωπον, οὐθὲν ἔτερον λέγων ἡ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτ’ εἶναι παγίως . . . μέτρον δὲ εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον ἐκάστῳ. Cf. *Met.* Γ. 5. 1009 a. 6, where Aristotle says that the doctrine of Protagoras amounts to a denial of the Principle of Contradiction—ἔτι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρον λόγος, καὶ ἀνάγκη δροίως αὐτοὺς ἀμφω ἡ εἶναι ἡ μὴ εἶναι. εἴτε γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἀνάγκη πάντα ἀμα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ εἶναι. πολλοὶ γὰρ τάνατία ὑπολαμβάνοντιν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοὺς μὴ ταῦτα δοξάζοντας ἔαντος διεψεῦσθαι νομίζουσιν· ὅστ’ ἀνάγκη τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ εἰ τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι πάντ’ ἀληθῆ· τὰ ἀντικείμενα γὰρ δοξάζοντιν ἀλλήλοις οἱ διεψευσμένοι καὶ ἀληθεύοντες· εἰ οὖν ἔχει τὰ ὄντα οὔτως, ἀληθεύσοντι πάντες. The denial of this Principle (*πασῶν βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή Met.* Γ. 3. 1005 b. 18) amounts to the denial of Life. Life is not a succession of unrelated φαντάσματα, but a principle acting in conformity with definite objective laws—the physical life acting in conformity with definite physical laws, the moral life with

the law of Duty. Right and wrong are ‘in things,’ not in our [1113 a. 16.](#) feelings. See Cudworth’s *Eternal and Immutable Morality*, book ii. chap. i for an excellent discussion of the individualistic morality of Protagoras.

**§ 2. συμβαίνει . . . μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ἂν βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὄρθως [a. 17.](#) αἱρούμενος]** This verbal difficulty (for Aristotle is really at one with Plato against Protagoras and all who set up the subjective standard of feeling) the writer of the *M.M.* (ii. II. 1208 b. 39) evades by means of a verbal distinction—*βουλητὸν μὲν γάρ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, βουλητέον δὲ τὸ ἐκάστω ἀγαθόν.*

**§ 3. μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν]** *i.e.* they deny the existence of an [a. 20.](#) objective moral standard.

**τὸ δοκοῦν . . . φαίνεται]** Zell quotes passages which show that [a. 21.](#) these terms are properly distinguished: but here there does not seem to be any distinction suggested—*E. E. H.* 2. 1235 b. 25 *τὸ γάρ ὄρεκτὸν καὶ βουλητὸν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.* διὸ καὶ *τὸ ἥδὺ ὄρεκτόν φαινόμενον γάρ τι ἀγαθόν τοῖς μὲν γάρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται κανὸν μὴ δοκῆσθαι γάρ ἐν ταῦτῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα*—cf. *de An.* iii. 3. 428 a. 18 sqq.

**§ 4. ὁ σπουδαῖος κ.τ.λ.]** There is an objective good, a *φύσει [a. 29.](#) βουλητόν*, or *ἀγαθόν*, which *ἀρετή*, man’s true *φύσις*, or perfection discloses: cf. vi. 12. 6 ἡ μὲν γάρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὄρθον. What is said here of the *σπουδαῖος*, or perfect *man*, must be said of every perfect organism. Its actions are adapted to its environment. If we were to ask ‘what is best for a butterfly?’ the answer would be—‘to do as the nature and instincts of a butterfly dictate.’ The example introduced by *ῶσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων [a. 26.](#)* shows how far it was from Aristotle’s thought to draw a sharp line between *ἀρετή* and other phases of life. His biological studies made it impossible for him to do so.

**§ 5. μέτρον]** For the *μέτρον ἄνθρωπος* of Protagoras Aristotle [a. 33.](#) substitutes *μέτρον ὁ σπουδαῖος*: cf. *E. N.* ix. 4. 2, and x. 5. 10.

**τὴν ἥδονήν]** *i.e.* the pleasure of *ἀπόλαυσις* is their chief good. [a. 34.](#) They do not know that the performance of duty—*τὰ καλὰ πράττειν*—is the chief good, and is attended by ‘its own’ pleasure: cf. *E. N.* i. 8. §§ 11 and 12.

## CHAPTER V.

## ARGUMENT.

The particular acts deliberately chosen as means to a wished for end being voluntarily performed, and virtue manifesting itself in the performance of such acts, it follows that being virtuous is ‘in our power’—and being vicious also: for, if to do this or that is right, and is in our power, then not to do it, being wrong, will also be in our power; and if not to do it is right, and in our power, then to do it, being wrong, will also be in our power. Indeed, if we deny that being good or bad is in our power, we must deny that man is the parent of his actions. But this we cannot deny, for actions cannot be referred to any other origin than to the man who performs them. Originating in him they are in his power, or voluntary. If they originated elsewhere, what would be the use of trying to influence him by rewards and punishments? If they were not voluntary, we should no more try to persuade him to do them, than we try to persuade a man to feel warm, or experience any other sensation over which he has no power. On the other hand, where the efficiency of the man is obviously excluded, that is, in the case of acts forced upon him, and of acts caused by ignorance, we do not think of punishing him—unless, indeed, the ignorance be caused by himself. Thus the drunken man is ignorant of what he does; but he is himself the cause of the ignorance; and in some cities is doubly punished—both for the ignorance, and for what he does in it: so also men are punished for what they do in ignorance of a plain law, because the ignorance is due to their own carelessness. If it be urged in extenuation—that ‘it is their nature to be careless’—we answer that it is a second nature, which they have acquired by repeating acts which it was in their power not to perform: that they knew quite well what the repetition of these acts was leading to; and that consequently their final state—their carelessness or injustice generally—has been voluntarily chosen by them: not voluntarily chosen, however, in the sense that they can, if they wish, lay it aside and become just, any more than a man can, if he wish, lay aside the bad health which has resulted from a voluntarily chosen course of dissipation. It originally rested with themselves not to become unjust; but they have made themselves so with their eyes open. In this sense they are ‘voluntarily unjust’ although it is now beyond the power of ‘wishing’ to change their injustice into justice. And, lest it should be thought strange that a moral state which we cannot alter if we wish, should yet be described as ‘voluntary,’ and be blamed, it may be pointed out that there is nothing exceptional in this: what we say of a moral state is true of many bodily states also: no one would blame a man for natural unsightliness; but for unsightliness produced by dissipation or carelessness a man is blamed: blamed, because his unsightliness was ‘voluntarily’ produced, although now beyond the power of ‘wishing’ to change. In short, where blame lies, the vice is ‘in our power.’ We cannot shelter ourselves from this blame behind the pretext that the vice is now fixed and no longer ‘in our power’; it originally was ‘in our power’ not to contract it.

But some one may say—'Perhaps it is not true that it originally was in our power not to contract it. Perhaps the vicious disposition which you hold a man responsible for because he himself, as you say, has fixed it with his eyes open, was fixed for him from the beginning. A man always seeks what he thinks good. But is he master of his thoughts? Does not his view of the Chief End of Life depend upon his disposition? You say that he himself contributes to the making of his disposition, in which case, of course, he would be in a sense the cause of the view which he takes of the Chief End, and be responsible for the conduct determined by that view—but what if he himself has nothing to do with the making of his disposition—if it is fixed by nature from the beginning? Then surely no blame attaches to the man who does evil. He does evil because nature has not endowed him with an eye for the true end of life.'

To this we answer—You prove more than you wish. You prove virtue to be as involuntary as vice. If vice is natural blindness, virtue is natural endowment. The virtuous man, equally with the vicious man, is dominated in his actions by a conception of the end which has been fixed for him from the beginning. But if, in order to make the good man a voluntary agent, you admit either that he has something to do with the formation of his conception of the good end, or that, though dominated by an end fixed for him by nature, he nevertheless selects means voluntarily—surely you are bound to make the same admissions in the case of the bad man? If the good man is a voluntary agent so is the bad man. Both are efficient in the performance of acts, if not in the formation of the conception of the end. Nay rather, we cannot regard acts and end as separate. By acts good or bad we contribute to the making of character good or bad; and according as is the character so is the end.

If then the virtues are 'voluntary' the vices are also 'voluntary.' It is not to be supposed, however, that these habits are voluntary as actions are voluntary. A voluntary action is one over which an agent, with full knowledge of all the circumstances, has control from beginning to end. But a voluntary habit is one over the beginning only of which the agent had control—which has imperceptibly, like bodily weakness, taken hold of him and become at last independent of his control. It is called voluntary because the acts which produced it were in his power to perform or not.

§ 1. περὶ ταῦτα] Apparently τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος: see iii. 3. 15, *ai* 1113 b. 4. πράξεις ἄλλων ἔνεκα.

§ 2. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή κ.τ.λ.] The Paraphrast exhibits the b. 6. connexion between this clause (introduced by δῇ) and the previous clause thus—ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γάρ πράξεις δὶ ἀν ἐθίζομεν ἔαντος εἰς τὴν ἀρετὴν προαιρεταὶ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσίν. The writer of the *M. M.* (i. 9. 1187 a. 7) makes 'Socrates' deny the doctrine of this section—Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν γενέσθαι τὸ σπουδαῖος εἶναι ἡ φαύλους. εἰ γάρ τις, φησίν, ἐρωτήσειεν ὃντιναοῦν πότερον ἀν βούλοιτο δίκαιος εἶναι ἡ ἀδικος, οὐθεὶς ἀν ἔλοιτο τὴν ἀδικίαν. ὅμοιως δὲ ἐπ' ἀνδρείας καὶ δειλίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἀεὶ ὠσαύτως. δῆλον δὲ ὡς εἰ φαῦλοι

1113 b. 6. *τινες εἰσίν, οὐκ ἀν ἔκόντες εἴησαν φαῦλοι· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ σπουδᾶιοι.—* δὸ δὴ τοιοῦτος λόγος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής. διὰ τί γάρ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐκ ἐξ τὰ φαῦλα πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ σπουδᾶια κελεύει; καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς φαῦλοις ἔημίαν τάττει, ἀν πράττῃ, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς, ἀν μὴ πράττῃ; καίτοι ἄποτος ἀν εἴη ταῦτα νομοθετῶν, ἀ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστι πράττειν. ἀλλ' ὡς ἔουκεν, ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ σπουδᾶιος εἶναι καὶ τὸ φαῦλοις. The writer of the *M.M.*, of course, misunderstands the true position of ‘Socrates.’ When ‘Socrates’ says that vice is involuntary (*e.g. Protag.* 345 D, E, also *Gorg.* 509 E), he means only that it is *παρὰ φύσιν*: as for the doctrine *Meno* 100 B *θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἀρετὴ οἵς παραγίγνεται*, where the reference is to the political *genius* of a Themistocles or Pericles—it is evidently not touched by such arguments as those here brought forward by the writer of the *M.M.* ‘Socrates’ was not the man to underrate the influence of the *νομοθέτης*.

b. 7. *ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ.]* Grant refers to *Met.* Θ. 2 where *ai μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις* are said to be *τῶν ἐναντίων*. Cf. *Met.* Θ. 5 where *ὅρεξις* or *προαίρεσις* is said to be *τὸ κύριον*, and to determine which of the two possible *ἐναντία* shall be selected.

b. 13. § 3. *τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθῶς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι]* ‘And this (*i.e.* τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά) is, according to our view, being good and bad.’ *ἦν* refers back (*as e.g.* in iii. 8. 14), not perhaps, as Grant thinks, ‘to the preceding section,’ but more generally to the doctrine already established that the *deliberate choice* of τὰ καλά or τὰ αἰσχρά indicates a good or bad *character*: cf. iii. 4. 2. At any rate Trendelenburg, in his paper on *τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι* (*Rheinisches Museum*, 1828, vol. ii. pp. 457 sqq.), referred to by Grant, is right in telling us that *ἀγαθῶς* here is simply by attraction to *ἡμῖν*, and that the formula *τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι* = ‘the essential idea of goodness,’ or ‘of a good man,’ is not in the writer’s mind. He seems to be thinking of the way in which a man’s deliberate actions indicate his character to the ordinary observer; not of the scientific formula (*τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι*) of Virtue or Vice. For the use of the dat. with *εἶναι* to express the essential notion see *De Anima* ii. 1. 412 b. 12 *ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἀν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ—An. Post.* ii. 4. 91 b. 4 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷο εἶναι κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι.—*Phys.* iii. 5. 204 a. 23 τὸ γὰρ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι καὶ ἀπειρον τὸ αὐτό, εἴπερ οὐσία τὸ ἀπειρον καὶ μὴ καθ’ ὑποκειμένον—*Met.* Z. 6. 1031 b. 11 ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, ὅσα μὴ κατ’ ἄλλο λέγεται, ἀλλὰ

καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ πρῶτα—*i.e.* the words ἄπειρον, ἀγαθόν, καλόν mark 1113 b. 13. notions, not concrete things. That τὸ ἀγαθόis εἶναι in the present passage (*E. N.* iii. 5. 3) cannot mean ‘the essential notion’ of the virtuous man becomes very plain if we turn to ii. 6. 17, where the essential notion of ἀρετή is distinguished from its excellence—κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.—Τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ answers to the τὰ καλὰ πράττειν of the present passage.

§ 4. οὐδεὶς ἔκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδὲ ἄκων μακάριος] *μακάριος* seems to be b. 14. the reading of all MSS., and is accordingly restored by Bywater. Bekker and Susemihl adopt *μάκαρ*, the suggestion of Victorius. Bergk (*Poet. Lyr.* p. 1076, referred to by Ramsauer) thinks that this line may be by Solon. The Schol. (quoted by Zell and Michelet) says—παροιμία τοῦτο ἡ καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ὁ Συρακόσιος κέχρηται ἐν οἷς φησίν· ἀλλὰ μὰν ἐγώ 'ναγκαῖος ταῦτα πάντα ποιέω, σῖομαι δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἔκὼν πονηρός, οὐδὲ ἄταν ἔχων. ἐν Ἡρακλεῖ δὲ ταῦτα τῷ παραφόρῳ. The line is quoted in the spurious dialogue *περὶ δικαίου* (*Plato Dial.* p. 374 a.) referred to by Zell, Coraes, and Grant. There can be no doubt that the writer of the line used *πονηρός* in the sense of ‘wretched,’ to contrast with *μάκαρ* meaning ‘happy.’ But Aristotle here, and the writer of the dialogue *περὶ δικαίου*, quote the line in order to give the word its other sense of ‘wicked,’ although that other sense is obviously not intended by the poet. The liberty which they thus take with the poet’s meaning is not so great however as it seems. A Greek would not distinguish the two senses of *πονηρός* so sharply as we do when we are compelled to translate the word by ‘wicked’ in one context, and by ‘wretched’ in another.

§ 5. τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις] Above, iii. 3. 15—ζοικε δὴ . . . ἀν- b. 17. θρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων. As for the parallel ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων, it has not, Ramsauer notes, been mentioned before in the *E. N.*; but in *E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b. 15 we have—εἰσὶ δὴ πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ οὐσίαι κατὰ φύσιν τινὲς ἀρχαῖ, διὸ καὶ ἑκάστῃ πολλὰ δύναται τοιαῦτα γεννᾶν, οἷον ἀνθρωπος ἀνθρώπους . . . πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁ γ' ἀνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ζῴων.

§ 6. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα] *i.e.* τὰ εἰρημένα.

παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν] Bekker reads ἐψ' in b. 20. place of the first *ἐν*. The text as given above is that restored by



§ 14. οὐ μὴν ἔάν γε κ.τ.λ.] ‘No man wishes to be unjust’ would a. 13. be true if wish (*βούλησις*) were only of τὸ ἀγαθόν, as distinguished from τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. But the ἀδικῶν voluntarily with his eyes open performs the acts ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἀδικος, and he is responsible for the habit of ἀδικία which is formed. He must be treated practically as if he wished to form it. It is irrelevant, then, to urge ‘no man *wishes* to be unjust’ as an excuse of injustice. ‘Not wishing,’ in the sense of ‘not making injustice his ideal,’ has evidently nothing to do with the matter. He did not ‘wish’ in this sense to be unjust, and yet he became unjust by his own voluntary acts; and, being unjust, he may wish to be just, but that will not make him just.

καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν] *καίτοι* is Rassow’s certain conjecture (as it a. 15. seems to me) for *καὶ*, see *Forsch.* p. 28.

προεμένῳ] sc. τὴν ὑγίειαν. Par.

a. 17.

βαλεῖν] K<sup>b</sup>, L<sup>b</sup>, M<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>, Γ, Ald., Cambr., have βαλεῖν: but a. 18. λαβεῖν is the reading of CCC, NC, B<sup>1</sup>, B<sup>2</sup>. Syllables written backwards are not very uncommon in MSS. Bywater brackets καὶ ρῖψαι, reading βαλεῖν. If βαλεῖν accidentally became λαβεῖν, the words καὶ ρῖψαι would be naturally added; or perhaps ρῖψαι was originally a marginal gloss on βαλεῖν, and crept into the text, and suggested the change (not however universally made) of βαλεῖν into λαβεῖν. Susemihl reads λαβεῖν καὶ ρῖψαι.

§ 15.] We are held responsible for states of body sometimes; a. 21. *à fortiori* for states of mind, even though it may be beyond the power of ‘wishing’ to change them.

§ 17.] This involved section, into which the movement of a. 31. whole Dialogue seems to be compressed, consists of two sentences, in the first of which—εἰ δέ τις 1114 a. 31 . . . εὐφυΐα 1114 b. 12—the protasis states the position of Aristotle’s opponent, and the apodosis, beginning οὐθεὶς 1114 b. 3, develops the consequences of that position in such a way as to lead up to the second sentence—1114 b. 12 εἰ δὴ ταῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἔκουσιον;—in which Aristotle refutes his opponent by showing him that he ‘proves too much.’ The clause 1114 b. 1 εἰ μὲν οὖν . . . b. 3 αὐτὸς αἴτιος is best regarded as a parenthesis stating Aristotle’s own view, thrown in at the beginning of the ‘Dialogue,’ by the side

1114 a. 31. of the opponent's view, to make the issue between the two disputants clearer.

a. 32. τῆς δὲ φαντασίας] *φαντασία* is described in *de An.* iii. 3. 428 b. 10 as a κίνησις started by αἰσθησις, and resembling it; *φαντάσματα* are images derived from sense—*ideas*, *Vorstellungen*, ‘reliques of motions made in the sense’—to quote an expression of Hobbes (*Lev.* iii), whose account of *Imagination* (*Lev.* ii and iii) resembles Aristotle's account of *φαντασία* very closely. See *de An.* iii. 3, where, after having shown that *φαντασία* is not αἰσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς, or δόξα, Aristotle says (428 b. 9) οὐτ' ἄρα ἐν τι τούτων ἔστιν οὗτ' ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντασία. ἀλλ' ἐπειδή ἔστι κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἔτερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ' αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὅν αἰσθησίς ἔστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίγνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην δμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἀν αὐτῇ ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. Cf. also 429 a. 1 ἡ φαντασία ἀν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γυγνομένη. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἰσθησίς ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἰληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἴδειν. καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμρένειν καὶ δμοίας εἶναι ταῦς αἰσθήσει, πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἡ νόσοις ἡ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἀνθρώποι. *Φαντασία* is thus a motion caused by sensation, distinct from sensation, but resembling it. As such, it mediates between sensation and thought—*de Mem.* i. 449 b. 31 νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος—and gives appetite objects, see *de An.* iii. 10. 433 b. 27 ἡ ὄρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῶον ταύτη ἁντοῦ κινητικόν ὄρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἡ λογιστικὴ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει. Αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία converts the sensation of an object into an idea of it which attracts or repels: λογιστικὴ (called βούλευτικὴ in *de An.* iii. 11. 434 a. 7) φαντασία enables the calculative faculty to marshal reasons which will appeal to ὄρεξις. Hobbes' ‘Trayn of Imaginations’ (*Lev.* iii)—the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows—is an excellent example of what λογιστικὴ φαντασία does. The close connexion which thus subsists between φαντασία and ὄρεξις enables us to appreciate the force of the former term in the present section. It is used here simply for ‘the idea that this or that is good.’ Hence it is almost equivalent to ‘a desire or wish for this or that.’

**εἰ μὲν οὖν . . . αὐτὸς αἴτιος]** Aristotle's own view here parenthetically stated in conditional form involves a difficulty. A man is *τῆς ἔξεως πῶς αἴτιος* because he has voluntarily performed the acts which have resulted in the *ἔξις*: but each of these acts implies *φαντασία*—*όρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀνεν φαντασίας*: what if *φαντασία ἡσ οὐ κύριοι ἐσμεν* dominates the whole process by which a *ἔξις* is formed? Aristotle cannot be said to face this difficulty. It is enough for his present purpose to refute his opponent by making him prove more than he wishes, *viz.* that we cannot take credit to ourselves for our *virtues*. Broader ground, however, might have been taken. It might have been argued that the *φύσις*, or natural bent which determines the *τέλος*, is after all *the man's own φύσις—his own character*—in short *himself*—the concrete man, made up of elements inherited from ancestors, and of elements taken on in the lifetime of the individual; and that consequently to say that the end is fixed *φύσει* is to say that the man himself fixes it, not that it is fixed for him, in spite of himself, by an external power. The biological antecedents of the individual are not external to him. They are summed up *in* him. Aristotle's opponent in the present passage, like many disputants in our own day, commits the mistake of externalising biological antecedents. He does not see that an inherited character is still *the man's own character*.

**εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς]** *εἰ δὲ μηδείς* is the reading of Mb, Lb, Nb, Γ, b. 3. Ald., B<sup>1</sup>, B<sup>2</sup>, NC, CCC, adopted by Rassow (*Forsch.* 121) and Susemihl. Kb, Ob, Camb., read *εὶ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς*, adopted by Bekker, Ramsauer, and Bywater. If *εὶ δὲ μηδείς* be adopted, the whole section is one sentence, in which the protasis makes three starts: (1) *εὶ δέ τις λέγοι*, (2) *εὶ δὲ μηδείς*, and (3) *εὶ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ*—the apodosis beginning at *τί μᾶλλον* b. 12.

**ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει**] Ramsauer notes that b. 4. this view resembles Aristotle's *ἄγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἀ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὅν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιάντην ἀμαρτίαν ἀδικοὶ καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται E.N. iii. 1. 14.* Aristotle differs from his present opponent in regarding the *μοχθηρός* as *αἴτιος τῆς ἄγνοίας*, in recognising in the *φύσις* which causes the *ἄγνοια* the man's own character.

**ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις]** = *τὸ δὲ τέλος οὐ ἔφιεται.*

b. 5.

**εὐφυής]** That *εὐφυΐα* is highly prized by Aristotle is shown by b. 8.

1114 b. 8. the place which *φυσικὴ ἀρετή* (*E. N.* vi. 13. 1) and *εὐγένεια* (see note on i. 8. 16) occupy in his system.

b. 9. *τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . τοιοῦτον ἔξει*] There is a Platonic ring about these words, and the doctrine reminds one of that maintained at the end of the *Meno*—that *ἀρετή* is a divine gift, which its possessor cannot communicate to others. We can imagine a Platonising opponent encouraged by Aristotle to enlarge on *ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ εὐφυΐα*, and so lay himself open to the awkward question—*τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἑκούσιων*;

Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 121) finds the construction of the sentence *τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . ἀν εἴη εὐφυΐα* irregular: the words *τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . ἔξει* have no suitable predicate, the predicate *τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ εὐφυΐα* being a superlative which answers rather to the clause *καὶ τὸ εὖ . . . πεφυκέναι*. He accordingly translates, as if *εὐφυΐα* *ἀν εἴη* were read after *ἔξει*, thus—‘das Grösste und Schönste, was man von einem andern nicht empfangen und lernen kann, sondern was man so besitzen wird, wie es von Natur geworden ist, (ist die *εὐφυΐα*), und ist es gut und schön von Natur geworden, so ist es die vollkommene und wahre *εὐφυΐα*.’ I cannot help thinking that this is a little too subtle. The superlatives *μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον* in the first clause of the sentence surely deserve the superlative predicate as much as *τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι*. But is Rassow right in making *τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον . . . ἔξει* a subject with *εὐφυΐα* (whether *τελεία* or not) as predicate? Is it not better to make *τὸ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον* the object of *ἔξει* and to regard the clause *τὸ γὰρ . . . ἔξει* as explanatory of *εὐφύής* l. 8, *τὸ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον* developing *εὖ-* and *καὶ ὁ . . . ἔφυ* developing *-φυής*? We should then translate—‘for he will have that which is greatest and fairest, and that which one cannot receive or learn from another, but has entirely from nature.’ Then follows the clause *καὶ τὸ εὖ . . . εὐφυΐα* not as ‘Ein steigernder Zusatz zum Subject (Rassow, *Forsch.* 121),’ but added to distinguish this moral *εὐφυΐα*, as *τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ*, from the lower kind of *εὐφυΐα* which a man of ‘good natural ability’ possesses. The *τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ εὐφυΐα* of this passage may be compared, as Ramsauer notes, with the *θεῖα εὐτυχία* (*E. E. H.* 14. 1248 b. 3), or *εὐφυΐα ὄρεξεως καὶ ἐπιθυμίας* (*E. E. H.* 14. 1247 b. 39) of the *E. E.* and *M. M.* The writers of these treatises found the doctrine of *φυσικὴ ἀρετή* in Aristotle; but they certainly developed it in a way which suggests Platonic influence.

The Platonic tone and phraseology of the following passage 1114 b. 9. (*M. M.* ii. 8. 1207 a. 35) is remarkable:—*ἔστιν οὖν ἡ εὐτυχία ἀλογος φύσις*· ὁ γὰρ εὐτυχής ἔστιν ὁ ἄνευ λόγου ἔχων ὅρμην πρὸς τάγαθά, καὶ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνων, τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι φύσεως· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ ἔνεστιν τῇ φύσει τοιούτον φόρμῳ μεν ἀλόγως πρὸς ἄν εὖ ἔχωμεν. καὶ εἴ τις ἐρωτήσει τὸν οὗτος ἔχοντα, διὰ τί τοῦτο ἀρέσκει σοι οὕτω πράττειν; οὐκ οἶδα, φησίν, ἀλλὰ ἀρέσκει μοι, ὅμοιον πάσχων τοῖς ἐνθουσιάζουσιν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ἄνευ λόγου ὅρμην ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τι. Cf. Plato, *Meno*, 99 D καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαίμεν ἄν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὅντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὃν λέγουσι.

**§ 18. τὰ δὲ λοιπά] τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.**

b. 15.

**§ 19.]** At the end of § 17 the opponent had to admit that if the **b. 16.** *τέλος* being *φυσικόν* makes vice involuntary, it also makes virtue involuntary. But he wishes to believe that virtue is voluntary (*ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιον ἔστιν 1114 b. 19*); accordingly he must admit either that the end is not fixed *φύσει* (*εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκάστῳ φαίνεται ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ' αὐτὸν ἔστιν*—it is partly due to himself) or that the end is indeed *φυσικόν*, but the means are voluntarily chosen by the good man (*εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκούσιας τὸν σπουδαῖον . . .*). But either admission, made in the interest of the voluntariness of virtue, entails the voluntariness of vice.

**§ 20. ὥσπερ λέγεται]** i.e. it is maintained by our opponent that **b. 22.** *virtue* is voluntary.

**§§ 21, 22.]** The order accepted by Bekker from the MSS. viz. **b. 26.** (1) *κοινῆ . . . προστάξῃ*, (2) *οὐχ ὅμοιώς . . . ἐκούσιοι* ought to be reversed: see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 28. Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* pp. 205-6) inclines to the view that the section *οὐχ ὅμοιώς . . . ἐκούσιοι* is a *marginale*, and not, as Scaliger supposed, a part of the original text detached from its immediate antecedent § 20 by the intrusion of the words *κοινῆ . . . προστάξῃ*. He thinks that the words *οὐχ ὅμοιώς . . . ἐκούσιοι* are out of place after § 20, which merely proves that *ἀρετὴ* and *κακία* are equally voluntary. But are they out of place as referring back to the remark made at the end of § 14?

**§ 21. πρακτικαὶ (καὶ) καθ' αὐτάς]** i.e. not *τούτων πρακτικαὶ κατὰ b. 28. συμβεβηκός*: e.g. the *ἕξις* of temperance produces temperate acts, because it is its own nature to do so, not because they happen to

1114 b. 28. conduce to health or respectability. Susemihl and Bywater insert *kai* before *καθ'*, with Γ, Asp., Ob<sup>b</sup>, CCC, NC, Cambr. Of course MSS. do not help us to a decision. I do not like the *kai*.

1115 a. 3. § 22. *χρήσασθαι*] ‘to act’: cf. the use of *χρῆσις* = *ἐνέργεια* E. E. ii. 1. 1219 a. 14.

a. 5. § 23. *πόσαι*] See Grant's excellent notes here and on ii. 7. 1. Aristotle can hardly have regarded his list of virtues as theoretically exhaustive. He only means that it is not limited to the four ‘cardinal virtues’ *σοφία*, *ἀνδρεία*, *σωφροσύνη*, *δικαιοσύνη*, but involves a more minute analysis of the conditions of human life than that enumeration presupposes. We may suspect that, having written *τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς*, he naturally went on to write *καὶ πόσαι*.

## CHAPTER VI.

### ARGUMENT.

*Here ends our general description of moral virtue. Let us now proceed to describe in detail the various forms of moral virtue—the virtues in the plural: their number our list, when finished, will show.*

Courage. It is a mediocrity in relation to the feelings of fear and confidence. Now, we fear evils—to use the most general expression. Hence fear is defined as the expectation of evil. But although we fear all evils—disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death, it is not with all of them that courage has to do; for there are some evils which a man ought to fear. Thus if a man does not fear disgrace he is shameless, not courageous, although the latter epithet is sometimes wrongly applied to him, because he resembles the courageous man in ‘not fearing.’ On the other hand, poverty and disease perhaps ought not to be feared: they do not come by one’s own fault; but yet, being without fear of them does not constitute a man courageous, except in a metaphorical sense. A man may be a coward in war, and yet look the loss of his fortune boldly in the face. Or again, he may fear the outrage of wife and children or the jealousy of Heaven, and yet be no coward; may look forward to a flogging with a stout heart, and yet not be courageous. What then is the object of fear with which courage is concerned? Surely that which is the object of the greatest fear—for the courageous man is the man to face it—death, which puts an end to life. But not death, as such, however coming—thus, not death by shipwreck or disease—but death coming gloriously in battle. He is courageous, in the strict sense, who is without dread of a glorious death, and of the risks which bring it to close

quarters with him in sudden onslaught—and such above all are the risks of war: not that the courageous man is not also without dread of death by shipwreck or disease; but the prospect of such a death does not call forth his peculiar excellence, for he revolts against it, as miserable and inglorious, often, in his inexperience, regarding it as inevitable, when it is not; nor can he take up arms and defend himself against it. It is only where a man can take up arms and defend himself, or where death is glorious, that he can ‘show courage’.

§ 1. περὶ ἀνδρείας] See Grant’s excellent notes on §§ 1–8 of this 1115 a. 6. chapter, in which he refers to the *Protagoras* (349–51, 359–61), and to the *Laches* to show that ‘Aristotle’s admirable account of courage is to some extent indebted to the observations of Plato, while in some points it is a protest against the Platonic theory.’ Aristotle’s relation to the Platonic theory may be briefly stated thus—Aristotle is at one with Plato in recognising the moral elevation of the virtue, but he limits its sphere to war, whereas Plato extends it so as to include all dangers—even those of temptation.

§§ 1, 2. περὶ φόβους . . . προσδοκίαν κακοῦ] Grant quotes *Protag.* 358 D προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε, and *Laches*, 198 B ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἢ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἢ μὴ δέος παρέχει δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγονότα, οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ. But, it is argued by Socrates,—ἀνδρεία cannot be an ἐπιστήμη, for science has nothing to do with time. Agriculture, or strategy, μία οὖσα ἐφορᾶ καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ γενησόμενα (198 E) . . . καὶ ὁ νόμος οὗτος τάττει μὴ τὸν μάντιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἀρχειν ἀλλὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν τοῦ μάντεως. If courage is a science, it cannot be confined to the future (δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων) but must be concerned with good and evil universally—ἢ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἔχόντων (199 C). Then, asks Socrates, can he be wanting in the highest virtue, who knows all that is good and all that is evil; and can he fail in temperance or justice or holiness, who alone can guard against evil and compass good, whether in the service of the gods or in the society of men? οὐκ ἄρα, concludes Socrates (199 E), μόριον ἀρετῆς ἀν εἴη τὸ νῦν λέγομενον ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἀρετή. What we call ‘moral courage’ is, in fact, made the foundation of all virtue. Such is the suggestion put forward in the *Laches*. It is particularly to be noted that it is only a suggestion. In § 3 Aristotle protests against this wide and vague use of the term

1115 a. 6. ἀνδρεῖος suggested in the *Laches*. The term is properly used, he thinks, only in connexion with the dangers of war (§ 10), and καθ' ὅμοιότητα (§ 4) in connexion with all other evils.

a. 7. ἥδη φανερὸν γεγένηται] This is the reading K<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>, Cambr., accepted by Susemihl and Bywater, instead of the καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται of other MSS. (some of which, e.g. CCC, B<sup>1</sup>, B<sup>2</sup>, however add φανερὸν γὰρ γεγένηται) accepted by Bekker. I prefer Bekker's reading: cf. below iii. 10. Ι ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἔστι περὶ ἥδονάς ἡ σωφροσύνη εἴρηται ἡμῖν. Whatever may be thought of the genuineness of the διαγραφή in ii. 7, there can be no doubt that there was a διαγραφή of some kind there to which Aristotle is entitled to refer back here.

a. 10. § 3. φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν] Eudemus (*E. E.* iii. i. 1229 a. 33) limits the application of the term φόβος. He distinguishes φόβος, properly so called (fear of death), from dread of disgrace, &c. ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου. τοιαῦτα δ' ἔστιν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς· τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλην τινὰ προσδεχομένοις λύπην ἔτερα μὲν ἀν τις ἵστη λύπη γένοιτο καὶ πάθος ἔτερον, φόβος δ' οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἰ τις προορῷτο ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπην ἦν οἱ φθονοῦντες λυπῶνται, ἢ τοιαύτην οὖλαν οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἔσεσθαι λύπαις φόβος γίνεται, ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν. Thus φόβος is not the proper name for the anticipation of the pain of envy or shame; it is applied only to the anticipation of such pains as are destructive of life—ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν. This refinement in the use of the term φόβος was doubtless suggested primarily to Eudemus by Aristotle's limitation of the sphere of ἀνδρεία to war; but a passage in *Rhet.* ii. 5. 1382 a. 21 may also have had its influence—ἔστω δὴ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ· οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται ἵσται γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. εἰ δὴ ὁ φόβος τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερὰ εἶναι ὅσα φαίνεται δύναμιν ἔχειν μεγάλην τοῦ φθείρειν ἢ βλάπτειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην συντεινούσας.

a. 12. ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν] Eudemus would have avoided the word φοβεῖσθαι here; nor is it quite consistent with the usage of *Rhet.* ii. 5: εὐλαβεῖται τὸ αἰσχρόν expresses better than φοβεῖται the relation of the ἐπιεικῆς to moral evil.

λέγεται] The subject is ὁ ἀναίσχυντος.

1115 a. 14.

§ 4. οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν] In limiting the a. 17. sphere of ἀνδρεία to war, without narrowing the application of the term φοβεῖσθαι (as it is narrowed by Eudemus), Aristotle shows that he fully recognises the virtue which we call ‘moral courage’—the σύμπασα ἀρετή of *Laches* 199 E, which Plato (adopting the Socratic doctrine of ἔγκράτεια) very rightly regards as the foundation of πολεμικὴ ἀρετή and all the other virtues.

§ 5. φθόνον] Does he mean the envy of a rival (or of Heaven), a. 23. or the pain of being oneself envious? The writer of the *E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 37 adopts the latter alternative—φόβος δ' οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἴ τις προορῷ ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπην ἥν οἱ φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται.

§ 6. φοβερώτατον . . . κακὸν εἶναι] Here δοκεῖ does not necessarily a. 26. express Aristotle's own view, any more than it does in i. 10. 3 δοκεῖ γάρ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. *E. N.* i. 10. §§ 3-5, and *E. N.* i. 11, should be read in connexion with the present remark.

§ 7. ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις] Grant quotes *Laches*, 191 D, E, for a. 29. the extended use of the term ἀνδρεία, to which objection is made here and in the following sections—θουλόμενος γάρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὁπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἵππικῷ καὶ ἐν ἔνυπναντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἴδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσι, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῦν ἴ εἰσιν ἡ φύσους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἥδονάς δεινοὶ μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες ἢ ἀναστρέφοντες—εἰσὶ γάρ πού τινες, ὁ Λάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρεῖοι.

§ 8. καλλίστω] Cf. Thuc. ii. 42. 5 καὶ δι' ἐλαχίστου καιροῦ τύχης a. 31. ἀμα ἀκμῇ τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ δέους ἀπηλλάγησαν.

§ 10. ὑπόγυια] αἰφνιδίως ἐπερχόμενα Paraph.—the sense given to a. 34. the word here by *Liddell and Scott*; cf. iii. 8. 15 διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειότερου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις ἀπὸ ἔξεως γάρ μᾶλλον ἥν, ὅτι ἥττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γάρ καν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δὲ ἔξαιφνης κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. The word ὑπόγυιος means literally ‘nigh at hand,’ and Hippocrates 1225 C. E. F. is quoted by *Liddell and Scott* for an absolute use of ὑπόγυιον=‘near the end, at the approach of

1115 a. 34. death.' *ὑπόγνια* here may have been selected by Aristotle with a reminiscence of this absolute use; cf. *E. E.* iii. i. 1229 b. 10 καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτους λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλησίον ἡ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς ποιητικόν φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται.

b. 2. § 11. οἱ μέν] οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι.

b. 4. § 12. ἐν οἷς ἔστιν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν] Men 'show courage' where they can take up arms and defend themselves, or (*ἢ*) where death is glorious. The former condition may be realised without the latter; in which case the *ἀνδρεία* would be of one of the spurious kinds described in chapter 8: the latter condition, however, cannot be realised without the former. Death, in a good cause, which a man endured fearlessly, but could not actively resist, would not be *καλὸς θάνατος*.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ARGUMENT.

*Men differ in the things which they fear; but there are things so fearful that no man in his senses will regard them without terror, or think of facing them. These may be dismissed, for we have to do only with things which, although they are fearful, it is possible for men to face. These latter are, in themselves, and for different men, fearful in different degrees. Similarly, things inspire confidence in different degrees. It is with objects of fear, then, which are not too fearful for man to face, and with the grounds of confidence which may be set off against them, that the courageous man is concerned. His fear and his confidence he will govern aright, facing the danger of battle, as he ought, and as reason dictates, for the sake of glorious achievement; for glorious achievement is the end of virtue. A courageous act, like every other virtuous act, realises its own end when it shows forth the end for the sake of which its parent habit exists. The habit of courage is a glory to human nature: it exists for the sake of being a glory to human nature—to be this that it is its end. To show forth then the peculiar glory of courage is the end for the sake of which the courageous man faces danger and does deeds of courage.*

*On the side of excess we have:—*

(1) *The man whose fearlessness is excessive. He has no name, but may be described as a sort of madman, or insensate person, for whom (as they say for the Celts) earthquakes or waves have no terrors.*

(2) *The man whose confidence is excessive—the rash man, who is also a swaggerer and a pretender to courage, but fails in the hour of real danger.*

(3) *The man whose fear is excessive—the coward. He appears also on the side of defect, for his confidence is defective; excessive fear, however, is what is most noticeable in him, and hopelessness; whereas the courageous man is full of good hope. Rash men again are eager for the fray before the danger is at hand, but in the hour of danger they hang back; whereas courageous men are keen when the time for action comes, but keep quiet before it.*

*Courage then is a mediocrity in relation to the feelings of confidence and fear, as these are roused in war; and the courageous man deliberately takes his stand where he does because it is glorious to do so, or would be disgraceful not to do so.*

*But to commit suicide in order to avoid poverty, or the pangs of love, or any other pain or sorrow, is not courageous, but cowardly: for to shrink from hardships is effeminacy; and the suicide braves death, not because death is glorious, but because life is evil.*

§ 1. *τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν . . . ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον]* There are two classes 1115 b. 7. of φοβερά, (1) φοβερά which men can face; each one of these is differently φοβερόν to different men: (2) φοβερά so appalling that no man in his senses will face them—lightnings, earthquakes, inundations (Paraph.).

§ 2. *ώς ἄνθρωπος]* i.e. so far as τὰ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον are concerned. b. 11.

*φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα]* i.e. as well as τὰ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον.

*ώς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ώς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ]* προστάττει is to be understood b. 12. after λόγος, and ὁ ἀνδρεῖος is the subject of ὑπομενεῖ. He will indeed fear them, but yet, in obedience to the dictates of reason, will face them. Ramsauer refers to a passage in *Top.* iv. 5. 125 b. 20, in which Aristotle makes the ἀνδρεῖος ἀπαθῆς, instead of, as here, ἐγκρατῆς φόβου. (See § 5, below κατ' ἀξίαν . . . πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος). The passage in the *Topics* is as follows—διαμαρτάνουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὴν ἔξιν εἰς τὴν ἀκολουθοῦσαν δύναμιν τάττοντες, οἷον τὴν πραότητα ἐγκράτειαν ὡργῆς καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φάβων καὶ κερδῶν ἀνδρεῖος μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρᾶος ὁ ἀπαθῆς λέγεται, ἐγκρατῆς δ' ὁ πάσχων καὶ μὴ ἀγόμενος. "Ισως μὲν οὖν ἀκολουθεῖ δύναμις ἐκατέρῳ τοιαύτῃ, ὥστ' εἰ πάθοι, μὴ ἄγεσθαι ἀλλὰ κρατεῖν" οὐ μὴν τοῦτο γ' ἐστὶ τῷ μὲν ἀνδρείῳ τῷ δὲ πράῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ δῆλος μὴ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν. We may explain this difference between the *Topics* and *Ethics* by pointing out that in the *Topics* Aristotle is speaking of the abstract notion of ἀνδρεία—τοῦτο γέ ἐστι τῷ μὲν ἀνδρείῳ εἶναι, as discussed by dialectical

- 1115 b. 12. disputants; whereas in the *Ethics* he is describing the *ἀνδρεῖος* in the concrete.

τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς] Ramsauer observes that it is here for the first time that the chief end is described as *τὸ καλόν*: henceforward it is often so described, as in *E.N.* 1116 a. 11, 12, 1117 a. 8, 1178 b. 13, 1120 a. 23, 24, 1122 b. 6: in *E.E.* 1229 a. 8, 1230 a. 27: and in *M.M.* 1190 a. 28 and 33.

- b. 15. § 4. *<δ> οὐ δεῖ*] Susem. and Bywater restore *δ* from Γ.  
 b. 17. § 5. ὁ μὲν . . . ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος . . . δμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν] ‘The man who governs his fear and also his confidence aright, and faces the dangers that he ought to face.’

οὐ ἔνεκα] sc. δεῖ, i.e. καλοῦ ἔνεκα—in a glorious cause.

- b. 19. κατ’ ἀξίαν] There ought to be the same ratio between the magnitudes of two *φόβοι* as there is between the magnitudes of their respective *φοβερά*.

ὁ λόγος] The faculty which perceives, or the consciousness of, that right ratio (*δ ὁρθὸς λόγος . . . τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν*) which education has established among the *ἄλογα πάθη* of human nature.

- b. 20. πάσχει] Cf. note on § 2, b. 12, above.

§ 6. τέλος δὲ . . . τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν] See paraphrase at the beginning of this chapter. Rassow’s *ἔξιν καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δέ* ἡ δ’ ἀνδρείᾳ καλόν for the received *ἔξιν καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ* ἡ ἀνδρείᾳ καλόν is probably right (*Forsch.* p. 90). We see from this passage what a ‘positive’ conception of Nature underlies Aristotle’s ‘Teleology.’ Human Nature is a beautiful organism, and to be beautiful is its *raison d’être*. So a plant or animal is its own *raison d’être*; it performs the functions of its nature for the sake of maintaining that nature in perfection—a doctrine which was afterwards eagerly taken up by Plotinus: see *Enn.* v. 8. (vol. 2. p. 12, ed. Kirchhoff) Διὸ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ποθειόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ταῦτὸν τῷ καλῷ, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐράσιμον, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πότερον δὲ ποτέρου αἴτιον τί χρὴ ζητεῖν, οὕσης τῆς φύσεως μᾶς;

- b. 22. ὄριζεται γὰρ ἔκαστον τῷ τέλει] These words are placed by Imelmann (*Obs. Crit. in Arist. Eth. Nic.* p. 6) after τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν with the approval of Rassow. I think they are better in

their old place, immediately after *τοιοῦτον* (*i.e.* καλόν) δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος, 1115 b. 22. which they explain. The meaning is—‘If ἀνδρεία is καλόν, we may infer that its *end* is τὸ καλόν, for a thing is (*i.e.* is essentially as defined—*ὅριζεται*) what it is in relation to its τέλος.’

§§ 7-12.] Cf. ii. 7. 2, where the same complicated system of b. 24. extremes is exhibited, *viz.* :—

- 1. excess of fear
- 2. defect of confidence } constituting the δειλός.
- 3. excess of confidence constituting the θρασύς.
- 4. defect of fear (or excess of fearlessness) constituting an ἀνώνυμος.

The writer of *E. E.* iii. 1. 1228 a. 33 sqq., instead of distinguishing the ὑπερβάλλων τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ as ἀνώνυμος from the θρασύς, simply says ὁ θρασύς . . . οἷος φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἡττον ἡ δεῖ θαρρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ.

§ 7. Κελτούς] Cf. *E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 b. 28. Zell and Coraes b. 28. quote Strabo vii. p. 293, who relates, on the authority of Ephorus—  
 ὅπλα αἴρεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πλημμυρίδας τοὺς Κίμβρους, καὶ ὅτι ἀφοβίαν οἱ Κελτοὶ ἀσκοῦντες κατακλύζεσθαι τὰς οἰκίας ὑπομένουσιν. Zell thinks it not unlikely that Aristotle here borrows directly from Ephorus. Ramsauer refers to an extract in Stobaeus, *Flor.* ζ. 40 (vol. i. p. 167 ed. Meineke) from the συναγωγὴ ἐθῶν of Nicolaus, Κελτοὶ οἱ τῷ ὀκεανῷ γειτνιῶντες αἰσχρὸν ἥγονται τοῖχον καταπίπτοντα ἡ οἰκίαν φεύγειν, πλημμυρίδος δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἔξω θαλάττης ἐπερχομένης μεθ' ὅπλων ἀπαντῶντες ὑπομένουσιν ἕως κατακλύζονται, ἵνα μὴ δοκῶσι φεύγοντες τὸν θάνατον φοβεῖσθαι. As Ramsauer notes, both Plato and Aristotle represent the character of the Northern peoples as marked by the preponderance of θυμός *Rep.* 435 E, *Pol.* 1327 b. 23. Eudemus says (*E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 b. 29) καὶ δῆλος ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν.

§ 10. ἐν ταῖς λύπαις] *i.e.* ἐν φόβοις. Excessive fear (generally 1116 a. 1. producing physical symptoms, see iv. 9. 2) is more manifest than defective confidence.

§ 13. ἐν οἷς εἰρηται] *i.e.* ἐν πολέμῳ.

a. 11.

τὸ δὲ ἀποθήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle, Grant a. 12. remarks, ‘does not sympathise with or discuss the sentimental deaths of the Cynic philosophers. Suicide was afterwards dignified by the

1116 a. 12. Stoics with the name of ἐξαγωγή—"ushering oneself out of the world." See Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics* p. 316 sqq. (English translation) for suicide among the Stoics.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### ARGUMENT.

*Such is Courage strictly so called ; but five other kinds less strictly so called may be distinguished : and first, as resembling true courage most closely—*

(1) *The courage of the ordinary citizen.* He faces danger because his city punishes and disgraces him if he does not, and honours him if he does. Hence 'courageous men' are most common in those cities in which cowardice is held in dishonour and courage in honour. This is the sort of courage which Homer portrays in Hector with his—'What will Polydamas think of me !' and in Diomedes with his—'What will Hector say !' It is like the true courage in so far as its motive is virtuous, i.e. shame and a wish to avoid disgrace and a desire for honour and glory. Under this head we may also bring the courage of those who are compelled by their commanding officers to face danger—a much inferior form, being actuated not by shame, but by bodily fear, by desire to avoid not disgrace but physical pain. This kind of courage to which a man is compelled is very far removed from that of the truly courageous man, who faces death under the inspiration of a glorious cause.

(2) *The courage of experience :* that of trained professional soldiers who know the risks of war (often more imaginary than real), and how to meet them with the greatest safety to themselves and loss to their adversaries. They go into battle knowing that they are likely to come out of it unhurt. If they are confronted by superior numbers, and see that there is real danger, they are the first to flee ; whereas non-professional citizen troops prefer death to the disgrace of flight. Socrates, when he said that 'courage is knowledge,' seemed to identify true courage with this courage of experience ; but the two are widely different.

(3) *The courage of passion and spirit.* This is the courage of wild beasts when they rush upon those who have wounded them, and of Homer's heroes when their 'blood boils,' and they 'breathe forth wrath through their nostrils.' The truly courageous man is indeed helped on by his passion and spirit, but the consciousness of the glorious significance of his achievement is his real motive, and guides him throughout, whereas passion and spirit are blind guides, and cannot supply a moral motive : their influence is that of mere feeling—of painful feeling, when one is angry, of pleasurable feeling, when one wreaks one's vengeance. If pleasure and pain were moral motives, then the ass, emboldened by the pain of hunger to graze on, in spite of blows, and the lover, risking all to enjoy his mistress, would be examples of true courage. True courage is not a thing of feeling, but of reason ; nevertheless the courage of

*passion and spirit lies near to true courage, in that it is more deeply constitutional than the other forms, and expresses the nature of the man more fully, and accordingly may become true courage, if guided by reason and supplied with an ideal.*

(4) *The courage of hope.* Those who have often conquered are confident in danger, their confidence being due to the idea that they are superior to their adversaries, and will receive no harm from them. Men who are drunk also become emboldened by hope; but if things do not turn out as they expect, then they flee. *The unexpected is the best test of a man's courage.* Expected dangers a man who is not very courageous may prepare for, and face, because he has come to the conclusion that there is less risk in facing them than in avoiding them; but if a man is found facing an unexpected danger, we may infer that the habit is strong in him.

(5) *The courage of ignorance.* It is not unlike that of hope, but inferior to it, inasmuch as the man who hopes is actuated by an idea of success in circumstances of which he is aware, whereas the man whose courage is that of ignorance is not actuated by an idea of success in circumstances of which he is aware, but by ignorance of the circumstances, like the Argives who went boldly out to battle, not because they hoped to beat Spartans, but because they thought that Spartans were Sicyonians.

§ 1. *κατὰ πέντε τρόπους]* The ground on which these five forms 1116 a. 16. of courage are distinguished, as spurious, from true courage is concisely stated in *E. E.* iii. i. 1229 a. 12 ἔστι δὲ εἴδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ' ὅμοιότητα· τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένοντιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτά. The spring of action is different. In the case of true courage it is the obligation which the perception of τὸ καλόν lays upon the agent: the source of each truly courageous act is the whole man, *i. e.* the agent as a rational whole; whereas the seeming courageous acts done *κατὰ τὸν πέντε τρόπους* spring not from the whole man, but from isolated feelings. It is the same difference as Kant marks by the distinction between a formal principle and material grounds of action.

These spurious forms are given in three different orders by Aristotle, Eudemus, and the writer of the *M. M.* Eudemus (*E. E.* 1229 a. 12 sqq.) has ἡ πολιτική—ἡ στρατιωτική (δι' ἐμπειρίαν)—ἡ δι' ἀπειρίαν καὶ ὕγνωμαν—ἡ κατ' ἐλπίδα—ἡ διὰ πάθος ἀλόγιστον οἶνον δι' ἔρωτα καὶ θυμόν. The writer of the *M. M.* (i. 20. 1190 b. 21 sqq.) has ἡ κατ' ἐμπειρίαν—ἡ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν—ἡ διὰ τὰ πάθη, οἷον οἱ ἐρῶντες ἡ οἱ ἐνθουσιάζοντες—ἡ δι' αἰσχύνην τὴν πρὸς τὸν πολίταν—ἡ δι' ἐλπίδα.

πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν] ‘ideoque (γάρ) a. 17. obtineat primum locum.’ Rams. ‘This phrase (πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία),’ says Grant, ‘is to be found in Plato’s *Republic* p. 430 C, where it

1116 a. 17. probably originates, but it is there used in a different sense from the present. Plato meant by the term “civil courage” to distinguish the true courage of a civilized man from all merely brutal instincts. Δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγονοῦν, τίνι τε θηριώδῃ καὶ ἀνδραποδώδῃ, οὔτε πάνυ νόμιμον ἥγεισθαι, ἀλλο τέ τι ἡ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. Ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτικήν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέξει. Aristotle meant by “civil courage” that daring which is prompted, not by an independent desire for the beautiful, but by a regard to reputation, and to the fame or disgrace and even punishment awarded by society to brave or cowardly actions respectively.’ It is scarcely necessary to add that the difference here between Plato and Aristotle is only about the use of a phrase. Aristotle is at one with Plato in regarding true *ἀνδρεία* as a habit acquired by the *πολίτης* under the influence of *νόμος*. We can only say that he thinks fit to use the adjective *πολιτική* in an inferior sense here, just as he does in *E. N.* i. 5. 4, where he makes the *πολιτικὸς βίος* one of the inferior lives, although man is *φύσει πολιτικὸν ψών*. The contrast between *πολῖται* (*ordinary citizens*), and hired *στρατιώται* (§ 6 below), going out to battle, was doubtless in his mind when he wrote § 1, and probably induced him to give *πολιτική* the sense which it bears here: cf. *E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 13, where *πολιτική* and *στρατιωτική* occur close together—Μία μὲν πολιτική, αὕτη δ' ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ αἰδῶς οὐσα. δευτέρα ἡ στρατιωτική· αὕτη δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι. That the influence of *νόμος*, so carefully allowed for in Plato's definition of *ἀνδρεία* (*Rep.* 430) as *δύναμις καὶ σωτηρία διὰ παντὸς δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν πέρι καὶ μῆ*, is fully taken account of in Aristotle's theory of *ἡ ἀνδρεία ἡ διὰ τὸ καλόν* is proved, if it is necessary to quote special passages in support of what is involved in Aristotle's whole conception of the relation between the individual and the state—by *Rhet.* i. 9. 1366 b. 11 *ἀνδρία δὲ δι' ἦν πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει καὶ ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ*.

a. 23. § 2. Πουλυδάμας] *Iliad* xxii. 100.

a. 25. Ἔκτωρ] *Iliad* viii. 148.

a. 28. § 3.] Ramsauer, rightly I think, makes *δι' αἰδῶς γάρ* parenthetical. This kind of courage resembles true courage more closely than the other forms do, because it is actuated by *αἰδῶς*, which, though not

ἀρετή, is akin to it, and contributes to it (see ii. 7. 14 ἡ γὰρ αἰδῶς 1116 a. 28. ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων: cf. iv. 9), and by a desire for τιμή, which though not τὸ καλόν, or the chief end (see i. 5. §§ 4, 5); is yet its ‘guinea stamp,’ and an object the moderate pursuit of which constitutes an ἀρετή (see iv. 4) which contributes to the attainment of the chief end.

**§ 4. ἀναγκαζομένους]** There are thus two kinds of πολιτικὴ a. 30. ἀνδρεία: (1) ἡ δί' αἰδῶ, (2) ἡ δί' ἀνάγκην καὶ φόβον. Grant refers to *Phaedo* 68 D, ‘where Plato speaks of most men being courageous from a sort of cowardice’—τῷ δεδιέναι καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι καίτοι ἄτοπον γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλίᾳ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι.

**δὲ Ἔκτωρ]** *Il.* ii. 391. It is Agamemnon not Hector who a. 33. speaks. The lines are quoted again in *Pol.* iii. 9. 1285 a. 10 and attributed correctly to Agamemnon. See Zell’s note.

**§ 5. προστάττοντες]** The reading apparently of all MSS., except a. 36. a ‘Codex Pontificius,’ which has the reading προτάττοντες accepted by Lamb., Vict., Coraes, and Susemihl. *Προτάττοντες* would mean ‘posting in front’; *προστάττοντες*, simply ‘posting,’ generally with dat. or adverb of place.

**τύπτοντες]** The commentators refer to Herod. vii. 223, where the Persian commanders at Thermopylae are said to have used whips. See Rawlinson’s note (7) on the chapter, and note (8) on Herod. vii. 22 for the practice among the Persians and other Oriental nations.

**§ 6. ἡ ἐμπειρία]** See *Laches* 195, and *Protag.* 360, where b. 3. ἀνδρεία is defined as ἐπιστήμη or σοφία τῶν δεινῶν τε καὶ μῆ, and *Protag.* 350, where those who know the art of warfare are said to be bolder than those who do not (if the latter are bold they are not ἀνδρεῖοι but μανόμενοι)—in short οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροι εἰσι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔαντῶν, ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν, ἡ πρὶν μαθεῖν. But as we have seen (note on iii. 6, §§ 1, 2), objections are raised in the *Laches* 199, to the definition ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μῆ, and ‘the knowledge of good and evil,’ with which ἀνδρεία is identified at the end of the dialogue, is something differing *toto coelo* from the ἐμπειρία of the professional (*i. e.* mercenary) soldier with which Aristotle very unfairly wishes to confound the Socratic ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν. Aristotle’s unfair statement of the Socratic position, ‘is

1116 b. 3. corrected,' Grant tells us, 'by Eudemus in his Ethics'—(*E. E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 15) ἡ στρατιωτικὴ . . . δὶ’ ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὰ δεινά, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. I fear that this 'correction' does not really amount to a fair treatment of the Socratic doctrine. Eudemus still wishes his readers to think that Socrates identified courage with στρατιωτικὴ ἐμπειρία, and therefore ought to have made it knowledge, not of τὰ δεινά, but of τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν, for he says, *E. E.* iii. 1. 1230 a. 4 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὅσοι δὶ’ ἐμπειρίαν ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅνπερ τρόπον σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπομένουσιν. αὐτὸ γὰρ τούναντίον ἔχει ἡ ὡς φέτο Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμην ολόμενος εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. οὕτε γὰρ διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ φοβερὰ θαρροῦσιν οἱ ἐπὶ τοὺς ιστοὺς ἀναβαίνειν ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἵσασι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν· οὕτε δὶ’ ὁ θαρραλεώτερον ἀγωνίζονται, τοῦτο ἀνδρεία. καὶ γὰρ ἀν ἡ ἴσχυς καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος κατὰ Θέογυνιν ἀνδρεία εἴεν·

“πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίη δεδμημένος.”

φανερῶς ⟨δ⟩ ἔνιοι δειλοὶ ὅντες ὅμως ὑπομένουσι δὶ’ ἐμπειρίαν· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οὐκ οὖνται κίνδυνον εἶναι· ἵσασι γὰρ τὰς βοηθείας. σημεῖον δέ· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἔχειν οὖνται βοήθειαν, ἀλλ’ ἥδη πλησίον ἢ τὸ δεινόν, οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. The knowledge of the professional soldier is indeed the knowledge of the means of avoiding danger; but the knowledge required by Socrates is the knowledge of danger itself—the power of estimating it rationally and facing it at the call of duty. The courageous man is the man who knows when to risk all. The professional soldier, simply *qua* professional soldier, never makes up his mind to risk all. If his experience does not tell him that he is likely to escape, his courage fails. To make the Platonic Socrates seem to identify courage with professional ἐμπειρία is ridiculously unfair. And it is only a very superficial appreciation of the meaning of such a statement as that in Xen. *Mem.* iv. 6. 11 οἱ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστάμενοι τοῖς δεινοῖς τε καὶ ἐπικινδύνοις καλῶς χρῆσθαι ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ διαμαρτάνοντες τούτου δειλοί—which could lead anyone to suppose that the real Socrates identified them. For an estimate of the meaning of the Socratic 'virtue is a science' see Grant, *Eth.* vol. i. pp. 165 sqq. Essay II.

b. 7. **κενά]** The editors have notes here to show that τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου—'the empty alarms of war,' *inanis belli* (*Tac. Hist.* ii. 69), and τὰ καινὰ τοῦ πολέμου, 'the surprises of war,' are both expressions

in use. See also Göller's note on Thucydides, iii. 30, where τὸ 1116 b. 7. καινὸν τοῦ πολέμου is proved to be the correct reading. The MSS. here (*E. N.* iii. 8. 6) vary hopelessly between κενά and καινά, and need not be considered. I think that κενά is to be preferred; it seems to be a more natural object for συνεωράκασιν than καινά.

§ 7. εἰτα] Their ἐμπειρία gives them confidence (1) as making b. 9. them aware of τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, and (2) εἰτα, as making them skilful in the use of weapons, &c. See Grant's note on § 6.

§ 9. τὰ δὲ πολιτικά] the citizen troops.

b. 18.

τῷ Ἐρμαῖῳ] The Ald. Schol. has the following—Ἐρμαῖον ἐν b. 19. Κορωνείᾳ τῆς Βοιωτίας τόπος οὗτος καλούμενος ἐστὶ πεδινὸς ἐν αὐτῇ, τῶν ἀλλων ἀνωμάλων ὄντων ἐν φερατεταγμένοι ποτὲ Κορωνεῖς σὺν τοῖς βοηθήσοντισιν αὐτοῖς στρατιώταις ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχοίου, μετὰ τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατέλαβον· καὶ τὴν Ἀκρόπολιν εἰχεν ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ Ὁνόμαρχος ὁ Φωκεὺς προδοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ· αὐτοὶ μὲν μείναντες ἀπέθανον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Ὁνόμαρχον ἀποκλείσαντες τὰς πύλας, ἵνα αὐτοῖς μηδὲ βοιλομένους ἔξειη φυγεῖν καὶ καταλιπεῖν τὴν πατρίδα. οἱ δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν βοηθήσαντες αὐτοῖς στρατιώταις ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχοίου ἔφυγον εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς μάχης, αἰσθόμενοι ἵνα τεθνάναι τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν Χίρωνα. Ἰστοροῦσι περὶ τῆς μάχης ταύτης Κεφισσόδωρος (Κηφισσόδιος?) ἐν τῇ δωδεκάτῃ τῶν περὶ τοῦ ιέρου πολέμου, καὶ Ἀναξιμένης ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ τῶν περὶ Φίλιππον καὶ Ἐφορος ἐν τῇ τριακοστῇ.<sup>1</sup> Cf. Zell's note on this scholium.

See Grote, *Hist. of Greece* pt. II, chap. 87, for the career of Onomarchus the Phocian. The date of the capture of Coroneia by him was B. C. 353 or 352.

§ 10. καὶ τὸν θυμόν] θυμός in Plato is the *Wille zum Leben*—b. 23. that principle that manifests itself, not only in anger, but in tenacity of purpose, rivalry, pluck, push, and other forms of 'spirit.' Without its aid, λόγος would succumb. The λόγος of the state—its constitution, and institutions, must be maintained by 'public spirit' and 'patriotism,' against the selfishness of citizens, and the attacks of foreigners; the λόγος of the individual must be 'preserved and succoured' against the attacks of pleasure and pain, by 'strength of will'—succoured by θυμός against the insidious attacks of ἐπιθυμία (see *Rep.* 441 A ἐν ψυχῇ . . . ἐστὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐπί-

<sup>1</sup> I find this scholium (with a few verbal differences, and the words *ιστοροῦσι* . . . *τριακοστῇ* omitted) on the margin of CCC. *ad loc.*

1116 b. 23. κουρον δν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει, and 440 Α πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅταν βιάζωνται τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, λοιδωροῦντά τε αὐτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὥσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόντοιν ξύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου), and preserved by it against the disturbing influence of fear (see *Rep.* 430 Β δύναμις καὶ σωτηρία δόξης ὄρθης κ.τ.λ.). In Aristotle *θυμός* has the same fundamental meaning—spirit of independence, enterprise, patriotism, loyalty in national and individual character. Here indeed, as in the parallel passage *E. E.* iii. 1 (1229 a. 24 δι' ὄργὴν καὶ θυμὸν ὡσαύτως, and 1229 b. 29 καὶ δῆλος ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἔστιν, ἔνοι δὲ καὶ δὲ ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ὑπομένουσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά· μετ' ἐλπίδος γάρ ἔστι τιμωρίας), and in *E. N.* vii. 6, §§ 1-5, it is regarded chiefly in the light of its special manifestation—anger: but in *Pol.* H. 6. 1327 b. 23 sqq. its fundamental meaning—spirit of enterprise, independence, patriotism, loyalty in national and individual character, is brought out very strongly—τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μέν ἔστι πλήρη, διανοίας δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίον ἄρχειν οὐ δυνάμενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἄθυμα δέ, διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ· τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὥσπερ μεσείει κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῦν μετέχει. καὶ γὰρ ἔνθυμον καὶ διανοητικὸν ἔστιν· διόπερ ἐλεύθερόν τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δ' ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη [καὶ] πρὸς ἄλληλα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, τὰ δὲ εὐ [τε] κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ διανοητικούς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐναγώγους ἔστεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρέτην. ὅπερ γάρ φασί τινες δεῦν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικὸν μὲν εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας ἀγρίους, ὁ θυμός ἔστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν. αὗτη γάρ ἔστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις ἡ φιλούμεν. σημεῖον δέ· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἱρεταὶ μᾶλλον ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνῶτας, διλιγωρεῖσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχιλοχος προστηκόντως τοῖς φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμόν·

“σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγγεαι.”

καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν· ἄρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀήττητον ὁ θυμός.

b. 26. ἴτητικώτατον] Ramsauer quotes Plato, *Protag.* 349 Ε καὶ ἵτας γε (ὁ ἀνδρεῖος), ἔφη, ἔφ' ἀ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἱέναι.

**"Ομηρος]** Zell and the other editors note that the first quotation 1116 b. 27. is from *Il.* xiv. 151, or xvi. 529; the second from *Il.* v. 470; and the third from *Od.* xxiv. 318. The fourth does not occur in Homer at all. Theocritus 20. 15 (later than Aristotle) has ἐμοὶ δ' ἄφαρ ἔξεσεν αἷμα, and in *Probl.* ii. 26. 869 a. 5 we find ὁ θυμὸς ζέστις τοῦ θερμοῦ ἔστιν τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν. Coraes compares Soph. *O. C.* 434 ὀπῆνικ' ἔξει θυμός, κ.τ.λ.

**§ 11. ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς]** cf. below § 12 φυσικωτάτη δ' b. 31. οὐκεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαιρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὖ ένεκα (i.e. τὸ διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττειν) ἀνδρείᾳ εἶναι. There is a natural alliance between *θυμός* and *λόγος*: see Plato, *Rep.* 441. *Θυμός* is an *active* principle which sides with *λόγος*, the principle of order, against the mere *passions* of the sensibility—the pleasures and pains: Cf. *E.N.* vii. 6, §§ 1-5, where it is argued that *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ* is not so bad as *ἀκρασία ἐπιθυμιῶν*, because *θυμός* is, at least, loyal to *λόγος*, whereas *ἐπιθυμία* is *ἐπίθουλος*. There is thus a special reason for confining the remark *συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς* to *θυμός*: but Eudemus, looking at the matter from a slightly different point of view, is also right in recognising the material value to true courage of *all* the feelings—shame, anger, hope, &c. which inspire the various forms of spurious courage—*E.E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 30 πρὸς τὰς παρακελεύσεις τὰς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις χρήσιμα ταῦτα: see Ramsauer's note. Fritzsche (*E.E.* p. 65, note 28) quotes Cic. *Tusc.* iv. 19. 43 'quid? quod iidem Peripatetici perturbationes istas, quas nos extirpandas putamus non modo *naturales* esse dicunt, sed etiam utiliter a natura datas. Primum multis verbis iracundiam laudant: cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt.'

**ἢ ἐν Ἑλει]** Struck out by Vict. and Scaliger: see Spengel, *Arist.* b. 33. *Stud.* p. 206: may be a dittograph of ἐν ὑλῃ ἢ.

**ὄνοι]** Zell and Coraes adopt the suggestion of Camerarius that b. 36. the reference here is to *Iliad* xi. 557

ώς δ' ὅτ' ὄνος παρ' ἄρουραν ἵων ἐβιήσατο παῖδας  
νωθῆς, φέδη πολλὰ περὶ ρόπαλ' ἀμφὶς ἔάγη,  
κείρει τ' εἰσελθὼν βαθὺ λήϊον· οἱ δέ τε παῖδες  
τύπτουσιν ροπάλιοι· βίη δέ τε νηπίη αὐτῶν·  
σπουδῇ τ' ἐξήλασσαν, ἐπεὶ τ' ἐκορέσσατο φορβῆς.

**§ 12. φυσικωτάτη]** Cf. *E.E.* iii. 1. 1229 a. 27 μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ 1117 a. 4.

1117 a. 4. τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀγέτητον γάρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ πᾶντες ἄριστα μάχονται: *E. N.* vii. 6. 2 ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικῶτερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κ.τ.λ. Θυμός in short represents the natural man—those inherited qualities of constitution which supply the rough material to be shaped by education into the form of virtue. Cf. *Rēp.* 410 D καὶ μήν, ἦν δὲ ἔγω, τό γε ἄγριον τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἀν τῆς φύσεως παρέχοιτο, καὶ ὅρθῶς μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδρεῖον ἀν εἴη.

προσλαβοῦσα προαιρεσιν] Θυμός is one of the forms of ὕρεξις. This ὕρεξις must become βουλευτική.

a. 5. καὶ τὸ οὖ ἔνεκα] i.e. τὸ καλόν, cf. *E. E.* iii. i. 1230 a. 27 ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γε ἀρετὴ προαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἔνεκα τινος πάντα αἱρέσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτο ἐστι τὸ οὖ ἔνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετὴ τις οὖσα ἔνεκα τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δὶ’ ἄγνοιαν (ὅρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε δὶ’ ἡδονὴν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καλόν. Θυμός then is a principle which naturally lends itself, if cultivated rightly, to the performance of *duty*. It is an active principle which makes a man scorn the passive life of submission to pleasures and pains.

a. 6. ὅργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δὲ ἡδονται] But, if uncultivated, θυμός manifests itself chiefly as anger—a pain hungering for the pleasure of personal revenge. It thus ceases to be the ally of λόγος, and becomes an ἐπιθυμία opposed to it. Cf. *E. E.* iii. i. 1229 b. 31 καὶ γάρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά μετ’ ἐλπίδος γάρ ἐστι τιμωρία. ἀλλ’ ὅμως οὕτ’ εἰ διὰ ταύτην οὕτ’ εἰ δι’ ἀλλην ἡδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τὸν θάνατον ἡ φυγὴν μειῶνων λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως (ἀν) ἀνδρεῖος λέγοιτο τούτων. Cf. *Rhet.* ii. 2. 1378 b. 1 (referred to by Fritzsche in his note on the above passage) καὶ πάσῃ ὅργῃ ἐπεσθαί τινα ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι· ἡδὺ μὲν γάρ τὸ σίεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ὀν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, ὁ δὲ ὅργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν αὐτῷ. διὸ καλῶς εἴρηται περὶ θυμοῦ

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο  
ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται.

a. 7. διὰ ταῦτα] i.e. λύπην (ἀλγοῦσι) and ἡδονὴν (ἡδονται). Pain and pleasure are subjective springs of action (*πάθη*). Moral action must be actuated by reverence for the objective law of duty (*τὸ καλόν*) apprehended by reason.

a. 8. οὐ γάρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδὲ ὡς ὁ λόγος] sc. κελεύει, cf. *E. E.* iii. i.

1229 a. Ι ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολούθησις τῷ λόγῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν 1117 a. 8. αἱρεῖσθαι κελεύει.

Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 29, 30) omits (with K<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>, and CCC) the sentence *οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεία . . . κινδυνον* at the beginning of § 12 (it is probably a dittograph of the similar clause in § 11. 1116 b. 33, 35); places the sentence *φυσικωτάτη . . . ἀνδρεία εἶναι* after *τι* at the end of § 12, 1117 a. 9; and reads δέ (with M<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>) instead of δή after *καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι* 1117 a. 6. He adds that the words *καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ . . . δρῶσιν* § 11 ought perhaps to be struck out. They are out of place in a context relating to *τὰ θηρία*, and anticipate the transition made by the words *καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι* δέ.

§ 13. *μηθὲν ἀν παθεῖν*] Perhaps we should read *μηθὲν ἀν ἀντιπαθεῖν*. a. 14. The MSS. have *μηθὲν ἀντιπαθεῖν*.

§ 14. *μεθυσκόμενοι*] Zell quotes *Prob.* A. I. 955 a. 1 *καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίνειν εἰς μέθην πάντες ἔχουσιν προθυμῶς, ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς εὐελπίδας ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τοὺς παῖδας· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γῆρας δύστελπί ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ νεότης ἐλπίδος πλήρης.*

§ 15. *διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ.*] The courage of the sanguine man is the a. 17. result of temporary feeling; he is elated by a perhaps groundless hope of victory. But the truly courageous man is actuated by steady principle. His nature is such that the law of duty is always before his eyes. Hence (*διὸ*) you may take him on a sudden without discomposing him. His courage will be ready on the shortest notice, because it is *himself*, not a passing mood.

*ἀπὸ ἔξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἥττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς*] This is a. 19. Bywater's reading for the *ἀπὸ ἔξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* of L<sup>b</sup> M<sup>b</sup> accepted by Bekker. K<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>, CCC, and Cambr. have *μᾶλλον ἢ ὅτι ἥττον*. I am not sure that the imp. *ἦν* is in place here. I would suggest *ἀπὸ ἔξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον εἶναι, ὅτι ἥττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς*.

§ 16. *εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων*] Because their hope blinds a. 23. the sanguine to the real nature of the danger which they encounter.

*ἀξίωμα*] Those who do not know (*οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες*) are, however, a. 24. inferior to the sanguine in not having that opinion of their own superiority which the latter have. *Ἀξίωμα* is here the superior value which the sanguine attach to themselves, as persons likely to prevail: cf. *E.N.* iv. 3. 12, where *τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα* is the

1117 a. 24. superior value which the *μεγαλόψυχος* assigns to himself—*μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῦ ἀξιος ἄν*—iv. 3. 3.

a. 26. ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον] The editors refer to Xen. *Hell.* iv. 10 for this incident, which occurred in the battle (B. C. 392) at the Long Walls of Corinth, between the Argeians, Corinthians, and Athenian mercenaries who held Corinth, and the Corinthian exiles aided by Lacedaemonians and Sikyonians. ‘The Argeians,’ says Grote (*Hist. of Greece* pt. II, chap. 75), ‘bold from superior numbers attacked and broke the Sikyonians, tearing up the palisade, and pursuing them down to the sea with much slaughter: upon which Pasimachus the Lacedaemonian commander of cavalry, coming to their aid, caused his small body of horsemen to dismount and tie their horses to trees, and then armed them with shields taken from the Sikyonians inscribed on the outside with the letter *sigma* (Σ). With these he approached on foot to attack the Argeians, who, mistaking them for Sikyonians, rushed to the charge with alacrity.’

Eudemus (*E. E.* iii. 1. 1230 a. 16 sqq.) thus sums up his discussion of the spurious forms of courage—*πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρείων οἱ διὰ τὴν αἰδῶ ύπομένοντες μάλιστα φανεῖεν* ⟨ἄν⟩ ἀνδρεῖοι, καθάπερ καὶ “Ομηρος τὸν Ἐκτορά φησιν ύπομεῖναι τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα”

“Ἐκτορα δ' αἰδῶς εἶλε·”

⟨καὶ⟩

“Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·”

καὶ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία αὕτη. ἡ δ' ἀληθῆς οὔτε αὕτη οὔτ' ἐκείνων οὐδὲμίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίᾳ μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων, ἢ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν δμόσε τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται. οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι ἀδοξῆσει, δεῖ μένειν φοβουμένους, οὔτε δι' ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ τὸ μὴ νομίζειν ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν φυλακτικά· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἴησται οὔτω γε φοβερὸν εἶναι οὐθέν. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ προαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἔνεκά τινος πάντα αἱρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἔστι τὸ οὖθε, τὸ καλόν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετή τις οὖσα ἔνεκά τινος ποιήσει καὶ φοβερὰ ύπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὅρθως γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε δι' ἡδονήν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν, ἐπειί, ἄν γε μὴ καλὸν ἢ ἀλλὰ μανικόν, οὐχ ύπομένει· αἰσχρὸν γάρ.

## CHAPTER IX.

## ARGUMENT.

*We have said that Courage is concerned with feelings of confidence, and with feelings of fear: but it is with the latter more than with the former that it is concerned, for fear is painful, and it is harder and more praiseworthy to bear pain than to abstain from pleasure. But though the exercise of courage is surrounded by circumstances of pain, yet the end is sweet, as the garland is sweet for the athlete, though the contest be painful. The courageous man endures death and wounds for the sake of glorious achievement in war. It would be absurd however to say that he rejoices in death and wounds: he endures them as pains, and the more complete his excellence, and the happier his life, the greater pains are they to him: life is so well worth living, and he has to look forward to the loss of so much. But he is all the more courageous that he gives up so much for glory in war: his courage realises in the most perfect way the type of those strenuous virtues which taste pleasure only in laying hold of the end. But, although he is thus the bravest of men, perhaps a less brave man, with nothing to lose, might make a more useful soldier, being ready to risk his life for a small remuneration.*

§ 1. μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά] So, as Ramsauer notes, σωφροσύνη 1117 a. 30. is ἡττου περὶ τὰς λύπας (iii. 10. 1), and ἐλευθεριότης is μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ δόσει (iv. 1. 1).

§ 2.] δικαιώς ἐπαινεῖται χαλεπώτερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Cf. ii. 3. 10 περὶ a. 34. δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βελτιον ἐν τούτῳ.

§ 3. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἀν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἥδν, a. 35. ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλω δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι] The ἥδονή which the courageous man experiences in realising his end is not a pleasurable feeling, but an ideal satisfaction. Pleasurable feeling cannot coexist with painful feeling; but ideal satisfaction may. As Professor Jowett says in his *Introduction to the Gorgias*—Plato does not ‘mean to say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than of the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the *Protagoras*, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the *Phaedo*. What then is his meaning? And what is the value of his method? His

1117 a. 35. meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel notions, which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have always existed among mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself implies that he will be understood or appreciated by very few. He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand times rather have their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only because we believe that they will obtain an immortality of fame, or that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their enemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented. Men are found in a few instances to do what is right, without reference to public opinion or to consequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground only, much as Socrates' friends are described as regarding him in the opening of the Phaedo; or as was said of another, "they looked upon his face as upon the face of an angel." We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the standard of utility, or by the rules of logic, but merely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the better part of human nature.'

b. 4. **εἴπερ σάρκινοι]** Grant translates (rightly I think) 'the blows . . . are painful and grievous to flesh and blood,' following Lambinus, who has *cum ex carne constent*. Michelet rejects this rendering for *præsertim si multa præediti sint carne*, referring to *de Anima* ii. 11. 423 b. 22 where flesh is said to be the medium of touch—δῆλον ὅτι ἐντὸς τὸ τοῦ ἀπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν. οὕτω γὰρ ἀν συμβαίνοι ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτιθεμένων γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένων αἰσθάνεται ὥστε τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ.

b. 5. **διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ . . . φαίνεται ἔχειν]** The ideal satisfaction—'the Idea of Happiness,' is apt to be lost in the crowd of painful feelings.

b. 7. **§§ 4, 5.]** In these sections self-sacrifice is praised in a manner which we shall do well to keep in mind when we examine Aristotle's account of *μεγαλόψυχία*. *Quād μεγαλόψυχος* the *εὐδαιμών* seems to be devoted to his own *εὐδαιμονία*: but *quād ἀνδρεῖος* he is ready joyfully to surrender it. See Grant's interesting note, in

which Aristotle's ἀνδρεῖος, φῶ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον is compared with 1117 b. 7. Wordsworth's 'Happy Warrior'—'more brave for this, that he hath much to love.'

§ 5. οὐ δὴ . . . ἐφάπτεται] sc. τις. 'The deep moral pleasure,' b. 15. says Grant (*Ethics*, Essay IV, vol. i. p. 226), 'which attaches to noble acts, Aristotle describes as triumphing even over the physical pain and outward horror which may attend the exercise of courage. And he acknowledges that in many cases this may be the *only* pleasure attending upon virtuous actions.'

Of course τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν stand in a somewhat exceptional position, as compared with τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. They are painful in a sense in which other virtuous actions are not. Other virtuous actions indeed imply a restraint put upon inclination; but when once the moral character has been formed, they are no longer painful: and some of them are even in themselves (*i.e.* as distinguished from their ends) pleasant, e.g. τὰ κατὰ τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν are themselves pleasant to the connoisseur (*ἐπιστήμων*) who performs them. Τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν however are not thus *in themselves* pleasant. They are so painful that it is only the man who has the strongest interest in the chief end, who will bring himself to perform them. Aristotle thus gives due prominence in his account of ἀνδρεία to the struggle which some have represented as essential to morality. But we must not allow ourselves to be misled by his remarks here. He is not one of those who make a struggle *essential* to morality. On the contrary, morality with him is perfect adaptation to environment: accordingly, we find him in his accounts of the other virtues dwelling on the ease and pleasure with which the good man acts. But the other virtues are concerned with life, and may well result in pleasant actions; whereas ἀνδρεία shows itself in the presence of death. It necessarily involves acts which are painful, as breaking with life. Its grandeur is enhanced, in proportion as the life or adaptation which it calls a man away from, is the more perfect. It is perhaps a defect in Aristotle's system that it does not recognise any other virtues, except ἀνδρεία, which call a man away from the brilliant everyday life of which the μεγαλόψυχος is the ideal ornament: e.g. Aristotle's good man is never required to give up his brilliant career, in order to help the outcasts of society. As it is, it is only here in this passage, in reference to the ἀνδρεία of the man φῶ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον,

1117 b. 15. that we find Aristotle deeply touched by the sublimity and pathos of that struggle between inclination and duty, which impressed Kant so powerfully, and is celebrated by him in so many passages full of lyrical fervour.

b. 17. § 6. στρατιώτας] i.e. mercenaries:  $\mu\acute{\eta}$  goes with the subject  $\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma\tau\acute{o}\nu\acute{t}o\upsilon\varsigma$ , and  $\kappa\acute{r}at\acute{t}o\upsilon\varsigma\tau\acute{o}\nu\acute{t}o\upsilon\varsigma\sigma\acute{t}rati\omega\acute{t}a\varsigma$  is predicate.

## CHAPTER X.

### ARGUMENT.

*Next in order comes Temperance, the excellence of the other subdivision of the irrational part of the soul. It is, as we have said, a mediocrity in relation to pleasures, and (though to a less extent) to pains; and profligacy is related to the same pleasures and pains.*

To what special pleasures then is Temperance related? Pleasures may be distinguished as bodily and mental. Mental pleasures are those which affect the mind without affecting the body, such as the pleasure of being esteemed, of acquiring knowledge, of listening to wonderful tales, of hearing oneself talk, and of gossip. It is not in relation to any of these pleasures that we speak of men being temperate or profligate. The man, e.g. who likes to hear himself talk is a bore, but not a profligate. Accordingly, it is with bodily pleasures that Temperance will be concerned; but not with all of them—not with the pleasures of the eye, as such: e.g. a man is not temperate or profligate by reason of the pleasure he takes in painting, although there is undoubtedly a right way of liking pictures, as there are wrong ways—nor with the pleasures of the ear: we do not speak of those who are too much addicted to music and the theatre as profligate, or of those who like them in moderation as temperate—nor with the pleasures of smell, except by association: thus there is no profligacy or intemperance in being very fond of the scent of flowers, but there is in being very fond of the odours of the perfume bottle and the dinner table. Profligate, gluttonous persons like these odours because they remind them of the things they lust after. Even people who are not gluttonous like the smell of food when they are hungry; but gluttonous persons like it without being hungry. This associated pleasure is the only pleasure which the lower animals derive from the senses of sight, hearing, and smell. The dog likes the smell, because it suggests the taste, of the hare which he tracks; the lion rejoices when he hears the lowing of the ox and knows that it is near and may soon be eaten; the roe deer, or wild goat, pleases his eye with the prospect of food. Temperance and profligacy then are concerned with those pleasures which the lower animals share with man—servile and brutish pleasures, it would thus appear. These are the pleasures of touch and taste—although taste, properly so called, i.e. the

discrimination of flavours, as exemplified by the wine-taster, or the chef, is not what the gluttonous person takes much, or any, pleasure in. His pleasure is in the purely tactal enjoyment which is common to swallowing meat and drink. Thus a certain gourmand wished that his throat were as long as a crane's, showing thereby that his pleasure was tactal. Profligacy then being related to touch, which is the most general or elementary of all the senses, and belongs to man, not as man, but as animal, is justly held to be a disgraceful and brutish vice. Certain finer tactal pleasures must however be distinguished from those to which profligacy, or intemperance, is related. Profligacy, or intemperance, has to do only with the tactal pleasures of certain definite organs: not e.g. with the pleasure of a skin glowing under the hand of the rubber in the gymnasium.

§ 1. περὶ σωφροσύνης] See *E. E.* iii. 2 and *M. M.* i. 21. ‘Σω- 1117 b. 23. φροσύνη,’ says Grant, ‘which in spite of the false etymology given in Plato’s *Cratylus* 411 Ε [σωτηρία φρονήσεως] and *Eth.* vi. 5. 5 [ώς σώζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν] meant originally “sound mindedness” (in German, Besonnenheit), soon came to mean temperance with regard to pleasures. In this sense it is often popularly defined by Plato, cf. *Rep.* 430 Ε κόσμος πού τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἔστι καὶ ἥδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια. *Symp.* p. 196 C εἶναι γὰρ διολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατέν ἥδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, &c.’ See also *Charm.*

The same tendency which appeared in Aristotle’s treatment of ἀνδρεία appears in his treatment of σωφροσύνη—the tendency to narrow the reference of a term which Plato, in accordance with popular usage, employed with a wider meaning. Σωφροσύνη in the *Republic* is good sense and good feeling; resulting in moderation in all things; and is especially viewed as a *communis sensus*, or διάνοια uniting the various classes of the state in peace and contentment under an established system of government (*Rep.* 432). But Aristotle limits the meaning of the term to moderation in respect of certain bodily pleasures. Σωφροσύνη, from being, in the *Republic*, a virtue with as distinct a social reference as δικαιοσύνη itself, thus becomes, in the *Ethics*, the most strictly personal of all the virtues.

δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί] Ramsauer suspects these words. As they stand, they seem to indicate a plan upon which Aristotle arranges the ἀρεταί in order. He begins with the two ἀρεταί specially associated with the two subdivisions of the ἀλογος φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς, μετέχοντα μέντοι πῃ λόγου—viz.:—θυμός and ἐπιθυμία. It is true that the other ἡθικαὶ ἀρεταί, as well as ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη, consist in the regulation of ἀλογα πάθη having their

1117 b. 23. origin in *θυμός* or *ἐπιθυμία*: but *ἀνδρεῖα* and *σωφροσύνη* are specially associated with these parts, being the regulation of their most characteristic manifestations—those manifestations, namely, which are common to man and brutes, and may, as owing nothing to social influences, be deemed *ἄλογα* in a more thorough sense than such passions as a desire for other people's money, or a desire for honour, which are called into existence by social influences. On the other hand, if the divisions of the *όρεκτικὸν μέρος* were in Aristotle's mind, 'Why,' as Grant asks, 'does he not begin with *σωφροσύνη*, since *θυμός* is higher than *ἐπιθυμία* (Eth. vii. 6) ?' I am inclined, after all, to think with Grant that 'Aristotle probably began his list of the virtues with courage and temperance, because they were two of the Greek cardinal virtues'; and to follow Susemihl in attaching great weight to Ramsauer's suggestion that the words *δοκοῦσι γὰρ . . . αἱ ἀρεταὶ* are interpolated.

b. 25. *εἰρηται*] ii. 7. 3.

b. 26. *ἥττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ δμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας*] The article before *λύπας* (*cf.* ii. 7. 3 *περὶ ήδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ πάσας, ἥττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας*) limits the reference to the pains caused by the absence of the pleasures: *cf.* below iii. 11. 5.

b. 28. *διηρήσθωσαν*] *cf.* x. 5, where *ήδοναί* are distinguished according to the *ἐνέργειαί* which they attend.

b. 29. *ἐκάτερος*] *i.e.* *ὁ φιλότιμος* and *ὁ φιλομαθής*.

b. 30. *τούτων χαίρει*] Scaliger's conjecture *τούτῳ* is probably correct.

1118 a. 1. § 3.] See Theoph. *Char.* xxii. (iii) *περὶ ἀδολεσχίας*, and xxiii. (vii) *περὶ λαλίας*, and xxiv. (viii) *περὶ λογοπούμας*.

a. 9. § 5. *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*] *i.e.* 'by association.'

a. 13. §§ 6, 7, 8.] *Cf. de Sensu* 5, where two kinds of *δσματ* are distinguished, (1) those which are correlated with the various *χυμοί*, and have therefore *τὸ ήδὺν καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, or by association. (These are the *δσματ* with which the *ἀκόλαστος* is said in *E.N.* iii. 10. 6 to be concerned *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*.) They are associated with *τροφή* and *τὸ θρεπτικὸν μέρος*, and so become indirectly objects of *ἐπιθυμία*. When the desire for food has been satisfied, these *δσματ* no longer give pleasure. (2) Those *δσματ* which are pleasant *καθ' αὐτάς*, *e.g.* the scent of flowers. They do not invite us to eat, nor do they stimulate any desire. The pleasure

derived from such *δσμαί* is peculiar to man, whereas that of *δσμαί* 1118 a. 13. associated with tastes is common to him with the brutes; see *de Sensu* 5. 443 b. 16 εἴδη δὲ τοῦ δσφραντοῦ δύο ἔστιν οὐ γάρ ὁσπερ τινές φασιν, οὐκ ἔστιν εἴδη τοῦ δσφραντοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν. διοριστέον δὲ πῶς ἔστι καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἔστι κατὰ τοὺς χυμοὺς τεταγμένον αὐτῶν, ὁσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ τὸ ἥδυν καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἔχουσιν· διὰ γάρ τὸ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ πάθη εἶναι, ἐπιθυμούντων μὲν ἥδεῖαι αἱ δσμαὶ τούτων εἰσί, πεπληρωμένοις δὲ καὶ μηδὲν δεομένοις οὐχ ἥδεῖαι, οὐδὲ τούτοις, ὡστε αὗται μέν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἔχουσι τὸ ἥδυν καὶ λυπηρόν, διὸ καὶ πάντων εἰσὶ κοιναὶ τῶν ζώων· αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰς ἥδεῖαι τῶν δσμῶν εἰσίν, οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀνθῶν· οὐδὲν γάρ μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἥτταν πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν παρακαλοῦσιν, οὐδὲ συμβάλλεται πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον μᾶλλον. Cf. *E. E.* iii. 2, where the above distinction between αἱ δσμαὶ αἱ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἥδεῖαι and αἱ καθ' αὐτὰς is brought out distinctly (it is only hinted at in the *E. N.*—τοὺς γάρ χαίροντας μήλων ἡ ρόδων ἡ θυμιαμάτων δσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους § 5), 1231 a. 6 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δσμῶν ταύταις χαίροντιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός εὑφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς. λέγω δὲ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς, αἰς ἡ ἐλπίζοντες χαίρομεν ἡ μεμνημένοι, οἷον ὄψεων καὶ ποτῶν (δι' ἑτέραν γάρ ἥδονὴν ταύταις χαίρομεν, τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἡ πιεῖν), καθ' αὐτὰς δὲ οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀνθῶν εἰσίν. διὸ ἐμμελῶς ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν τὰς δὲ ἥδυν.

We may say that *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία* are concerned with those *ἥδοναί* which Plato distinguishes as *πληρώσεις τῆς ἐνδείας*, or *ἀπαλλαγὴ λύπης*, from the *καθαρὰ ἥδοναί*: see note on x. 3. 7, for quotations from *Rep.* 584 B, and *Philebus* 51 B, where Plato distinguishes these two kinds of *ἥδοναί*. The *οἶον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι* of *E. N.* iii. 10. 3 may be an echo of the *τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα* of *Philebus* 51 B. The *τῶν δσμῶν τὰς πλείστας* of *Philebus* 51 B shows that the distinction marked by Aristotle's *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* and *καθ' αὐτάς* was present to Plato's mind. The following passage in *M. M.* ii. 7. 1205 b. 20-28 may be compared as giving very clearly this distinction between *ἥδοναί*, which is the psychological ground upon which Aristotle proceeds in determining the proper sphere of *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία*—ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ἔστιν ἡ ἥδονὴ καὶ καθισταμένης τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκνίας, οἷον καθισταμένης μὲν αἱ ἐξ ἐνδείας ἀναπληρώσεις, καθεστηκνίας δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὖσαι, βέλτιόν τινες εἴησαν αἱ καθεστηκνίας τῆς φύσεως ἐνέργειαι· αἱ γάρ ἥδοναί κατ' ἀμφοτέρους λεγόμεναι τοὺς τρόπους ἐνέργειαι εἰσίν· ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως ἥδοναὶ καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τοῦ διανοεῖσθαι βέλτισται ἀν εἴησαν, ἐπεὶ αἱ γε σωματικαὶ ἐξ ἀναπληρώσεως.

1118 a. 16. § 7. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδ' . . . συμβεβηκός] Zell refers to *Problemata* KH. 7, 950 a. 9 οὐσῶν δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πέντε, τά τε ἄλλα ζῷα ἀπὸ δύο μόνων τῶν προειρημένων ἥδεται, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἄλλας ἡ ὅλως οὐχ ἥδεται ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τοῦτο πάσχει. ὁρῶν μὲν γάρ ὁ ὁρῶν, ἡ καὶ ὀσφραινόμενος, χαίρει ὅτι ἀπολαύει· καὶ ὅταν πληρωθῇ, οὐδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἥδεα αὐτῷ, ὅσπερ οὐδὲ ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ταρίχου ὁδμή, ὅταν ἀδην ἔχωμεν τοῦ φαγεῖν. ὅταν δὲ ἐνδεεῖς ὅμεν, ἥδεα. ἡ δὲ τοῦ ῥόδου ἀεὶ ἥδεῖα. Cf. E. E. iii. 2. 1230 b. 36 ἄλλὰ περὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα, περὶ ἄπερ καὶ τὰλλα θηρία μόνον τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ χαίροντα καὶ λυπούμενα, περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἀπτά. περὶ δὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ἥδεα σχεδὸν ὅμοιως ἀπαντα φαίνεται ἀναισθῆτως διακείμενα, οἷον περὶ εὐαρμοστίαν ἡ κάλλος. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἡ τῇ ἀκροάσει τῶν εὐαρμόστων, εἰ μή τι που συμβέβηκε τερατῶδες· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ εὐώδη ἡ δυσώδη· καίτοι τάς γε αἰσθήσεις ὁξυτέρας ἔχουσι πάσας. ἄλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός εὐφραινούσιν, ἄλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς.

I agree with Grant in thinking that this view according to which ‘brutes have no pleasure of hearing or smell or sight except accidental ones, namely when sounds or scents indicate to them their prey or their food’ is questionable. Some animals seem to derive pleasure from music<sup>1</sup>. A dog will sit for an hour at a time at a window looking with evident pleasure and interest at people and vehicles passing in the street. As for his pleasures of smell, which engross so much of his attention, they are obviously so different from any with which our less developed sense makes us acquainted, that it would be rash to say that they are all *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. Indeed the presumption is in favour of many of them being *καθ' αὐτάς*. That a dog experiences *ψυχικαὶ ἥδοναι*, such as those of friendship, performance of duty, and vanity, is pretty obvious.

a. 18. αἱ κύνες] Giphanius notes that *κύων* and *canis* are feminine when hunting is concerned. Aristotle tells us that the female Laconian hounds were better than the males; see *Hist. Anim.* ix. i. 608 a. 27 αἱ Λάκαιαι κύνες αἱ θήλειαι εὐφνέστεραι τῶν ἀρρένων εἰσίν.

a. 22. ὅμοιώς δ' οὐδ' ἵδων ἡ [εὔρων] ἔλαφον] οὐδ' ἵδων = οὐδὲ τῇ ὄψει (cf. οὐδὲ ταῖς ὀσμαῖς, and οὐδὲ τῇ φωνῇ above); and ἡ εὔρων is added

<sup>1</sup> Coraes calls attention to *Pol. Θ.* 6, where Aristotle himself admits that brutes have some appreciation of music: 1341 a. 13.

because he (or an interpolator, according to Sus. and Byw.) is 1118 a. 22. thinking of Iliad iii. 23

ώστε λέων ἔχάρη μεγάλῳ ἐπὶ σώματι κύρσας,  
εὐρών ἡ ἔλαφον κεραδὸν ἡ ἄγριον αἴγα.

§ 8. ὅθεν ἀνδραποδῶδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται] Zell quotes a. 25. *Prob.* K.H. 2. 949 b. 6 διὰ τί κατὰ δύο μόνας αἰσθήσεις ἀκρατεῖς λέγομεν, οἷον ἀφῆν καὶ γεῦσιν; ἡ διὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων γινομένας ἥδονὰς ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις; ἀτε οὖν κοιναὶ οὐσαι ἀπιμόταται εἰσι, διὸ καὶ μᾶλιστα ἡ μόνη ἐπονεΐδιστοι εἰσιν. ὥστε τὸν ὑπὸ τούτων ἡττώμενον ψέγομεν καὶ ἀκρατὴ καὶ ἀκόλαστον εἶναι φαμέν, διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν χειρίστων ἥδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι.

ἀφή] Touch is the fundamental sense in all animals; see *de a. 26.* *Anima* ii. 2. 413 b. 4 αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἀφή. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἀφῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὗτος ἡ ἀφή τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. Θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς Ψυχῆς οὐ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχει· τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἀπτικὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα. Touch is necessary to the preservation of the animal. Sounds and colours and smells do not feed the animal. That which feeds it must touch it immediately. The touch of food is taste. Taste accordingly is correlated with τὸ θρεπτικὸν μέρος, see *de Anima* iii. 12. 434 b. 11 ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον σῶμα ἐμψυχόν ἔστι, σῶμα δὲ ἄπαν ἀπτόν, ἀπτὸν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἀφῆ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τοῦ ζῷου σῶμα ἀπτικὸν εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει σώξεσθαι τὸ ζῷον. αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις δι’ ἔτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὁσφρησις ὅψις ἀκοή· ἀπτόμενον δέ, εἰ μὴ ἔξει αἰσθησιν, οὐ δυνήσεται τὰ μὲν φεύγειν τὰ δὲ λαβεῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀδύνατον ἔσται σώξεσθαι τὸ ζῷον. διὸ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἀφή τις· τροφῆς γάρ ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἀπτόν. ψόφος δὲ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ὀσμὴ οὐ τρέφει, οὐδὲ ποιεῖ οὕτ’ αὔξησιν οὕτε φθίσιν. ὥστε καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν ἀνάγκη ἀφῆν εἶναι τινα, διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀπτοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι· αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖαι τῷ ζῷῳ, καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀνευ ἀφῆς εἶναι ζῷον. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τοῦ τε εὖ ἔνεκα καὶ γένει ζῷων ἥδη οὐ τῷ τυχόντι, ἀλλὰ τισίν, οἷον τῷ πορευτικῷ ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν· εἰ γὰρ μέλλει σώξεσθαι, οὐ μόνον δεῖ ἀπτόμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποθεν. Cf. *de Sensu* i. 436 b. 10 Τοῖς δὲ ζῷοις, ἥ μὲν ζῷον ἔκαστον, ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν αἴσθησιν· τούτῳ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον εἶναι καὶ μὴ ζῷον διορίζουμεν. Ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἥδη καθ’ ἔκαστον ἡ μὲν ἀφή καὶ γεῦσις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἡ μὲν ἀφή διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Ψυχῆς, ἡ δὲ γεῦσις διὰ τὴν τροφῆν· τὸ γὰρ ἥδη διακρίνει καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν αὐτῇ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φεύγειν τὸ δὲ διώκειν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ χυμός ἔστι τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ μορίου πάθος. Λί δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν αἰσθήσεις τοῖς πορευτικοῖς αὐτῶν, οἷον ὁσφρησις καὶ ἀκοή καὶ

1118 a. 26. ὅψις, πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἔχουσι σωτηρίας ἐνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅπως διώκωστὶ τε προαισθανόμενα τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ φεύγωσι, τοῖς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως τυγχάνουσι τοῦ εὖ ἐνεκα· πολλὰς γὰρ εἰσαγγέλλουσι διαφοράς, ἐξ ᾧ η̄ τε τῶν νοητῶν ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις καὶ η̄ τῶν πρακτῶν.

§ 9 τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν η̄ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι] With the pleasures derived from the various flavours which γεῦσις perceives as distinct (and it is with these that γεῖσις in the strict sense is concerned—*τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν η̄ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν*) the ἀκόλαστος has not directly to do. Γεῖσις, the perception of flavours, stands to the mere sensation of throat-touch, with which the ἀκόλαστος has directly to do, in much the same relation in which the smell of food stands to its taste; and, although certain χυμοί may, like certain ὁσμαί, be desired κατὰ συμβεβηκός by the ἀκόλαστος, yet roughly the remark of Eudemus is true that ἀκολασία is not concerned with the pleasures of the tip of the tongue, but with those of the throat: *E. E.* iii. 2. 1231 a. 12 ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστὸν οὐ περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἐπτόηται τὰ θηρία, οὐδὲ ὅσων τῷ ἄκρῳ τῆς γλώττης η̄ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ’ ὅσων τῷ φάρυγγι, καὶ ἔσικεν ἀφῇ μᾶλλον η̄ γεύσει τὸ πάθος. διὸ οἱ ὄψιοφάγοι οὐκ εὔχονται τὴν γλώτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξιδος. ὥστε περὶ τὰ ἀπτόμενα, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, θετέον τὴν ἀκολασίαν.

With τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν η̄ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν may be compared *de An.* ii. 10. 422 b. 10 τὰ δὲ εἶδη τῶν χυμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χρωμάτων, ἀπλᾶ μὲν τάνατία, τὸ γλυκὺν καὶ τὸ πικρόν, ἔχόμενα δὲ τοῦ μὲν τὸ λιπαρόν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἀλμυρόν\* μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων τό τε δριμὺν καὶ τὸ αὐστηρὸν καὶ στρυφὺν καὶ ὁξύν σχεδὸν γὰρ αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι διαφορὰί χυμῶν. ὥστε τὸ γευστικόν ἐστι τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, γευστὸν δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐντελεχείᾳ αὐτοῦ.

a. 32. § 10. ὄψιοφάγος] His name, Philoxenus, is given in the passage *E. E.* iii. 2. 1231 a. 16 quoted above, and in the present passage is supplied by N<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>, Ald., K<sup>b</sup>, CCC, NC, Cambr., and other MSS.: also in *Prob.* KH. 7. 950 a. 2 we read τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν τροφὴν ἀπ' ἐνίων μὲν ἐν τῇ γλώττῃ τὸ ἡδύ, ἀπ' ἐνίων δὲ ἐν τῷ λάρυγγι, διὸ καὶ Φιλόξενος γεράνου φάρυγγα εὔχετο ἔχειν. There are several references to him (or them, for there were more than one of the name) in later writers—Plutarch, Aelian, Athenaeus: thus, Plut. *de Amore* 1 has χυμῶν ἡδονῆ δεδουλωσθαι Φιλόξενον τὸν ὄψιοφάγον: Plut. *de occulte vivendo* 1 τοὺς μὲν γὰρ περὶ Φιλόξενον τὸν Ἐρύξιδος . . . ἐπτο-

μένους περὶ τὰ ὄψα: Athenaeus *Deipn.* viii. 26 καν ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει φησί 1118 a. 32.  
[Μάχων]

Φιλόξενός ποθ', ὡς λέγουσ', δὲ Κυθήριος  
ηὔξατο τριῶν ἔχειν λάρυγγα πήχεων,  
ὅπως, καταπίνω, φησίν, ὅτι πλείστον χρόνον,  
καὶ πάνθ' ἄμα μοι τὰ βρώμαθ' ἥδουνὴν ποιῆ.

Cf. also Aelian *Var. Hist.* x. 9 Φιλόξενος λίχνος ἦν, καὶ γαστρὸς ἥττων. Aristophanes mentions an Eryxis son of Philoxenus in *Batrach.* 934. Corr. K<sup>b</sup> and Γ have Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξις, pr. K<sup>b</sup> and CCC Φ. ὁ Εὔξιος.

Φάρυγξ is properly the wind-pipe, but is here used loosely for the οἰσοφάγος or gullet. Ramsauer refers to *de Part. An.* iv. 11. 690 b. 29 to show ‘quo sensu Aristoteli probabile fuerit votum Philoxeni’: ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα τῶν χυμῶν ποιεῖ τὴν αἰσθησιν, τῶν ἐδεστῶν ἐν τῇ καθόδῳ ἡ ἡδονή . . . καὶ σχεδὸν τῶν πλείστων ὄψων καὶ ἐδεστῶν ἐν τῇ καταπόσει τῇ τάσει (v. l. θίξει) τοῦ οἰσοφάγου γίνεται ἡ χάρις.

**κοινοτάτη]** i.e. it belongs to all animals: see *de Anima* ii. 2. b. 1. 413 b. 4 αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἀφῆ. ὡσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἀφῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἡ ἀφὴ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων. θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδὲ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχειν τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἀπτικὴν αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα. The Paraphrast's explanation is wrong—κοινοτάτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀφὴ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀφῇ τινὶ πᾶσαι αἱ αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνονται, for Aristotle in the *de Sensu* 4. 442 a. 29 finds fault with Democritus for reducing all the senses to touch: Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων, ὅσοι λέγουσι περὶ αἰσθήσεως, ἀτοπώτατόν τι ποιοῦσι: πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπτὰ ποιοῦσιν. καίτοι εἰ οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἔκαστη ἀφὴ τις ἐστίν· τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιδεῖν. Cf. Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii. pp. 152 sqq. for a defence of the view of Democritus assailed by Aristotle.

**§ 11. ἐλευθεριώταται]** Opposed to ἀνδραποδώδεις in § 8. b. 4.

**γυμνασίοις]** In the Gymnasia there were baths, apparently b. 6. similar to our Turkish baths, which were used by the gymnasts after exercise. For the advantages derived from *τρίψις* and the consequent *θερμασία* see *Prob. AZ.* 2. 965 b-966 a, b.

## CHAPTER XI.

## ARGUMENT.

Desires are (1) common to all men and natural, and (2) peculiar to individuals and acquired. Thus the desire for food and drink and the sexual desire are (1) natural, while individuals show (2) preferences for this or that kind of food, etc. But even in these individual preferences there is an element of natural desire, in that there are some things which all men agree in preferring to certain other things. So far as a desire is simply natural, i.e. so far as individual preference has not refined upon it, it does not hold out much temptation to error, and when error takes place, it is always in the way of excess. Thus those people are few who, simply because they are hungry or thirsty, will overfill their bellies with whatever comes to hand. It is only the lowest sort of people who tend to become guzzling-bellies as they are called.

But when individual preference comes in as to the particular kind of food, etc. with which the natural desire is to be satisfied, there are many who err, and many are the ways of error. For when we say that a man ‘has a great liking for something,’ we mean either that he likes something which he ought not to like at all, or likes it more than the average man does, or in the wrong way. Now in all these respects the profligate, or intemperate man, goes to excess. He delights in things which he ought not to delight in at all—abominations; and where it is permitted to take delight, he does so more than he ought, and more than the average man does.

So much for the relation of temperance and intemperance to pleasures: as for the pains to which they are related, they are those caused by the absence of the excessive pleasures. Such pains the temperate man does not feel, while the profligate, or intemperate, man is tortured by them. These absurd pains (pains produced by pleasures!) are to be distinguished from the more real pains which the courageous man endures and the coward shrinks from.

Those who are deficient in their love of pleasure are very rare—so rare that they are not even distinguished by a name; indeed such insensibility as theirs is scarcely human.

As for the temperate man, he observes the mean in these things. He takes no pleasure in what the intemperate man takes most pleasure, but rather hates it; and the pleasures which he does allow himself are never excessive or ill-timed—whether they be those proper to a healthy constitution, or other pleasures in so far as they do not interfere with health and vigour, and are not inconsistent with the ideal of a noble life, or beyond his means.

1118 b. 8. §§ 1, 2, 3, 4.] The κοινά, or φυσικά ἐπιθυμίατ are those which all men experience. But few men habitually gratify them in an improper way, simply *quād κοινά* or *φυσικά*, i.e. promiscuously

without caring for the manner in which they are gratified, so long 1118 b. 8. as they are gratified somehow. The few who do so are the λιαν ἀνδραποδώδεις, who *e.g.* overfill their bellies with any sort of food. The ὕδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι ἐπιθυμίαι are partly (1) the particular directions which the κοινάὶ ἐπιθυμίαι legitimately take in different men, *e.g.* preference for this kind of food or drink rather than that, where the things specially desired are good, if taken in moderation; partly (2) perversions of the κοινάὶ ἐπιθυμίαι, by which they are directed to objects which are μισητά. It is where the κοινάὶ ἐπιθυμίαι take particular directions, that we find ἀκολασία for the most part. This particular (and in itself legitimate) way of gratifying a natural human desire attracts one man, that particular way another man, and they go to excess in these particular ways. Here we have to do with what is distinguished in *Z.N.* vii. 5. 8 as ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ἀκολασία from ἡ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ἡ θηριώδης ἡ νοσηματώδης, under which latter head it may be noted the desire of τὰ μισητά mentioned in § 4 properly falls.

§ 1.] Scaliger, with the approval of Susemihl and Rassow, (*Forsch.* p. 58) inserts καὶ φυσικαὶ after κοιναὶ, b. 8.

**τροφῆς . . . καὶ εύνῆς]** These are the two objects of τὸ θρεπτικόν b. 9. distinguished in *de Anima* ii. 4. 415 a. 23—nutrition and reproduction—ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμις ἔστι ψυχῆς καθ' ἥν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν· ἡς ἔστιν ἔργα γεννήσαι καὶ τροφῆς χρήσασθαι.

**ξηρᾶς ἢ ύγρᾶς τροφῆς]** We have here the ordinary distinction b. 10. between solid and liquid nourishment. For Aristotle's *scientific* account of the physiology of nutrition and taste see *de Sensu* 4. 441 b. 15 sqq. where he tells us that τὸ ξηρόν and τὸ ύγρόν must both be present in every experience of taste and process of nutrition—“Ωσπερ οὖν οἱ ἐναποπλύνοντες ἐν τῷ ύγρῷ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς τοιούτον ἔχειν ποιοῦσι τὸ ὄδωρ, οὔτω καὶ ἡ φύσις τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ γεῶδες, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ γεῶδους διηθοῦσα καὶ κινοῦσα τῷ θερμῷ ποιόν τι τὸ ύγρὸν παρασκευάζει. Καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο χυμὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰρημένου ξηροῦ πάθος ἐν τῷ ύγρῷ τῆς γεύσεως τῆς κατὰ δύναμιν ἀλλοιωτικὸν εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγει γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν εἰς τοῦτο δυνάμει προϋπάρχον· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἔστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. Ὅτι δ' οὐ παντὸς ξηροῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ τροφίμου οἱ χυμοὶ ἡ πάθος εἰσὶν ἡ στέρησις, δεῖ λαβεῖν ἐντεῦθεν, ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ξηρὸν ἄνευ τοῦ ύγροῦ οὔτε τὸ ύγρὸν ἄνευ τοῦ ξηροῦ· τροφὴ γὰρ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν τοῖς ζῷοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεμιγμένον.

1118 b. 11. “Ομηρος] The editors quote *Iliad* xxiv. 129.

δ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων] As Achilles, whom Thetis is addressing in the lines referred to above.

b. 12. τοιᾶσδε] τροφῆς καὶ εὐνῆς. Ramsauer conjectures παντός for πᾶς in this clause, construing τὸ δὲ τοιᾶσδε ἡ τοιᾶσδε ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκέτι παντός ἔστιν οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν (masc.). But it is better to accept the anacoluthon, and to suppose that Aristotle wrote τὸ δὲ with the infinitive in his mind, and then carelessly wrote πᾶς instead of παντός because he had written πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ above. Reading πᾶς we must of course make τῶν αὐτῶν neuter, and explain—οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ αὐτός. Bywater's suggestion, τῆς δὲ τοιᾶσδε, is very tempting however.

b. 13. § 2. ἡμέτερον] ‘Et fere ἐφ’ ἡμῖν,’ Ramsauer. ‘Ἐπίθετος, ὑφ’ ἡμῶν ἐπινοηθεῖσα, Par. ‘Merely capricious,’ Grant.

b. 14. ἔτερα γὰρ . . . τυχόντων] Here two reasons are given for the assertion that there is something ‘natural’ even in the most factitious tastes: (1) they are ‘natural,’ in the sense of being the expressions of the nature of the particular individuals, it being ‘natural’ that the tastes of individuals should vary within certain limits; and (2) they are ‘natural,’ because they are confined within these limits—because, though varying, they agree in not giving the preference in any case to certain things distinguished as τὰ τυχόντα.

πᾶσιν] τισίν Ob, a mere blunder.

b. 20. § 3. αὐτήν] sc. τὴν γαστέρα.

b. 22. § 4. τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων . . . πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν] Rassow (*Forsch.* 58, 59) reads τῷ for τῷ before χαίρειν (with Mb and Ob) and before μᾶλλον (Nb and Ob) in line 23, and treats the words τῶν γάρ (l. 22) . . . δεῖ (l. 24) as an independent sentence, which he closes with a full stop. If τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων is to be treated as a genitive absolute, τῷ being retained before χαίρειν and μᾶλλον, and a comma placed after δεῖ, l. 24, then we must follow Eucken (*De Arist. dic. rat.* p. 31) in reading δή (Mb) after κατὰ πάντα.

Grant thinks that ὡς in the phrase ἡ τῷ μᾶλλον ἡ ὡς οἱ πολλοί is an interpolation, because he supposes that, if it is retained, we must place a comma after μᾶλλον, and treat ἡ ὡς οἱ πολλοί as a separate clause, rendering ‘or because they like them as people

in general do ;' whereas (he argues) *μᾶλλον ή* ought to be taken 1118 b. 22. together so as to give the rendering 'or because they like them *more than* people in general' (*πλέον η κατὰ τοὺς πολλούς*, Par.). This is undoubtedly the right rendering (it is remarkable however that Grant does not notice its inconsistency with the natural meaning of the reading *καὶ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν* which he accepts in l. 27); but it is not necessary to omit the *ὡς* in order to obtain it. *Μᾶλλον η ὡς οἱ πολλοί* is as good Greek as *μᾶλλον η οἱ πολλοί*, and has the same meaning. Thus in vii. 8. 2 (referred to by Ramsauer) we have *ὅμοιος γάρ οἱ ἀκρατής ἐστιν τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπὸ ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος η ὡς οἱ πολλοί*, although in iv. 4. 4 (quoted by Grant) we have *ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον η οἱ πολλοί*. The above being the meaning of *η μᾶλλον η ὡς οἱ πολλοί*, it is absolutely necessary to accept in l. 27 the reading of K<sup>b</sup>, CCC, and Camb. *καὶ η ὡς οἱ πολλοί*, rendering 'and more than people in general.'

§ 5.] The pains with which the *σώφρων* and *ἀκόλαστος* are b. 27. concerned are not independent pains like those which the *ἀνδρεῖος* faces, but pains caused by pleasures (*καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ η ἡδονή*) i.e. caused by the absence of pleasures.

§ 6. *ἀτόπω]* This is what Grant calls 'the disgraceful paradox' 1119 a. 4. of *ἀκολασία*. The Paraphrast has *ῶστε καὶ ἀτοπόν τι δοκεῖ τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου*.

§ 7. *οὐ πάνυ γίνονται]* The ascetic spirit (unless we regard a. 6. Cynicism as a manifestation of it) was conspicuously absent from the Greek national character.

*οὐ γάρ ἀνθρωπική ἐστιν η τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γάρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κ.τ.λ.]* Such insensibility would be inconsistent with being a man; for man is after all an animal: cf. *E. N.* iii. 1. 27 δοκεῖ δ' οὐχ ἥττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη.

*οὐ τέτευχε δ' κ.τ.λ.]* In *E. N.* ii. 7. 3 we have *ἔλλείποντες δὲ περὶ a. 10. τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται διόπερ οὐδὲ ὄνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναισθητοι*. Eudemus (*E. E.* iii. 2. 1230 b. 13) has *τοὺς δὲ ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας δι' ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς οἱ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἀναισθήτους, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοις ὄνόμασι τοιούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἔστι δ' οὐ πάνυ γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδὲ ἐπιπόλαιον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτερον ἀμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον καὶ πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφυτον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδεών ἥτταν καὶ αἴσθησιν. μᾶλιστα δ' εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἵους οἱ κωμῳδοιδάσκαλοι παρά-*

1119 a. 10. γονσιν ἄγροικους, οἱ οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα πλησιάζοντι τοῖς ἡδεσιν. Cf. *E.N.* ii. 2. 7 ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι, ἀναίσθητός τις: and *E.N.* ii. 7. 13 περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾳ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δὲ ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δὲ ἐλλείπων ἄγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἔξις ἄγροικία: cf. also *E.N.* vii. 9. 3 εἰσὶ δὲ ἵσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι’ ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες ἐὰν μὴ μεταπείθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἐοίκασιν ἡ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ. From these passages we may gather that, if any name belongs to the ἐλλείπων περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, it is ἀναίσθητος, and that the ἄγροικος or rustic (as distinguished from the ἀστεῖος or town-man) is merely adduced in *E.E.* iii. 2 and *E.N.* ii. 2. 7 as an example of ἀναισθησία, as he is introduced elsewhere as an example of other peculiarities—in *E.N.* ii. 7. 13, of dullness, and in vii. 9. 3, of opinionativeness. Theophrastus, *Char.* x. (iv), gives an amusing sketch of the ἄγροικος. Ἅγροικία is ἀμαθία ἀσχήμων. The ἄγροικος is the man who maintains that myrrh smells no sweeter than thyme: his shoes are too large for him: he talks loudly: he mistrusts his own friends, and makes confidants of his servants. He will stand on the road and look at a cow or a goat, but will look at nothing worth looking at. He runs himself to answer a knock at his door. The ἀναισθησία of Theophrastus does not seem to have much in common with Aristotle's ἀναισθησία—insensibility to the pleasures περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος. Ἀναισθησία is defined in *Char.* xxv. (xiv) as Βραδύτης ψυχῆς ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν. The ἀναισθητος is the only man who goes to sleep in the whole theatre. He loses things and cannot find them. He fatigues his children by obliging them to wrestle.

With regard to the ἄγροικοι of the κωμῳδοιδάσκαλοι referred to by Eudemus—plays entitled ΑΓΡΟΙΚΟΣ, ΑΓΡΙΟΙ, ΑΓΡΙΩΤΗΣ, are known to have been written by Antiphanes, Menander, Pherecrates, and Sophron: see Fabric. *Bib.* ii. pp. 414, 460, 474, 494 referred to by Zell. It is not unreasonable to suppose that Theophrastus sometimes borrowed from the comedians in writing his *Characters*.

a. 13. § 8. οὐδ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 91) reads οὐδ'... οὐδέ for the οὐθ'... οὐτε of the codd. here. The clause occupies the same position in the first (οὐτε γὰρ ἡδεταὶ ...) of the two main divisions of the sentence, as the clause οὐδ'

$\epsilon\pi i\theta\nu m\epsilon i$  κ.τ.λ. does in the second ( $o\check{\nu}\tau'$  ἀπόντων . . .); and if οὐδέ is 1119 a. 13. right in the second division it must be in the first also. Susem. and Bywater follow Rassow.

οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 91) favours a. 15. οὐθενός, making it depend upon  $\epsilon\pi i\theta\nu m\epsilon i$ . Although all MSS. apparently exhibit οὐθενός, three—K<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>, and CCC—read immediately after it, not ὅσα but ἃ, and so are as good evidence for an original οὐθέν' ὅσα, as for an original οὐθενός' ἃ. It seems certain that the letters οσ are original, and that Susemihl's οὐδέν' ἃ is wrong. I think, however, that οὐδέν is right. I take the phrase οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν as a blank adverbial formula, or *et cetera*, added to οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ή δεῖ and οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, and, with them, epexegetic of μετρίως by which οὐτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ'  $\epsilon\pi i\theta\nu m\epsilon i$  is qualified. This blank formula is to be filled in ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα (*E. N.* ii. 3. 5)—e.g. οὐδ' ὡς μὴ δεῖ would be included in it.

The reading οὐθενός' ὅσα would easily arise by dittography of οσ, and would be retained by scribes, for Rassow's reason—that οὐθενός depends on  $\epsilon\pi i\theta\nu m\epsilon i$

οὔτως ἔχων] i. e. ὁ ὀρεγόμενος τῶν ἥδονῶν τῶν τούτοις ἐμποδίων οὐτων, a. 19. ή παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ή ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.

## CHAPTER XII.

### ARGUMENT.

*Profligacy, or intemperance, is more voluntary than cowardice, for it pursues pleasure, which men naturally seek after, whereas cowardice consists in not facing pain, which men naturally avoid. Moreover, pain disturbs and destroys the nature of its subject, but pleasure has no such effect. Being more voluntary, profligacy is therefore more disgraceful. It is easier to habituate oneself to resist bodily pleasures, than to habituate oneself to endure the pains of fear; for one has many more opportunities in life of habituating oneself to resist bodily pleasures, and the process of habituation is without danger. But the habit of cowardice is more voluntary than the particular acts of cowardice; for the habit is not in itself painful, whereas the acts are caused by a pain which disturbs the man's nature and makes him throw away his arms and otherwise disgrace himself. Hence the opinion that these acts are even forced upon him. On the other hand, acts of profligacy are more voluntary than the habit is; for they are actuated by desire and appetite, whereas no one desires the habit.*

The term ἀκόλαστος—which means literally, ‘unchastised’—is also applied to children when they are naughty; for there is a certain similarity between the ‘profligate’ and the naughty child. It does not matter here which is the original application of the term; at any rate, its transference is warranted by the real analogy between desire and a child—both try to do what is unseemly, and both grow apace, and need chastisement. If desire be not chastened and brought under subjection to reason, it will go great lengths, being an insatiable principle, which is strengthened by indulgence, till it at last casts reason out. As the child must live in obedience to his master, so must the principle of desire be subjected to reason. Hence in the temperate man desire will be in harmony with reason; both will aim at that which is noble and good; desire will seek the right objects, in the right way, and at the right time, in conformity with the dictates of reason.

1119 a. 21. §§ 1, 2.] In these sections Aristotle is speaking about τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις. *Acts* of intemperance are more voluntary than acts of cowardice, because the former are prompted by the desire of pleasure, and express the natural bent of the agent, while the latter are done under the constraint of pain, and seem to represent, not the agent, but his necessity.

a. 24. § 2. φύσιν] The normal state, as Grant points out.

μᾶλλον δὴ ἔκουστον] sc. η ἀκόλασία τῆς δειλίας. The MSS. seem all to have δ', but δή is certainly right: see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 92.

a. 26. πρὸς αὐτά] πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα, Coraes.

a. 27. §§ 3, 4.] In these sections he passes on to speak about the ἔξεις themselves.

The habit of cowardice is more voluntary (*οὐχ ὅμοιως=μᾶλλον*) than acts of cowardice; the habit of profligacy less voluntary than acts of profligacy. The reasons given for these differences are that the habit of cowardice is not painful, as compared with acts of cowardice, which seem to be forced upon a man at the time by the pains of fear; while the habit of profligacy is not desired or sought after, although profligate acts are. There is a good deal of confusion here. The habit δειλία is acquired by the repetition of particular acts caused by λύπη. It is misleading therefore to describe it as *αὐτῇ ἀλυπός*, in order to prove it to be ‘more voluntary’ than the particular acts. When Aristotle calls a *habit* ‘voluntary’ he means, as we have seen (iii. 5. 14), that we are *responsible for it*. If then the *acts* which produce the habit of δειλία are in a sense involuntary (as caused by λύπη η ἔξιστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ

*ἔχοντος φύσιν*), the *habit* will be equally involuntary, *i.e.* the δειλός 1119 a. 27. will be relieved of responsibility for it, in proportion as the acts which produced it were ‘involuntary.’ So much for the relation between the acts which made the habit and the habit ‘itself.’ If, on the other hand, the τὰ καθ’ ἔκαστα here are not the acts which made the habit of δειλία, but the acts which flow from the habit when made—what is meant by distinguishing the *habit itself*, as ἀλυπτος, from its acts, as forced upon us by λύπη? Are they not forced upon us by a λύπη of which the ‘habit itself’ has made us at least more susceptible? Again, how does the fact that οὐθεὶς ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκολαστος εἶναι make the habit of ἀκολασία less ‘voluntary,’ in the sense of making it a habit for which we are less responsible? The habit is just as ‘voluntary’ as the acts which produced it; *i.e.* if they are entirely voluntary, we are fully responsible for it. Nor can the acts which flow from the formed habit of ἀκολασία be distinguished, as ‘desired and fully voluntary,’ from the habit, as ‘not desired and less fully voluntary.’ Surely if these acts are desired, it is because the habit makes us desire them. By ἀκολασία we mean only that such acts are desired. We seem then to have nothing but scholastic trifling in the sections before us, if we render them quite literally thus:—‘acts of cowardice are forced upon us by the pains of fear; but we do not fear cowardice itself, and it is not painful to be a coward. Therefore cowardice itself is more voluntary than acts of cowardice. On the other hand, acts of profligacy are pleasant and are objects of desire; but we do not desire to be profligate. Therefore profligacy itself is less voluntary than acts of profligacy.’ An important psychological truth, however, may be got out of these sections, if we interpret them a little more freely, and suppose Aristotle to mean by the ἔξις αὐτή *acts* performed after a certain date, and by the τὰ καθ’ ἔκαστα *acts* performed before that date; the psychological truth being that the pleasures or pains, as the case may be, which originally prompt acts, tend to disappear from consciousness, and leave the acts to go on automatically. The pains which prompt early acts of cowardice are very keenly felt; but, as time goes on, cowardly acts are performed on the occasion of less and less painful experiences, till at last we may suppose the perfect δειλός cultivating his δειλία at home in security, studiously avoiding all occasions for its active display in the presence of danger. In such a case the δειλία might be described as αὐτή μὲν ἀλυπτος. Again, a pleasure like that of

1119 a. 27. drinking brandy, keenly felt at the beginning of the drunkard's progress, disappears almost entirely at last and leaves him the victim of a physical craving—of pain, not of pleasure.

It is to be noted that *έκούσιον*, after *όμοίως* in § 3, is the reading of Γ, Nb, Ald, mg. Ob, pr. P<sup>2</sup>, NC, B<sup>1</sup>, (B<sup>1</sup> has *έκούσιον ὁ καὶ κρεῖττον* in the text; Ob has on the margin *καὶ έκούσιον ὁ καὶ κρεῖττον*); while *φευκτόν* is the reading of Bekker's four MSS., K<sup>b</sup>, L<sup>b</sup>, M<sup>b</sup>, Ob and also of CCC and B<sup>2</sup>.

a. 33. § 5.] Eudemus (*E. E.* iii. 2. 1230 a. 38—1230. b. 8) has the following account of the derivation and uses of the word *ἀκόλαστος*—λέγεται δ' ὁ *ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς*. ὁ τε γάρ μὴ *κεκολασμένος πώς μηδὲ λατρευμένος*, ὥσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ *τετμημένος*, καὶ τούτων ὁ μὲν δυνατός, ὁ δ' ἀδύνατος ἄτμητον γάρ τό τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν μὲν μὴ *τετμημένον* δέ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ *ἀκόλαστον*. καὶ γάρ τὸ μὴ *πεφυκός δέχεσθαι κόλασιν*, καὶ τὸ *πεφυκός μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ περὶ ἀμαρτίας, περὶ ἣς ὁρθοπραγεῖ ὁ πώφρων, ὥσπερ οἱ παιδες, κατὰ ταύτην γάρ *ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκολασίαν**. ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον οἱ δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάμπαν διὰ κολάσεως.

b. 2. δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ *ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου*] I agree with Grant that 'there can be no doubt that the punishment and unrestrainedness of children is the more concrete and primary idea.' Aristotle seems to make it plain in § 8 which he regards as *πρότερον* and which *ὕστερον*—ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα . . . οὗτος καὶ τὸ *ἐπιθυμητικόν*.

b. 9. § 7. *ἀνοήτῳ*] One without τὸ *ἄρχον*—*νοῦς*.

*τὸ συγγενές*] That which is born with one—connate. He means that the gratification of desire strengthens the natural principle of desire in us. Function reacts on organ. Coraes has—*προβιβάζει τὴν συγγενή καὶ ἔμφυτον τῇ παιδικῇ ήλικίᾳ ἐπιθυμίαν αὐτῇ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἀν μὴ κολάζηται*.

b. 13. § 8. *ὥσπερ δέ*] K<sup>b</sup>, Ob, and Camb. have *ὥσπερ* δέ, CCC has *ὥσπερ* δῆ. Bekker's *ὥσπερ γάρ* is given by L<sup>b</sup>, M<sup>b</sup>, Γ.

b. 16. § 9. *ἀμφοῖν*] i.e. The *ἐπιθυμητικόν* and *λόγος*. Cf. vi. 2 2 δεῖ τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὅρεξιν ὁρθήν . . . καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι, τὴν δὲ διώκειν.

## *BOOK IV.*

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[*Introductory Note.*] THE E. E. and M. M. agree in the following order—ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, πραότης, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια: then follow, though not in exactly the same order in each treatise, the παθητικὰ μεσότητες—νέμεσις, αἰδώς, φιλία, σεμνότης, ἀλήθεια, and εὐτραπελία. The Nicomachean order is—ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, φιλοτιμία, πραότης, φιλία, ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπελία,—and lastly, αἰδώς, distinguished from all the foregoing as a πάθος.

In E. N. iii. 10. 1 Aristotle seems to give a reason (but see note *ad loc.*) why he begins with ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη—viz. δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν ἀνταὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ. It is true that all the moral virtues consist in the regulation of τὸ ἀλογον or the element of disorder in man; but θυμός and ἐπιθυμία represent this element in certain purely animal forms, without the regulation of which, to begin with, the more distinctively human and social virtues could not be acquired. The reasons which make it proper to begin the list with ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη are in favour of giving the third place to πραότης, which consists in the regulation of ὅργη, a feeling which man shares with the brutes. As ὅργη, however, is most often roused by causes which depend for their existence on society, the virtue of πραότης, if placed third, makes an easy transition to ἐλευθεριότης, and the other virtues which consist no longer in the regulation of purely animal instincts, but of feelings which are of distinctively human origin—i.e. do not come into existence except in society—the desire of wealth, the love of display, the desire of honour, the wish to please, and so forth.

Book IV may be said to discuss the virtues which consist in the

regulation of feelings and desires, which, however evolved from animal instincts, owe their present form and force to society. ἄνδρεία and σωφροσύνη (and perhaps to some extent πραότης), although, as *virtues*, they are no less social than ἐλευθεριότης and the rest, are concerned with feelings which have their roots deep in man's animal as distinguished from his social nature<sup>1</sup>.

## CHAPTER I.

### ARGUMENT.

*Liberality* (*ἐλευθεριότης*) is the observance of the Mean in spending and acquiring 'wealth' (*χρήματα*)—its more characteristic side however being that which relates to spending, i. e. to the use of 'wealth'—of moderate wealth, it must be understood, not of great wealth. Being the habit of using such wealth properly, its extremes, ἀσωτία and ἀνελευθερία, are the habits of abusing such wealth. The term ἀσωτία, however, is often employed with an implication (*συμπλέκοντες*, § 3) of ἀκρασία and ἀκολασία, and thus appears in a very bad light. In the strict sense (*οἰκεῖως*, § 4), however, the ἀσωτός is one who wastes his substance (§ 5), and so ruins himself—as the etymology of the word shows (ἀ and σώζειν).

The ἐλευθέριος, then, is concerned with the *χρῆσις χρημάτων*, and is better characterised as one who spends well than as one who acquires well; for to acquire is *κτῆσις*, not *χρῆσις*—i. e. 'to acquire well' is, at best, the mere refusal to receive except from proper sources, it is not active function. Ἐλευθεριότης will thus realise the characteristic of all ἀρετή—to issue in positive well-doing, rather than to merit the merely negative praise of refraining from evil (§ 7). The ἐλευθέριος will give τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ ὅρθῶς (§ 12), i. e. with

<sup>1</sup> See, however, Zeller's *Ph. d. Gr.* 3rd German Ed. p. 634 (Aristotle), note 1, for a criticism of Häcker (*das Eintheilungs- und Anordnungsprincip der moralischen Tugendreihe in der Nikomachischen Ethik*, Berlin, 1863), who adopts a view similar to that advanced above. Zeller's chief point is that if the view were correct, πραότης must come after ἄνδρεία. To this it may be answered—that it could hardly come in between the two Cardinal Virtues ἄνδρεία and σωφροσύνη: but as a matter of fact comes in after σωφροσύνη in the *E. E.* and *M. M.*—a point which Zeller does not mention. Aristotle indeed interpolates the virtues of the Fourth Book between the discussion of ἄνδρεία and σωφροσύνη and that of δικαιοσύνη and φρόνησις: but this is because, I would urge, the virtues of the Fourth Book (like δικαιοσύνη which immediately follows them) are distinguished from ἄνδρεία and σωφροσύνη by being concerned with the regulation of feelings which owe their appearance to society. The fact that πραότης has the third place in the *E. E.* and *M. M.* seems to me to show that the writers of these treatises think that ἄνδρεία and σωφροσύνη stand on a different footing from the virtues of the Fourth Book, πραότης occupying an intermediate position.

due regard to the fitness of things, of which his φρόνησις makes him a correct judge. Consequently his liberality must not be estimated from the amount that he gives, but from the relation which the gift bears to his means (§ 19). Hence Tyrants with practically unlimited means are not ἀσωτοί. They cannot 'ruin themselves' by their extravagance (§ 23). The ἐλευθέριος does not value wealth for its own sake, but only ἔνεα τῆς δόσεως. Those who have made fortunes have done so by setting a high value on wealth and devoting themselves to its acquisition. They are less likely to be liberal with their money than those who have inherited fortunes (§ 20).

Of the extremes, ἀσωτία is much better than ἀνελευθερία. It runs short of means (§ 30) and, being a generous impulse, may be chastened by age and experience into ἐλευθερία (§§ 30, 31). It also benefits many, by making 'money circulate.' Ἀνελευθερία, however, is incurable, being the vice of old age and helplessness, and of narrow and timid natures, of which nothing can be made (§§ 37-40).

We may note in this account of ἐλευθεριότης and its extremes—  
 (1) the stress laid on the point that ἐλευθεριότης results in a *χρῆσις χρημάτων*. It thus takes its place with the other virtues in a life of doing. The *χρηματιστής βίος*, which may be contrasted with the life of the ἐλευθέριος, is concerned merely with indefinite *κτῆσις*, and is a life of reception, that is, not properly a Life at all.  
 (2) The importance attached to force of character. It is better to do what is noble, than to refrain from what is base; and the bold spendthrift is a more hopeful character than the timid niggard.  
 (3) The remark that the spendthrift 'benefits many,' may be noticed as untrue. Money does more work and 'benefits' more people as 'capital' than it does if scattered about broadcast: cf. Grant's good notes on §§ 31-32 and § 44.

As I observed in note on ii. 7. 2, Aristotle's treatment of ἐλευθεριότης is as complicated as his treatment of ἀνδρεία: see ii. 7. 4 and iv. i. 29. The ἀσωτος is in excess as regards spending and in defect as regards acquiring; the ἀνελευθερος is in excess as regards acquiring, and in defect as regards spending. Nor are the two moments of ἀνελευθερία always united in one character. Some exceed in acquisition; others are in defect as regards spending: see iv. i. 38, 39.

§ 1.] The method of exhaustion, by which its object is assigned 1119 b. 22. to ἐλευθεριότης may be compared with that by which the object of Particular Justice is found—v. 2. 5.

§ 2.] Cf. v. 5. 15.

b. 2.

1119 b. 30. § 3. συμπλέκοντες] ‘with an implication’—implying intemperance. Grant compares ‘the Prodigal Son.’ The historian Theopompus, Aristotle’s contemporary, in a passage preserved by Athenaeus (iv. 62), gives a vivid picture of the ἀσωτία of Philip and his friends, which may serve as an illustration of ἀσωτία ‘with an implication’—Φίλιππος, ἐπεὶ ἐγκρατής πολλῶν ἐγίνετο χρημάτων, οὐκ ἀνάλωσεν αὐτὰ ταχέως, ἀλλ’ ἔξεβαλε καὶ ἔρριψε, πάντων ἀνθρώπων κάκιστος ὁν οἰκονόμος, οὐ μόνον αὐτός, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτόν. ἀπλῶς γάρ οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἡπίστατο ζῆν ὅρθως, οὐδὲ σωφρόνως οἰκεῖν οἰκίαν. τοῦ δὲ αὐτὸς αἴτιος ἦν, ἀπληστός καὶ πολυτελῆς ὁν, προχείρως ἀπαντα ποιῶν, καὶ τάναλισκόμενα δι’ ἀσχολίαν οὐκ ἥδύνατο. ἐπειτα δὲ οἱ ἑταῖροι αὐτοῦ ἐκ πολλῶν τόπων ἥσαν συννερρυηκότες· οἱ μὲν γάρ ἔξ αὐτῆς τῆς χώρας, οἱ δὲ ἐκ Θετταλίας, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος, οὐκ ἀριστίνδην ἔξειλεγμένοι, ἀλλ’ εἴ τις ἦν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἢ τοῖς βαρβάροις λάσταυρος ἢ βδελυρὸς ἢ θρασὺς τὸν τρόπον, οὗτοι σχεδὸν ἀπαντες εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀθροισθέντες ἑταῖροι Φιλίππου προσηγορεύοντο. εἰ δὲ μὴ καὶ τοιοῦτος τις ἐληλύθει, ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς διαίτης τῆς Μακεδονικῆς ταχέως ἐκείνοις ὅμοιος ἐγένετο. τὰ μὲν γάρ οἱ πόλεμοι καὶ αἱ στρατεῖαι, καὶ αἱ πολυτελεῖαι θρασεῖς αὐτοὺς εἶναι προετρέποντο, καὶ ζῆν μὴ κοσμίως ἀλλ’ ἀσωτῶς καὶ τοῖς λησταῖς παραπλησίως.

b. 33. § 4. οἰκείως] ‘they are not properly called ἀσωτοι.’

1120 a. 4. §§ 6-8.] See *Argument* at the beginning of this chapter.

a. 14. § 8. ἐπειται] For the technical use of this term = ὑπάρχειν τινί, or κατηγορεῖσθαι τινός, see *An. Pr.* i. 27 and 28 *passim*.

a. 17. § 9. ἡττον προΐενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι] ‘For men are less inclined to give away (ἡττον προΐενται) what is their own, than (μᾶλλον ἢ = ἢ) to abstain from taking what belongs to others.’ As Grant and other editors point out μᾶλλον is redundant.

a. 20. § 10. οὐχ ἡττον] = μᾶλλον Ald. Schol.

a. 33. § 16.] Grant has an interesting note on this section in which he calls attention to ‘the spirit of manliness and nobility (ἀνδρώδης καὶ φιλόκαλος cf. Eth. iv. 4. 3.) which runs through the virtuous characters of Aristotle.’ ‘The principle of individuality,’ he says ‘a sense of life and free action (ἐνέργεια), are with Aristotle the basis of morality, and the first requisite to nobleness seems to be self-respect . . . Christianity says “It is more blessed to give than

to receive" . . . In the Christian sentiment there is so great a 1120 a. 33. harmony between the object and subject, that the subjective side appears to be lost; but in reality it is only lost to be found again, it is diminished to be enhanced. Aristotle's statement would be, "It is better to give than to receive, because it is more noble." This has a slight tendency to give too much weight to the subjective side.' I think not—εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτον ἔστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν.

§ 17. ἀναγκαῖον] *i.e.* ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως—materially necessary, b. 1. if the beautiful form (*τὸ καλόν*) is to be realised (see *Met.* Δ. 5. 1015 a. 20).

§ 18. βλέπειν] Bekker reads ἐπιβλέπειν with L<sup>b</sup>. Rassow b. 6. (*Forsch.* 59) prefers βλέπειν, the reading of K<sup>b</sup> and M<sup>b</sup>. CCC, which in this part of the Ethics is practically a transcript of the text of K<sup>b</sup> (see *Anecd. Oxon.* Classical Series, vol. i. part i. p. 45), omits not only the prefix ἐπι- but also the μή immediately preceding.

§ 19. αὐτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν] 'δίδωσιν fort. seclu- b. 9. dendum' Bywater. Retaining δίδωσιν, I would suggest οὗτος in place of αὐτη.

§ 20.] Zell, Coraes, Michelet, and Grant compare Plato, *Rep.* b. 11. 330 B, C, where Socrates (in his conversation with Cephalus) says οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ ἡ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά (*sc. τὰ χρήματα*). ὁσπερ γὰρ οἱ πουηταὶ . . . καὶ οἱ πατέρες κ.τ.λ. Cf. also *E.N.* ix.

7. 3.

§ 22. οὐδ’ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα] Cf. note on iii. 11. 8, a. 15 οὐδ’ ὄλως b. 21. τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.

§ 24. ἐπεται . . . b. 34. αἱ ἐπόμεναι] See above, note on § 8 b. 32. of this chapter.

§ 27. Σιμωνίδη] 'fort. Σιμωνίδου' Bywater. Coraes quotes 1121 a. 7. Athenaeus xiv. 73 (656) ὅντως δὲ ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς κίμβιξ ὁ Σιμωνίδης καὶ αἰσχροκερδής, ὡς Χαριλέων φησύ. 'Ἐν Συρακούσαις γοῦν τοῦ 'Ιέρωνος ἀποστέλλοντος αὐτῷ τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν λαμπρῶς, πωλῶν τὰ πλείω ὁ Σιμωνίδης τῶν παρ' ἐκείνου πεμπομένων, ἑαυτῷ μικρὸν μέρος ἀπετίθετο. ἐρομένου δέ τινος τὴν αἰτίαν' ὅπως, εἶπεν, ἡ τε 'Ιέρωνος μεγαλοπρέπεια καταφανῆς ἦ, καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ κοσμιότης. Coraes adds—ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας αὐτῷ φιλαργυρίαν ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεστερημένος διὰ τὸ γῆρας ἡδονῶν, ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔτι γηροβοσκεῖται τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν, ὡς φησι Πλούταρχος

1121 a. 7. (Plut. *an seni sit gerenda resp.* 5). Cf. also Stobaeus (*Flor.* i. 240 ed. Meineke) quoted by Coraes—Σιμωνίδης ἐρωτηθεὶς διὰ τί ἐσχάτου γῆρως ὅν φιλάργυρος εἴη κ.τ.λ. Grant quotes *Rhet.* ii. 16. 1391 a. 8 ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εὑρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν ‘Ιέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον γενέσθαι κρείττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν πλούσιον εἰπεῖν· τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη, δρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις διατρίβοντας. See also the amusing reference to his love of money in *Rhet.* iii. 2. 1405 b. 24 καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδον μισθὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὀρεῦσιν, οὐκ ἥθελε ποιεῖν ὡς δυσχεραίνων εἰς ἡμίονους ποιεῖν, ἐπεὶ δ' ἵκανὸν ἔδωκεν, ἐποίησε ‘χαίρετ’ ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἵππων.’ καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἥσταν.

a. 15. § 29. πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς] See below §§ 41, 42.

a. 16. §§ 30, 31. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας . . . βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου] ‘The two sides of *ἀσωτία* (mentioned in § 29) are very seldom found united in the same person, for it is not easy for one who has no receipts to give to everybody (if he tries, his means soon come to an end—that is, if he is a private individual; and it is only the private individual who can be termed *ἀσωτος*): where they are united however—that is, in the *ἀσωτος* proper, we have a character not a little better than that of the *ἀνελευθέρος*.’ The words *ταχέως . . . ἀσωτοι εἶναι* are parenthetical; and ὁ γε *τοιοῦτος* is δ *μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνων καὶ πᾶσι διδούς* = the *ἀσωτος* proper = δὲ *τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀσωτος* of § 32 below. Where (as is generally the case) extravagance goes with indiscriminate acquisition (§§ 33, 34), we have really a bad form of *ἀνελευθερία*, not something better than *ἀνελευθερία*. See Rassow *Forsch.* p. 121.

a. 24. § 31. δῶσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ] Kb, CCC, Γ, and Cambr. omit both negatives, with the approval of Rassow (*Forsch.* 59), who is followed by Susemihl. The fault of the *ἀσωτος*, as Rassow points out, is to give too much and take too little. If he is reformed and becomes like the *ἐλευθέρος*, he will give the right amount to the right people, and also take the right amount from the right sources—λήψεται ὅθεν δεῖ.

b. 4. § 35. οὐδὲ τούτου ἔνεκα] τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. All MSS. except Kb Ob and CCC, seem to read *τούτου αὐτοῦ*—which I prefer to *τούτου* accepted by Sus. and Byw.

b. 16. §§ 38–40.] *ἀνελευθερία* has two moments: but they do not always coexist in the same character; hence we have two classes

of ἀνελεύθεροι, (1) Those who are conscientious enough—or at 1121 b. 16. least externally irreproachable—in the matter of acquisition, but will not part with what they acquire. (2) Those who are bent upon acquisition, and unscrupulous in the methods which they employ.

§ 39. κίμβικες] Coraes, in his note on this section, explains the use b. 22. of κίμβιξ = ‘niggard,’ by pointing to its connexion through the diminutive κιμβίκιον with the modern Greek τσιβίκι which means a *dog-tick* or *flea* = the old Greek κροτών. “Εστι τοίνυν, he says, ὁ κίμβιξ δίκην κροτῶνος οἰονεὶ κεντῶν καὶ ἐκμυζῶν τὰ ἔλάχιστα, ὁ μηδὲ τὰ λεπτότατα τῶν κερμάτων (small change) παρορῶν, δύν οἱ Γάλλοι τὴν αὐτὴν μεταφορὰν σώζοντες pince-maille καλοῦσι.

κυμινοπρίστης] a cummin-splitter. Cummin, a relish eaten b. 27. with food.

§ 40. τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ] Zell (reading τοκισταὶ b. 34. καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἐπὶ πολλῷ) supplies δανείζοντες out of τοκισταὶ—‘who lend small sums at a high rate of interest.’ Michelet prefers to take τὰ μικρὰ ἐπὶ πολλῷ with ἐργαζόμενοι—‘who perform small services for a large return’—agreeing with Coraes apparently, who (also reading καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἐπὶ πολλῷ) says—τοῦτο μὲν σημαίνει, τὰ εὐτελῆ ἐπὶ πολλῇ τιμῇ διδόντες ἢ ὑπουργοῦντες. I prefer Zell’s interpretation, which applies as well to the reading κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ (Byw.) as to Zell’s. For Aristotle’s general objection to τόκος see *Pol.* i. 3. 1258 b. 6 ὁ δὲ τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα νομίσματος. ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἔστιν.

§ 44.] The grounds upon which ἀνελευθερία rather than ἀσωτία 1122 a. 13. is to be regarded as the proper contrary of ἐλευθεριότης are the two specified in ii. 8. 7, 8.

It is only as a character that ἀνελευθερία can be truly described as μεῖζον κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας. The economic effects of ἀσωτία are unquestionably worse than those of ἀνελευθερία.

With the account of ἐλευθεριότης and its extremes given in this chapter, cf. *E. E.* iii. 4 (a very meagre treatment of the subject), and *M. M.* i. 23, 24. The various forms of ἀνελευθερία are described by Theophrastus (*Char.*) not only in his chapter περὶ ἀνελευθερίας, but also in the chapters περὶ ἀπονοίας, περὶ αἰσχροκερδίας and περὶ μικρολογίας. The following is his description of the αἰσχροκερδής, as translated by Jebb:

‘The avaricious man is one who when he entertains will not set

1122 a. 13. enough bread on the table. He will borrow from a guest staying in the house . . . When he sells wine he will sell it watered to his own friend. He will seize the opportunity of taking his boys to the play when the lessees of the theatre grant free admission . . . He is apt to claim his part of the halfpence found by his servants in the streets and to cry—“Shares in the luck” (*κοινὸν εἶναι φῆσας τὸν Ἐρμῆν*) . . . It is just like him too when he is paying a debt of thirty minas to withhold four drachmas (about 3s. out of £120). Then if his sons, through ill health, do not attend the school throughout the month, he will make a proportionate deduction from the payment; and all through Anthesterion he will not send them to their lessons because there are so many festivals, and he does not wish to pay the fees. It is just like him too when a club-dinner is held at his house to secrete some of the fire-wood, lentils, vinegar, salt and lamp-oil placed at his disposal. If a friend or a friend’s daughter is to be married he will go abroad a little time before in order to avoid giving a wedding present.’

## CHAPTER II.

### ARGUMENT.

*Μεγαλοπρέπεια*—magnificence—differs from *ἐλευθερότης* in being concerned only with expenditure, and that on a grand scale (§ 1). The *μεγαλοπρεπής* is *ἐλευθέριος*, but the *ἐλευθέριος* is not therefore *μεγαλοπρεπής* (§ 3). Both expend with equal propriety, but the scale on which they do so is different; and the expenditure of the *μεγαλοπρεπής* results in performances, and works, which are beautiful and striking in the public eye, rather than merely useful to individuals, as are the gifts of the *ἐλευθέριος*. *Ἐλευθερίτης* results in a *κτῆμα* useful to the person benefited; whereas *μεγαλοπρέπεια* results in an *ἔργον* which is the glory and admiration of the city (§ 10). Hence the *μεγαλοπρεπής* must be a rich man, and even a man whose riches have been inherited (§§ 13, 14), otherwise expenditure on a great scale (whether for public objects<sup>1</sup>, or on great family occasions, §§ 11–17) would be out of keeping with his condition; but the *ἐλευθέριος* need not be a rich man. The habit of spending money on a great scale with propriety will direct the *μεγαλοπρεπής* even in cases where the expenditure is necessarily small. He is an artist—*ἐπιστήμονι* ξοκεν (§ 5), and will display his superior taste, even in cases in which the *ἐλευθέριος*, strictly so called, can compete with him—*καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον* (§ 10).

<sup>1</sup> What we understand by ‘public spirit’ enters largely into the notion of *μεγαλοπρέπεια*.

The extremes are βανανία or ἀπειροκαλία<sup>1</sup> and μικροπρέπεια. The former results in vulgar display of wealth; the latter falls short of the requirements of great occasion (e.g. a marriage or a θεωρία) by anxiety to do the thing as cheaply as possible.

§ 1. περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον] Aspasius has ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθεριότης 1122 a. 21. περὶ δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ἡ δὲ μεγαλοπρέπεια περὶ τὴν δόσιν.

§ 2.] The τριηραρχία was one of the extraordinary λειτουργίαι at a. 24. Athens. The τριηραρχος got the ship, fairly equipped, from the State. The State also paid the crew, and bore the expense of their provisions. The τριηραρχος had to maintain the efficiency of the ship for one year, hire the crew, and often pay large bounties in order to induce men to serve; he had also often to advance the money required for pay and provisions. The cost of a trierarchy amounted to about fifty minae. See Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*: article *Trierarchia*, and Jebb's *Theophrastus*, p. 253. The ἀρχιθεωρός was the leader of a θεωρία, or embassy sent by the state to the Great Games, or to consult the oracle at Delphi, or to assist at the celebration of the Delia—the solemn festival of the Ionian confederacy. The ἀρχιθεωρία was one of the ordinary, or ἔγκυκλοι λειτουργίαι, which devolved upon the wealthy Athenian citizen. See Smith's *Dict. of Antiquities*, articles—*Delia*, *Theori*, *Leiturgia*. Zell assumes that the τριηραρχία would cost more than an ἀρχιθεωρία: Grant reverses this opinion. The Delian ἀρχιθεωρία probably cost more than a τριηραρχία: some other ἀρχιθεωρίαι probably less.

§ 3. πολλάκι κ.τ.λ.] from *Od.* xvii. 419,

a. 27.

καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ ποτε οἶκον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔναιον  
ὅλβιος ἀφνειόν, καὶ πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη.

§ 4. οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι . . . λαμπρυνόμεναι] Asp. has—βαναν- a. 32. σίαν . . . προσποίησίν τινα οὖσαν μεγέθους τοῦ ἐν δαπανήμασιν ἀξίου· ἐν οἷς γὰρ οὐ δεῖ οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ λαμπρύνεται.

ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔροῦμεν] K<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>, Camb., and CCC read a. 33. ὑπέρ for περί. Susemihl (followed by Bywater) attaches so much

<sup>1</sup> In the *E. E.* (iii. 6) ὁ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον is said to be ἀνώνυμος, but to resemble the ἀπειρόκαλος and σαλάκων: in the *ὑπογραφή*, however, the habit is called δαπανηρία (*E. E.* ii. 3). In the *M. M.* (i. 26) the habit is called σαλακωνέλα (1192 a. 37—K<sup>b</sup> however reads ἀλαζονέλα here, and ἀλαζών for σαλάκων in 1192 b. 2 and 3). The σαλάκων, or swaggerer, is coupled with the σόλοικος, or vulgar person, in *Rhet.* ii. 16. 1391 a. 4.

1122 a. 33. weight to the joint authority of K<sup>b</sup> and O<sup>b</sup> here, that he accepts ὑπέρ from them. He may be quite right in doing so: but I think he ought to do more, and bracket the clause (suspicious in itself) in which ὑπέρ appears. See note on iii. 3. 2.

b. 4. § 6.] Rassow (*Forsch.* 75) inserts *εἰ πρέπον* between *πρέπον* and *τῷ ἔργῳ* (1122 b. 4), believing that no sense can be got out of the clause *οὗτω γὰρ . . . ἔργῳ* as it stands. Is this so? Aristotle says that the *δαπάναι* (answering to the *ἐνέργεια* mentioned in the line above) of the *μεγαλοπρεπῆς* are (as his name implies) *μεγάλαι* and *πρέπουσαι*. The *ἔργα* or objects (answering to the *ῶν ἐστίν* above) of his *δαπάναι* will therefore be *μεγάλα*, for unless they are *μεγάλα*, we cannot speak of a *μέγα δαπάνημα* in the sense in which we wish *μέγα* to be here understood—*i.e.* in the sense of *μέγα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ*—not only great materially (for the *δαπάναι* of the *βάναυσος* are great materially), but having its material greatness plainly justified by the greatness of its object.

Münscher and Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 75) omit *καὶ* (b. 1) before *ῶν ἐστίν*: wrongly I think. A *ἔξις* (like an organ) is to be understood in relation to its functions, *and* to its objects, or the environment for which it is suited.

'*Ἐν ἀρχῇ* may be taken as a reference to the account of the nature and formation of the *ἡθικαὶ ἔξεις* with which Aristotle began this division (Books ii—iv) of his Treatise.

b. 12. § 10. *ἐν τούτοις δὲ κ.τ.λ.*] '*Ἐν τούτοις i.e. ἀ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.* Peters translates—‘So the magnificent man must be liberal also; for the liberal man too will spend the right amount in the right manner; only, both the amount and the manner being right, magnificence is distinguished from liberality (which has the same<sup>1</sup> sphere of action) by greatness—I mean by actual magnitude of amount spent: and secondly, where the amount spent is the same, the result of the magnificent man’s expenditure will be more magnificent.’ This seems to be the only rendering which the words as they stand admit of: *οἷον μέγεθος* is epexegetic of *τὸ μέγα*, and *τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὕτης* is a genitive absolute. The rendering of Lambinus—*sed in his quidquid magni est magnifici proprium est, veluti magnitudo liberalitatis circa haec versantis,*

<sup>1</sup> Here Peters translates Bekker’s *ταῦτα*.

which makes the gen. ἐλευθεριότητος depend on μέγεθος, can hardly 1122 b. 12. be right. I am inclined, however, to suspect the text, and to think that Coraes is right in trying to restore a verb to govern μέγεθος. He suggests σχούσης for οὖσης and has the following note: Σχούσης ἀντὶ τοῦ οὖσης οὐ γὰρ ἀλλως ἔξηγήσαιο τὸ πολλὰ τοῖς κριτικοῖς παρασχὸν πράγματα χωρίον τοῦτο. ὁ νοῦς, ἐπεὶ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖος καὶ ἐλευθέριος, κατ’ οὐδέν τε ἐκείνου διαφέρει ἔτερον, πλὴν ὅτι ἐν μεγάλοις καὶ μεγάλων ἔνεκα δαπανᾷ, εἴη ἄν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐλευθεριότης σχούσα μέγεθος· τουτέστιν ἡ δαπάνη ἐν οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ μετρία μὲν οὖσα ἐλευθεριότης κεκλήσεται, προσλαβοῦσα δὲ μέγεθος καλείσθω μεγαλοπρέπεια. Rassow (*Forsch.* 92) adopts the method of emendation indicated by Coraes, and conjectures λαβούσης for οὖσης, comparing such uses as λαμβάνειν αὔξησιν, τελείωσιν, τέλος, τοῦ μεγέθους τέλος, ὑψος. Susemihl accepts Rassow's λαβούσης into his text. Thus μεγαλοπρέπεια 'ist gewissermassen eine ἐλευθεριότης in grossem Stil.' The reading ταῦτα (accepted by Rassow, Susemihl and Bywater) has the support of all MSS. apparently, except H<sup>a</sup>, CCC, and rec. K<sup>b</sup>, which have ταῦτά adopted by Bekker.

Whether we leave the text as it stands with οὖσης, or read λαβούσης, we have to remember that the μέγα, or μέγεθος, characteristic of μεγαλοπρέπεια, is not material bulk, as such, but the *grandeur* which belongs to material bulk subserving a worthy end. 'Magnificence,' says Grant, 'differs from Liberality not in degree, but in kind, being a display of more genius and imagination on the same objects, and thus with the same expense producing a more striking result.' Grant reads περὶ ταῦτα—but even this ought not to be rendered 'on the same objects.' The ἐλευθέριος and the μεγαλοπρεπῆς do not spend 'on the same objects,' but 'both spend the right amount in the right manner,' on their different objects.

οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτή κ.τ.λ.] This explains how it is that ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης b. 14. δαπάνης the magnificent man produces a finer result than the liberal man. The result produced by the liberal man is merely a *κτῆμα*—something that is materially useful to the recipient, and has its market value, whereas the result produced by the magnificent man is of the nature of a work of art. It is θαυμαστόν—'displays genius and imagination.'

The words with which this section ends are variously given by the MSS—K<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>, Γ, CCC, and Cambr. give καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετή,

1122 b. 14. *μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἐν μεγέθει*, adopted by Bekker and Bywater: L<sup>b</sup>, M<sup>b</sup>, have καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου μεγαλοπρέπεια ἀρετὴ ἐν μεγέθει, adopted by Susemihl and Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* ii. 2, p. 638, note 4). Zeller translates ‘die Grossartigkeit des Werkes besteht in einer im Grosse sich darstellenden Trefflichkeit.’ I prefer Bekker’s reading; but perhaps ή has dropped out between ἀρετή and μεγαλοπρέπεια. The words ἐν μεγέθει qualify the predicate ἔργου ἀρετή.

b. 19. § 11. *τὰ τίμια*] as distinguished from *τῶν δὲ ἴδιων* § 15. See viii. 14. 3, where *τιμή* is said to be the return which Society makes to its benefactors. There ought to be a comma (Bekker has none) after *θεούς*,—ἀναθήματα, κατασκευαὶ (*constructiones templorum* Lamb., *arae aedificatae* Victor.), and *θυσίαι* being the three subdivisions of *τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς*.

b. 22. *χορηγεῖν*] See Smith’s *Dict. of Antiq.* article *Choregus*. The *χορηγία* was one of the most expensive *λειτουργίαι*. The duty of the *χορηγός*, who was appointed by his Tribe, was to provide choruses for tragedies, and comedies, and other public functions. He had to pay the *χοροδιδάσκαλος* and the *choreutae*, supplying the latter with proper food, and with the necessary dresses and masks. Even the prize which the most successful *χορηγός* received, (a tripod) he had to pay for himself. For the expenses of the *χορηγία*, see Haigh, *Attic Theatre*, p. 82 sqq.

b. 23. *ἔστιαν τὴν πόλιν*] It would seem that Aristotle uses this expression to distinguish the *λειτουργία* referred to, from the less splendid *ἔστιαν τὴν φυλὴν*, one of the regular *λειτουργίαι*, which consisted in giving a feast to one’s tribesmen. See Smith’s *Dict. of Ant.* article *Hestiasis*.

b. 24. § 12. *ἀναφέρεται*] The subject of this verb is *τὰ δαπανήματα*, and *τὸ τις κ.τ.λ.* is in apposition to *τὸν πράττοντα*.

b. 29. § 14. *πρέπει δὲ [καὶ] οὖς*] Bywater brackets *καὶ*. I think that its omission is a great improvement.

b. 30. *προϋπάρχει*] Cf. *E. E.* iii. 6. 1233 b. 11 *τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ὄφετο Θεμιστοκλεῖ πρέπειν ήν ἐποίησατο Ὁλυμπίαζε διὰ τὴν προϋπάρξασαν ταπεινότητα, ἀλλὰ Κίμων*: with which Fritzsche compares Plut. *Them.* 5—εἰς Ὁλυμπίαν ἐλθὼν ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ διαμιλλώμενος τῷ Κίμωνι περὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σκηνὰς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην λαμπρότητα καὶ παρασκευήν, οὐκ

ηρκεσε τοῖς Ἑλλησιν. ἐκείνῳ γάρ ὅντι νέῳ καὶ ἀπ' οἰκίας μεγάλης φοντο 1122 b. 30.  
δὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα συγχωρεῖν· ὁ δὲ μήπω γνώριμος γεγονὼς ἀλλὰ καὶ δοκῶν  
ἔξ οὐχ ὑπαρχόντων παρ' ἀξίαν ἐπαιρεσθαι, προσωφλίσκανεν ἀλαζονείαν.

ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν] ἢ διὰ τίνος τῶν ἔτι ζώντων αὐτοῖς οἰκείων καὶ b. 31.  
συγγενῶν, Coraes. ‘Their connections’—Peters.

§ 15. τῶν δὲ ἴδιων] Aristoile here passes from the highest objects b. 35.  
of μεγαλοπρέπεια (τὰ περὶ θεούς, and the great λειτουργίαι), to those  
of second rank—the celebration of a marriage, the entertainment  
of private friends, the furnishing of one’s house, &c.

§ 17. καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων] I follow Susemihl and Bywater 1123 a. 10.  
in reading ἐπεὶ for ἐπί, and make the apodosis begin at διὰ τοῦτο  
§ 19. I find that CCC has γρ. ἐπεὶ on the margin for insertion  
before<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων: but all MSS. seem to read ἐπί.  
Peters (reading ἐπί) translates—‘ And in his expenditure every detail  
will be great after its kind, great expenditure on a great occasion  
being the most magnificent, and then in a less degree that which  
is great for the occasion, whatever it be.’

ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει] ὥστε εἶναι τὰ ἔργα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς a. 11.  
μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστά, πρὸς τὰ ὄμογενῆ συγκρινόμενα· τάφων μὲν οἰκο-  
δομήματα πρὸς τάφους, ναῶν πρὸς ναούς, καὶ γεφύρας πρὸς γεφύρας, καὶ  
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄμοιώς. Paraph.

τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα] οἷον ἐν ναῷ μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ. Coraes. I do a. 12.  
not think that Bywater’s insertion of ἀπλῶς after μεγαλοπρεπέστατον  
is necessary. I understand μεγαλοπρεπές, not μεγαλοπρεπέστατον, as  
the predicate of τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα.

ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα] ἐν δὲ τοῖς μικροῖς, τὸ ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς  
μέγα, ὥστε τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς πρὸς τὰ ὄμογενῆ τῶν ἄλλων  
μικρὰ παραβαλλόμενον μέγιστον εἶναι. Coraes.

§ 20. ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἐστιῶν] “Eranos being a club where a. 22.  
each member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each  
guest contributed, it was of course bad taste to eclipse the rest in  
splendour.” Grant.

ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων] The πάροδος was the entrance a. 23.  
of the chorus in the orchestra, and the first song sung on entrance—

<sup>1</sup> Possibly instead of ἐπί: but the three dots referring to the γρ. are under  
the καὶ.

1123 a. 23. defined in *Poet.* 12. 1452 b. 22 πάροδος μὲν ἡ πρώτη λέξις ὅλου χοροῦ. Zell and Coraes, however, are of opinion that here πάροδος means the part of the theatre at which the chorus entered, and that the ‘purple’ is not the dress of the choreutae, but the hangings of this part, which, in the case of comic representations, were usually skins. That hangings are here intended seems to be the view both of the Ald. Schol. and of the Par. The former has—σύνηθες ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ παραπετάσματα δέρρεις ποιεῖν οὐ πορφυρίδας: and the Par. has—ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδίαις ἀντὶ κωδίων (sheep skins), ἀ παραπετάσματα ἦν ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, πορφυρίδας ἔχει, καθάπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. Zell quotes Lysias (699) for the cost of a comic choregia—κωμῳδῶν χορηγῶν Κηφισοδότῳ ἐνίκων καὶ ἀνήλωσα σὺν τῇ τῆς σκευῆς ἀναβέσει ἔκκαιδεκα μνᾶς—*i.e.* about £6*4*. The cost of a tragic choregia would be much greater.

Bywater restores Μεγαροῖ from Kb, in place of the Μεγαρεῖς of other MSS. Pr. CCC has Μεγαροί.

a. 31. § 22.] Μεγαλοπρέπεια and its extremes are discussed in *E. E.* iii. 6, and in *M. M.* i. 26 shortly, and in an inferior manner.

## CHAPTER III.

### ARGUMENT.

*The μεγαλόψυχος, or great-souled man, deems himself worthy of that which is highest, being worthy of it, as distinguished from the χαῖνος, or vain man, on the one side, who thinks too highly of himself, and the μικρόψυχος, or small-souled man, on the other side, who thinks too little of himself.*

*That which is highest—among external good things—is honour. It is this which the μεγαλόψυχος rightly deems himself worthy of. Μεγαλοψυχία, then, may be defined as a mediocrity where honour and dishonour are concerned.*

*Rightly deeming himself worthy of that which is highest, the μεγαλόψυχος must be a truly virtuous man; and his μεγαλοψυχία will lend distinction to the virtues, without which it cannot itself exist.*

*But, although he deems himself worthy of the highest honour, the μεγαλόψυχος does not make honour his all-in-all. Since, then, even honour is not all-in-all to him, he will not be likely to think too highly of inferior good things. The consciousness of his own commanding personality will be enough for him. This consciousness will reveal itself externally in the independence of his demeanour,*

and the distinction of his bearing. He will accept the honour which he receives from good men, not as adequate to his desert, but as the best thing which they can offer. The opinion of ordinary men—favourable or unfavourable—he will look down upon. (Here he is apt to be imitated by those who are not really μεγαλόψυχοι. But he has a right to look down on other men.) He will rather do good offices than have them done to him. He will remember those whom he has benefited, but those who have benefited him he will easily forget. He will be haughty and reserved with the great, and easy with those of middle-state. He will not enter into competition with others for honour. He will reserve himself for great occasions of acting, and great danger; but when the great danger comes he will not grudge his life. He will love and hate openly. He will speak and act the truth—except in so far as he keeps ordinary people at a distance by his irony. He will never be found looking up to people or things with awe and wonder. Remembering evil, personal talk, praise, blame, complaint, will all be far from his nature.

His walk will be slow, his voice deep, his manner of speaking calm and measured.

The extremes—the vain man, and the small-souled man, are not exactly vicious characters—they are not evil-doers: but they are in error. The small-souled man deprives himself of what is his due, from not ‘knowing himself’: He is not silly; but he is backward. His poor opinion of himself, however, makes him a worse man in time. The vain man, on the other hand, is silly. His lack of self-knowledge is conspicuous. He is always being shown-up, as he strives, by dress, and all kinds of ostentation, to make people think highly of him.

Μικροψυχία, however, is the real opposite of μεγαλοψυχία, for μικροψυχία is more common than χαννότης, and worse.

*[Introductory Note.]* THE picture of the μεγαλόψυχος given in this chapter is a creation of art, intended to present a great philosophical truth with concrete evidence to the imagination. We must therefore be careful not to look at it as if it were a portrait-sketch after the manner of Theophrastus, or stood on the same plane with the other character-pictures given in the Fourth Book.

The μεγαλόψυχος accepts the highest honour, though falling short of his deserts, because men have nothing better to give him. He remembers those whom he has benefited, but not those from whom he has received benefits. To the many he is ironical. He does not give way to admiration, for in his eyes nothing is great. This spirit in a real man would be intolerable. But Aristotle’s μεγαλόψυχος is not a real man. He is an ideal creation in philosophy, as Philoctetes or Antigone is in tragedy. He is Aristotle’s concrete presentation of that θεωρία which is essential to human excellence. He ‘contemplates’ the κόσμος or beautiful harmony of his own nature, and allows nothing external to it

to dominate his thought or conduct. He thus realises *αὐτάρκεια* or autonomy, and ‘possesses all the virtues’ in a fuller sense than other virtuous men, who are conscious of the moral law merely through their *φρόνησις*, or *practical* insight and self-knowledge. The *μεγαλόψυχος* is a man of the highest *speculative* power. Like Spinoza’s ideal, he has the *scientia intuitiva*, and sees in every virtuous act the ‘whole world of human nature clearly, which good men of less speculative power see only dimly.’ The ever-present spectacle of ‘the moral law within,’ by its sublimity, exalts his mind; while the exaltation of mind, or *μεγαλοψυχία*, reveals itself outwardly in the dignity and distinction of his bearing. High speculative power being thus essential to *μεγαλοψυχία*, it is not every virtuous man who can be *μεγαλόψυχος*.

It is impossible to determine how far Aristotle was guided in his delineation of the *μεγαλόψυχος* by reference to particular individuals known to him. There certainly seem to be touches in the work suggested by such a reference; but it may be said, I think, that the work loses, rather than gains, by these attempts at realism, and that the impression which they convey, that we have before us a real and possible man, who, as described, would be intolerable, is unfortunate, and has contributed to the misunderstanding of the significance of *μεγαλοψυχία* in Aristotle’s Ethical System. The measured movements, and the deep voice, make us think of a real man: but, after all, they are only the buskins and mask of an ideal character. Aristotle, we may be sure, was as fully aware of the ideality of his *μεγαλόψυχος*, or man who is a law to himself, as Kant was of the ideality of his Good Will: but Aristotle, unlike Kant, had undertaken to picture the ideal of moral autonomy, for the eye, as it were, and could not withstand the temptation of putting in touches more suitable to a psychological and physiological description, than to the representation of an ethical ideal.

Hegel’s view, that Alexander the Great was Aristotle’s model, is a particularly unfortunate one. The impetuous genius, and the vices, of Alexander distinguish him, in the most marked manner, from the harmoniously developed *μεγαλόψυχος*<sup>1</sup>. Nor must too much be made of the examples of *μεγαλοψυχία*—Alcibiades, Achilles, Ajax, Lysander, and Socrates—given, in a purely

<sup>1</sup> For other objections to Hegel’s view see Teichmüller *Literarische Fehden*, p. 192.

logical context, in *An. Post.* ii. 13. 97 b. 18; for no one of these characters answers to the description here given. The description of the *μεγαλόψυχος* in the *Ethics* is rather the *mise en scène* of Aristotle's doctrine of the *αὐτάρκεια* of the *εὐδαιμων* in the Life of Reason, than a portrait-sketch after the manner of Theophrastus.

§ 4. *σώφρων*] here means 'modest,' 'knowing his place'—1123 b. 5. as each of the classes in Plato's State, in virtue of its *σωφροσύνη*, 'knows its own place.'

§ 5. *τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι*] The editors refer to *Poet.* 7. b. 7. 1450 b. 36 *τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἔστι*.

§ 6. *οὐ πᾶς χαῖρος*] i.e. a man may think too much of himself, b. 9. without going the stupid length of vanity.

§ 8. *τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος*] Cf. ii. 6. 17. b. 13. As 'a great man' he stands on a pinnacle; as 'a virtuous character' he occupies the mean. His position, as he himself is conscious of it, and as it strikes the imagination of the admiring beholder, is one of incomparable preeminence; but to the moral analyst it suggests difficulties of detail in which the *χαῖρος* and the *μικρόψυχος* fail—and in which the 'virtuous character' himself *might have failed*.

§ 10. *ἥ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἔκτὸς ἀγαθά*] 'Worth' is a b. 17. relative term—i.e. it cannot be understood except as entitling its possessor to 'something'; and this 'something' has to be specified. Being something which the person 'worthy of it' gets, it cannot be a good thing of the soul, or of the body; it must, therefore, be one of *τὰ ἔκτὸς ἀγαθά*.

*τιμή*] When *μεγαλόψυχία* is said to be *περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας*, we b. 20. must remember that *τιμή* is after all only a symbol of the reward to which the worth of the *μεγαλόψυχος* is entitled. *Τιμή* regarded at an end in itself in the *πολιτικὸς βίος* turns out to be something precarious, *ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον η̄ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ* (i. 5. 4). The true reward is *εὐδαιμονία* or the *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς καὶ ἀρετῆς* itself. This is indeed *τίμιον* (i. 12) and an end in itself, as the gods, to whom we do not give *ἔπαινος*, but assign *τιμή*, are ends in themselves, not means to our advantage. The *τιμή* which is assigned to the *μεγαλόψυχος* must therefore be understood in connexion with the

1123 b. 20. technical use of the term *τίμιον* as explained in *E.N.* i. 12. The self-sufficing personality of the *μεγαλόψυχος* inspires reverence. The outward expressions of this reverence are in themselves nothing to the *μεγαλόψυχος*, but he receives them, as the gods receive our homage, not because they need it, but because we offer it, as the best thing we have to offer. But if the world is unappreciative and withholds the homage due to his character, the *μεγαλόψυχος* is not troubled. He goes on his way like Plato's embodiment of the 'autonomy of the Will'—*δέ ἐπιστήμην λαβών* (*Rep.* 362 and 366), who walks through life with the inward consciousness of justice, and the reputation of injustice.

b. 23. § 11. *τιμῆς γάρ μάλιστα [οἱ μεγάλοι] ἀξιοῦσιν ἔαυτούς*] Bywater brackets *οἱ μεγάλοι*—rightly. It probably represents an interpolated *οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι*.

b. 25. § 12. *ἀξίωμα*] 'non est *sui aestimatio*, sed *ipsa dignitas*'—Michelet, rightly.

b. 26. § 13. *οὐ μὴν τόν γε μεγαλόψυχον*] *πρός* ought perhaps to be restored to the text before *τόν*. K<sup>b</sup> omits *γε*.

b. 30. § 14. *τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα*] The virtues of the *μεγαλόψυχος* are exalted by his clear consciousness of their systematic unity. An error, which might escape the notice of the ordinarily virtuous man, cannot escape his notice, but is instantly seen in its bearing upon the whole of life. He has always the 'Representation of Law Universal' before his eyes. It must be admitted that the *μεγαλόψυχος* is not easily understood by us, and does not command our modern sympathy. The whole man is ideal; whereas we prefer to idealise one trait, leaving the rest of the character still human, and prone to error. We are tempted to apply to the faultless *μεγαλόψυχος* our saying—'Pride goes before a fall,' forgetting that *ex hypothesi* he cannot fall, as a god cannot die.

We, in modern times, are dominated by two great conceptions, to which Aristotle is a stranger—the conception of Social Progress, and that of Human Brotherhood. The *μεγαλόψυχος*, with 'all the virtues,' answers to the conception of a stationary social order. He lives in a glorious present which has no need of a future. But in the mind of the modern social reformer, new ideas appear,

as disturbing elements, among the old ideas which reflect actually 1123 b. 30. present conditions. These new ideas he must cherish, and give himself up to. He must be willing to correspond badly with the present, to incur odium, to make himself ridiculous—all for the sake of a future, which he may not, perhaps cannot, live to see. Here, evidently, there is no room for ‘all the virtues.’

The other great conception of modern times—that of the Brotherhood of men, especially as it gives reality in our eyes to the misery that we see around us, is equally opposed to the Aristotelian ideal of ‘all the virtues.’ If these miserables are to be succoured, it must be by men who devote themselves to the work entirely, without thought of ‘culture.’

**§ 15. παρασείσαντι]** here used absolutely as in *Probl.* v. 8. b. 31. 881 b. 6 ὁ δὲ θάττον θεῖ παρασείων ἢ μὴ παρασείων: but the full construction has χεῖρας, cf. περὶ πορείας ζώων 3. 705 a. 17 καὶ οἱ θέοντες θάττον θέοντες παρασείοντες τὰς χεῖρας. The editors compare Theoph. *Char.* περὶ ἀδολεσχίας—παρασείσαντα δὲ χρὴ τοὺς τοιούτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ διαράμενον (*sc.* τὰ σκέλη—‘with long steps,’) ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, ὅστις ἀπύρετος βούλεται εἶναι.

ὦ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα] The reading of O<sup>b</sup>, CCC and K<sup>b</sup> man. alt.; b. 32. Bekker omits the γ' wrongly: see Rassow, *Forsch.* 60.

**§ 16. κόσμος]** The beauty and order of the virtues which is the 1124 a. 1. object and work of Reason.

**καλοκαγαθίας]** This term does not seem to have the technical a. 4. meaning for Aristotle, which it afterwards bears in the *E. E.* (H. 15. 1248 b. 8 ff.) In the *E. E.* it is that *ἔξις* which enables a man to see the ultimate *σκοπός* or *ὅρος*—the Divine Nature. It is a kind of *amor intellectualis Dei*. Here, however, and in *E. N.* x. 9. 3 (the only other place where the word occurs in the *E. N.*) ‘no special import is given to the word. It seems to imply a sort of elevated virtue.’ (Grant.) To Aristotle as to Plato the *καλός τε κἀγαθός* is ‘very much what we mean by a “gentleman.”’ (Grant.) The writer of the *M. M.* (ii. 9) describes the *καλός καὶ ἀγαθός* as the man for whom *all* things really good in life are good—*ἔστιν οὖν ὁ καλὸς κἀγαθὸς φῶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς καλὰ καλά ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος γὰρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός.* φῶ δὲ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ μή ἔστιν ἀγαθά, οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὑγιαίνειν ἀν δόξειεν φῶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ὑγιεινὰ μὴ ὑγιεινά ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ ὁ πλοῦτος

1124 a. 4. καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ παραγωμένα τινα βλάπτοιεν, οὐκ ἀν αἰρετὰ εἶη, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα αὐτὸν μὴ βλάψει, βούλήσεται αὐτῷ εἶναι. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὧν οἷος ὑποστελλόμενός τι τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἀν δόξειε καλὸς κἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ἀλλ’ φέτα τάγαθὰ πάντα ὄντα ἀγαθά ἔστιν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μὴ διαφθείρεται, οἷον ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ ἀρχῆς, ὁ τοιοῦτος καλὸς κἀγαθός (*M.M.* 1207 b. 31—1208 a. 4). This description of the καλὸς κἀγαθός as the man in perfect correspondence with the most brilliant social circumstances—not obliged to ‘furl his sails’—to deny himself good because it hurts him, comes very near what was Aristotle’s thought when he wrote *χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οὗν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.*

a. 7. § 17. ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς] equivalent to *καλοκαγαθία* as understood in the present context.

a. 17. § 18. ὡς μέγιστον ὅν] These words have caused difficulty to the editors; and Ramsauer proposes the omission of ὡς. Peters following the Par. translates—‘Seeing that not even honour affects him as if it were a very important thing.’ This interpretation is supported by the following φέτη καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρὸν ἔστιν. Coraes, however, following Lambinus, interprets differently, taking ὡς not in the sense of ‘as if,’ but closely with the superlative μέγιστον—οὐδὲ περὶ τὴν τιμήν, καίπερ ὃν ὡς μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οὕτως ἔξει ὥστε πέρα τοῦ μετρίου χαίρειν, τυγχάνων, ἢ λυπεῖσθαι, στερούμενος. I have no hesitation in accepting the Paraphrast’s interpretation—οὐ γὰρ μέγιστον ἡγήσεται τὴν τιμὴν καὶ οὕτω περὶ αὐτὴν ἔξει ὡς μέγιστον ὅν. It is true that *τιμή* is μέγιστον τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν (§ 10): but ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἀν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμῆς (§ 17).

a. 20. § 19. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν] The force of δοκεῖ must be observed here. *Μεγαλοψυχία* as *popularly conceived* is enhanced by prosperity: but true *μεγαλοψυχία* with its παντελῆς ἀρετή is independent of fortuitous aid.

The force of the passive verbs ἀξιοῦνται and τιμῶνται in this section and in § 20, as explained by Ramsauer, is also to be observed—  
 ‘a. 21 ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς . . . a. 24 τιμῶνται . . . a. 25 τιμητέος . . .  
 a. 26 ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς: observandum genus passivum verborum. Prius igitur iste quidem de honoribus cogitare videtur qui sibi ab aliis offeruntur, ut deinde (vs. 27 ἔαντος ἀξιοῦσιν) et ipse audeat eosdem sibi vindicare. Id quod secus erat in vera virtute, quippe

qua ab initio δ ἀξιος ὁν αὐτὸς ἀξιοι ἔαυτὸν μεγάλων (1123 b. 2), non 1124 a. 20. egens ille testimonio aliorum.'

ἢ πλουτοῦντες] Rassow (*Forsch.* 60) rightly omits the article a. 22. before πλουτοῦντες, with Kb, Mb, Camb., and CCC. Οι δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες are together distinguished from οι εὐγενεῖς. The article before πλουτοῦντες would have been right, if καὶ instead of ἢ had been used.

τιμητός] Bekker reads τιμητέος. τιμητός is given by pr. Kb, Mb, a. 25. Asp. NC, B<sup>1</sup>.

§ 20. ἄμφω] φ δὲ ἄμφω ιρόσεστι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ τὰ ἔξωθεν ἀγαθὰ μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς τοῦ τὴν ἀρετὴν μόνον ἔχοντος. Par.

§ 21. ὑπερόπται] Jebb (*Theophrastus* p. 186) compares the a. 29. ὑπερηφανία, or arrogance, of Theophrastus with the parody of μεγαλοψυχίᾳ described in this section. ‘Ο δὲ ὑπερήφανος says Theophrastus τοιόσδε τις οἶος . . . εὑρισκεῖται φάσκειν—‘he will profess to recollect benefits which he has conferred—*i.e.*,’ says Jebb (p. 187), ‘he will remind others in a patronizing manner that he has placed them under obligations; which may or may not be true, for the ambiguous φάσκειν, “to allege,” leaves it doubtful. This trait illustrates the difference between arrogance and Loftymindedness. It is characteristic of the Loftyminded man, as Aristotle observes, to remember whom he has benefited. The arrogant man (who is a bad imitator of the Loftyminded) does not only remember;—he proclaims that he remembers.’

καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται] οἱ has been received into the text by Bekker, Susemihl and Bywater, on the authority of Kb. It is given also by Camb.; but all other MSS., apparently, read καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. I feel considerable doubt about the reception of οἱ. Michelet’s defence of καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθά seems to me to be a strong one. ‘K<sup>b</sup> οἱ ante τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθά addit, quam lectionem Cardwellus et Bekkerus in textum reperunt. Male. Kai τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθά est causa, cur ii, qui virtute orbati sunt, contemptores et contumeliosi fiant: *ut pote habentes etiam externa bona*; ad γίγνονται igitur supplices subjectum e praecedentibus (*οἱ ἀνεν ἀρετῆς*). Addentibus οἱ, alterum καὶ rejiendum esset.’ This καὶ is marked for omission by a later hand in CCC. If we suppose the original text to have been—ὑπερόπται

1124 a. 29. δὲ καὶ ὑβριστὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται (*sc. οἱ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς*), we may explain the words *καὶ οἱ* as fragments of an ancient blunder ὑβριστικαὶ with the final *ai* corrected *oi* above the line. But there is no strong objection, I think, to the retention of the *καὶ*. If it belonged to the original text, the blunder ὑβριστικαὶ would be almost inevitable: and the correction of the final *ai* into *oi* would follow as a matter of course.

The readings ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβριστὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες κακὰ (Par. 1417, Ald., Coraes) γίγνονται are worth noticing only as κακοὶ (Γ, Zell) showing that the clause is one which puzzled scribes.

b. 5. § 22. ὁ μὲν γάρ] Susemihl and Bywater read ὁ μὲν γάρ on the authority of K<sup>b</sup>. The first hand in CCC likewise gives ὁ μὲν γάρ. So far as sense is concerned, I do not think that there is much to choose between this and Bekker's ὁ δέ.

b. 7. § 23. μικροκίνδυνος] This is the reading of K<sup>b</sup>, Camb., CCC, and B<sup>1</sup>. The other MSS. seem to agree in giving πυκνοκίνδυνος. The Par. and Asp. also read πυκνοκίνδυνος. It is difficult to decide between the two readings.

b. 9. πάντως] 'at all costs,' Peters.

§ 24.] Grant remarks that 'the principle of independence appears here in an extreme form.' But we must remember that Aristotle is putting on the stage for us his doctrine that the chief end of man is ἐνέργεια not πάθος: we must not criticise the 'character' in which this doctrine has been embodied, as if he were a person whom we might meet in real life. At the same time, it must be admitted that it is more difficult not to criticise the μεγαλόψυχος in this way, than it is to appreciate correctly an abstractly presented ideal like that of Spinoza or Kant.

b. 11. οὗτοι γάρ οἱ προσοφλήσει] Bywater introduces *οἱ*, given by K<sup>b</sup>, CCC, and Camb. I feel very doubtful about it in Aristotle.

b. 13. § 25. ὅν δ' ἀν πάθωσιν οὐ] This is true in tendency of us all—as Menander says (Meineke iv. 345)—

ἐπιλανθάνονται πάντες οἱ παθόντες εὖ.

Münscher's insertion of *ἴφ'* before *ὅν* is a tempting but perhaps not strictly necessary emendation. Bywater reads *οὐ* for the *οὐς* of the codd. after *μνημονεύειν*: and *ἀκούειν* for *ἀκούει*.

Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὑεργεσίας τῷ Διὶ] In general terms she *does* b. 15. (Il. i. 503-4 εἴποτε δή σε μετ' ἀθανάτοισιν ὅνησα, ἡ ἔπει ἡ ἔργῳ), as Coraes points out: λείπεται οὖν, he adds, μνημονικὸν ἀμάρτημα ὑπολαμβάνειν τοῦ φιλοσόφου τὸ προκείμενον.

**Λάκωνες**] This again, Coraes remarks, is perhaps a *μνημονικὸν* b. 16. ἀμάρτημα—that is, if the reference is to the circumstance narrated by Xenophon (*Hellen.* vi. 5. 33, 34) of Spartan envoys (together with envoys from Corinth and Phlius) coming to Athens to ask for aid against the Thebans, b. c. 369; for, in Xenophon's summary of the Spartan speeches, the services rendered to Athens by Sparta are very prominent (see Grote's *Greece* part ii. ch. 78. vol. vii. 205). As for the historian Callisthenes, referred to by the Ald. Schol. *ad loc.*, we cannot be sure that the Schol. reports him correctly. At any rate the close verbal agreement with Aristotle's present statement is suspicious. The words of the Schol. are—τὸ δὲ περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων τοιούτον ἴστορεῖ Καλλισθένης ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἐλληνικῶν, ὅτι Θηβαίων εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν εἰσβαλλόντων, ἔπειμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους συμμαχίας δεόμενοι, λέγοντες ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅσα μὲν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πεποιήκασιν εὐ τούτων ἐπελάθοντο ἕκόντες, ἢ δ' αὐτοὶ χρηστὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίων ἐπεπόνθεσαν τούτων ἐμέμνητο, ὡς διὰ τούτων αὐτοὺς ἐπαξόμενοι πρὸς τὴν συμμαχίαν μᾶλλον.

**§ 26. ἐπ' ἑκείνοις**] Susemihl and Bywater accept ἐπ' ἑκείνοις b. 21. the reading of K<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>, CCC, and Camb. In the next line the MSS. seem all to agree in reading ἐν. I much prefer ἐν ἑκείνοις.

**§ 28. καὶ ἀμελεῖν]** restored by Bywater from K<sup>b</sup>. I prefer the b. 27. μέλειν of the other MSS., and would close the parenthesis with φοβουμένου.

**παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἀληθευτικός**] b. 29. This is Bywater's reading for παρ. γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν· διὸ καὶ ἀλ., which Bekker, and originally Susemihl, accepted on the sole authority of γρ. Par. 1856. There is no passage in the *E. N.* where the MSS. exhibit such variety (see Susemihl's *E. N. app. crit.* and especially his *E. E.* Appendix ii, where he abandons Bekker's reading). As the meaning given is in all cases practically the same, I think that we cannot do better than accept Bywater's

1124 b. 29. choice—without assuming that it is exactly what Aristotle wrote.

b. 30. ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν] See below chapter 7. Bywater brackets εἰρωνεία δέ which all MSS. give after εἰρωνείαν, except Nb, which gives εἰρωνα δέ, accepted by Bekker. Susemihl's suggestion—εἰρων δέ is worth consideration I think. Perhaps εἰρων γάρ.

b. 31. § 29. πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι [ζῆν ἀλλ' η φίλον] ‘He cannot fashion his life to suit another, except he be a friend’ (Peters), i.e. he cannot make himself *relative to* (πρὸς τι) any one who is less than his ἔτερος αὐτός. See ix. 9. 10 ἔτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν.

1125 a. 8. § 31. εἰ μὴ δι' ὑβριν] Coraes is undoubtedly wrong with εἰ μὴ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ὑβρισθείη. Peters has ‘except with the express purpose of giving offence.’ I much prefer Jebb’s ‘unless it be to show his scorn’ (*Theophr.* p. 35).

a. 15. § 34. σύντονος] ‘excited,’ Peters.

Zell refers to the *Physiognomonica*, where the bodily characteristics attending the various virtues and vices are described. Although the characteristics of the μεγαλόψυχος are not described, those of the μικρόψυχος are in ch. 3. 808 a. 29 μικροφύχου σημεῖα· μικρομελής, μικρογλάφυρος (‘small and round,’ *Liddell and Scott*) ἴσχνός, μικρόματος καὶ μικροπρόσωπος, οἷος ἀν εἴη Κορίνθιος η Δευκάδιος. The characteristics of the κόσμιος, however, answer partly to those assigned here to the μεγαλόψυχος—κοσμίου σημεῖα· ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσι βραδύς, καὶ διάλεκτος βραδεῖα καὶ φωνὴ πνευματώδης καὶ ἀσμενής κ.τ.λ. 807 b. 33. Zell and Coraes refer also to *de Gen. An.* v. 7. 786 b. 35 δοκεῖ γενναιοτέρας εἶναι φύσεως η βαρυφωνία καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι τὸ βαρὺ τῶν συντόνων βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον ἐν ὑπεροχῇ, η δὲ βαρύτης ὑπεροχή τις.

a. 18. § 35. οὐδ' οὐτοι] no more than the ἔξεις of μικροπρέπεια and βανανσία are *kakíai* in the strict sense. See above ch. 2, § 22.

a. 21. καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἔαυτόν] Coraes in defending this infinitive against the v. l. ἀγνοεῖ, makes it depend on ἔοικε. Grant and Peters however make its construction the same as that of ἀξιοῦν. In any case, the particles καὶ—δέ (see Eucken *de partic. usu* p. 32) introduce

words—ἀγνοεῖν ἔαυτόν— which explain wherein the inferiority of the 1125 a. 21. *μικρόψυχος* really consists.

§ 36. *χαῦνοι*] Jebb (*Theophr.* p. 198) compares the *μικροφιλότιμος* a. 27. of Theophrastus with the *χαῦνος*, remarking that ‘the *μικροφιλότιμος* does not necessarily, like the *χαῦνος*, overrate *himself*; he only overrates those things on which he founds his claim to honour.’ ‘The man of Petty ambition (*μικροφιλότιμος*)’, says Theophrastus (Jebb’s translation, p. 99), ‘is one who when asked to dinner will be anxious to be placed near the host at table . . . In the Market Place he will frequent the bankers’ tables; in the gymnasia he will haunt those places where the young men take exercise; in the theatre when there is a representation he will sit near the Generals . . . Also he is very much the person to keep a monkey; to get a Satyr ape, Sicilian doves, deer-horn dice, Thurian vases of the approved rotundity, walking-sticks with the true Laconian curve, and a curtain with Persians embroidered on it . . . When he has sacrificed an ox he will nail up the skin of the forehead wreathed with large garlands opposite the entrance, in order that those who come in may see that he has sacrificed an ox. When he has been taking part in a procession of the knights, he will give the rest of his accoutrements to his slave to carry home; but after putting on his cloak, will walk about the market-place in his spurs.’ The *χαῦνος* as such does not occur among the portraits of Theophrastus.

οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὅντες] Bywater follows K<sup>b</sup> (and CCC) in reading οὐ. a. 28. Bekker, following all other MSS., reads ως. Cf. ως ἀνάξιοι ὅντες two lines above, I suspect that an original ως fell out after ἐπιφανῶς, and a corrector, seeing something amiss, inserted οὐ in the archetype of K<sup>b</sup>.

*σχήματι*] ‘outward show,’ Jebb (*Theophr.* p. 198).

a. 30.

περὶ αὐτῶν] περὶ αὐτῶν is Bekker’s reading: but περὶ αὐτῶν (*sc.* a. 32. περὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων) gives much better sense, and is defended by Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 60. Cf. the Par. πειρᾶται φανερὰ ποιεῖν δεὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα ἔαυτοῦ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν δεὶ λέγει.

§ 37.] *Μικροψύχία* is worse than *χαυνότης*, and more common: it is accordingly the real contrary of *μεγαλοψύχία*. ‘Want of

1125 a. 2. elevated aims,' says Grant *ad loc.*, 'want of effort of will, of individuality, these are indeed fatal deficiencies as regards the attainment of what is fine and noble in character.' *Μικροψυχία*, like *ἀνελευθερία*, is the characteristic of a weak and narrow nature, of which nothing can be made. *Χαννότης*, like *ἀσωτία*, may perhaps disappear as age and experience indicate to a man his true level. Not that the *χαῖνος* will thus become *μεγαλόψυχος*. *Μεγαλοψυχία* requires such high and singular endowments that a man cannot become *μεγαλόψυχος* by the simple process of moderating youthful *χαννότης*, as it is suggested (iv. 1. 31) he may become *ἐλευθέριος* by the decay of his *ἀσωτία*. *Μεγαλόψυχος* nascitur non fit. A man with the speculative endowment of the *μεγαλόψυχος* can never have been really vain, even in the years of youthful inexperience. But if we descend to a lower intellectual and moral level, we may see the vain youth becoming a man who thinks well of himself, but not too well, and is able and ready to play his part in life with spirit. The *μικρόψυχος*, however, has not the *amour propre*, and personal force, necessary for the struggle which results in fine social types: he becomes worse, as time goes on, and he falls further and further out of the running. It must be observed, however, that *μικροψυχία* may imply either a general feebleness of character—in which sense it is indeed a hopeless state; or mere backwardness (*όκνηροι* § 35) in the social struggle, which is not inconsistent with latent strength. It is also to be observed that *μικροψυχία* of this latter kind, *i.e.* mere social backwardness, would be a greater hindrance to the attainment of 'excellence,' as Aristotle understood 'excellence,' *i.e.* the possession of 'all the virtues' which put a man *en évidence* in a brilliant society, than it is to that self-denying devotion to the public good which is now recognised as the chief element in Virtue.

*Μεγαλοψυχία* is discussed in *E.E.* iii. 5 (in an inferior manner) and in *M.M.* i. 25.

## CHAPTER IV.

## ARGUMENT.

*There is an ἀνώνυμος ἄρετή (we may perhaps call it Proper Ambition), the mean between φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία, which stands to μεγαλοψυχίᾳ in respect of τιμή as ἐλευθεριότης stands to μεγαλοπρέπειᾳ in respect of δαπάνῃ. Ἐλευθεριότης is concerned with comparatively small δαπανήματα, the anonymous mean between φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία, with the honours which are within the reach of the ordinary citizen—honours which a man cannot take his proper share in social life without aspiring to.*

[*Introductory Note.*] The comparison of the ἐλευθέριος and the μεγαλοπρεπής brought out more than a quantitative difference, or difference in the amounts expended. The μεγαλοπρεπής, we saw, is an artist, and his performances differ qualitatively from those of the ἐλευθέριος. Much more striking is the qualitative difference between the respective objects of the μεγαλόψυχος and the ἀνώνυμος of this chapter. The statement that the μεγαλόψυχος is concerned with μεγάλη τιμή and the ἀνώνυμος with μικρὰ τιμή (ii. 7. 8) takes us only a short way. It is a different kind of τιμή with which each is concerned. The τιμή which the μεγαλόψυχος accepts is but ‘the guinea stamp,’ which symbolises his intrinsic worth. His object is, not this τιμή, but the personality—the εὐδαιμονίᾳ to which it is rendered. But the ἀνώνυμος of this chapter seeks another kind of τιμή—ordinary social recognition; not, indeed, that he may enjoy it selfishly, but that he may be better able to influence society for good, just as the ἐλευθέριος seeks to have money that he may be liberal with it. Neither he, nor the ἐλευθέριος, as such, has that sense of Form, which enables the μεγαλοπρεπής to make an artistic use of wealth, and in the μεγαλόψυχος appears as *scientia intuitiva*—the intuition of Life as a Whole. It is therefore somewhat misleading to coordinate μεγαλοψυχίᾳ and the virtue of this chapter, as Aristotle does here, and the writer of ii. 7. 8 does, describing the former simply as περὶ τιμὴν οὖσα μεγάλην, and the latter as περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα. The virtue of this chapter is the quality of the ‘successful man,’ who makes a career for himself,

but in a public-spirited way: *μεγαλοψυχία* is Goethe's *Im Ganzen Guten Wahren resolut zu leben*; or Spinoza's *Amor intellectualis Dei*, or the *καλοκάγαθία* of Eudemus.

1125 b. 1. § 1. *καὶ περὶ ταύτην*] Ramsauer reads *τιμήν* for *ταύτην*, because *ταύτην* relates not to *τιμήν* but to *τιμὴν μεγάλην*, and brackets the clause *ἡ μὲν οὖν . . . εἴρηται*, (ch. 3, § 38), because *μεγαλοψυχία* has not been described in this Book as *περὶ μεγάλην τιμήν*, although in ii. 7. 8 it is so described. If ii. 7 is genuine—and Ramsauer seems to accept it as such—I cannot see why Aristotle should not be allowed to refer to it here in *ῶσπερ εἴρηται*, and *καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἔλέχθη*. Of course if we accept the view of Monro (*Journal of Philology* vi. 185 sqq.), and reject ii. 7 as an interpolation, the case is different. If we could read *μικράν* for *ταύτην* Ramsauer's grammatical difficulty would be removed, and the presence of the clause containing *μεγάλην* perhaps made more acceptable. It is to be noted that this chapter adds scarcely anything new to the sketch (itself comparatively full) in ii. 7. 8, 9: it is also to be noted that its subject is not treated of, either in the *E.E.* or in the *M.M.* It is perhaps allowable to suspect that this chapter was inserted here after the whole Book was written: and that there is some connexion between its late insertion, and the comparative fulness of the summary in ii. 7. 8, with which, moreover, it stands in close verbal relationship. I have no theory to put forward: but my suspicions make me inclined to accept as genuine the clause (a. 34, 35) bracketed by Ramsauer, as well as the clauses *καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἔλέχθη* (§ 1) and *ῶσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἰπομέν* (§ 4) bracketed by Monro (l.c.). Grant's note on *καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις* points, I believe, in the right direction. 'Cf. *Eth.* ii. 7. 8. This expression might seem to suggest that the present passage was written after an interval; it is repeated in § 4.'

b. 9. § 3. *καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ*] Ramsauer refers to the *μικροφιλοτιμία* of Theophrastus defined (*Char. μικρόφ.*) as *ὅρεξις τιμῆς ἀνελέυθερος*.

b. 14. § 4. *πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου*] When we say that a man is 'fond of,' we may mean that he is '*too* fond of,' or 'laudably fond of.' In some connexions the prefix *φιλο-* is unambiguously meant in a good sense—*e.g.* in the term *φιλομαθής*—

or in a bad sense—*e.g.* in the term *φίλους*: but in other contexts b. 14. it is doubtful in which sense it is meant—*e.g.* in the term *φιλότιμος*. Bywater's *τὸ φιλότιμον* for the *τὸν φ.* of the codd. in line 15 is a distinct improvement.

**ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον η̄ οἱ πολλοί]** The many are b. 15. regarded as being deficient in ambition and its kindred public-spirit. They are devoted too much to *κέρδος* or material interests: see *Pol.* ii. 4. 1266 b. 38 *ἔτι στασιάζοντιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνιστήτητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τούναντίον δὲ περὶ ἑκάτερον, οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀνιστον, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἔαν ισται.*

**ἐρήμης]** The allusion is doubtless to the *ἐρήμη* δίκη or action b. 17. in which one party does not appear and judgment goes against him by default. Its own special name ‘does not appear’ to defend the mean against the claims of the extremes.

**§ 5. ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ]** restored by Sus. and Byw. for Bekker's b. 20. *ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ ὡς δεῖ.* The inference marked by δὴ is required. *ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ* is given by NC, B<sup>2</sup>, and CCC: and Cambr. has *ἔστι δὴ η̄ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.*

**§ 6. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' κ.τ.λ.]** even in the ordinary case of the virtue b. 23. having a name: thus δ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, ii. 8. 2.

## CHAPTER V.

### ARGUMENT.

The adjective *πρᾶος*, which we apply to ‘the good-tempered man’ who occupies the mean position between the man ‘who shows excessive or ill-directed anger’, and the man ‘who cannot be provoked to anger’, is not strictly appropriate, connoting, as it does, a reprehensible ‘mildness’ or ‘insensibility’; however it may be taken, in the absence of a better term, to describe the man who occupies the mean, for after all he bears more resemblance to the ‘mild’ than to the ‘ill-tempered’ man. Of ‘ill-tempered’ men there are several varieties—the *ὅργιλος*, *ἀκρόχολος*, *πικρός*, and *χαλεπός*. On the other side, the ‘mild character’ may go the length of being *ἀνδραποδώδης* (§ 6), or may shade into the mean state. The abstract noun *πράτης*, it would seem, is available for the *μέσην ἔξις*, but the adjective *πρᾶος* has associations which make it somewhat inapplicable to the man who is *μέσος*.

*Introductory Note.]* The close connexion between ἀνδρεία and θυμός or ὄργη (see iii. 8. 12) naturally suggests a different place on the list for πραότης. The writers of the *E.E.* and *M.M.*, as we have seen, place it after σωφροσύνη: but perhaps Aristotle is after all justified in placing it where he does, inasmuch as it ‘inclines towards the defect’ (§ 1) and so involves συγγνώμη (§ 4)—sympathy or fellow-feeling—a principle of conduct which exists only for the πολιτικὸν ζῆν.

1125 b. 28. § 1. ἀνώνυμον οὐσαν] The ἔλλειψις has no name: it is however described below in § 5 as ἀοργησία τις. The writer of ii. 7. 10 (whether Aristotle, or another) is scarcely more definite. The ἔξεις he finds without names; but he gives them names σαφηνείας ἐνεκα. Thus he says τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσωμεν, and ή δ' ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία ἔστω.

b. 30. § 2. τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλά] and so various kinds of ὄργιλότης may be distinguished.

b. 33. § 3. βούλεται κ.τ.λ.] ‘being πρᾶος means being ἀτάραχος etc.’

1126 a. 2. § 4. οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικός] i.e. where the τιμωρία would be justified.

a. 7. § 6. οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός] Here Aristotle seems to touch upon the ‘final cause of anger,’ which Grant tells us is not included in the present enquiry.

a. 8. § 7. ή δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται . . . οὐ μὴν ἀπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει] This distinction will not apply in the case of the ἔλλειψις, which shows itself κατὰ πάντα, and in the same man.

a. 13. § 8. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὄργιλοι ταχέως μὲν ὄργιζονται] The ὄργιλος here is ‘the quick-tempered man,’ the term being used in a specific sense, whereas in § 2 the ὑπερβολὴ as a genus is called ὄργιλότης τις, and in ii. 7. 10 the terms ὄργιλος and ὄργιλότης are used in the generic sense.

a. 17. ἀνταποδιδόσιν ή φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν δέσύτητα] Coraes describes ή φανεροί εἰσι as χωρίον ὑποπτον. A later hand in CCC inserts καὶ after ή. If the text is sound, we must suppose ή φανεροί εἰσι to qualify ἀνταποδιδόσιν adverbially and to stand for φανερῶς.

a. 23. § 10. τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν] see *de Part. An.* iii. 11. 673 b. 7, where

τὸ κοῦφον is opposed to τῷ ποιῶντι βάρος, that which is indigestible. 1126 a. 23. The *πικρός* has as it were a load of indigestible anger in him—  
ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὄργην χρόνου δεῖ.

§ 11. *χαλεπούς*] How does the *χαλεπός* differ from the *πικρός*? a. 26. Both keep up their angry feelings: but it does not appear that the *χαλεπός*, like the *πικρός*, conceals his displeasure. The writing however is very careless; for in the next § the whole genus of *οἱ ὑπερβάλλοντες περὶ ὄργας* seems to be covered by *οἱ χαλεποί*. In *E.E.* iii. 3. 1231 b. 25 we find—*ὅ πρᾶος μέσος τοῦ χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδοντος*.

§ 13. οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον κ.τ.λ.] The passage beginning here and a. 32. extending to the end of § 14—ἀνθεκτέον, occurs almost in the same words in ii. 9. §§ 7, 8 and 9. See Rassow's *Forsch.* p. 16. Rassow thinks that the proper locus of the passage is in the Second Book.

ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένυς ἄρχειν] as opposed to ἀνδραποδώδεις § 6, b. 1. Ramsauer notes.

ὅ δὴ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦ- b. 2.  
ναι] The same construction occurs in the twin-passage ii. 9. 8  
ὅ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι. For the usage of ἀποδοῦναι (here = ἀφορίσαι) see note on ii. 1. 8. Grant translates here—‘to lay down in the abstract.’

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστα κάν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις] see note on b. 3.  
ii. 9. 8. The codd. seem all to have καὶ τῇ αἰσθ., but I believe that Ramsauer (followed by Byw.) is right in inserting ἐν before τῇ αἰσθήσει. I would suggest further that a comma be placed after ἔκαστα, so as to give the meaning which we have in ii. 9. 8  
τὰ δὲ τοιάντα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις where the  
ἐν before τῇ αἰσθήσει means ‘rests with,’ ‘depends on’; while that before τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστα means simply ‘in’ or ‘among.’ This is plainly the meaning required in iv. 5. 13 also. The *κρίσις* is not ἐν  
τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστα in the sense of ‘resting with them,’ as it is ἐν  
τῇ αἰσθήσει: but if we follow the codd., we are, I think, obliged to give the preposition, as expressed before τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστα, the sense which it is about to bear as understood before τῇ αἰσθήσει—viz. the sense of ‘rests with.’

1126 b. 4. § 14.] By the frequently employed terms *ἐπανερόν* and *ψεκτόν*, Aristotle indicates, with sufficient clearness, the moral standard which he recognises. The praise or blame of social equals is given, according as we conform to, or transgress, the prevailing *νόμος* of the society in which we live. The prevailing *νόμος* of a society which flourishes cannot be bad: it must embody much of the *φυσικὸν δίκαιον*. Actions are good or bad, according as they fall in with, or conflict with, an existing system of Greek Life, assumed to be good as a system, and final as a system, although capable of improvement in details. Any radical improvement of the existing system was inconceivable to Aristotle.

*Πραότης* is described (*third* on the list) in *E. E.* iii. 3 and *M. M.* i. 22.

## CHAPTER VI.

*Argument and Introductory Note.]* The *ἀρεταὶ* described in this chapter, and in the two following chapters, concern ‘one’s deportment in society’ (Grant). That they do not stand on the same level of moral importance as the *ἀρεταὶ* hitherto discussed is recognised by the writer of the *E. E.* when he styles them *παθητικαὶ μεσότητες—ἐπανεταὶ*, but not *ἀρεταὶ ἀνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ* (*E. E.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 24), and by the writer of the *M. M.* when he says (i. 32. 1193 a. 35) *εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὗται ἀρεταὶ η̄ μὴ ἀρεταὶ, ἂλλος ἀν εἴη λόγος.*

This chapter is concerned with the general subject of ‘agreeable manners.’ The man with agreeable manners has a certain sympathy (to be distinguished from the affection of Friendship) with those whom he meets in society, which causes him to ‘get on well’ with them. This, however, he does without sacrificing his personal dignity. He makes himself pleasant in society, without over-complaisance or flattery. Nor is it only by a sense of his own personal dignity that he is guided in the manifestation of his sympathy: but also by the desire of keeping up a high standard of manners and conduct in other people; for he will not make himself pleasant, when by doing so, he would encourage something decidedly objectionable. He occupies the mean position between

the over complaisant man, and the man with disagreeable manners, who does not 'get on well' with people.

Chapter 7 treats of another element in 'one's deportment in society'—the straightforward unaffected presentation of oneself as one really is—opposed to swagger and self-exaltation on the one side, and self-depreciation on the other.

Chapter 8 treats of the third element in 'one's deportment in society'—conversational brilliancy.

In ii. 7. 11 the three ἀρεταὶ of social deportment are given in a different order (*ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπελία, φιλία*) determined by a division of τὸ περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν into τὸ περὶ τἀληθές and τὸ περὶ τὸ ήδύ, and a subdivision of the latter into τὸ ἐν παιδιᾶ and τὸ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον.

It is to be observed, however, that the same order as that of ii. 7. 11 is suggested in iv. 8. 12, where Aristotle sums up his account of the ἀρεταὶ of social deportment—τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἔστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ήδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ήδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιάς, ἡ δὲ ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὄμιλαις.

Aristotle's scheme in iv. 6 is—

δύσκολος οἱ δύσερις—ἀνώνυμος—ἀρεσκος and κόλαξ.

In ii. 7. 13 the ἀνώνυμος is called φίλος, and his ἔξις, φιλία.

In the *E.E.*, however, we have a distinction drawn between φιλία and σεμνότης thus—

ἔχθρα—φιλία—κολακεία  
αὐθάδεια—σεμνότης—ἀρεσκεια.

See *E.E.* iii. 7. 1233 b. 29 φιλία δὲ μεσότης ἔχθρας καὶ κολακείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐχερῶς ἄπαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὄμιλῶν κόλαξ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἄπασας ἀντικρούων ἀπεχθητικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ πρὸς ἄπασαν ήδονὴν μήτ' ἀκολουθῶν μήτ' ἀντιτείνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον βέλτιστον, φίλος. σεμνότης δὲ μεσότης αὐθαδείας καὶ ἀρεσκείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἔτερον ξῶν ἀλλὰ καταφρονητικὸς αὐθάδης, ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ πάντων ἐλάττων ἀρεσκος, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μῆ, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους οὔτως ἔχων σεμνός.

The writer of the *M.M.* (i. 28 and 31), making the same distinction, explains it thus—σεμνότης is the μεσότης περὶ τὰς ἐντεύξεις: φιλία, περὶ πράξεις καὶ λόγους. The αὐθάδης is described (*M.M.* i. 28. 1192 b. 31) as οἷος μηθενὶ ἐντυχεῖν μηδὲ διαλεγῆναι: the ἀρεσκος as οἷος πᾶσιν ὄμιλεῖν καὶ πάντως καὶ πανταχῆ: the σεμνός as οὐκ εἰς

*πάντας ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ἀξίον.* Under the name of *σεμνός*, then, the *ἀνώνυμος* of Aristotle's scheme is regarded as *one who knows how to maintain his personal dignity*. Under the name of *φίλος* (*M.M.* i. 31) the same man is regarded as *one who gets on well with people*. The *ἀπεχθητικός*, however, and the *αὐθάδης* are different men, the former being aggressively rude, the latter only surly when approached: so also the *κόλαξ* and *ἄρεσκος* are different men, the former having an object to gain by his flattery, the latter being overcomplaisant without ulterior object.

1126 b. 19. § 4.] In ii. 7. 13, as noted above, the *μέσος* is simply called *φίλος*, and his virtue *φιλία* (so also in *E.E.* and *M.M.*). Here, however, 'the man with agreeable manners' is said to resemble the *ἐπιεικῆς φίλος*, but to differ in being *ἄνευ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὄμιλεῖ*.

b. 23. § 5. οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἡ ἔχθαιρειν ἀποδέχεται ἔκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι] 'for it is not from any feeling of friendship or of enmity that he permits this [or objects to that]—always with perfect propriety—but because he is the well-mannered man we are describing (*τοιοῦτος*).'  
The logical balance of the sentence requires *ἡ δυσχεράνει* after *δεῖ*, b. 24, answering to *ἔχθαιρειν* as *ἀποδέχεται* does to *φιλεῖν*.  
The Paraphrast sees this: his words are—  
*οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ στέργειν ἡ ἔχθαιρειν ἀποδέχεται τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα, ἡ ψέγει κ.τ.λ.*

1127 a. 7. § 9. τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δέ] Cf. iii. 1. 13 τοῦ δὴ δὶ' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δέ.

a. 8. *ἄρεσκος*] See Theophrastus (*Char. περὶ ἀρέσκειας*), who defines *ἀρέσκεια* as *ἔντευξις οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ ἡδονῆς παρασκευαστική*. 'Complaisance,' he says (Jebb's Transl. p. 85), 'may be defined as a mode of address calculated to give pleasure, but not with the best tendency. The complaisant man is very much the kind of person who will hail one afar off with "my dear fellow"; and after a large display of respect, seize and hold one by both hands. He will attend you a little way, and ask *when* he is to see you, and will take his leave with a compliment on his lips. Also when he is called in to an arbitration he will seek to please not only his principal, but the adversary as well, in order that he may be deemed impartial. He will say too that foreigners speak more justly than his fellow-citizens.'

In a note on the character of *ἀρέσκεια* Jebb remarks (p. 181)—

'The Flatterer, according to Aristotle, flatters for money or what 1127 a. 8. money buys ; the Complaisant man "aims at being pleasant with no further object" ( $\muὴ δὶ ἀλλο τι$ ). This is a fault (1) because to combat the wishes of others is sometimes a duty to them and to oneself : thus Aristotle's Perfectly-behaved man is one who will occasionally "make difficulties" ( $\deltaυσχεραίνει$ ) for either reason or both. (2) Because the primary object of the Complaisant man is, not that others may be pleased, but that he may be pleasant. He desires popularity, either from mere vanity or for the sake of influence. When, therefore, he is said to aim at being pleasant "without *further* object" this does not exclude a selfish object. To be thought pleasant is itself the object which he most covets. He is unmercenary, as contrasted with the Flatterer ; but he is not disinterested.' Jebb goes on to notice two salient points of difference between the *κόλαξ* and the *ἄρεσκος* as portrayed by Theophrastus : (1) The *κόλαξ* treats his patron as a superior ; the *ἄρεσκος* treats his associate as an equal for whom he has a warm regard. (2) The *κόλαξ* attaches himself to one patron ; the *ἄρεσκος* desires to be on cordial terms with as many persons as possible.

*κόλαξ*] Κολακεία is defined by Theophrastus as *όμιλίαν αἰσχρὰν* a. 10. *συμφέρουσαν δὲ τῷ κολακεύοντι*. 'The Flatterer,' he says (Jebb's Translation p. 81), 'is a person who will say as he walks with another, "Do you observe how people are looking at you? This happens to no man in Athens but you. A compliment was paid to you yesterday in the Porch. More than thirty persons were sitting there : the question was started, who is our foremost man? Every one mentioned you first, and ended by coming back to your name." With these and like words, he will remove a morsel of wool from his patron's coat ; or if a speck of chaff has been laid on the other's hair by the wind, he will pick it off : adding with a laugh, "Do you see? because I have not met you for two days, you have had your beard full of white hairs ; although no one has darker hair for his years than you." Then he will request the company to be silent while the great man is speaking, and will praise him too in his hearing, and mark his approbation at a pause with "True" ; or he will laugh at a frigid joke, and stuff his cloak into his mouth as if he could not repress his amusement.' In his note on this character, Jebb remarks (p. 178)—'The notion conveyed by the term *κολακεία* is not precisely what we usually mean by

1127 a. 10. ‘flattery,’ but something coarser. It meant a sort of extravagant toadyism practised not as a fine art, but simply as an industry—as a recognised method of obtaining a livelihood. This tone is unconsciously illustrated by Athenaeus, when in his reminiscences of eminent Flatterers (vi. pp. 248–260) he speaks of “Cheirisophus the Flatterer of Dionysius,” “Callicrates the Flatterer of Ptolemy,” “Anaxarchus one of the flatterers of Alexander.” These men had, as it were, been preferred to permanent posts.’

Athenaeus (vi. 80, 261) quotes lines of the comic poet Anaxandrides in which *κολακεία* is presented as a sort of *τέχνη* or trade—*τῇ δ' ἀλαζονείᾳ μετὰ τὴν κολακείαν χώραν δίδωσιν Ἀναξανδρίδης ὁ κωμῳδιοποιὸς ἐν Φαρμακομάντει, λέγων οὕτως*

ὅτι εἴμ' ἀλαζών, ταῦτ' ἐπιτιμᾶς; ἀλλὰ τί;  
νικᾷ γὰρ αὐτῇ τὰς τέχνας πάσας πολύ,  
μετὰ τὴν κολακείαν ἥδε μὲν γὰρ διαφέρει.

Again (vi. 73, 258) Athenaeus quotes Antiphanes to the same effect—*Ἀντιφάνης δ' ἐν Δημίαις τέχνην τιὰν ὑποτίθεται τὴν κολακείαν εἶναι, ἐν οἷς λέγει·*

εἰτ' ἔστιν ἡ γένοιτ' ἀν ἥδίων τέχνη,  
ἡ πρόσδοσ άλλη, τοῦ κολακεύειν εὐφυῶς,  
δ ζωγράφος πονεῖ τι καὶ πικραίνεται,  
δ γεωργὸς ἐν ὅσοις ἔστι κινδύνοις πάλιν  
πρόσεστι πᾶσιν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ πόνος·  
ἥμīν δὲ μετὰ γέλωτος δ βίος καὶ τρυφῆς·  
οὐδ γὰρ τὸ μέγιστον ἔργον ἔστι παιδά,  
ἀδρὸν γελάσαι, σκῶψαι τιν', ἐκπιεῖν πολύν,  
οὐκ ἥδυ; ἐμοὶ μὲν μετὰ τὸ πλουτεῖν δεύτερον.

Plutarch (*de adulatore et amico* ch. 7) describes the *κόλαξ* in the following terms—*δ δὲ κόλαξ ἄτε δὴ μίαν ἔστιαν ἥθους οὐκ ἔχων μόνιμον, οὐδὲ ἑαυτῷ βίον ζητῶν αἰρετόν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρῳ καὶ πρὸς ἔτερον πλάττων καὶ προσαρμόζων ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἀπλοῦς οὐδὲ εἰς, ἀλλὰ παντοδαπός ἔστι καὶ ποικίλος, εἰς ἄλλον ἐκ ἄλλον τύπον, ὥσπερ τὸ μεταιρόμενον ὕδωρ, περιπρέων ἀεὶ καὶ μετασχηματιζόμενον τοῖς ὑποδεχομένοις.* Alcibiades is adduced as the great *κόλαξ*, who changed his manners with his place, living elegantly at Athens, and austerely at Sparta; fighting and drinking in Thrace, and giving himself up to oriental luxury in Asia. In his treatise *de Amicorum multitudine* ch. 9, Plutarch again employs the expression *ἰδίαν ἥθους ἔστιαν οὐκ ἔχοντος*, applying it to the man who is *μετάβολος καὶ παντοδαπός*, without the special

implication of *κολακεία*. The treatise *de adulatore et amico* contains 1127 a. 10. the philosophy of *κολακεία* (which it presents as a phase of ‘heteronomy’), and throws considerable light on the peripatetic theory of *αὐτάρκεια*<sup>1</sup>.

**δύσκολος**] Eudemus and the writer of the *M. M.*, as we have seen, oppose the *αὐθάδης* to the *ἀρέσκος* and the *ἀπεχθητικός* to the *κόλαξ*.

The *αὐθάδης* is the man who ‘pleases himself.’ As Jebb (*Theophr.* p. 184) remarks, he ‘acts chiefly from a desire to be left alone . . . he repels advances, but he does not take liberties.’ He is described by Theophrastus (*αἰθάδεια*) in the following terms—‘The surly man is one who when asked where so-and-so is, will say, “Don’t bother me”; or when spoken to will not reply . . . He cannot forgive a person who has besmirched him by accident, or pushed him, or trodden upon his foot . . . when he stumbles in the street he is apt to swear at the stone. He will not endure to wait long for anyone; nor will he consent to sing, or to recite, or to dance. He is apt also not to pray to the gods.’ (Jebb’s Transl. p. 87.)

In illustration of the Eudemian terminology, according to which *αὐθάδεια* is one of the extremes where *σεμνότης* is the mean, see the lines of Eubulus preserved by Athenaeus (vi. 76, 260)—

ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς σεμνοῖς μὲν αὐθαδέστερος,  
καὶ τοῖς κόλαξι πᾶσι τοῖς σκώπτουσί τε  
ἔαυτὸν εὐργγητος.

The dangerous proximity of *ἀρέσκεια* to *κολακεία* is implied in the following line of Anaxandrides (apud Ath. vi. 66, 255)—

τὸ γάρ κολακεύειν νῦν ἀρέσκειν ὄνομ' ἔχει.

<sup>1</sup> Clearchus of Soli (Aristotle’s pupil) is quoted by Athen. vi. 66, 255 as follows:—*κόλαξ μὲν οὐδεὶς διαρκεῖ πρὸς φιλίαν καταναλίσκει γάρ ὁ χρόνος τὸ τοῦ προσποίματος αὐτῶν ψεῦδος· ὁ δὲ ἐραστὴς κόλαξ ἔστι φιλίας δι’ ὥραν ἢ κάλλος.* In another fragment, preserved by Athenaeus (vi. 67, 255), Clearchus says—*τὴν κολακείαν ταπεινὰ ποιεῖν τὰ ἡθη τῶν κολάκων, καταφρονητικῶν ὕντων τῶν περὶ αὐτούς. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ πᾶν ὑπομένειν εἰδότας οἴλα τολμῶσι. τὰ δὲ τῶν κολακευομένων ἐμφυσωμένων τῇ κολακείᾳ, χαινούσι καὶ κενούσι ποιοῦντα, πάντων ἐν ὑπεροχῇ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι κατασκενάζεσθαι.* On Clearchus see Bernays, *Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit*, p. 110.

## CHAPTER VII.

*Argument and Introductory Note.]* The ἀληθευτικός, who realises the mean between ἀλαζονεία and εἰρωνεία, is straightforward in conversation and demeanour, where no important interests are involved. Of course he will be truthful where they are; but this kind of truthfulness belongs properly to the virtue of justice (§§ 7, 8). Here we are concerned merely with the habit of presenting oneself in society as one really is, neither better nor worse.

The ἀλαζών—the Boaster or ‘Swaggerer’ (see Jebb’s *Theophr.* p. 193) is of three kinds, according to this chapter—(1) ὁ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος μηδενὸς ἔνεκα: (§ 10); (2) ὁ δόξης ἔνεκα ἀλαζονεύμενος, (3) ὁ κέρδους ἔνεκα ἀλαζονεύμενος. In all three cases the ἀλαζών pretends to the possession of ἐνδοξα, or qualities held in repute, which he either does not possess at all, or possesses to a smaller extent than he would have it believed (§ 2). ‘Ο δόξης ἔνεκα pretends to those qualities which are admired and praised; ὁ κέρδους ἔνεκα, to qualities agreeable and useful to others, the absence of which can be concealed—such as prophetic or medical skill (§ 13).

The ἀλαζών described by Theophrastus belongs to the second kind. ‘When he is living in a hired house he will say (to anyone who does not know better) that it is the family mansion; but that he means to sell it, as he finds it too small for his entertainments.’ (Jebb’s Translation p. 97.)

The εἰρων, as here described by Aristotle, depreciates himself by denying the possession of qualities held in repute, or making them out less than they are. He is better than the ἀλαζών, being more refined; he does not seek profit by his irony, nor even repute, for qualities held in repute are what he especially disclaims (§ 14). Excessive irony or self-depreciation, however, passes easily into swagger (§ 15). ‘The general characteristic of [Aristotle’s] Ironical man,’ says Jebb (*Theophr.* p. 190), ‘is that he holds in reserve, for whatever purpose, something of his available power. This purpose may be an earnest dialectical one, like that of Socrates. Or it may be to avoid ostentation and check impertinence; as Aristotle’s lofty-minded man is ‘ironical’ to the common crowd

(*Eth.* iv. 3. 28). Or the purpose may be merely playful; as Anacharsis in Lucian says that the Athenians were reputed ‘ironical’ in conversation (*Anach.* c. 15).’ Jebb finds the picture of the *εἰρων* drawn by Theophrastus strikingly inadequate as judged by Aristotle’s standard. Theophrastus ‘describes merely a person who takes a cynical pleasure in misleading or inconveniencing others by the concealment of his real feelings and intentions.’ According to O. Ribbeck (*Rheinisches Museum* 1876, vol. xxxi. pp. 381 sqq., über den Begriff des *εἰρων*) the *εἰρων* is mentioned for the first time in Greek literature in Aristoph. *Nub.* 449. The scholiast on this passage has—*εἰρων δὲ πάντα παιζῶν καὶ διαχλευάζων, εἰρωνεύμενος ἀπατεών, ὑποκριτής.* The Fox is the type of the *εἰρων*: cf. Philemon, *Fragm.* οὐκ ἔστ’ ἀλώπηξ ἡ μὲν εἰρων τῇ φύσει, | ἡ δὲ αὐθέκαστος; Neither Plato nor Xenophon, according to Ribbeck, makes Socrates *call himself εἰρων*. The term was really one of reproach applied by his contemporaries who thought that he outwitted them. Plato uses *εἰρωνεία, εἰρωνικός, or εἰρωνεύεσθαι* in a bad sense in *Soph.* 268 A, *Legg.* 908 D, *Rep.* 337 A (the passage in which Thrasymachus says to Socrates ὁ ‘*Ηράκλεις, ἔφη, αὕτη ἐκείνη ἡ εἰωθῦνα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐγὼ γῆδη τε καὶ τούτοις προῦλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἡ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἴ τις τι σε ἐρωτᾷ*), *Symp.* 216 E. Cf. Aristoph. *Aves* 1211, Plato, *Apol.* 38 A. The notion of *εἰρωνεία* was, however, ennobled by the character of Socrates, and by the representation which Plato gave of him. In the *Eth. Nic.* *εἰρωνεία* has the old meaning in so far as it involves a divergence from *truth*; but when the *εἰρων* is said to be *χαριέστερος*, as *φεύγων τὸ δύκηρόν*, his character is taken in a better and finer sense. Aristotle is the first to make Socrates the type of true refined *Irony*. But Theop. understands ‘irony’ ‘in a sense almost wholly bad,’ as Jebb remarks (*Theop.* p. 191).

§ 1.] Imelmann (*obs. crit.* p. 12), followed by Rassow (*Forsch.* 1127 a. 13. p. 17), distinguishes two introductory passages in this section, (1) *περὶ τὰ αὐτά . . . συνιδόντες*, and (2) *ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν . . . προσποιήματι*. Imelmann (*l. c.*) inserts *καὶ τῆς εἰρωνείας* after *ἀλαζονείας* in line 1127 a. 13; and Rassow, Susemihl, and Bywater (the last omitting *τῆς*) accept the emendation.

*καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι] προσποίημα* is something *unduly assumed*, a. 20. something *pretended to*: hence here it refers properly only to the

1127 a. 20. *ψευδομένων*, and strictly only to the ἀλαζών, for ἀρνεῖσθαι not προσποιεῖσθαι is characteristic of the εἴρων (§ 3). The words τῷ προσποιήματι limit the scope of ψευδομένων ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι—‘those who are untruthful in what they say and do, I mean in the matter of personal pretensions.’ The καὶ however (which Imelmann *obs. crit.* p. 12 wishes to omit) seems to me to be necessary before τῷ προσποιήματι.

a. 21. § 2. ἐνδόξων] ‘things held in esteem.’ The commoner meaning of τὰ ἔνδοξα in Aristotle is of course that of ‘probable opinions.’

a. 23. § 4. αὐθέκαστος] In the good sense here intended, the αὐθέκαστος is ‘the man who appears in his own character.’ The term was also used in a bad sense as equivalent sometimes to βίας, sometimes to ἴδιογνώμων, sometimes to αὐθάδης—see uses collected by Zell and Coraes. It is contrasted with εἴρων in the fragment of Philemon quoted above.

a. 24. καὶ τῷ βίῳ] Bywater’s note is ‘fort. καν τῷ βίῳ.’

a. 25. ὁμολογῶν] Ramsauer notes the care with which the three verbs are used—ὁμολογεῖ of the ἀληθευτικός, ἀρνεῖται of the εἴρων, and προσποιεῖται of the ἀλαζών.

a. 28. § 6.] It is not necessary to point to a base ulterior object, for the sake of which the ψευδόμενοι choose τὸ ψεῦδος, in order to establish the position that they are ψεκτοί: for τὸ ψεῦδος *in itself* is φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν: and those who choose it μηθενὸς ἔνεκα (and there are such), are φαῦλοι τὴν ἔξιν and ψεκτοί. Similarly, the man who is ἀληθευτικός, where no great interests are involved, simply because it is his habit to stick to the truth as such, is ἐπαινετός.

a. 33. § 7. ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις] The Par. has ἔστι τοίνυν ἀληθευτικός, οὐχ δὲ ἀληθεύων ἐν ταῖς συμφωνίαις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις ὅσα εἰς δικαιοσύνην ἡ ἀδικίαν συντείνει . . . ἀλλ’ ὅστις ἀνευ ἀνάγκης ἡ νομίμου ἡ δικαίου ἡ ἀλλου τινὸς πολιτικοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει διὰ μόνον τὸ ἔχειν ἔξιν τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς.

b. 5. § 8. ὡς γὰρ αἰσχρόν κ.τ.λ.] The man who shrinks from τὸ ψεῦδος as such, in circumstances in which it cannot be called αἰσχρόν, as not involving serious social consequences, will à *fortiori* shrink from it in those circumstances in which the verdict of society is severely against it: see the Par. οἱ γὰρ φιλαλήθεις καὶ ἐν οἷς οὐκ

ἔστιν ἀνάγκη, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐν οἷς ἀληθεύειν ἀνάγκη διὰ τὸ πολιτικὸν 1127 b. 5. ἀγαθόν· ὃς γὰρ εὐλαβεῖται τὸ φεῦδος καθ' ἑαυτό, διότι κακόν, ὅταν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ αὐτὸν γένηται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἡ κακόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκῆ τοιοῦτον, πῶς οὐ φεύξεται πάσῃ δυνάμει;

**§ 9. ἀποκλίνει]** I have no hesitation in accepting Coraes' **ἀπο-** b. 8. **κλινεῖ**, which is moreover supported by the Par., ὃς, εἰ δεήσει παρεκκλίναι τοῦ μέσου, πρὸς τὴν Ἑλλειψιν οὐ πρὸς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν νεύσει.

**§ 10. μηδενὸς ἔνεκα**] It is difficult to suppose the case of a man b. 10. who magnifies his *ὑπάρχοντα*, without thinking of his own *δόξα* or *τιμή* as thereby enhanced. Perhaps we may say that *ὁ δόξης ἡ τιμῆς ἔνεκα ἀλαζονευόμενος* is the man, who, with a definite scheme of social success before his eyes, is always ‘advertising’ himself by a consistent course of swagger—*e.g.* the rich parvenu carefully affecting country tastes in order to get into county society: whereas *ὁ μηδενὸς ἔνεκα ἀλαζονευόμενος* is the man who boasts, not indeed without some idea of enhancing his reputation, but without a definite scheme of social success before his eyes.

**§ 11. ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών]** The text would be much better without these b. 12. words: but if we retain them, we must understand them to refer to ‘the Boaster proper,’ *i.e.* the man who boasts without any *definite* end to be served, as distinguished from the man who boasts for reputation, and the man who boasts for gain. ‘The man who boasts for reputation is not very blameworthy, any more than the simple boaster (*ὁ ἀλαζών*) is; the man who boasts for gain, however, is more reprehensible. But, whether a man boast from simple love of untruth (*ὁ μὲν τῷ φεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων = ὁ ἀλαζών*) or with the ulterior object of reputation or gain (*ὁ δὲ δόξης κ.τ.λ.*), we must remember that his boasting is the expression of a character, not the practice of an art, and therefore comes in for blame.’

**§ 12.]** The clause *οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δὲ κ.τ.λ.* is added, lest too b. 14. much should be made of the admission—*οὐ λίαν φεκτός*: see *Toφ.* iv. 5. 126 a. 30 ὅραν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι τῶν φεκτῶν ἡ φευκτῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἡ δυνατὸν ἔθηκεν, οἷον τὸν σοφιστὴν ἡ διάβολον ἡ κλέπτην τὸν δυνάμενον τὰ ἀλλότρια ὑφαιρεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ. . . . πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι κατὰ προ-  
αίρεσιν λέγονται.

*Ἀλαζονεία* is after all a fixed moral habit, not, as might perhaps be supposed from its less offensive forms, a mere *faculty* like that

1127 b. 14. of the disputant (*διαλεκτική*), which can be employed without raising a moral issue. *Σοφιστική*, not *διαλεκτική*, is its true parallel.

For the doctrine that *προαιρέσεις*, not *δυνάμεις*, are the objects of moral judgments, Zell, Michelet, Grant, and Ramsauer refer to *Tōp.* iv. 5. 126 a. 30 (quoted above) and *Rhet.* i. 1. 1355 b. 20 *σοφιστῆς μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαιρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαιρεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν*—‘the Sophist is distinguished,’ as Grant puts it, ‘from the Dialectician not intellectually but morally.’

Bywater makes the words *οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει . . . ἀλαζών ἔστιν* parenthetical; Bekker places a comma after *ἔστιν* b. 15, and, like Bywater, takes *ῶσπερ καὶ ψεύστης* with what follows. I prefer to take the words *ῶσπερ καὶ ψεύστης*, as = *ῶσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ἔστι κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι*, and refer, ὃ *μὲν* and ὃ *δέ* to the ὄ *ἀλαζών* l. 14, not to the *ψεύστης*. I would therefore punctuate thus—*οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δὲ ἔστιν ὄ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει (κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν γάρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἔστιν, ὖσπερ καὶ ψεύστης), ὃ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὃ δέ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἡ κέρδους*. If we refer ὃ *μέν* and ὃ *δέ* to the *ψεύστης*, we distinguish the person described as *τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων* from the *ἀλαζών* proper<sup>1</sup> of § 10, and make ὄ *δόξης ὀρεγόμενος* ἡ *κέρδους*, not an *ἀλαζών*, but a person fraudulent in another way. But is it likely that when he wrote ὃ *μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων*, Aristotle was thinking of *another ψεύστης*, distinct from the one whom he had just described in almost identical terms (*οὐ γάρ ἀν ἔχαιρε τῷ ψεύδει* b. 10) in § 10; and, although the methods employed by *ψεύστης* and by *ἀλαζών* respectively, where *κέρδος* is concerned, may be distinguished, how is the *ψεύστης*, *quā δόξης ὀρεγόμενος*, to be distinguished from ὄ *δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονεύμενος*? It is perhaps worth noticing also that the definition of the *ἄνθρωπος ψευδῆς* in *Met.* Δ. 29 seems to be against the identification of the *δόξης ὀρεγόμενος* ἡ *κέρδους* here (b. 16) with the *ψεύστης* as distinguished from the *ἀλαζών*—see *Met.* Δ. 29. 1025 a. 2 *ἄνθρωπος δὲ ψευδῆς, ὃ εὐχερῆς καὶ προαιρετικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, μὴ δι' ἔτερόν τι ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτό*—on which Alexander (ed. Bonitz p. 402) has the following comment—*λέγεται ἄνθρωπος*

<sup>1</sup> Stahr interprets the words *ῶς ὄ ἀλαζών* in § 11 as if they implied that the term *ἀλαζών* is not properly applied to the *μηδενὸς ἔνεκα προσποιούμενος*, but only to the *δόξης ἔνεκα*. This is surely wrong. ‘Thut er es aber aus einer bestimmten Absicht, so ist wieder ein Unterschied, will er sich nämlich damit bloss Ansehen und Ehre geben, wie der eigentliche Prahler, so ist er nicht allzuhart zu beurtheilen.’

ψευδής . . . ἥ εὐχερής πρὸς τὸ ψεύδεσθαι καὶ τούτου προαιρετικὸς καὶ 1127 b.14. χαίρων τῷ ψεύδεσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι, οἷον κέρδος ἢ μισθόν τινα· οὗτος γάρ οὐκ ἔστι ψευδής οὐδὲ φιλοψευδής, ἀλλὰ φιλοκερδῆς ἢ εἴ τι τοιοῦτόν ἔστιν.

The Paraph. Heliodorus avoids the error of making ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀργόμενος ἢ κέρδος a species of ὁ ψεύστης (as distinguished from ὁ ἀλαζών), by referring ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων to the ψεύστης and ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀργόμενος ἢ κέρδος to the ἀλαζών: he says καὶ κατά τινα ἔξιν ὁ ἀλαζών γίνεται, ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ ψεύστης, ὃς οὐ δόξης ἔνεκα ἢ χρημάτων προσποιεῖται, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ψεύδος ἔνεκα μόνον.

§ 13. οἱ δὲ κέρδοις, ὅν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἔστι τοῖς πέλας καὶ διαλαθεῖν b.19. ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἰατρόν] So Bywater, following K<sup>b</sup>, which (with CCC) omits ἂ before διαλαθεῖν, and ἥ before ἰατρόν. Bekker follows the other MSS in reading ἂ and ἥ. Susemihl reads ἂ, but not ἥ. It is to be noted that pr. K<sup>b</sup> has ὅν ηδεῖ ἀπόλαυσις, CCC ὅν ἥ δει ἀπόλαυσις, and Cambr. ὅν ηδεῖα ἀπόλαυσις, and that NC, B<sup>1</sup>, B<sup>2</sup>, Γ, H<sup>a</sup>, N<sup>b</sup>, Ald., Hel., have οἷον ἰατρὸν ἥ μάντιν σοφόν, and O<sup>b</sup> has οἷον μάντιν ἥ ἰατρὸν σοφόν.

As regards the omission of ἥ (which seems to rest on three authorities, K<sup>b</sup>, CCC, and Aspasia—he has τοιοῦτον δὲ μαντική, ἰατρική, σοφία)—a point is certainly made by the inclusion in the list of impostors of a third variety—the learned impostor—σοφός or σοφιστής: but, on the other hand, it might be argued that it is necessary to qualify at least ἰατρόν by an adjective expressing the *skill* which is pretended to; that it is not being a doctor, but being a good doctor, which is the pretence that escapes detection. The ἥ might very easily drop out, and, once out, would be likely to remain out, because it seemed so natural to include the Sophist among notable impostors. K<sup>b</sup>'s omission of ἥ ought not to weigh too much with us. It may be only one of the numerous blundering omissions for which the MS is remarkable: and perhaps the omission of ἂ may belong to the same class. On the other hand, what K<sup>b</sup> adds or substitutes is entitled to great attention; and so, I think that Ramsauer's conjecture—ὅν ἥδη ἀπόλαυσις—is not to be overlooked.

It seems to be generally assumed (*e.g.* by Stahr and Peters) that ὄντα is neut. pl. In that case the words οἷον μάντιν κ.τ.λ. follow awkwardly. On the other hand, if we take ὄντα as masc. sing., there is some difficulty in connecting the clause — καὶ

1127 b. 19. (or καὶ ἀ) διαλαθεῖν κ.τ.λ. with what goes before, so as to allow us to translate—‘They pretend to have qualities from which other people derive advantage, and to be what one may not-be, and yet never be found out, e.g. a good doctor.’

b. 21. προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα] τὰ τοιαῦτα = τὸ μάντιν σοφὸν ἡ λατρὸν εἶναι, and τὰ εἰρημένα = ἀπόλανσις τοῖς πέλας and τὸ διαλαθεῖν μὴ ὄντα. We must understand Aristotle to say that οἱ κέρδους ἔνεκα are the largest class (*οἱ πλείστοι*) of ἀλαζόνες.

b. 25. § 14. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται] Jebb (*Theophr.* p. 190) seems to give the exact force of this remark—‘And moreover it is *creditable* things which such persons especially disclaim.’ This is an additional reason for regarding them as *χαριέστεροι*.

οῖον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει] In the next section we are told that εἰρωνεία may become ἀλαζονεία, if excessive. In Plutarch, *adv. Colotem* 18, we actually find the style of Socrates described as ἀλαζών—πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀλαζόνες οἱ Σωκράτους λόγοι, μηδὲν αὐτοῦ εἰδέναι φάσκοντος, ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν ἀεὶ καὶ ζητεῖν τὸ ἀληθές;

b. 26. § 15. οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ [προσποιούμενοι]] See the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant. The difficulty is that ἀπαρνεῖσθαι not προσποιεῖσθαι is the term regularly used by Aristotle<sup>1</sup> in connexion with the εἴρων. On the other hand, however, Theophrastus defines εἰρωνεία as προσποίησις ἐπὶ χείρον πράξεων καὶ λόγων, and in the present section Aristotle is showing how εἰρωνεία passes into ἀλαζονεία. Those εἴρωνες who not only deny the possession of great qualities, but, in order to lend plausibility to their denial, seriously affect small merits or accomplishments, which might be allowed ‘to go without saying’ (*τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερά*), as if these were their only good qualities, are humbugs. Ramsauer throws out the suggestion that the words *οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ . . . εὐκαταφρόνητοι εἰσιν* have accidentally been removed from their proper place after εἰρημένα § 13; but he does not press the suggestion. It seems, however, worth consideration: φανερά would make a good antithesis to διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα. Bywater (following Vahlen) cuts the knot by bracketing προσποιούμενοι.

<sup>1</sup> In ii. 7. 12, however, εἰρωνεία is defined as προσποίησις ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον.

**βαυκοπανούργοι]** The derivation of this word is obscure. The 1127 b. 27. Ald. Schol. has *βαυκοπανούργους* . . . τὸν σεμνοπανούργους' βαυκὸν γάρ ἔλεγον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸν τρυφερόν. See also *Liddell and Scott*, s. v. *βαυκός* 'prudish,' 'affected.' The general idea seems to be that of silly affected humbugs, contemptible for their little transparent artifices.

ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθῆτας] not as worn by the Spartans themselves, b. 28. but as imitated by certain Athenians. See Coraes, *ad loc.* τὸν Ἀθήνησι λακωνικῶν βιοῦντας Ἀθηναίους αἰνίττεται, ὃν καὶ Δημοσθένης (1267. 21) καθάπτεται, ‘ἴσασιν ὑμῶν, ὡς ἐγὼ νομίζω, πολλοὶ καὶ τὸν Διότιμον, καὶ τὸν Ἀρχεβιάδην, καὶ τὸν Χαιρέτιμον, τὸν ἐπιπόλιον τουτοῖ, οἵ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἐσκυθρωπάκασι, καὶ λακωνίζειν φασί, καὶ τρίβωνας ἔχονται, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὑποδέδενται ἐπειδὰν δὲ συλλεγῶσι, καὶ μεθ' ἀλλήλων γένενται, κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν οὐδὲν ἐλλείπουσι.’

§ 17. χείρων γάρ] sc. τοῦ εἰρωνος.

b. 32.

## CHAPTER VIII.

*Argument and Introductory Note.]* The *εὐτράπελος*, or *ἐπιδέξιος*, is the man whose conversation in society is easy, bright and playful, contributing to the pleasure and amusement of the company, without offending against good taste, or hurting susceptibilities. Especially in the sallies of pleasantry of which persons present (himself included) are the objects, will he show graceful tact—never saying anything that his victim, being a man of taste, does not enjoy: and tacitly imposing his own rule of good taste upon those who attack him in turn. The *βωμολόχος* is the buffoon, or 'funny man,' whose pleasantry is coarse and offensive, and practised in and out of season. The *ἄργιος* or *ἄγροικος* (*ἄγροικος* in *E. E.*, *M. M.*, and *E. N.* ii. 7. 13), presumably so called as being contrasted with the *ἀστεῖος*, is the dull man, who, like a rustic in polite society, sits silent, unable to follow, or contribute to easy conversation, and 'incapable,' as Grant puts it, 'of either making or appreciating a joke.' The *βδελυρία* and *ἄγροικία* of Theophrastus do not present many points of likeness to Aristotle's extremes.

Looking back over the list which ends with *εὐτραπελία*, we seem to see in the *ἀρεταῖ* of the Fourth Book, not *virtues* in our sense,

but qualities forming the dignified and brilliant member of polite society. ‘The Gentleman,’ always conscious of what is due to himself, seems to be presented as the ideal of ‘the good man.’ But we must not let this ideal of ‘the Gentleman’ mislead us in our interpretation of Aristotle. We must not overlook the way in which *all* ‘the qualities of the Gentleman’ (even the most superficial of them) are made to subserve earnest aims.

‘Ελευθεριότης is essentially the habit of doing good with one’s money, and implies fellow-feeling regulated by discrimination of desert, and a large perception of the public issues involved in the smallest act of giving. Μεγαλοπρέπεια is essentially the virtue of the man of public spirit, who undertakes a *λειτουργία*, on the proper performance of which the credit and advantage of his city depend. The *φιλότιμος* shows how personal ambition may be reconciled with enthusiasm for the common good. The *πρᾶος* is, above all, *συγγνωμονικός*—a man who has sympathies which enable him to understand others, and bear with them. The *φίλος* and the *ἀληθευτικός* set the example of dignified, and at the same time kindly and straightforward, manners, and so perform a moral work of the highest importance, making men understand one another better, and respect one another more. Finally the *εὐτράπελος* performs an important function, by lightening the incubus of ennui which tends to oppress life. He contributes to that *ἀνάπαυσις* which is sought not for its own sake, but because it makes us more capable of the performance of the earnest duties of life: *παιξειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖν ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονέειν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἐνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας* (E. N. x. 6. 6).

Thus, in all cases, we are brought back to the standard of the Noble Life, or Hellenic Culture. Those who participate in this culture know when it is realised in the habits of a member of their society, and *praise* his habits accordingly—*τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν* (i. 13. 20).

1128 a. 1. § 1. οῖα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὡς, δόμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν] In the E. E. (iii. 7. 1234 a. 14) two kinds of *εὐτραπελία* are distinguished—that of the man who knows how to receive pleasantry—and that of the man who knows how to originate it. The former consists in being able to enjoy a polite and delicate *σκῶμμα*—even when it

raises a laugh against oneself; the latter consists in being able to 1128 a. 1. originate a *σκῶμμα* which its victim, being a man of good taste, will enjoy. οὐσῆς δὲ διτῆς τῆς εὐτραπελίας (ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἔστι τῷ γελοίῳ καὶ τῷ εἰς αὐτόν, ἐὰν ἢ τοιοῦδι, ὅν ἐν τῷ σκῶμμα ἔστιν, ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι), ἔτεραι μέν εἰσιν ἀλλήλωι, ἀμφότεραι μέντοι μεσότητες. καὶ γὰρ τὸν δυνάμενον τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι ἐφ' ὅσιοις ἡσθήσεται ὁ εὐ κρίνων, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ τὸ γελοῖον, μέσος ἔσται τοῦ φορτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ. ὁ δ' ὄρος οὗτος βελτίων ἢ τὸ μὴ λυπηρὸν εἶναι τὸ λεχθὲν τῷ σκωπτομένῳ ὅντι ὁποιῳῦν· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τῷ ἐν μεσότητι ὅντι ἀρέσκειν οὐτος γὰρ κείνει εὐ. The same distinction is made in *M. M.* i. 30. 1193 a. 17 ἔσται δὲ ὁ εὐτράπελος διττῶς πως λεγόμενος καὶ γὰρ ὁ δυνάμενος σκῶψαι ἐμμελῶς, καὶ ὃς ἂν ὑπομείνῃ σκωπτόμενος εὐτράπελος.

**ἐν τοιούτοις . . . τοιούτων]** Masc. The kind of company will a. 2. make a difference.

**§ 3. βωμολόχοι]** The *βωμολόχος* is literally one who hangs about a. 4. the altars to steal or beg what is offered on them: then, metaphorically, a low-fellow who will do anything to get a meal—a ‘loafer’: and, still more metaphorically, a person who will say anything to raise a laugh—a low jester. See *Liddell and Scott*, s. v.

**ἄγροικοι]** The reading of K<sup>b</sup> and CCC, restored to the text a. 9. by Bywater, in place of Bekker's *ἄγριοι*, given by all other MSS. See on the use of the term *ἄγροικος* in Aristotle, note on iii. II. 7.

**οῖον εὔτροποι]** Grant gives us a neat rendering here—‘they are a. 10. called witty, by a name that implies their happy turns.’

**§ 4. καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες]** a. 14. And also *εὐτραπελία* is sometimes used in a bad sense—as in *N. T. Eph.* 5. 4 (quoted by Giphanius), where it is coupled with *μωρολογία*, and means low jesting.

**§ 5. ἐλευθερίου]** K<sup>b</sup> (followed by CCC) has *ἐλευθέρου*. In either a. 20. case ‘gentleman’ is the meaning.

**§ 6. τῶν κωμῳδῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν]** Ramsauer quotes a. 22. *Rep.* 395 E, where *κωμῳδεῖν* is used as synonymous with *αισχρολογεῖν*

1128 a. 22. and κατηγορεῖν—κατηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμῳδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρο-λογοῦντας. Cf. Hor. *A. P.* 281

‘Successit vetus his comoedia, non sine multa  
Laude; sed in vitium libertas excidit et vim  
Dignam lege regi; lex est accepta chorusque  
Turpiter obticuit sublato jure nocendi.’

On which Orelli quotes Cic. *de Rep.* 4. 10. 33 ‘apud quos (Graecos antiquiores) fuit etiam lege concessum, ut quod vellet comoedia de quo vellet (*praeterquam de archonte*: Schol. Aristoph. *Nub.* 31) nominatim diceret. Quem illa non attigit, vel potius, quem non vexavit? cui pepercit?’—and Suidas, ‘Αντίμαχος’ (B. c. 417-404?) ἔδοκει οὗτος ψῆφισμα πεποιηκέναι, μὴ δέν κωμῳδεῖν ἐξ ὄνόματος. For τὸ κωμῳδεῖν ἐξ ὄνόματος of the Old Comedy, the New Comedy substituted ὑπόνοια—allusion—in the case of things as well as persons.

a. 25. § 7. τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα] Is the conversation of *εὐτράπελοι* merely a game of polite personal banter? We can hardly suppose that Aristotle means this. ‘Ο εὖ σκώπτων rather is one whose conversation plays gracefully round things and people—sometimes round even serious things and people—presenting them in new and amusing—but not therefore ridiculous—lights; he is a sort of Dialectician, too, in the world of fancy; for he shapes no course for his conversation beforehand, but goes as the winds waft him. He is in short the charming talker, whom we like to listen to, for other reasons, and because he is always willing to listen to us. The meagre accounts of the *εὐτράπελος* in the *E. E.* (iii. 7) and *M. M.* (i. 30) present him merely as one who can give and take polite personal banter.

The definition of *εὐτραπελία* in *Rhet.* ii. 12. 1389 b. 11 as *πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις* must be taken in its context; the *εὐτράπελοι* whom Aristotle has immediately in view there are impulsive but gentlemanly *youths*. The *εὐτραπελία* of the Fourth Book is an *ἀρετή* of the man of the world, and ‘*πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις*’ describes only one aspect of his conversational ‘versatility’.

a. 27. ἡ καὶ τέρπειν] Eudemus (as quoted in note on § 1) lays stress on the pleasure which the *εὐτράπελος* gives τῷ εὖ κρίνοντι.

a. 29. § 9. οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει] Following the Paraphrast’s οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἔρει, Coraes reads οὐ δὴ πᾶν λέξει. Others have proposed ἀκούσεται for ποιήσει. Ποιήσει seems to me to be the right word in this place, after the preceding ποιεῖν.

§ 10. ἔντα δ' οὐδ' ἀν ἀκούσαι] The rule in respect of  $\tau\delta$  ἀκούειν is, 1128 b. 1. it would appear, not so strict as that in respect of  $\tau\delta$  λέγειν.

ἄγροικος] Bywater: ἄγριος (Bekker) is the reading of K<sup>b</sup> and b. 2. CCC (as of all other MSS.), although in § 3 both K<sup>b</sup> and CCC read ἄγροικος. Is this ἄγροικος in § 3 a corruption of ἄγριοι καὶ?

§ 12.] See *Introductory Note* to iv. 6. The ἀρεταὶ of social b. 4. deportment are given here in the same order as in ii. 7. 11—viz. ἀλήθεια, εὐτραπέδια, φιλία.

## CHAPTER IX.

*Argument and Introductory Note.]* The passage ii. 7. 15, in which the discussion of *νέμεσις* follows that of *αιδώς* in § 14, prepares us for a discussion of *νέμεσις* in the present context also. But the Fourth Book, as we have it, ends without even mentioning *νέμεσις*. It seems probable that the accident which deprived us of the Nicomachean books answering to v, vi, vii, deprived us of the last part of iv, treating of *νέμεσις*: (iv. 9. 8 is perhaps an editor's interpolation). Perhaps, indeed, part of the discussion of *αιδώς* is lost; for it is to be noted that there is no mention of the *ἀναισχυντος* and *καταπλήξης* as extremes, where the *αιδήμων* is *μέσος*. At the same time, we cannot feel sure that it was Aristotle's intention here to represent the *αιδήμων* definitely as *μέσος*. So far as the discussion goes, *αιδώς* appears merely as a provisionally good feeling, admirable only in the young: whereas in the *E. E.* and *M. M.* the *αιδήμων* is evidently regarded as a mature man, no less than the *φίλος*, *ἀληθής*, and *εὐτράπελος*,—as the man who has just the right amount of self-assurance, who is not either regardless of what people think of him, or too shy and sensitive to put himself forward at all. See *M. M.* i. 29. 1193 a. 1 sqq. *αιδώς* δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως, ἐστιν δὲ περὶ πράξεις καὶ λόγους [i.e. it is definitely one of the ἀρεταὶ, so-called, of 'one's deportment in society']. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀναισχυντός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν παντὶ καὶ πρὸς πάντας λέγων καὶ πράττων ἡ ἔτυχεν, ὁ δὲ καταπεπληγμένος ὁ ἐναντίος τούτῳ, ὁ πάντα καὶ πρὸς πάντας εὐλαβούμενος καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ εἰπεῖν (ἀπράκτος γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁ πάντα καταπληττόμενος)· ἡ δὲ *αιδώς* καὶ ὁ *αιδήμων* μεσότης τις τούτων. οὐτε γὰρ ἀπαντα καὶ πάντως, ὡς ὁ ἀναισχυντος, καὶ ἐρεῖ καὶ

*πράξει, οὔτε ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ, ἐν παντὶ καὶ πάντως εὐλαβηθήσεται, ἀλλὰ πράξει καὶ ἔρει ἐν οἷς δεῖ καὶ ἀ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε δεῖ.* So also *E. E.* iii. 7. 1233 b. 26 sqq. *αἰδώς* δὲ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀναισχυντος, ὁ δὲ πάσης ὄμοιως καταπλήξ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων.

(This is all that we have about *αἰδώς* in the *E. E.*) The same extremes are given in ii. 7. 14, where presumably the view of the *αἰδήμων* is the same—viz. that he is a mature man on the same level with the *εὐτράπελος*, &c. All that we can say, then, is that in the Fourth Book, at least so far as we have it, *αἰδώς* is looked at from a different point of view: and that the discussion of it, so far as it goes, cannot be regarded as paralleled by the discussion in the later treatises. In the *E. E.* and *M.M.* both *αἰδώς* and *νέμεσις* appear among the so-called *παθητικαὶ μεσότητες*—ἀλήθεια, *εὐτραπελία*, *φιλία*, and *σεμνότης*: whereas the subject of the 9th chapter of the Fourth Book is carefully distinguished from the foregoing *ἀρεταί*, its discussion forming a sort of appendix to the Book. *Αἰδώς*, as presented in this chapter, is a natural shrinking from incurring the bad opinion of other people, which is useful in those whose morality is not yet assured, as preventing them from doing things which would bring them into disgrace: but it is only thus provisionally useful. The time ought to come when one, as a matter of fact, does not do, or think of doing, such things. This is the strong position which Aristotle takes up. But it suits most men to look at *αἰδώς* differently, and to argue thus—‘I have done wrong, but I am ashamed. I have done a bad *thing*, but I am not such a bad *man* after all, because I am ashamed. This bad thing done by me is not so bad as the same thing done by my neighbour, who does not seem to be ashamed of having done it.’ Aristotle in this chapter declares himself—as we might expect—against this substitution of the subject’s feeling in the place of an objective moral standard. He sees that the man who thus palliates a bad action, and gives himself, as it were, absolution for it, will be prepared, with a light heart, to repeat it; and that *αἰδώς*, though at first a protection, may become a snare. We can understand therefore the anxiety which he shows throughout the chapter to make it quite plain that *αἰδώς* is not a *virtue*. He feels that the point is one of great *practical* importance, because it suits human weakness so well to make it out a *virtue*.

For *ποίᾳ αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀναισχυντοῦσιν καὶ πρὸς τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες* see the interesting chapter *Rhet.* ii. 6. 1383 b. 12 sqq.

§ 1. πάθει] See note on ii. 7. 14.

1128 b. 11.

φόβος τις ἀδοξίας] Ramsauer refers to Plato, *Legg.* i. 646 Ε φοβούμεθα δέ γε πολλάκις δόξαν, ὑγούμενοι δοξάζεσθαι κακοὶ πράττοντες ἡ λέγοντες τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν· ὃν δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ πάντες, αἰσχύνη. In *Rhet.* ii. 6, referred to above, the definition (1383 b. 13) does not include the term φόβος—ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἡ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἡ παρόντων ἡ γεγονότων ἡ μελλόντων. In *Trop.* iv. 5. 126 a. 6 (referred to by Ramsauer) doubt seems to be thrown on the propriety of including the term φόβος in the definition—ἐὰν οὖν τις τὴν αἰσχύνην φόβον εἴπῃ ἡ τὴν ὄργην λύπην οὐ συμβῆσται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος ὑπάρχειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰσχύνη ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, ὁ δὲ φόβος ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ (ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἡδονή), ἡ δὲ ὄργη ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, ὥστ' οὐ γένη τὰ ἀποδοθέντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοῖς εἶδεσι πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. In strict conformity with this view that αἰσχύνη is ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ we have a second definition in *Rhet.* ii. 6. 1384 a. 23 ἐπεὶ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασίᾳ ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, καὶ ταύτης αὐτῆς χάριν ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀποθανόντων κ.τ.λ. It is to be noted, however, that the definition with which *Rhet.* ii. 6 opens (1383 b. 13, quoted above) contains the word φαινόμενα.

§ 2. ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεως εἶναι] Ramsauer compares b. 15. *de An.* i. 1. 403 a. 16 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἀμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα. It is of course only a *ἔξεις* of the ψυχῆς which is contrasted here, in this way, with a πάθος, for there are *bodily* *ἔξεις*.

§ 3. διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ b. 17. κωλύεσθαι] This regulation of πάθος by πάθος is the only regulation possible at first, but must not be acquiesced in as a permanent form of moral government. The φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ which is constituted by the *de facto* prevalence of good over bad feelings, does not make a man good *in his own right*. Οὐχ οὖν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἀνεν φρονήσεως vi. 13. 6).

§ 5. οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα] This seems to bind down the ἐπιεικῆς b. 24. to a very strict observance of conventional propriety; but probably Aristotle only means that the ἐπιεικῆς will avoid vulgarity as well as immorality—*e.g.* as the Ald. Schol. says, he will not eat in the market-place—like the βδελυρός of Theophrastus, who, πληθούσης τῆς ἀγορᾶς, προσελθὼν πρὸς τὰ κάρνα ἡ τὰ μῆλα ἡ τὰ ἀκρόδρυνα, ἔστηκὼς

- 1128 b. 24. *τραγηματίζεται*, ἥμα τῷ πωλοῦντι προσλαλῶν. Rassow (*Forsch.* 93) is probably correct in reading οὐδ' for οὐκ before *αἰσχυντέον*.
- b. 25. § 6. *φαύλου δὲ καὶ*] Rassow (*Forsch.* 93) conjectures διά for καὶ here, and supplies with *φαύλον* not simply ἔστι but *αἰσχύνη* ἔστι. Susemihl adopts Rassow's διά, and makes the words οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον § 4 . . . *αἰσχυντέον* § 5 parenthetical. I think that Rassow's διά, though a legitimate and tempting conjecture, is not strictly necessary. The same may be said of Bywater's suggestion—*καὶ τῷ*.
- b. 28. ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς] In *Rhet.* ii. 6. 1384 a. 16-22, as Ramsauer notes, ἀκούσια are mentioned which cause *αἰσχύνη*. K<sup>b</sup> CCC, Paris 1853, and NC read *ἀκούσιοις*.
- b. 29. § 7. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές] 'good if': but the ἀρεταί are good without an if.
- b. 32. τὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα] Bywater (with K<sup>b</sup> and Cambr.). I much prefer Bekker's *τὸ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα*.
- b. 33. § 8.] I think that this § is an editor's interpolation. A case, however, might conceivably be made out for the retention of οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή: the argument being—'even ἐγκράτεια is not an ἀρετή, so *a fortiori* αἰδώς is not. The ἐγκρατής has bad desires which he resists stoutly and successfully; the αἰδούμενος who makes a virtue of his αἰδώς has bad desires which he seeks to palliate.'

## BOOK V.

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MICHAEL EPH. introduces this Book as follows:—ἐν τῷ παρόντι πέμπτῳ βιβλίῳ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἡθικῶν Νικομαχείων πραγματείας πρόθεσις ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς μερικωτέρας δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ συστοίχου ταύτη δικαίου τῶν ἀντικειμένων τε τούτοις ἀδικίας καὶ ἀδίκου· διττὴ γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη λέγεται, ἡ τε ὅλη ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ προκειμένη, ἥτις καὶ ἀντιδήρηται τῇ φρονήσει τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ, ὃν ἔκαστη, πρὸς τὸ δικαιοσύνη λέγεσθαι, καὶ ἴδιας ἡ μὲν φρόνησις, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία ἡ δὲ σωφροσύνη ὄνομάζεται· ἡ δὲ προκειμένη ἀρετὴ δικαιοσύνη μὲν λέγεται καὶ ὄνομάζεται τῷ τῆς ὅλης δικαιοσύνης ὄνόματι· ὅνομα δ' ἴδιον οὐκ ἐκληρώσατο, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος δ' Ὁλυμπιονίκης οὐ Σωκράτης οὐκ Ἀριστείδης ἀλλὰ τῷ κοινῷ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ὄνόματι ἀνθρωπος ὄνομάζεται, οὗτος καὶ ἡ παροῦσα ἀρετὴ δικαιοσύνη καλείται τῷ κοινῷ τῆς ὅλης δικαιοσύνης ὄνόματι· εἰσὶ δὲ αὐτῆς μέρη δύο, τό τε διαινεμητικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν.

For a summary of the Peripatetic teaching περὶ δικαιοσύνης see *M. M.* i. 33.

## CHAPTER I.

### ARGUMENT.

*Concerning Justice and Injustice.* Let us, according to the method hitherto adopted, start from the commonly given descriptions of the states in question.

Justice then is commonly described as ‘a state which makes us able to perform just acts; which makes us act justly and wish what is just.’ A corresponding description is given of injustice. Here the words ‘and wish what is just’ are important, serving to mark the distinction between a state or habit on the one hand and a science or faculty on the other. A science or faculty (e.g. Ἰατρική) can produce either of two contraries, but a state or habit (whether physical like

*ἰγίεια, or moral like δικαιοσύνη) is a bent towards<sup>1</sup> the production of one class of effects only. We may gather then from the commonly given description of justice that it is not a faculty which enables us to perform just or unjust acts indifferently.*

So much for the ethical import of the ‘description.’ But from the merely logical point of view it is to be noted that since, as we have just observed, science is of contraries, the science or knowledge of a state or habit will be that of its contrary also. It is also to be noted that the knowledge of a state or habit throws light upon its material conditions, and a knowledge of these upon the state or habit: if e.g. we know that being in good training is having firm flesh, we know that being in bad training is having soft flesh; and we also know that things good for training are things which produce firmness of flesh. It is generally the case that if one of two contraries has various meanings the other has correspondingly various meanings.

Now injustice has two meanings, for the unjust man is (1) the man who transgresses the law and (2) the man who takes too much or is unfair. Consequently the just man is (1) the man who observes the law and (2) the man who is fair. Qua ‘disposed to take too much’ the unjust man will have to do with external good things. But since the unjust man is also disposed to take too little of that which is evil, the wider designation ‘unfair’ is more accurately applied to him, including as it does both ‘disposed to take too much of that which is good’ and ‘disposed to take too little of that which is evil.’

Concerning justice in the first sense of the term. Since the just man is the man who observes the law, all that is in accordance with the law is ‘just’ in one sense of the term. Since then the laws cover the whole field of conduct, inculcating all the virtues and forbidding all the vices, justice in this sense is complete virtue—complete virtue, however, viewed not as a simple possession, but as putting its possessor in a certain relation to other people. In short, the just man in this first sense is the man who ‘can use his virtue towards other people.’ This is why ‘ruling over other people tests a man’s justice’; and why justice is sometimes thought to differ from all the other virtues in being ‘the good of other people.’ This first kind of justice then is not a part of virtue (i.e. a virtue) but virtue (i.e. the virtuous character) as a whole; and the contrary, injustice, is not a part of vice but vice as a whole. The difference between virtue (i.e. the virtuous character as a whole) and this kind of justice is constituted by a difference in the point of view from which each is regarded. Regarded simply as the possession of the good man his moral character as a whole is called virtuous; regarded as placing him in certain relations to other people it is called just.

1129 a. 3. § 1. περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης κ.τ.λ.] Τὸ δίκαιον is the principle of justice, or justice in the abstract; δικαιοσύνη is the habit of acting in accordance with the principle.

Grant and Ramsauer refer to *E. N.* ii. 7. 16 περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης,

<sup>1</sup> Βούλεται expresses the steady tendency of any natural law (cf. v. 5. 14 βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον), not merely the consistent wish of the moral agent.

ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἔροῦμεν πῶς 1129 a. 3. μεσότητές εἰσιν. Grant remarks that πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν; is a slightly different question from ποίᾳ μεσότητης; and Ramsauer says ‘caute dictum ποίᾳ μεσότητης,’ because it will be shown v. 5. 17 that ἡ δίκαιοσύνη μεσότητης τις ἐστίν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν—i.e. τοῦ ἵσου between τὸ πλέον and τὸ ἔλαττον. The doctrine of v. 5. 17, however, relates only to particular justice, no attempt being made, according to Ramsauer, in the Fifth Book, to show that universal justice is a μεσότητης, whereas in ii. 7. 16 both kinds of justice are contemplated as μεσότητες. Hence Ramsauer thinks that the words πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν (ii. 7. 16) are spurious. Surely this is a very unsafe line of criticism. If the Fifth Book was not written by the author of the Second Book, the inconsistency noticed by Ramsauer, if inconsistency it be, need not surprise us. If, as Ramsauer is inclined to believe (p. 281), the Fifth Book was written by the author of the Second Book, are the two passages really so inconsistent that to remove the inconsistency we must alter the text? Particular Justice may perhaps be a μεσότητης in a sense somewhat different from that in which the other ἀρεταῖ coordinate with it are μεσότητες: but universal justice, at any rate, being the manifestation in society of all the ἀρεταῖ, is a μεσότητης just as its constituent elements—ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, &c., are severally μεσότητες—i.e. it is a μεσότητης περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη. When we call a man ἀνδρεῖος we think of him specially as one who observes moderation in relation to certain particular πράξεις and πάθη: when we call him δίκαιος in the wide sense we think of him as one who observes moderation in relation to all πράξεις and πάθη generally. This is so obvious that the writer of the Fifth Book does not think it necessary to make any definite statement on the subject: although he comes very near to doing so when he says ch. 2. § 6 ἡ δὲ (i.e. Universal Justice) περὶ ἄπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος—i.e. the δίκαιος is related to all his circumstances ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος. I am therefore disinclined to follow Grant and Ramsauer in attaching any special significance to ποίᾳ here. It seems to follow very naturally the ποίας of the preceding line, to which no one thinks of attaching any special significance.

§ 2. κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον] i.e. the method of taking the a. 6.  
 ἔνδοξα or λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῆς (cf. § 3 below ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας . . .  
 βουλομένους λέγειν), and testing them by their conformity with

1129 a. 6. philosophical ideas, which, in their turn, are often modified in accordance with the ἔνδοξα ορ λεγόμενα: cf. *E.N.* i. 8. Ι σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὅλου ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς τῷ μὲν γάρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ φευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τάληθες. Cf. note on vii. 1. 5.

a. 9. § 3. καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια . . . τὰ ἄδικα] This is added, Mich. Eph. says, to distinguish the ἔξις—δικαιοσύνη—from a δύναμις (or ἐπιστήμη):—οὐκ ἐν τῷ βούλεσθαι πράττειν ἐστὶν τὸ εἶναι ἐκείναις (*i.e.* ταῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ ἐπιστήμαις) ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι ὁ γάρ τὴν ἱερικὴν ἔχων, κανὸν μὴ βούληται ὑγιάζειν, ἱερὸς ἐστὶν καὶ λέγεται, ὅμοιως καὶ ὁ τὴν ῥήτορικὴν δύναμιν ἔχων, κανὸν μὴ ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων λέγῃ ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀδίκων, ρήτωρ ἐστί, καὶ ὅλως κανὸν δύνηται ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τε δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ρήτωρ ἐστί. δίκαιος δέ ἐστιν οὐχ ὁ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν δυνάμενος (which is all that the expression πρακτικὸν τῶν δικαίων by itself without the addition καὶ βούλονται κ.τ.λ. implies)\* δύναται γάρ καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ δίκαιος ἐστιν ὁ βούλόμενος<sup>o</sup> βούλεται δὲ ὁ τὴν ἔξιν ἔχων τὴν εἰρημένην. The Paraph. Heliodorus has remarks to the same effect.

This view of the force of καὶ βούλονται seems to me to explain the connexion οὐδὲ γάρ § 4 naturally and adequately, and to make it unnecessary, with Jackson (*Book V.* introd. pp. xv, xvi), to interpolate v. 9. §§ 14–16, 1137 a. 4–26 between § 3 and § 4 here. It may be true that ‘the doctrine of ch. 1. § 4, is necessary to complete the argument of ch. 9. § 16,’ and it is interesting to note that this was the opinion of Mich. Eph. ‘who, though he does not suspect any displacement, is nevertheless careful in commenting on the latter passage to quote the former.’ But it is necessary to remember in connexion with this quotation that he has already explained to his own satisfaction the immediate sequence of § 4 upon § 3 in ch. 1.

For the popular view here appealed to, that Justice implies βούλησις, *i.e.* a definite moral bent, and is therefore not a δύναμις or ἐπιστήμη cf. Philemon (quoted by Stobaeus, *Flor.* vol. i. p. 189, ed. Meineke) ἀνὴρ δίκαιος ἐστιν οὐχ ὁ μὴ ἀδικῶν | ἀλλ’ ὅστις ἀδικεῖν δυνάμενος μὴ βούλεται, and Menander (Meineke iv. 344) δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν οὐκ ἐπίσταται τρόπος. The term προαιρεῖται would probably have been preferred by the writer here as more technically correct than βούλεται, had he wished to give an accurate definition of justice: as it is, he merely quotes popular language: cf. v. 8. 11 δίκαιος ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῆ, and v. 5. 17 καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶν καθ’ ἣν δ

δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαιρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου. At the same time 1129 a. 9. it is to be noted that in v. 11. 6, the impossibility of τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν is proved by reference to the fact (stated in v. 9. 5 and 6) that no man *wishes* (*βούλεται*) to be injured; the absence of βούλησις shows that there is no ἀδικία πρὸς ἑαυτόν. Προαιρεσις, however, seems to be the accepted term in the two Aristotelian passages which state most explicitly the distinction now before us between a moral habit and a faculty—viz. *E.N.* iv. 7. 12 οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει κατὰ τὴν ἔξι γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν, and *Top.* iv. 5. 126 a. 30 ὅρῶν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ψεκτῶν ἡ φευκτῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἡ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἔθηκεν (*sc.* one's opponent in a dialectical encounter), οἷον τὸν σοφιστὴν ἡ διάβολον ἡ κλέπτην τὸν δυνάμενον λάθρα τὰ ἀλλότρια κλέπτειν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων τῷ δυνατὸς εἶναι τι τούτων τοιοῦτος λέγεται· δύναται μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος τὰ φαῦλα δρᾶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι κατὰ προαιρεσιν λέγονται. The distinction between moral character on the one hand and intellectual ability or professional skill on the other, which is formulated by Aristotle in the above passages, was one which the Greek mind found it difficult or inconvenient to keep in view, if we may judge from Plato's evidently strong desire to bring it home to his readers: see *Rep.* 332 D τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἔχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει; Δοκεῖ μοι. Τίς οὖν δυνατώτατος κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἔχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν; Ἱατρός . . . 335 D οὐ θερμότητος, οἷμαι, ἔργον ψύχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Ναί. Οὐδὲ ἔγροτης ὑγραίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Πάνυ γε. Οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Φαίνεται. Ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. *Gorgias* 460 C Σω. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν ῥήτορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν; Γορ. Φαίνεται γε. Σω. οὐδέποτε ἄρα βούλήσεται ὁ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν. Γορ. Ἀνάγκη. Σω. τὸν δὲ ῥήτορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι. Γορ. Ναί. Σω. οὐδέποτε ἄρα βούλήσεται ὁ ῥήτορικὸς ἀδικεῖν. Gorgias then contradicts himself by saying that the ῥήτορικός may use his art ἀδίκως—the intention of the whole passage being to bring vividly before us 'the old confusion of the Arts and the Virtues' (Jowett iii. 12). Cf. also *Meno* 90 B, where it is argued that virtue is not an accomplishment which can be taught, else good men would surely teach their sons to be virtuous. So far from being an accomplishment which can be acquired, it is rather a divine gift or inspiration. At any rate, it is not something which the sophists can teach, as riding-masters

1129 a. 9. teach the art of riding: see also *E. N.* v. 9. 16 τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται εἶναι οὐθὲν ἡττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐθὲν ἡττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον δύναιτ' ἀν ἔκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων, and Grant's note *ad loc.*—‘The opinion that justice implies its contrary as if it were an art (*δύναμις*) would be a consequence of the Socratic doctrine that justice is knowledge. Plato saw what this doctrine led to and drew out the paradoxical conclusion, *Rep.* p. 334 a, *Hipp. Min.* pp. 375, 6. The Aristotelian theory that justice is a moral state (*ἔξις*) set the difficulty at rest.’ To this last remark it is necessary to add that Plato, although he has no technical terms in which to express his view, sees as clearly as Aristotle that justice is a state involving the harmony of the whole man, and resulting from life-long intelligent obedience to *νόμος*. If justice were the dexterity of a single faculty, easily imparted in a few lessons by the Professors of *ρήτορική*, then *ρήτορική* would be the sovereign science, as these Professors maintain. But *πολιτική* is the sovereign science, and *ρήτορική* is ancillary: see *Politicus* 304 C D E, and note on *E. N.* i. 2. 6.

a. 11. § 4.] See *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγουν. διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰστιν ἐν ἀλλῷ ἢ ἀλλο. καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταὶ, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι μία ἑνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας. αὕτιον δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δῆλος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν, πλὴν οὐχ ὠσαύτως, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ἀμφοῖν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος μᾶλλον. ὥστε ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς τουαύτας ἐπιστήμας εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, εἶναι δὲ τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰς τοῦ δὲ μὴ καθ' αὐτάς· καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὐτό, τοῦ δὲ τρόπον τινὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἀποφάσει γὰρ καὶ ἀποφορᾷ δῆλοι τὸ ἐναντίον· ἡ γὰρ στέρησις ἡ πρώτη τὸ ἐναντίον, αὕτη δὲ ἀποφορὰ θατέρου. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη δύναμις τῷ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν, τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν ὑγίειαν μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα, ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων ἀμφω. From this passage it is plain that the δυνάμεις of the present section are αἱ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις, and it is probable that the ἐπιστῆμαι which the writer has more prominently in view are αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, such as ἰατρική, *i. e.* those which are ἀρχαὶ μεταβλητικαὶ ἐν ἀλλῷ ἢ ἀλλο—although, of course, the remark τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτή is true of science generally. Thus the ἐπιστήμη οἱ δύναμις μετὰ λόγου—ἰατρική, apprehending the ἄλογος δύναμις—τὸ θερμαντικόν, apprehends also its contrary τὸ ψυκτικόν, and according

as it employs the one or the other will produce θερμότης or ψυχρότης 1129 a. in the patient—always a definite result from the means taken, since *ai ἀλογοι δύναμεις μία ἐνός*. In *Met.* Θ. 2 the contrast is that between an *ἀλογος δύναμις* such as *τὸ ὑγιεινόν* (*i.e.* *τὸ ποιητικὸν ὑγείας*) and a *δύναμις μετὰ λόγου*, such as *ἰατρική*: in the passage before us (*Eth.* v. i. 4) the contrast is between a *ἔξις*, such as *ὑγίεια*, and a *δύναμις μετὰ λόγου*, such as *ἰατρική*. As the *ἀλογος δύναμις*—*τὸ ὑγιεινόν* produces only *ὑγίεια* (*Met.*), so the *ἔξις*—*ὑγίεια* (*Eth.*) produces only *ὑγιεινά* (*i.e.* *τὰ σημαντικὰ ὑγείας*—see *Toph.* i. 15. 106 b. 35 *τὸ ὑγιεινόν τὸ μὲν ὑγείας ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ φυλακτικόν, τὸ δὲ σημαντικόν*. Cf. *Met.* Γ. 2. 1003 a. 35, *Met.* Κ. 3. 1061 a. 6). For the doctrine *τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη* the editors refer to *An. Pr.* 24 a. 21, 48 b. 5, 50 a. 19, *Phys.* viii. 1. 251 a. 30, *de An.* 427 b. 5; and Jackson refers also to Plato, *Phaedo* 97 D, and *Charmides* 166 E. The reason why *τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη* is stated in the passage *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1-20 quoted above—viz. *λόγος ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν*. For *στέρησις* see *Met.* Δ. 22, and cf. *Toph.* vi. 9, where rules are given for the definition of *τὰ καὶ στέρησιν λεγόμενα*.

*ἔξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ*] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 95, note) a. 14. supports the conjecture of Muretus—*ἔξις δ' ἡ αὐτὴ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ*. On the margin of his copy Muretus found the note of a scribe to the effect that some MSS. have *ἀντί* instead of *ἐναντία*. This suggested to Muretus that an original *αὐτή* became *ἀντί*, which in its turn became *ἐναντία*. H<sup>a</sup> actually reads *ἡ αὐτή*.

*ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν]* Cf. *Toph.* i. 15. 106 b. 34 *τὸ ὑγιεινῶς ἡ ποιητικῶς* a. 16. *ἡ φυλακτικῶς ἡ σημαντικῶς ῥηθῆσεται.*

*§ 5. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται . . .]* The transition here, a. 17. though suggested by the *ἐπιστήμη* δοκεῖ *τῶν ἐναντίων* *ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι* of § 4, is very abrupt, and even inconsequent. After telling us in §§ 3 and 4 that ‘the *ἔξις* Justice does not result in both *δίκαια* and *ἀδίκα*, but only in the former, herein differing from a *δύναμις μετὰ λόγου* like *ἰατρική*, which can produce either health or sickness, and, generally, from an *ἐπιστήμη* which, if it knows the *ἔξις*, also knows the *στέρησις* of the *ἔξις*,’ the writer seems to be suddenly struck by the *logical* importance of this last point (that the knowledge of the *ἔξις* is the knowledge of its *στέρησις*) for his present purpose (the *joint* investigation of *δικαιοσύνη* and *ἀδικία*), and enlarges on it

1129 a. 17. throughout §§ 5, 6, and 7, dismissing entirely the really important ethical doctrine (the difference between *ἔξις* and *δύναμις* or *ἐπιστήμη*) which he has only just raised in §§ 3 and 4. Inconsequent, however, though the transition marked by *μὲν οὖν* certainly is, we can understand how it might seem a perfectly natural one to a writer whose critical faculty was overweighed by his knowledge of peripatetic doctrine. According to that doctrine *ἔξις* or ‘possession’ is related not only to certain definite *ἔκτα* (*i. e.* τὰ κατὰ τὴν *ἔξιν*) which may be safely inferred from it (as in turn it may be inferred from them as symptoms), but also to the *στέρησις* or ‘privation’ of that of which as *ἔξις* it is the ‘possession.’ True, the relation between *ἔξις* and *ἔκτα* is something very different from that between *ἔξις* and *στέρησις*: but the writer of the Fifth Book is not the man to discriminate in such a case. He sees no inconsequence in the remark that ‘a *ἔξις* does not produce contraries—but the knowledge of a *ἔξις* is the knowledge of its *ἐναντία* *ἔξις* or of its *στέρησις*.’

The writer’s implication, however, in §§ 5, 6, 7, and 8—that the knowledge of *δικαιοσύνη* is the knowledge of *ἀδικία*, and *vice versa*—must be accepted with a reservation. It has only a logical value. Definitions of the two *ἔξεις*, embodying and rationalising popular opinion, may indeed be arrived at by one enquiry. We may save ourselves the trouble of making two enquiries. But it is only the just man, as such, who *really knows* what Justice is. The dialectical outsider, as such, can only rationalise the popular *ὑπολήψεις ἃς ἔχομεν περὶ τοῦ δικαίου*, as he may equally well rationalise the *ὑπολήψεις περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου*. As the just man, however, is not ideally just, but has to struggle with the forces of evil, he will also know *ἀδικία*, and he will know it *in its essence*, because the essence of *ἀδικία* is that it opposes itself to *δικαιοσύνη*. The just man knows *ἀδικία* essentially because he knows it for what it really is—as the *enemy* of *δικαιοσύνη*. But it is not conversely true that the knowledge of *ἀδικία* which the *ἀδικος* possesses is also the knowledge of *δικαιοσύνη*. He sees in *δικαιοσύνη* only the enemy of *ἀδικία*: but this is to see only an accident of *δικαιοσύνη*, which is essentially *καλλίστη*—a beautiful organising principle—*καὶ οὐθὲν ἐσπερός οὐθὲν ἔώς οὔτω θαυμαστός*. The *ἀδικος* in short knows the *sanction* of the just law—the punishment which it inflicts, but not the just law *itself*, as such: see Plato, *Rep.* iii. 409 D, E *πονηρίᾳ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τε καὶ αὐτὴν οὐποτ’ ἀν γνοῖη, ἀρετὴ δὲ φύσεως παιδευομένης χρόνῳ ἀμα αὐτῆς τε καὶ πονηρίας ἐπιστήμην λήψεται.*

**τῶν ὑποκειμένων]** Fritzsche quotes *Met.* A. 2. 982 a. 23 δ τὴν 1120 a. 19. καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἔχων οὐδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα, where τὰ ὑποκείμενα are the particular cases or facts which fall under the general rule—or principle. In his note on the passage, Bonitz, while showing how the term naturally lends itself to this sense (the extension of the logical subject—τὸ ὑποκείμενον is narrower than that of the predicate), remarks that it is a sense which it does not bear elsewhere (*i.e.* than in *Met.* A. 2), so far as he knows, in Aristotle's writings. Nor is it easy to see how here (*E. N.* v. 1. 5) it can mean merely particular cases or symptoms—τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως, for ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν plainly takes up ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, and τὸ εὐεκτικόν is immediately afterwards explained as τὸ ποιητικόν. Peters translates—‘A habit is often known by the opposite habit, and often by its *causes and results*'; and Jackson says: ‘τὰ ὑποκείμενα include not merely manifestations and symptoms of the *ἔξις* in question, but also its causes and conditions. In fact the ὑποκείμενα of ὑγίεια (to take a particular example) are τὰ ὑγιεινά in the various kindred senses of φυλακτικά, ποιητικά, σημαντικά, and δεκτικά ὑγιείας. For these senses of ὑγιεινά cf. *Met.* iii. 2. p. 1003 a. 34, x. 3. p. 1061 a. 5, *Top.* i. 15. p. 106, b. 35.’ I am inclined to think that if the writer had intended to use ὑποκείμενα here for εὐεκτικά in this very wide sense of the latter term, he would not immediately have added καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικόν κ.τ.λ. I prefer to understand τὰ ὑποκείμενα as the *material conditions* of εὐεξία (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἔξις ὑποθέσεως of *Phys.* ii. 9. 199 b. 34–200 b. 8, τὸ οὐδὲ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ of *Met.* A. 7. 1072 b. 12, τὸ ὡς ὅλη λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ κινήσεις αἱ ταύτης of *Phys.* ii. 9. 200 a. 31)—the *necessary* food, &c., used as means or material (τὸ ποιητικὸν εὐεξίας) by the γυμναστής or trainer who is the efficient cause of εὐεξία: cf. *Pol.* Δ. 1. 1238 b. 25 τὴν κρατίστην τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δεῖ λεληθέναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν. Fritzsche (whom Grant follows) is supported in his (I think, erroneous) view of the meaning of ὑποκείμενα here by Mich. Eph. who has—γνωρίζεται ἡ ἔξις . . . ἥδη ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὸ αὐτὴν ἔκτων, καὶ τὰ ἔκτα ἐκ τῆς ἔξεως. The Paraph. Heliodorus, however, is right—γνώσκονται δὲ αἱ ἔξεις καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔκτων ἔξις μὲν γὰρ φέρε εἰπεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια, ἔκτὸν δὲ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν δι πρὸς ὑγίειν φέρει· εἰ γὰρ γνώσκομεν ὑγιεινὸν εἴναι τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκὶ γνώσκομεν εὐεξίαν εἴναι τὴν ἐν σαρκὶ πυκνότητα. The Paraph., it will be observed, is guilty of a little confusion here in his use of the terms ὑγίεια and εὐεξία: see *Top.* v. 7. 137 a. 3, quoted by Zell, ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως

1129 a. 19. ἔχει λατρός τε πρὸς τὸ ποιητικὸς ὑγιείας εἶναι καὶ γυμναστὴς πρὸς τὸ ποιητικὸς εὐεξίας, ἔστι δὲ ἵδιον γυμναστοῦ τὸ ποιητικὸν εἶναι εὐεξίας, εἴη ἀνὴρ ἵδιον λατροῦ τὸ ποιητικὸν εἶναι ὑγιείας.

a. 21. πυκνότης] Zell quotes *Physiognomica* 806 b. 22, where σκληρά is coupled with εὐεκτική as applied to σάρξ.

a. 23. § 6. ἀκολουθεῖ κ.τ.λ.] *Topf.* i. 15. 106 b. 21 ἔπι τῶν κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἔξιν λεγομένων ἐπισκοπῶν εἰ γὰρ θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ λοιπόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται κατά τε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι πλεοναχῶς ῥηθῆσται κατά τε ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα.

a. 24. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] because there are exceptions to the above rule: see *Topf.* i. 15. 106 b. 2 τῷ μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖν τὸ μισεῖν ἐναντίον τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν οὐδέν—*i.e.* φιλεῖν is used πλεοναχῶς (=‘to love’ and ‘to kiss’), but μισεῖν the θάτερον is not.

a. 25. οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον] This is the reading of H<sup>a</sup> M<sup>b</sup> N<sup>b</sup> Q<sup>b</sup> B<sup>1</sup> adopted by Bekker and Bywater. But K<sup>b</sup>, P<sup>b</sup>, Camb. read οἷον εἰ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἄδικία, and L<sup>b</sup> (followed by Jackson) reads οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἄδικία: *i.e.* we have τὸ ἄδικον and ἡ ἄδικία, but their contraries τὸ δίκαιον and ἡ δικαιοσύνη are absent from K<sup>b</sup> P<sup>b</sup> Camb., and ἡ δικαιοσύνη is absent from L<sup>b</sup>. I would suggest that the archetype of K<sup>b</sup> P<sup>b</sup> Camb., which was throughout distinguished for the unusual frequency with which it omitted words and clauses, omitted τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ, the original reading being οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἄδικία. The plural θάτερα (given by all MSS. apparently, except H<sup>a</sup> and Γ, which have θάτερον—adopted by Bywater—in both places) would perhaps be thus accounted for: cf. for similar plurals *E.N.* v. 2. 9. 1130 b. 14 καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἄδικία οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἔτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δὲ ὡς ὅλα.

a. 27. § 7. διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει] sc. ἡ δομωνυμία—‘the equivocation,’ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν being = τὰ ὁμώνυμα: ‘because the things called by the same name (τὰ ὁμώνυμα) stand very close to each other, the equivocal use of the name escapes notice.’ Ομώνυμα are things which have nothing but the name in common, as Man and Picture, each of which is called ζῷον. Συνώνυμα are things which have a common name and a common nature, as Man and Ox: each not only is called, but is ζῷον: see *Cat.* 1.

I a. Ι ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὅν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος 1120 a. 27. ἔτερος . . . συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὅν τὸ τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός.

In *Top.* i. 15. 107 a. 3 Aristotle illustrates the equivocal uses of the term ἀγαθὸν under various Categories, and remarks that a term which is applied to several objects, each of which belongs to a different Category, is employed equivocally, *i.e.* with a different meaning in each Category—σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν κατὰ τοῦνομα κατηγοριῶν, εἰ ταῦτα ἐστιν ἐπὶ πάντων εἰ γάρ μὴ ταῦτα, δῆλον ὅτι ὁμώνυμον τὸ λεγόμενον, οἷον τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἐδέσματι μὲν τὸ ποιητικὸν ἡδονῆς, ἐν ἴατρικῇ δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ὑγείας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ποιὰν εἶναι, οἷον σώφρονα ἢ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δικαίαν· ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπουν. ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ τὸ ποτέ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν γάρ λέγεται τὸ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ· πολλάκις δὲ τὸ ποσόν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ μετρίου λέγεται γάρ τὸ μέτριον ἀγαθόν. ὥστε ὁμώνυμον τὸ ἀγαθόν. ὥσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἐπὶ σώματος μὲν χρῶμα, ἐπὶ δὲ φωνῆς τὸ εὔήκοον παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὸ δέξι· οὐ γάρ ὥσαύτως ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ αὐτὸν λέγεται· φωνὴ μὲν γάρ δέξια ἡ ταχεῖα, καθάπερ φασὶν οἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἀριθμὸὺς ἀρμονικοί, γωνία δ' δέξια ἡ ἐλάσσων ὀρθῆς, μάχαιρα δὲ ἡ δέξιγνωνις. The Categories are thus an important instrument in the hands of the Dialectician when engaged with the second of the four processes mentioned in *Top.* i. 13. 105 a. 21 as constituting the dialectical method—τὰ δὲ ὄργανα δι’ ὅν εὐπορήσομεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐστὶ τέτταρα, ἐν μὲν τὸ προτάσεις λαβεῖν, δεύτερον δὲ ποσαχῶς ἔκαστον λέγεται δύνασθαι διελεῖν, τρίτον τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν, τέταρτον δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὅμοιον σκέψις. In connexion with this practical employment in dialectic of the Categories as means of distinguishing τὰ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενα, it may be noted as not without significance that the Treatise on the Categories itself (whether written by Aristotle or not matters little) begins with the words ὁμώνυμα λέγεται.

With διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν Jackson compares *Phys.* vii. 4. 249 a. 23 εἰσὶ τε τῶν ὁμωνυμιῶν αἱ μὲν πολὺ ἀπέχουσαι, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσαι τινὰ ὁμοιότητα, αἱ δὲ ἐγγὺς ἡ γένει ἡ ἀναλογία, διὸ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὁμωνυμίαι εἶναι οὖσαι.

καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δήλη μᾶλλον (ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ a. 28. ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν)] It is not where the ὁμώνυμα are particulars plainly distinguished by their ‘outward appearance’ (Peters), *e.g.* Collarbone and Key, that ὁμωνυμία is dangerous. It is when we are dealing with abstractions or general notions that it is likely to escape our notice and lead us into error: see *An. Post.* ii. 13.

1129 a. 28. 97 b. 30 αἱ ὁμωνυμίαι λανθάνοντι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις. Undetected ὁμωνυμία prevents the discovery of truth by causing us to connect together notions or facts which have nothing or little in common. From the comparison of such notions or facts no scientific results can be obtained, since scientific discovery requires the comparison of things which are similar (*ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέψις*), their similarity, as science understands similarity, being that which strikes us after we have carefully noted their differences (*τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν*): while it is impossible to note their differences till we have cleared the ground by dissolving any false associations due to ὁμωνυμία which may exist in our minds (*ποσαχῶς ἔκαστον λέγεται διελεῖν*): see *Top.* i. 13. 105 a. 21 quoted above. ‘Ομώνυμα, in short, as such, are not comparable for scientific purposes: but τὸ συνώνυμον πᾶν συμβλητόν *Top.* i. 15. 107 b. 17.

**δήλη μᾶλλον**] ‘Comparatively plain.’ Grant. Cf. *De Gen. et Cor.* 321 b. 30 ἡ γὰρ ὥλη ἐτέρα οὐσα δήλη μᾶλλον τοῦ εἴδους ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐπὶ σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν ὄμοιομερῶν. Spengel suggests (wrongly) μᾶλλον δήλη (*Arist. Studien Nic. Eth.* i. p. 207) for δήλη μᾶλλον—‘Das letzte Wort (μᾶλλον) gehört nicht zu δήλη, sondern zu πόρρω, so viel als πορρωτέρω. Seine jetzige Stellung ist kaum zu rechtfertigen, vielleicht genügt es ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω μᾶλλον δήλη zu setzen.’

a. 30. **κλείς**] Zell and others quote Plutarch, *Reg. et imp. apophthegmata* 9 τῆς δὲ κλειδὸς αὐτῷ (Philip) κατεαγείσης ἐν πολέμῳ, καὶ τοῦ θεραπεύοντος ἰατροῦ πάντως τι καθ' ἡμέραν αἰτοῦντος, Λάμβανε, ἔφη, ὅσα βούλει τὴν γὰρ κλεῖν ἔχεις.

When *ἡ καθόλου δικαιοσύνη* and *ἡ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη* are here said to be ὁμώνυμα, it is obvious that the term is not to be taken in the strict sense of ὡν τὸ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν (*Cat.* i. 1 a. 1), *i.e.* of τὰ κυρίως ὁμώνυμα λεγόμενα ἡ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης (*Alexander Aph. Met.* p. 197, line 12, ed. Bonitz); for, as Mich. Eph. says in his note on the present passage—*τῶν δικαιοσυνῶν . . . ἡ μὲν ἐστὶν ὁσπερ γένος δικαιοσύνη κατὰ πάσης ἀρετῆς, ἡ δὲ ὁσπερ ταύτης εἶδος. ὁστε ὡς μὲν γένος καὶ εἶδος συνώνυμα ἐσονται ἐπιδέχονται γὰρ τὰ εἴδη τὸν τῶν γενῶν ὁρισμόν.* Below (v. 2. 6, on which see note) they are actually called *συνώνυμα*. In fact, the two kinds of *δικαιοσύνη* (or of *ἀδικία*) are said to be ὁμώνυμα with as much or as little right as the things called *ἀγαθά* are said in *Top.* i. 15. 107 a. 3-17 to be ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενα. The statement made 107 a. 11 ὁστε ὁμώνυμον τὸ ἀγαθόν certainly cannot be reconciled with *E.N.* i. 6. 12. 1096 b. 27 οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε (*sc.* τὸ

ἀγαθόν) τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις, unless we allow a latitude in 1129 a. 30. the use of the term ὁμώνυμα which the definition in *Cat.* I. I a. I does not prepare us for. The ὁμώνυμα of that definition are merely τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, whereas the kinds of justice (like the various ἀγαθά) are only called ὁμώνυμα by an exaggeration, perhaps justified by the circumstance that the points in which they differ are very apt to be overlooked. In strict Aristotelian language they are neither ὁμώνυμα nor yet συνώνυμα, but τὰ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα—see *Met.* Z. 4. 1030 b. 2 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἱατρικὸν σῶμα καὶ ἔργον καὶ σκεῦος λέγεται οὕτε ὁμωνύμως οὕτε καθ' ἐν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐν—on which Alexander (p. 441. 13. ed. Bonitz) has οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ἱατρικὸν σῶμα καὶ σκεῦος οὕτε ὁμωνύμως λέγεται οὕτε καθ' ἐν καὶ συνωνύμως [cf. Alex. *Met.* p. 199. 20 καθ' ἐν μὲν λεγόμενα λέγει τὰ συνώνυμα καὶ ὑφ' ἐν τι κοινὸν τεταγμένα γένος], ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐν, ἥγουν ὡς τὰ ἀφ' ἐνός τε καὶ πρὸς ἐν—e.g. a drug, a bandage, and a lancet are all called ἱατρικά because they are ἀπὸ τῆς ἱατρικῆς, depend upon, are prescribed by, or used by medical science: exercise, fresh air, and food are all called ὑγιεινά because they are πρὸς τὴν ὑγίειναν, have Health in view as their end: see Alex. *Met.* 197. 2 τὰ δὲ ἀφ' ἐνός τε καὶ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα οὕτε τὴν τῶν συνωνύμων ἴστοιμίαν πρὸς τὸ κατηγορούμενον σώζει πρὸς ἄλληλα, οὕτε πάλιν ἔχει τὴν τῶν ὁμωνύμων ἄκρατόν τε καὶ ἄμικτον ἐτερότητα, ἀλλ' ἔστι τις αὐτοῖς κοινωνία κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ταῦτα ἀ λέγεται τῷ εἶναι τινα φύσιν ἐκείνου τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ταύτην ἐν τούτοις πως ἐνορᾶσθαι πᾶσιν, ἀφ' οὐδὲ ὅντα ἡ πρὸς ὃ λόγον ἔχοντά τινα διὰ τούτο καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος κεκοινώηκεν αὐτοῦ . . . οὐ μόνον ὀνόματος κεκοινώηκε τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα ὡς τὰ κυρίως ὁμώνυμα λεγόμενα ἀ ἔστι τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰτίαν τινὰ ἔχει τοῦ ὅμοίως ἀλλήλοις ὀνυμάσθαι.

Thus ἡ ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζῷων and ἡ τὰς θύρας κλείονσιν are both called κλείς and are ὁμώνυμα: horse and ox are both called ζῷον and are συνώνυμα or καθ' ἐν λεγόμενα: a bandage and a drug are both called ἱατρικά, and are ἀφ' ἐνός καὶ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα. It is under this third head, then, that the two kinds of justice really fall. ‘Ο ἵσος, the fair man, and ὁ νόμιμος, the man who has all the social ἀρεταί, are both called δίκαιοι, because the moral quality or complex of qualities characterised in each case is ἀφ' ἐνός, i.e. ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς—is produced by the chief science; and is an instrument in its hands πρὸς ἐν, i.e. πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Similarly Eudemus and the writer of *M. M.* describe the kinds of φιλία as πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα—*E. E.* H. 2. 1236 a. 16 ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἴδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ' ἐν ἀπάσας μηδ' ὡς εἴδη ἐνός γένους, μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνίμως πρὸς

1129 a. 30. μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἱατρικόν. Cf. *M. M.* ii. 11.

1209 a. 19-31. Similarly Alex. (*Met.* p. 197) places τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ σχῆμα, and ὁ ἀριθμός under τὰ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα. For the sense, however, in which Particular and Universal Justice may be called συνώνυμα see note on v. 2. 6.

a. 31. § 8. ποσαχῶς] τὸ ποσαχῶς ἔκαστον λέγεται διελεῖν is the second of the four ὄργανα δί' ὃν εὐπορήσομεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν enumerated in *Top.* i. 13. 105 a. 23. The first—τὸ προτάτεις λαβεῖν—has been employed in § 3.

a. 32. καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος] NC, Par. 1853, Bywater: other MSS., however, have the article before ἄνισος: and K<sup>b</sup> and CCC for καὶ ὁ ἄνισος read καὶ ἄδικος, a circumstance which may be thought to favour the view of Trendelenburg, Ramsauer, and Jackson, who reject καὶ ὁ ἄνισος. ‘These words (*καὶ ὁ ἄνισος*),’ says Jackson, ‘which after Trendelenburg I have bracketed, but which Bekker retains, cannot be said to destroy the sense, as they might be taken as an explanatory explanation of ὁ πλεονέκτης [this apparently is the view of the scribe of NC and Bywater, who omit the article before ἄνισος]. But they are certainly awkward, especially as the same idea is introduced with a justificatory explanation in § 11. See Trendelenburg’s *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie* ii. 354. I conceive that the scribe, not seeing that the word πλεονέκτης suggested *ἴσος* as its correlative, bridged the apparent gap by anticipating § 11.’ On the other hand, Hampke, with the approval of Spengel (*Aristotelische Studien* i. 207), brackets the words καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης. Their omission would, of course, make the clause more symmetrical: but the opening words of § 9 seem to show that they must be retained. On the whole, the omission of the article before ἄνισος seems to be the easiest way out of the difficulty. For a remarkable criticism of τὸ ἀδικεῖν = τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν see Plato, *Gorgias* 483 B-484 B: the gist of it is contained in the following words—νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν λέγεται τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸν καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε, οἷμαι, φύσις αὐτῇ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιον ἔστι τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. Δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν δλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥπτονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. Cf. Menander (*Meineke* iv. 359) ἴσοτητα δ' αἴρουν καὶ πλεονεξίαν φύγε.

b. 1. § 9. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος] Τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἄδικον is τὸ ἄνισον. But τὸ ἄνισον, which is the generic term (*τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν*

§ 11), has two species, *τὸ πλέον* and *τὸ μεῖον*. As, however, the man 1129 b. 1. who habitually disregards *ἰσότης* almost invariably does so for his own advantage, *τὸ πλέον* is *practically* identical with *τὸ ἄνισον*. The *ἄνισος* with whom we are practically concerned is the *πλεονέκτης*. The *μειονέκτης*—the man who will not stand up for his rights when he knows that he is being unfairly treated—is not often met with, and may be neglected. Not to be confounded with the *μειονεξία* properly so-called of the man who (reluctantly, of course—see V. 9 and 11) allows himself to be unfairly treated is the merely apparent *μειονεξία* of the man who chooses *τὸ μεῖον κακόν*, for this is really *πλεονεξία*. L<sup>b</sup> and B<sup>3</sup> read *καὶ* (adopted by Bekker) before *πλεονέκτης*: this *καὶ* might be defended as accentuating the term *πλεονέκτης*, and calling attention to the fact that the *ἄνισος* with whom we have practically to do is the *πλεονέκτης* not the *μειονέκτης*—‘Since the unjust man is not merely unfair (*ἄνισος*) but unfair to his own advantage (*καὶ πλεονέκτης*).’

*περὶ τάγαθὰ ἔσται]* Cf. *Rēf.* 359 C *τὴν πλεονεξίαν πᾶσα φύσις* b. 2. *διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βίᾳ παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἵσου τιμήν.*

οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα . . .] The *πλεονέκτης* seeks to have more than his fair share of *τὰ ἔκτος ἀγαθά*. To seek to have *τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν* (see *E.N.* i. 8. 2) in as large measure as possible is not *πλεονεξία*: see *E.N.* ix. 8. 11. 1169 a. 34 ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. οὔτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὡς δὲ οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή. These *ἔκτος ἀγαθά* are ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά, τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ—i. e. they are *in themselves* good things, although *in certain relations* (which must be specified in each case) they may be evils. Thus it would be absurd to call ‘money’ a bad thing. The term ‘money,’ taken by itself without qualification (*ἀπλῶς*), suggests the idea of something good; although when we qualify it, and speak of ‘the profligate’s money’ (*τυί*), it suggests the idea of something bad: cf. *Tōp.* ii. 11. 115 b. 33 ὁ ἀν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου δοκῆ εἶναι καλὸν ή αἰσχρὸν η ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἀπλῶς ρήθησται.

*Πλεονεξία* puts into practice the false theory of life which is criticised in *E.N.* i. 10. That theory placed *εὐδαιμονία* in external *εὐτυχία*—in the mere presence of (as distinguished from the proper use of) those things *ῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς* (*E.N.* i. 9. 7. 1099 b. 27)—cf. the *ἀναγκαῖα ἐξ ἴποθέσεως* of *Phys.* ii. 9, and *τὸ οὐκ ἕνεκ τὸ εὖ* of *Met.* Δ. 7.

1129 b. 2. 1072 b. 12). This false theory of life, then, the *πλεονέκτης* puts into practice, making the accumulation of these external good things, which are only *means* to the noble life, his end. He pursues τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά without considering whether they are or are not, as possessed by him, conducive to his own true welfare (*αὐτῷ ἀγαθά*)—*i.e.* conducive to the ἐνέργεια *ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν*. Of all the forms of vice, his is the most *unprincipled*—involves the most systematic neglect of the ideal, and is the most degrading to the moral character, inasmuch as it is the abuse of those external good things which are materially necessary to the practice not only of justice but of all the other social virtues. Mich. Eph. has the following note here—εἰπὼν τὸν πλεονέκτην ἄδικον εἶναι περὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, λέγει μὴ περὶ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεονέκτην εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ ἢ τοῦ ῥήτορος ἱατρικώτερος ἢ ρήτορικώτερος σπεύδει γενέσθαι, οὔτε τοῦ μουσικοῦ μουσικώτερος καὶ τὸ πλέον τούτων ἐν τούτοις ἔχειν ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεονεκτεῖ ἀπερ ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς καὶ τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει ἀγαθά, τοῖς φαύλοις δὲ καὶ μοχθηροῖς οὐκ ἀγαθά. εἰσὶ δὲ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ὑγίεια πλοῦτος κάλλος ἕνγενεια ἀρχὴ ἔξουσία, ἀ τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει ἀγαθὰ ὅντα τοῖς φαύλοις κακά ἐστι· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν αἰσχος νόσος πενία.

b. 5. ἀλλ' εὑχεσθαι μὲν . . . αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά] A man, while choosing poverty and obscurity if these conduce to his true welfare,—the performance of duty,—ought to aspire to a life in which that welfare is more brilliantly realised through the proper use of wealth and social advantages.

*Πλεονεξία* then is related only to τὰ ἔκτὸς ἀγαθά. There is no room for it, according to the Aristotelian doctrine, where the ἀρεταὶ are concerned. The *μεγαλόψυχος* in asserting a victorious personality before his contemporaries is not a *πλεονέκτης*, although ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ τὸ πλέον νέμων. We are tempted to ask, if not Aristotle, at least ourselves, the question—Is this self-centred culture which must have wealth and leisure, and must, on pain of losing its beautiful balance, shut its eyes to the surrounding misery and squalor, not a refined form of *πλεονεξία* after all? Or perhaps the more pressing question is that concerning ‘the modern man,’ in the notion of whose personality we include industrial and commercial success—distinguished by Aristotle as merely ἀναγκαῖον (or even βίαιον) from the *καλόν*, or life of culture, which constitutes the true personality of his citizen—if culture is perhaps *πλεονεξία*, what shall we say of the personality which

is constituted by the consciousness of success in commercial and 1129 b. 5. industrial competition, and by the influence which attends such success? But the question is a far wider one than at first sight appears. It is the law not only of human society, but of the natural world, that the strong take to themselves the lion's share, and have become strong by doing so. Are we or are we not to have Types distinguished from their fellows by strength and beauty? It is practically to this final issue that the question is pushed in the remarkable passage quoted from the *Gorgias*—483 B, C, D—end of note on v. 1. 8.

§ 10.] Cf. *E.N.* v. 3. 15, 16.

b. 6.

§ 11.] After *κοινόν* all MSS. apparently except K<sup>b</sup> and CCC b. 11. insert (with certain variations) the words *καὶ παράνομος τοῦτο γὰρ [ἢ παρανομίᾳ ἦτοι ἢ ἀνισότητι] περιέχει πᾶσαν ἀδικίαν καὶ κοινόν ἐστι πάσης ἀδικίας*. CCC, however, has these words on the margin, in the hand apparently of the original scribe.

§ 12. *πως δίκαια*] *πως* is added because all enactments are not b. 12. just in the sense of aiming at the maintenance of *ἰσότης*. Many of them have no reference to the requirements of Particular Justice: they are just *in a certain sense*—*i.e.* they are just in the wide and loose sense, not in the narrow and technical sense. See Mich. Eph.—*πρόσκειται δὲ τὸ πως δίκαιου, ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἴδιως λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην πάντα τὰ νόμιμα δίκαια, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς. Πως = κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην* is further explained by the words which follow in § 13, b. 17 *ώστε ἔνα μὲν τρόπον κ.τ.λ.*, where the *μέν* is answered by *ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην* in chapter 2, § 1: but see below, note on § 13, b. 17.

§ 13. *οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων*] ‘The view given here b. 14. of law,’ says Grant, ‘which is expressed still more strongly below, ch. 11, § 1, is quite different from modern views. Law is here represented as a positive system (though the instances quoted of its formulæ are all negative, *μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν, &c.*), aiming at the regulation of the whole of life, sometimes, however, with a bias of class-interests, and sometimes only roughly executed (*ἀπεσχεδιασμένος*). This educational and dogmatic character of the law was clearly exemplified to the greatest extent in the Spartan institutions. Athens rather prided herself (according to the wise remarks which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles) on leaving

1129 b. 14. greater liberty to the individual. But Plato and Aristotle both made the mistake of wishing for an entire state-control over individual life.' Cf. *E.N.* x. 9 οὐχ ἵκανὸν δὲ ἵστως νέοντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελεῖας τυχεῖν ὄρθης, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἔθιζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἀν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον. It must be remembered, however, in connexion with the statement *οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων*, that *νόμος* has a much wider meaning than *law*, and includes also all that we understand by *custom* as sanctioned by public opinion. However desirable Aristotle may have considered the extension of the sphere of law in the strict sense of the term, he could not have affirmed with any show of truth that 'the laws, as a matter of fact, have something to say about all that we do'—although it would be true to affirm that 'custom (whether sanctioned by law or by public opinion) has.' How largely the idea of *custom* enters into the connotation of *νόμος* may be seen from the statement *E.N.* v. 11. 1 ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει ὁ νόμος, ἀπαγορεύει, which is not true if *νόμος* be translated by *law*, but strictly true if it be understood generally as *custom*: e.g. custom or fashion does not tell Oxford undergraduates to go down to the River in academical dress; it therefore forbids them to do so. Nor do the Statutes of the University tell them; but the Statutes do not therefore forbid them. The Statutes are neutral in this matter, as in many other matters in which fashion takes a side. But see note on v. 11. 1, discussing Jackson's opinion.

b. 15. στοχαζόμενοι . . . τρόπον τοιοῦτον] As Rassow points out (*Forsch.* p. 76) the reference here is to the distinction between ὄρθαι πολιτεῖαι in which the rulers rule for the good of all (*τὸ συμφέρον πᾶσι*) and παρεκβάσεις in which they rule for their own advantage (*τὸ συμφέρον τοῖς κυρίοις*); see *Pol.* iii. 6. 1276 a. 17 φανερὸν τοίνυν ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν αὐταὶ μὲν ὄρθαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον . . . iii. 7. 1279 a. 28 ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἰς ἡ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἡ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἀρχωστι, ταύτας μὲν ὄρθας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἡ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἡ τῶν ὀλίγων ἡ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις: and cf. *E.N.* viii. 10.

Spengel (p. 207), supposing that the reference is to Democracy (*πᾶσι*), Aristocracy (*τοῖς ἀρίστοις* or *τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετὴν*), and Oligarchy or Monarchy (*τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον*), proposes to omit ἡ *τοῖς ἀρίστοις* or *κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡ*, on the ground that

*τοῖς ἀρίστοις* = *τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετὴν*. Rassow prefers the omission 1129 b. 15. of the words *ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις*, and Jackson and Susemihl bracket them. Bywater, on the other hand, brackets the words *κατ' ἀρετὴν*, which are omitted by K<sup>b</sup> and CCC. I venture to think that their omission by K<sup>b</sup> is a blunder. Bekker, followed by Susemihl, places a comma after *κυρίοις*, and Rassow says ‘*κυρίοις* mit *κατ'* ἀρετὴν zu verbinden verbietet der Sprachgebrauch, und Bekker ist vollkommen in seinem Rechte, wenn er vor *κατ'* ἀρετὴν ein Komma setzt.’ But why should *κατ'* ἀρετὴν not relate to *τοῖς κυρίοις*, or even to *τοῖς ἀρίστοις*? See *Pol. Δ. 5. 1293 b. 3* *τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ'* ἀρετὴν *πολιτείαν* καὶ μὴ *πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον προσταγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν*. It seems to me to be the safer course to leave the text as it stands (either with *κατ'* ἀρετὴν or with *ἢ κατ'* ἀρετὴν) in all MSS. except K<sup>b</sup> and CCC, taking *τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον πᾶσι* to refer to the end of the ὄρθαι πολιτείαι, and *τὸ συμφέρον τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις κατ'* ἀρετὴν *ἢ κατ'* ἄλλον τρόπον *τοιοῦτον* to refer to the ends of the *παρεκβάσεις*: *τοῖς ἀρίστοις*, of course, not being the ἄριστοι ἀπλῶς *κατ'* ἀρετὴν of *Pol. Δ. 5*, but the ἄριστοι *πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν* = *τοῖς κυρίοις κατ'* ἀρετὴν *ἢ κατ'* ἄλλον *τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον*, where the words *κατ'* ἀρετὴν must be understood to refer to the standard of high birth and military excellence, and the words *κατ'* ἄλλον *τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον* to the other grounds—especially wealth—on the strength of which men claim to rule. The word *τοιοῦτον* seems to show that the writer thought of *πολιτικὴ δύναμις* and *πλοῦτος* rather than of *ἐλευθερία* (see *Pol. Δ. 6. 1294 a. 10* ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν ὅρος ἀρετὴ, διλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δήμου δὲ ἐλευθερία: cf. *E. N. v. 3. 7*)—i.e. of tyranny and of better and worse oligarchies, rather than of democracy, in which last the *κοινῆ συμφέρον* appears at least to be more regarded. I cannot, however, agree with those (*e.g.* Michelet and Spengel) who make the writer refer in the words *τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον πᾶσι* to the end of democracy. The antithesis between *πᾶσι* and *τοῖς κυρίοις κατὰ κ.τ.λ.* is so sharply pointed that we must believe the writer to have in his mind the distinction between *ὄρθαι πολιτείαι* and *παρεκβάσεις*.

**Ὥστε ἔνα μὲν τρόπον κ.τ.λ.]** As I have said, these words explain b. 17. the *πως δίκαια* = *κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς λεγομένην δίκαιοσύνην δίκαια* of the last §, *μέν* being answered by *δέ* in ch. 2, § 1, 1130 a. 14. Jackson, however, opposes *ἔνα μὲν τρόπον* and *προστάττει δέ* (§ 14, 1129 b.

1129 b. 17. 19) and compares ch. 2, §§ 10, 11. 1130 b. 22 *σχεδόν . . . 26 κοινόν*—‘where νόμιμα, which promote virtue through education, are distinguished from νόμιμα which enforce the different virtues.’ I think that the broad distinction in v. 2. 10, 11 is rather between τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὁλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενα<sup>1</sup>, and τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὁλης ἀρετῆς—between the acts which proceed from, and the agencies which produce, virtue. These agencies are chiefly educational: but it is not, I take it, the writer’s object to make a point of distinguishing between ‘the indirect encouragement of the particular virtues by means of educational enactments’ and their ‘direct encouragement’ (Jackson, p. 74) by means of commands and prohibitions, however important the distinction in itself may be; he merely wishes to show that both τὰ πραττόμενα (whether performed in consequence of the agent’s possession of ὅλη ἀρετή, or merely in external conformity with its requirements—for ἀπὸ τῆς ὁλης ἀρετῆς admits of both meanings: cf. τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἱατρικῆς as a description of τὰ ἱατρικὰ ὄργανα) and τὰ ποιητικά (which are *chiefly* educational enactments) are called νόμιμα, and thus to exhibit the extent of the denotation of the term νόμιμα. Similarly in the passage before us (v. 1. 13, 14), I think that the words προστάττει δὲ κ.τ.λ., instead of containing a statement contrasted with that introduced by the words ἐνα μὲν τρόπον, merely go into the details suggested by the words καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. The μόρια τῆς εὐδαιμονίας (in Eudemian phraseology nearly = τὰ μόρια τῆς ὁλης ἀρετῆς, see *E. N.* vi. 12. 5) are the separate ἀρεταὶ enumerated in § 14, which are implanted by education (lasting throughout the whole lifetime of the citizen, see *E. N.* x. 9. 9) and enforced by law. In its educational, as well as in its strictly legal capacity, νόμος may be said προστάττειν τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν . . . καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος κ.τ.λ. Cf. *E. N.* ii. 6. 7 οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μνᾶι φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, δὲ ἀλείπτης ἐξ μνᾶς προστάξει—where the ἀλείπτης stands to the physique in the same relation in which νόμος in its *educational* capacity stands to the

<sup>1</sup> Instead of πραττόμενα corr. K<sup>b</sup>, P<sup>b</sup>, Ald., NC, CCC, B<sup>1,3</sup> and Γ read προσταττόμενα, adopted by Bywater, and apparently preferred by Susemihl (see Susem. *E. N. addend. et corr.* p. 246), who would substitute ὑπό (the reading of CCC) for ἀπό 1130 b. 22. Although the MS. authority seems on the whole to be against προσταττόμενα, that would not settle the matter between two such easily confounded words as πραττόμενα and προσταττόμενα. But internal evidence seems to me to be strongly in favour of τὰ πραττόμενα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς as contrasted with τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

moral character: cf. also *E. N.* iii. 12. 8 ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παιῆδα δεῖ 1129 b. 17. κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν κ.τ.λ.—where προστάγματα are evidently contemplated as τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς. The writer of the *M. M.* i. 33. 1193 b. 2 evidently treats προστάττει δὲ κ.τ.λ. as explanatory of, not as in any way contrasted with, ἔνα μὲν τρόπον κ.τ.λ. He writes—ἔστι δὴ διττὸν τὸ δίκαιον, ὃν τὸ μὲν ἔστι κατὰ νόμον. δίκαια γάρ φασιν εἶναι ἀ ὁ νόμος προστάττει· δὲ νόμος κελεύει τάνδρεῖα πράττειν καὶ τὰ σώφρονα καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀπαντα ὅσα κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγεται· διὸ καὶ, φασίν, δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ δίκαια μὲν ἔστιν ἄ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ποιεῖν, δὲ νόμος τὰ κατὰ πάσας ἀρετὰς ὅντα προστάττει, ὁ ἄρα τοῖς κατὰ νόμον ἐμμένων δικαίοις τελείως σπουδῶν ἔσται, ὥστε δίκαιος καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἀρετὴ ἔστιν· ἐν μὲν δὴ τι δίκαιον ἐν τε τούτοις ἔστι καὶ περὶ ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ τοῦτο τὸ δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν περὶ ταῦτα δικαιοσύνην ζητοῦμεν. Here plainly ἐν μὲν δὴ = ἔνα μὲν τρόπον of the passage before us (*E. N.* v. 1. 13) and ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ κ.τ.λ. = ζητοῦμεν δέ γε κ.τ.λ. of *E. N.* v. 2. 1. 1130 a. 14.

τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς] Cf. *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 18 sqq.

b. 18.

§ 14.] See Fritzsche's note here for references to enactments b. 19. against the offences mentioned, and Muretus *ad loc.* Before κατά 1129 b. 23 Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 60) advocates the insertion of τά read by L<sup>b</sup>.

§ 15. ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἔτερον] The writer of the *M. M.*, b. 26. in the passage parallel to this, goes out of his way to distinguish ἡ ὅλη δικαιοσύνη from ἡ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη in a somewhat misleading manner. His words are (i. 33. 1193 b. 12)—κατὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ δίκαια (i. e. τὰ νόμιμα generally) ἔστιν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ὅντα δίκαιον εἶναι (ὁ γὰρ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ὁ ἐγκρατῆς καὶ αὐτὸς καθ’ ἑαυτόν ἔστι τοιοῦτος). ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ πρὸς ἔτερον ἀλλο τοῦ εἰρημένου κατὰ νόμον δικαίον ἔστιν οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἔτερον δικαίοις οὖσιν καθ’ αὐτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον· τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν ὁ ζητοῦμεν δίκαιον καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν περὶ ταῦτα. Here he says that the temperate man may, *quād* temperate man, be virtuous καθ’ ἑαυτόν as well as πρὸς ἔτερον, whereas the fair man cannot, *quād* fair, be virtuous καθ’ ἑαυτόν, but is necessarily conceived as standing in a relation πρὸς ἔτερον. It is true, perhaps, that a man's temperance or intemperance *concerns* himself, at least immediately, more than it concerns other people; whereas his fairness or unfairness refers immediately and essentially to the interests of other people, *i. e.* cannot be conceived without reference to these interests: this,

1129 b. 26. however, is not what the writer of the present passage (*E. N. v. 1. 15*) is thinking of; but of ὁλη δικαιοσύνη as distinguished from the co-extensive ὁλη ἀρετή by being πρὸς ἔτερον (see § 20 of this chapter, and note). ‘This Justice, then,’ he says, ‘is perfect excellence—perfect excellence, however, viewed not as a simple possession, but as putting its possessor in a certain relation to others.’ I think that this statement (as well as that in § 20) is best explained by reference to the fact that the Aristotelian logic assigns ἔξις not only to the category of ποιότης (*Cat. 8*), but also to that of πρός τι (*Cat. 7*). As ἐπιστήμη is at once a *quality* of the ἐπιστήμων and a *relation* in which he stands to the ἐπιστητόν, so τελεία ἀρετή is at once a *quality* of the νόμος and a *relation* in which he stands to the social environment which requires that quality. So, the colour of a flower is at once that which is simply red or blue, and that which attracts the bees.

The distinction, however, here drawn between τελεία ἀρετή ἀπλῶς and τελεία ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἔτερον = δικαιοσύνη, is merely a logical one, and we must not think of the *man* who has δικαιοσύνη as distinguished from the *man* who has τελεία ἀρετή. Τελεία ἀρετή, because τελεία, *i.e.* because it is the perfect organisation of all the special ἀρεταῖ, will maintain its possessor in active relations with the social environment in correspondence with which its development has been perfected: there cannot, in short, be τελεία ἀρετή without ἡ τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις. But the man whose ἀρετή is ἀτελῆς, *i.e.* the man in whom certain ‘virtues’ exist separately without having been organised in correspondence with the social environment as one great whole, will make a merely private and personal use of his ‘virtues’—*e.g.* he will perform acts of ‘courage’ only when his own personal interests are concerned—when his *amour propre* is wounded—when he is angry—when he is afraid; he will be ‘fair’ to his friends, but unfair to strangers: ‘temperate’ so long as he is among his neighbours and acquaintances,—in short, he is one of those who ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἔτερον ἀδύνατονται—‘he can use his virtue, such as it is, in a narrow domestic way, but not as a citizen widely related to fellow citizens.’

With the τελεία ἀρετή of the present section compare the καλοκαγαθία of *E. E. Θ. 3. 1248 b. 8–1249 a. 16*, which is described as ἀρετὴ τέλειος, and distinguished from the ἔξις πολιτική of the Laconians and others who choose the ἀρεταῖ and the ἔργα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς not

καλοῦ ἔνεκα, but for the sake of τὰ φύσει ἀγαθά—τιμή, πλοῦτος, σώματος 1129 b. 26. ἀρεταί, εὐτυχίαι, δυνάμεις. Such are ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες . . . καλοκαγαθίαιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν.

καὶ οὕθ' ἔσπερος κ.τ.λ.] Zell and Fritzsche quote *Iliad* xxii. 317 b. 28.

οῖος δ' ἀστήρ εἰσι μετ' ἀστρασι νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ

"Ἐσπερος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν οὐρανῷ ἵσταται ἀστήρ.

The comparison is assigned to Euripides by the New College Oxon. Scholiast Cod. 240 (see Bywater, *Hermes* v. 356) καὶ οὕθ' ἔσπερος· τοῦτο ἐξ Εὐριπίδου σοφῶς (*sic*) Μελανίππης· λέγει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ δικαιοσύνας δὲ χρύσεον πρόσωπον. Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* i. 6 (vol. i. p. 5. ed. Kirchhoff) ὡς καλὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης πρόσωπον καὶ οὕτε ἔσπερος οὕτε ἑώρας οὕτω καλά: cf. *Enn.* vi. 6 (vol. ii. p. 67, Kirchhoff) δικαιοσύνη . . . ἡς ὡς ἀληθῶς καλὸν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ οὕτε ἔσπερος . . .

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴν ἔνι] ἀρετή 'στιν is the reading b. 29. of Γ M<sup>b</sup> Ald. Heliod. adopted by Bergk (*Poet. Lyr.* p. 360, 390). The authorship of the line is very doubtful: see New College Oxon. Schol. (Bywater, *Hermes* v. 356) καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοι φασὶ (originally φαμέν) τοῦτο Θεόγνιδος· εἴρηται δὲ οὗτως βούλεο δ' εὐσεβέως ὀλίγοις σὺν χρήμασιν οἰκεῖν ἢ πλούτειν ἀδίκως χρήματα πασάμενος ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσα ἀρετή. χώραν μέντοι παροιμίας ἐπέχει καὶ μέμνηται αὐτῆς ὡς παροιμίας Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ἥθων (originally θεῶν), ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἥθων ὡς Φωκυλίδης αὐτοῦ μέμνηται. καὶ ἵσως καὶ Φωκυλίδης αὐτῷ ἔχρήσατο. Iamblichus (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. i. pp. 193, 4, ed. Meineke) refers to it as 'an old saying'—'Ιαμβλίχου ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς τῆς πρὸς Ἀνατόλιον περὶ δικαιοσύνης' ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ τῶν ὅλων ἀρετῶν τέλος καὶ τὴν συναγωγὴν αὐτῶν συμπασῶν, ἐν ἦ δὴ πᾶσαι ἔνεισι συλλήβδην κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον, γένοιτο ἀν τις εἰς τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀγόμενος.

καὶ τελεία μάλιστα . . . ἀδυνατοῦσιν] These words have given the b. 30. critics much trouble. The difficulty is thus stated by Jackson (pp. 69, 70)—'From the opening words of this §, as well as from the argument generally, it is clear that the phrase πρὸς ἔτερον does not explain τελεία, but differentiates δικαιοσύνη from τελεία ἀρετή. This being so, it follows that the words ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσίς ἔστιν do not justify the statement καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, and that the words ὅτι δὲ ἔχων αὐτὴν κ.τ.λ. do not justify the statement τελεία δ' ἔστιν.' Jackson proposes to remove the difficulty by transposing

1129 b. 30. the words *καὶ τελεία μάλιστα* and *τελεία δὲ ἐστίν*. Other critics make other suggestions (see Susemihl, *app. crit. ad loc.* for an exhaustive list of their views). I believe that Ueberweg's simple suggestion—the insertion of *τελεία* after *χρῆσις ἐστιν*—which had occurred to me independently, is the best solution of the difficulty. If we make this insertion the meaning of the passage will be—'Justice is perfect excellence in the highest sense of the word "perfect" (*τελεία μάλιστα*), because it is the perfect employment (*χρῆσις τελεία*) of perfect excellence, *i. e.* its employment not merely in one's own affairs but towards one's neighbour.' The clause *ὅτι δὲ ἔχων κ.τ.λ.* explains *τελεία δὲ ἐστί* (*sc. χρῆσις*).

b. 31. [χρῆσις] 'The phrase *ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστιν* [*sc. ἡ δικαιοσύνη*],' says Jackson (p. 70), 'is strange, since *χρῆσις* is almost equivalent to *ἐνέργεια* (*Berlin Index*, s. v.), and a *ἔξις* can scarcely be identified with an *ἐνέργεια*; but cf. 2, § 10 quoted above. Apparently in this place *δικαιοσύνη* is the practice of the virtue, not the virtue itself. Aristotle would not have expressed himself so loosely.' The expression is certainly loose; but we ought not to go the length of supposing that 'in this place *δικαιοσύνη* is the practice of the virtue, not the virtue itself,'—for the writer immediately adds words which show that he is thinking of *δικαιοσύνη* as a *ἔξις*—*δὲ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἔτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι*.

1130 a. 1. § 16. *ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει*] This—the reading of K<sup>b</sup>—may be accepted as most probably correct. Susemihl prefers *ἀρχὰ τὸν ἄνδρα δείξει*. Zell quotes after Muretus *e proverbiis Graecis*—*ἀρχὴ τὸν ἄνδρα δείκνυσι, ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιεικῶν, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ ἀρχῇ βιαίων γενομένων*.

a. 2. [ἢδη] 'because the officer is *ex hypothesi* in relation to others and a member of a community,' Jackson.

a. 3. § 17. *ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν*] The editors quote Plato, *Rep.* 343 C . . . *ἀγνοεῖς* (says Thrasyllus) *ὅτι ή μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὅντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος ξυμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, ή δὲ ἀδικία τούναντίον*. Cf. *Gorgias* 483, and *E. N.* v. 6. 6 and 7.

'*Ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν ή δικαιοσύνη* expresses, in the portable form of an epigram or proverb, that view of life which is worked out on a larger scale in the various systems of 'ethical atomism' with which the student of the History of Philosophy is familiar. That view

of life—however expressed—assumes that self-love is the ultimate 1130 a. 3. spring of action. Another proverbial expression of the same view is ‘Honesty is the Best Policy.’ It is assumed that honesty or justice is something which a man *gives away* to his neighbour, for which he must be careful to get an adequate return; and the proverb asserts that, as a matter of fact, he *does* get such a return. The saying ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν η̄ δικαιοσύνη, on the other hand, suggests that he does *not* get an adequate return. It expresses the abstract point of view from which the poor man regards the capitalist, and generally the socially weaker the socially stronger; while the proverb ‘Honesty is the Best Policy’ expresses the desire (associated with an equally abstract or selfish point of view) of the man, whose position is already assured, that the political and economical *régime* under which he knows that he personally will continue to flourish may be maintained. Both proverbs represent the just man as an isolated individual who thinks only of himself—who knows that he is making a good bargain, or regrets that he is forced to make a bad one. The final cause of just action—τὸ κοινῷ συμφέρον (see *Pol.* iii. 6. 1279 a. 17) is entirely ignored by these proverbs. The hope of gain or the fear of superior strength, by itself, could not make men act ‘justly’; they would cheat, or perish in the attempt to resist, rather than act ‘justly,’ if hope of gain or fear of force were their only motive. If men act ‘justly’ it is because they really believe that κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, and are drawn, κατὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς θεῖον, to act in harmony with the law of that beautiful system in which they live and have their being; cf. Green’s *Works* vol. ii. pp. 427 (Principles of Political Obligation: G. Will, not Force, is the basis of the State).

ἄλλῳ γὰρ . . . κοινωνῷ] κοινῷ is the reading of Γ, Ald., Heliod., a. 4. B<sup>1</sup>, NC, accepted by Michelet. The weight of external authority is thus strongly in favour of κοινωνῷ, but such authority cannot be regarded as decisive here. The best MS. might easily omit the second of the two identical syllables in κοινωνῷ, or make κοινῷ into κοινωνῷ by dittograph. Accordingly we must allow internal considerations to decide between κοινῷ and κοινωνῷ. Michelet in support of κοινῷ says—‘ἡ ἀρχοντι ἡ κοινῷ referendum est ad duplex civitatum genus quod Aristoteles *Pol.* iii. 7 exponit . . . κοινωνῷ non esset diversum ab ἀρχοντι cum ii, penes quos summa imperii est, participes sint civitatis (κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πόλεως).’ Jackson reading

1130 a. 4. *κοινωνῷ* says—‘The alteration (Michelet’s) is unnecessary. The words *ἢ ἀρχοντὶ ἢ κοινωνῷ* may be paraphrased: “either that of the governing class in the case of a *παρεκβεβηκύναι πολιτεία*, or that of his fellow citizens in the case of a *πολιτεία ὄρθῃ*.”’ Thus both Michelet and Jackson agree in recognising a reference to the distinction between those states in which the governors rule for the public good, and those in which they rule for their own private advantage. But is it likely that this Aristotelian distinction is referred to in a clause which states the ground on which (*γάρ*) some have maintained the very unaristotelian doctrine that justice is *ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν?* It seems better to take the words to mean simply that the just man does what is to the advantage of another, that other being either his ruler (*ἀρχοντι*) or his neighbour (*κοινωνῷ*). In obeying the definite commands of his ruler he benefits his ruler; in dealing honestly with his neighbour he benefits his neighbour: but in neither case benefits himself. Further, the distinction between the *παρεκβεβηκύναι πολιτεία* and the *ὄρθῃ πολιτεία* turns on a difference in the conduct of the *ἀρχοντες*: but the subject of *πράττει* is the *ἀρχόμενος*, or the justice of the *ἀρχόμενος*.

Reference to the distinction between the *παρεκβεβηκύναι πολιτεῖαι* and the *ὄρθαι πολιτεῖαι* being thus excluded, we may decide in favour of the reading *κοινωνῷ*. The reading *κοινῷ*, originally due to a clerical slip, would maintain itself because it seemed to refer more pointedly than *κοινωνῷ* to this distinction which was not seen to be out of place in the context.

a. 6. § 18. *ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους]* Jackson says, ‘The first *καὶ* means “even,” i.e. “not merely towards his neighbour but”; not “both,” because friends are looked upon as part of the man himself (ix. 4. 5) and therefore cannot be identified with the *ἔτερος*.’ Rassow also (*Forsch.* p. 61), in answer to Nötel who would (with NC) omit the first *καὶ* and (with Mb) the second *πρὸς*, says—‘was hindert, das erste *καὶ* in der Bedeutung von *vel* zu fassen?’ I cannot help thinking that Rassow and Jackson are wrong here, and that we must take the first *καὶ* in the sense of ‘both,’ and *τοὺς φίλους* in the sense of ‘his neighbours.’ The writer is speaking about the *κάκιστος*, and it would be out of place in connexion with *him* to think of the doctrine of the identity of the *αὐτός* and the *φίλος*, which is formulated—as in the passage quoted here by Jackson (ix. 4. 5 *ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἅλλος αὐτός*)—to

describe the relation between *good* men. The Paraph. Heliодорус 1130 a. 6. seems to me to be right with—*ο μὲν οὖν ἑαυτόν τε βλάπτων τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ καὶ τοὺς φίλους κάκιστος*: *ο δὲ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς οὐ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον κεχρημένος συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἄριστος ἐστί.*

**ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἔτερον]** Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 61) seems to be right in a. 7. preferring ἀλλ’ *ο πρὸς ἔτερον*, the reading of Γ, Η<sup>a</sup>, Ν<sup>b</sup>, Ο<sup>b</sup>. He remarks that Bekker’s ἀλλὰ *πρὸς ἔτερον* could stand only if the foregoing words were *ο μὴ πρὸς αὐτόν*. NC has ἀλλὰ *καὶ ο πρὸς ἔτερον*.

**§ 19. οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ’ ὅλη ἀρετή]** Cf. *E. N.* vi. 12. 5 *μέρος* a. 9. *γὰρ οὖσα (sc. ἡ σοφία) τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς κ.τ.λ.*, where it would appear that *ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή* is the possession of all the ἀρεταῖ—διανοητικαὶ and ἡθικαὶ. The ἀρετή of τὸ θρεπτικὸν *μέρος* (*ὑγίεια*), however, is not an element in *ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή*: cf. *E. E.* ii. 1. 1219 b. 20 *εἴ τι μόριον ἐστι ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ θρεπτικόν, ἡ τούτου ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐστι μόριον τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς, ὃσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ τοῦ σώματος.* Here (v. 1. 19) *δικαιοσύνη* in the wide sense of the term is identified with *ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή*: and if we are to bind the writer to the meaning given to *ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή* in *E. N.* vi and in *E. E.* ii quoted above, we must suppose that the *χρῆσις πρὸς ἔτερον* of intellectual as well as of moral excellence is included in the conception of universal *δικαιοσύνη*.

**§ 20. ἐστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ’ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ’ η̄ μὲν πρὸς a. 12. ἔτερον, δικαιοσύνη, η̄ δὲ τοιάδε ἔξις ἀπλῶς, ἀρετή]** Grant brings out the meaning of this sentence with sufficient clearness—‘But what the difference is between virtue and this kind of justice is clear from what we have said already. They are the same, only conceived differently; viewed as a relation to others, the state is justice; viewed as a state of the mind simply, it is virtue.’ Here the comma is rightly placed after, not (as by Bekker) before, *ἀπλῶς*. Cf. *Met.* Λ. 10. 1075 b. 2 *τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ποιεῖ* (*ο Ἐμπεδοκλῆς*) *τὸ ἀγαθόν αὐτῇ δ’ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὡς κινοῦσα* (*συνάγει γὰρ*) *καὶ ὡς ὅλη μόριον γὰρ τοῦ μίγματος*: *εἰ δὴ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκε καὶ ὡς ὅλη ἀρχῇ εἶναι καὶ ὡς κινοῦντι, ἀλλὰ τό γε εἶναι οὐ ταῦτο*—on which Bonitz says—‘His verbis (*τό γε εἶναι οὐ ταῦτο*) *notioṇis* significari diversitatem, quasi dicat: οὐ ταῦτο ἐστι τὸ εἶναι ὅλῃ καὶ τὸ εἶναι κινοῦντι, appareat coll. *Τορ.* v. 4. 133 b. 33 ἀλλ’ ἄλλο λέγεται τῷ ἔτερον αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ εἶναι· οὐ ταῦτὸ γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ τε τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ

1130 a. 12. *εἶναι λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ*: *Phys.* iii. 3. 202 a. 20, b. 9, 12, 16, ubi promiscue usurpantur τὸ *εἶναι* τὸ αὐτό et ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός sive *εἰσ*: i. 3. 186 a. 31. al.' Cf. also the following passages quoted by the various editors—*De An.* ii. 12. 424 a. 25, iii. 2. 425 b. 25 (ἥ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἔστι καὶ μία, τὸ δὲ *εἶναι* οὐ ταύτον αὐταῖς): *E. N.* vi. 8. 1: *De Mem.* i. 450 b. 21 (τὸ ἐν τῷ πίνακι γεγραμμένον ζῷον καὶ ζῷον ἔστι καὶ εἰκὼν τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἐν τοῦτο ἔστιν ἄμφω τὸ μέντοι *εἶναι* οὐ ταύτον ἔστιν ἄμφοι, καὶ ἔστι θεωρεῖν ὡς ζῷον καὶ ὡς εἰκόνα): *De Juv. et Sen.* i. 467 b. 25 (where it is pointed out that τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἐν may be τῷ *εἶναι* πλείω καὶ ἔτερα).

That *notion* or *conception* is meant by τὸ *εἶναι* in the present section (v. 1. 20) is evident, I think, from the above parallels. Michelet, however, makes τὸ *εἶναι* here the ‘sensible substance’ as distinguished from the notion or λόγος, and quotes *Met.* M. 3. 1077 b. 12 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτε οὐσίαι μᾶλλον τῶν σωμάτων εἰσίν, οὕτε πρότερα τῷ *εἶναι* τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ μόνον, οὕτε κεχωρισμένα πον *εἶναι* δύνατόν, *εἴρηται* ίκανῶς—adding, ‘hoc loco τὸ *εἶναι* de sensibili substantia praedicatur quae *per se* existere queat: magnitudines autem mathematicae *per se* existere non posse dicuntur, sed a sensibili substantia sustentantur.’ Similarly he explains the passage *De An.* iii. 2. 425 b. 25—*αἰσθησις* and *αἰσθητόν* *exist separately*—τὸ *εἶναι* οὐ ταύτον αὐταῖς, but each *quād* separately existing is only a δύναμις. In actuality or *ἐνέργεια*, *i.e.* in real essence they are one. After all, this differs only verbally from Trendelenburg’s explanation (*De An.* p. 435, first ed.)—‘ubi res in sensum agit, sensus vero rem suscipit, ibi res et sensus in unum quasi concurrunt, ut utriusque actio quasi unam efficiat (ἥ αὐτή ἔστι καὶ μία), utriusque vero natura per se diversa sit (τὸ δὲ *εἶναι* οὐ ταύτον αὐταῖς).’ Then turning to the passage *E. N.* v. 1. 20 Michelet says—‘*Notione et substantia virtus et justicia universalis sunt idem, modo et ratione existendi* (τῷ *εἶναι*) *tantum differunt*. Firmatur hic sensus τοῦ *εἶναι* ipsa explicatione quae sequitur, cum verba ἥ μὲν πρὸς ἔτερον existendi rationem alteram, alteram vocabula ἥ δὲ τοιάδε ἔξις ἀπλῶς declarent. Sed non abnuerim his diversis existendi modis etiam diversam essentiam contineri.’ This last sentence seems to bear out the remark made above that the difference between Michelet’s explanation of τὸ *εἶναι* in *De An.* iii. 2, and that of Trendelenburg and others, who take it as = *notion*, is really only verbal. The truth is that *εἶναι* is a term which takes its colour from its context, as a technical term of such common extraction might be expected to do. Sometimes

it means what a thing *is to the senses*, sometimes, what it *is to the scientific understanding*. However, in the majority of cases in which it is used *carefully* (as in the formula  $\tau\delta\ \delta'\ \epsilon\in\nu\ i\ \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\ o\ a\ u\ t\ o\ i\ s$ ) it must be understood to mean what the thing *is to the scientific understanding*—*i. e.* as =  $\tau\delta\ t\ i\ \eta\ \epsilon\in\nu\ i$ , or  $\lambda\ o\ y\ o\ s$ . See Trendelenburg, *Rhein. Mus.* 1828, vol. ii. pp. 480, 481.

Turning now to *E.N.* v. 1. 20, we may say that virtue and universal justice are the same state conceived from different points of view, just as the same road is regarded differently by the man who stands at the top of the hill and by the man who stands at the bottom: see *Met.* K. 10. 1066 a. 33 and *Phys.* iii. 3. 202 a. 20 καὶ  $\tau\delta\ \alpha\ n\ a\ n\ t\ e\ s$  καὶ  $\tau\delta\ \kappa\ a\ t\ a\ n\ t\ e\ s$  ταῦτα γάρ ἐν μέν ἔστιν, δι μέντοι λόγος οὐχ εἰς (*Phys.*), or ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι οὐχ ἐν (*Met.*). To the one man the road *is* downhill; to the other it *is* uphill. What the road *is* is different for each.

Virtue and universal justice, then, being the same state conceived from different points of view, virtue is the state conceived simply as a state; justice is the state conceived as putting its possessor in a certain relation to society. Here the difference  $\tau\delta\ \epsilon\in\nu\ i$  between virtue and justice is evidently that between things assigned to different γένη τῶν ὄντων (see *Met.* Δ. 28. 1028 b. 13), to the category of quality and to the category of relation respectively. Now, as was pointed out in note on v. 1. 15,  $\epsilon\acute{\xi}\iota\ s$  is assigned not only to the category of ποιότης (*Cat.* 8), but also to that of πρός τι (*Cat.* 7). The moral  $\epsilon\acute{\xi}\iota\ s$ , then, considered under the category of ποιότης, is simply the *quality*, ἀρετή, and nothing more (ἀπλῶς); considered under the category of πρός τι, it is this quality viewed as putting its subject in a certain *relation to others*—δικαιοσύνη: and, being in different categories, ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη differ  $\tau\delta\ \epsilon\in\nu\ i$ , for the categories are the κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος (*Met.* Θ. 1. 1045 b. 28) ‘h. e. modi quibus esse aliquid dicimus’ (Bonitz, *ad loc.*). Cf. *Met.* Δ. 7. 1017 a. 22 καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται ὅσαπερ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας ὁσαχῶς γάρ λέγεται τοσανταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν τί ἔστι σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποιόν, τὰ δὲ ποσόν, τὰ δὲ πρός τι, τὰ δὲ ποιέν ή πάσχειν, τὰ δὲ ποῦ, τὰ δὲ ποτέ, ἔκαστῳ τούτων τὸ εἶναι ταῦτὸ σημαίνει: on which Alexander (331 l. 27) has —τὴν γάρ οἰκείαν ὑπαρξίν ἔκάστου σημαίνει τὸ ὃν ὁμώνυμον . . . δεκαχῶς καὶ τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ρήθησεται· τὸ μὲν γάρ τῇ οὐσίᾳ συντασσόμενον εἶναι τὴν οὐσιώδη ὑπαρξίν σημαίνει, τῷ δὲ ποσῷ τὴν ὡς ποσοῦ κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Met.* Γ. 2. 1003 b. 5 καὶ τὸ ὃν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μέν, ἀλλ' ἄπαν

1130 a. 12. πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι ὅντα λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας κ.τ.λ. Cf. *An. Pr.* i. 37. 49 a. 6 τὸ δὲ ὑπάρχειν τόδε τῷδε καὶ τὸ ἀληθεύεσθαι τόδε κατὰ τοῦδε τοσαυταχῶς ληπτέον ὄσαχῶς αἱ κατηγορίαι διῆρηνται.

Mich. Eph. has the following comment on the present section—  
 τῷ μὲν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐν ἔστι (*sc.* ἀρετὴ and δικαιοσύνη), πῆ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ὡς ἔξις ψυχῆς σκοπῆται ἀρίστῃ καὶ μηδὲν πλέον, ἀρετὴ λέγεται, ὅταν δὲ ὡς χρῆσις πρὸς ἔτερον, δικαιοσύνη ὄνομάζεται.

## CHAPTER II.

### ARGUMENT.

*Concerning the second kind of justice, i.e. the justice which is a particular virtue, not the virtuous character as a whole: and concerning the corresponding injustice.*

There is such a kind of injustice, for ‘taking too much’ is a distinct kind of wrong doing, which has as much right to be assigned to its own vice as running away in battle, and using abusive language, have to be assigned to their respective vices. In these latter cases it is true that we have special names cowardice and bad temper for the vices; whereas for the vice which disposes a man to take too much we have no special name, only the general name of all vice—injustice. But the absence of a special name must not be allowed to make us overlook the existence of the vice, which not only has its own acts which cannot be mistaken, but even displays itself sometimes in acts commonly assigned to other vices, as e.g. when adultery is committed for gain, not from lust. In short, when a man has taken more than his share of gain we say that he is unjust, as we say that he is cowardly when he runs away in battle, or profligate when he has committed adultery. Thus we must distinguish injustice in the specific sense, and injustice in the generic sense—two states which have the same name and involve the same notion of ‘relation towards other people,’ but differ in that injustice in the specific sense is concerned with social position, money, and other external good things, which men take pleasure in acquiring too much of at the expense of their neighbours, whereas injustice in the generic sense is concerned with the whole sphere of man’s activity as a moral agent.

‘Contrary to law’ being the whole under which ‘unfair’ falls as a part, particular injustice, which is relative to the unfair, will be a ‘part’ of universal injustice, which is relative to that which is contrary to law. Similarly, particular justice is a part of universal justice. With universal injustice, then, which is coextensive with that vice against which all legislation and state educa-

tion are directed, and with universal justice, which is coextensive with that virtue which all legislation and state education strive to produce, we have now no more to do: nor shall we at present discuss the question whether there is or is not another kind of virtue—that of the good man, as such,—produced by other agencies than those of legislation and state education:—our present subject is particular justice.

Particular justice is of two kinds, (1) distributive, and (2) corrective: and corrective justice finds a place both in (a) voluntary transactions (e. g. buying, lending), and in (b) involuntary transactions, whether these latter imply stealth and deception, as theft, or violence, as murder.

§ 1. τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην] Spengel (p. 207) rejects 1130 a. 14. ἀρετῆς as an explanatory addition. The passages collected by Waitz (*Organon* i. 375) and Eucken (*über den Sprachgebrauch des Ar.* p. 24 sq.), to whom Jackson (*ad loc.*) refers, for the equivalence of *ἐν μέρει* and *κατὰ μέρος*, give no instance of *ἐν μέρει* with a genitive; but below § 3. 1130 a. 23 we have *καὶ ἀδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου = ὡς μέρος τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου*.

§§ 2-5.] Nötel (*Quaest. Arist. Specimen* p. 11) would omit § 5, a. 16. because it merely repeats the argument of § 2. But we must not press the writer too hard in a passage like this, remembering that we have here merely to do with *σημεῖα*, and that grounds which might easily be shown to be *logically* identical, may present themselves superficially in popular thought and language as different, and hence may be used as distinct *σημεῖα* by a method which appeals to such thought and language. The writer wishes to show that there is such a vice as ‘particular injustice.’ In § 2 he enumerates the various acts which are considered wrong (*i. e.* unjust in the general sense), and assigns them to the special vices from which they spring, in order to show that the act of ‘taking too much’ (*ὅταν πλεονεκτῇ*) exists as a wrong act distinct from the others, and is left without an explaining vice, unless we admit the existence of ‘particular injustice’ (*ἥ ἐν μέρει ἀδικία*). In § 4 he shows further that this vice of particular injustice must sometimes be assumed to account for acts which seem at first sight to proceed from other vices—as when an act of adultery does not proceed from *ἀκολασία* but from the desire of gain—*τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἔνεκα*: and in § 5 he finally clinches the matter by means of this term *κερδαίνειν*, which has turned up in § 4, pointing out that, as we always refer other wrong actions (*ἀδικήματα*) to their definite vices—adultery to *ἀκολασία*, flight to *δειλίᾳ*, so, as a matter of fact, we always refer an

1130 a. 16. act from which a man derives gain unfairly (*εἰ ἐκέρδανεν*) to ἀδικία. The reference here is evidently to as definite a vice as it is in the case of adultery or flight; but this definite vice has only the *general name* ‘injustice’—ἀδικία. The name therefore is to be understood here in a *specific sense*. He has, in short, found that *κερδάνειν* has a well-recognised coordinate place in popular language by the side of *μοιχεύειν*, &c., and gives as definite a sense to the ἀδικία from which it proceeds as is possessed by ἀκολασία, &c. At the same time it must be conceded to those who, with Nötel, would omit § 5, that its omission would not materially weaken the argument. Its retention, however, is to be defended on the ground that, occurring in a passage which appeals to popular language, it makes use of the term *κερδάνειν*, whereas the term employed in § 2 is *πλεονεκτεῖν*. The difference between *πλεονεκτεῖν* and *κερδάνειν* may not be great; but we must remember that *κέρδος* is a term which is to hold a prominent place in the subsequent discussion of particular justice, and is worth dwelling on in an introductory passage like the present<sup>1</sup>. Before leaving this question of the relation of § 5 to the preceding sections, we must notice Susemihl’s attempt to meet Nötel’s difficulty by placing a comma after *κερδάνειν* 1130 a. 28, and reading ὅτι for εἴτι in the same line. I do not think the change necessary, and Susemihl is mistaken in saying that K<sup>b</sup> has ὅτι here. It is in line 24, not in line 28, that K<sup>b</sup> has ὅτι for εἴτι.

a. 22. § 2. καὶ κατ’ ἀδικίαν] καὶ = οἵτοι.

a. 27. § 4. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδάνειν] sc. ἀδικος λέγεται. Fritzsche.

a. 33. § 6. συνώνυμος . . . δύναμιν] Cf. E. N. v. 1. 7, where universal and particular injustice were said to be δύναμιν, and see note *ad loc.*, in which it was pointed out that, as there regarded, they are more properly τὰ πρὸς ἐν λεγόμενα than δύναμιν. Here, however, they are regarded from a somewhat different logical point of view, and can, with technical correctness, be called συνώνυμα. They are regarded, in short, as belonging to the same Category (δ ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει)—that of Relation (ἄμφω ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἔτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν);

<sup>1</sup> Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 17) says ‘1130 a. 28-32 (§ 5) ist wohl mit Unrecht von Nötel als Wiederholung von 1130 a. 16-22 (§ 2) verdächtigt. So verwandt nämlich die beiden Abschnitte dem Inhalte nach sind, so ist doch noch ein Unterschied der Gedanken zu erkennen.’ Unfortunately Rassow does not explain his view of the nature of this difference.

and thus having the same *τι ἔστιν* or *οὐσία* (viz. the *τι ἔστιν* or *οὐσία* 1130 a. 33.) characteristic of the *σχῆμα, γένος*, or Category of *πρός τι*), they are properly *συνώνυμα*: for (*Cat.* 1. 1 a. 6) *συνώνυμα λέγεται ὅν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός*. For the doctrine that the *τι ἔστιν* which the *δρισμός* declares has a different character in each category see *Met.* Z. 4. 1030 a. 17 καὶ ὁ δρισμὸς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τι ἔστι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ τι ἔστι ἕνα μὲν τρόπον σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι, ἄλλον δὲ ἔκαστον τῶν κατηγορουμένων, ποσόν, ποιόν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅμοίως ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρώτως τοῖς δ' ἐπομένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τι ἔστιν ἀπλῶς μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, πῶς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιὸν ἐρούμεθ' ἀν τι ἔστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τῶν τι ἔστι μέν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς.

On the passage before us (v. 2. 6) Mich. Eph. has the following—  
*ἔθος δὲ Ἀριστοτέλει συνώνυμα λέγειν, καὶ τὰ ἀφ' ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἐν λέγομενα, ἀ ὡς ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, μεταξύ ἔστι τῶν τε συνωνύμων καὶ τῶν κυρίως ὅμωνύμων, ὅτι ὁ δρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λέγεται. ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἔτερον. ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοῦ παρόντος βιβλίου μέχρι καὶ τοῦδε τὴν ἐν μέρει κακίαν συνώνυμον λέγει τῇ δλῃ κακίᾳ, ἦτοι τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀδικίαν τῇ δλῃ ἀδικίᾳ. εἰσὶ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ συνώνυμοι, ἀλλὰ μέσαι τῶν συνωνύμων καὶ ὅμωνύμων. δι' ὃν παρατίθεται ἐμφαίνει ὡς οὐχ ἀπλῶς συνωνύμως τὰς ἀδικίας ἐκάλει, ἀλλὰ πῆ, οἷα ἔστι τὰ ἀφ' ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἐν, ἀ τρόπον μέν τινα συνώνυμα ἔστιν, ὡς ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ δέδεικται, τρόπον δέ τινα ὅμωνυμα. καθ' ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ὁ δρισμὸς αὐτῶν, ὡς αὐτός φησιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτο συνώνυμον ἔστι. πῶς δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ ἐν τίνι γένει ἐδήλωσεν εἰπών—ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἔτερον, ἢ τε κοινὴ ἀδικία, καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἡν ἐπὶ μέρος λέγομεν. ἀμφότεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀδικίαι ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἔτερος ἀμαρτάνειν τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσι. κατὰ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο συνώνυμοι εἰσί. καθ' ὅσον δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐν μέρει ἀδικία ἡ κατὰ πλεονεξίαν περὶ τιμήν ἔστι καὶ χρήματα —λέγοι δ' ἀν τιμὴν καὶ χρήματα τὰ τυχηρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν—ἐν οὖς δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους ἡ πλεονεξία, ἡ δὲ καθόλου ἀδικία περὶ πάντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ νόμος καὶ σπουδαῖος, κατὰ δὴ τοῦτο πάλιν ὅμωνυμοι εἰσὶν αἱ ἀδικίαι. It will be observed that Mich. Eph. here describes the common *γένος* or category of the two kinds of justice as a common *εἶναι*.*

*περὶ τιμὴν . . . καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν]* Here apparently the *sphere* and the b. 2. motive of particular injustice are distinguished: but the Paraph. Heliod. has ἡ μὲν μερικὴ περὶ χρήματα ἡ σωτηρίαν ἡ περὶ ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους.

The *ἄδικος*, in the specific sense, actuated by the desire of ‘gain,’ seeks to have more than his share of social consideration, money,

1130 b. 2. or personal security (*e.g.* he tries to avoid risks which he should share equally with his fellow-citizens); the *ἀδικος* in the wide sense of the term is he who fails in all, or some, of those various social relations in which the good man succeeds.

b. 6. §§ 7-11.] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 17) suspects the whole passage, 1130 b. 6 *ὅτι . . . 1130 b. 29 παντί*. After refusing to accept Nötel's view that 1130 a. 28-32 is a repetition of 1130 a. 16-22, he says 'Eher hat man Grund, an der ersten Hälfte des folgenden Capitels (bis 1130 b. 29) Anstoss zu nehmen, die den Charakter grosser Breite und Weitschweifigkeit trägt und die sich ohne alle Beeinträchtigung des Gedankenganges aus dem Texte ausscheiden lässt. So sind die Worte (Z. 16) *ῶστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον κ.τ.λ.* ganz leer, da schon das vorhergehende Capitel von der *justitia particularis* gehandelt hat. Vor allem befremdend aber ist das Zurückkommen auf das *νόμιμον δίκαιον*, über das schon, p. 1129 b. 11 ff. des längeren gesprochen ist.' The passage is certainly chargeable with the faults here brought against it by Rassow; but to bracket it, with Susemihl, is to pledge oneself to a more definite theory of the authorship and composition of this Book than I am prepared to do.

b. 7. *παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν*] Spengel (pp. 207, 8) rejects *ἀρετήν* as a blundering insertion: it is *δικαιοσύνην* which must be understood after *ὅλην*.

b. 8. *τίς δὲ καὶ ποία τις*] For this phrase see note on *E.N.* i. 7. 19, a. 31.

b. 8. § 8. *διώρισται κ.τ.λ.*] 'now, two senses of "the unjust" have been distinguished, viz. "the illegal" and "the unfair."'

b. 10. § 9. *ἐπεὶ . . . b. 14. ὅλα*] Bekker's text here is *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλέον οὐ ταῦτὸν ἀλλ' ἔτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἄπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλέον), καὶ τὸ ἀδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταῦτά, ἀλλ' ἔτερα ἔκεινων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη, τὰ δὲ ὡς ὅλα.* This text seems to be given, without admixture, only by L<sup>b</sup> and N<sup>b</sup>. All other MSS. mix it up more or less with readings belonging to the text adopted by Bywater. The only possible explanation of the text given by L<sup>b</sup> and N<sup>b</sup> is that offered by Mich. Eph. and accepted by Michelet and Grant—viz. that as the *ἄνισον* is a genus under which the *πλέον* falls as a species (the *ἔλαττον* being the other

species), so universal justice is a genus under which particular <sup>1130 b. 10.</sup> justice falls as a species (courage, temperance, &c. being the other species),—‘what is said about “more” and “unequal” having nothing to do with *πλεονεξία*, but being simply an *illustration* of a part included by a whole’—Grant: or, as Mich. Eph. puts it—*ἔξ ἀναλόγου τινὸς δείκνυσι τὴν διαφορὰν τῆς τε μερικῆς ἀδικίας καὶ τῆς μερικῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ὅλης, δυνάμει λέγων, ὡς τὸ πλέον πρὸς τὸ ἄνισον οὕτως ἡ μερική δικαιοσύνη πρὸς τὴν ὅλην δικαιοσύνην.* Now, putting aside for the moment the question of the MS. authority for the text which calls for this interpretation, we may note the following difficulties connected with the interpretation itself in its context. In § 8 *τὸ ἄνισον* marks the sphere of particular injustice: here, in the very next section, we are asked to believe that it ‘has nothing to do with *πλεονεξία*,’ but is introduced (with *τὸ πλέον*) simply as ‘an illustration.’ And of what? Of the relation of part to whole: as if that required illustration. Further, *ἐπεὶ* is a conjunction which introduces a reason, not a mere illustration or parallel. Again,—although this may perhaps seem a small point—if *τὸ ἄνισον* is the genus or whole, and *τὸ πλέον* the species or part, the order being (1) *ἄνισον* and (2) *πλέον*, why have we this order reversed in the explaining clause *ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον?* (cf. Jackson, p. 74, who notices this last point).

From this review of the *ἀπορία* suggested by the interpretation of it we see that Bekker’s text cannot possibly be right. The protasis introduced by *ἐπεὶ* must give the *reason* for the apodosis *καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ’ ἐτέρα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ’ ὡς ὅλα*<sup>1</sup>: but the relation of the *ἄνισον* to the *πλέον* as Mich. Eph., Michelet, and Grant explain it (and their explanation is the only one consistent with the parenthesis of Bekker’s text), is not a *reason*. Accordingly Bekker’s text must be altered so as to make *ἐπεὶ* introduce a reason. Now, the *reason* why particular justice is a ‘part’ of universal justice can only be that it is (as notion—*τὸ ἄδικον*, and state—*ἡ ἀδικία*) related to a definite part of that field of conduct with the entire extent of which universal justice is concerned. The text adopted by Jackson, Susemihl, Ramsauer, and Bywater, with *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον κ.τ.λ.*, supplies this reason. Another internal ground for reading *παράνομον*, though a small one in com-

<sup>1</sup> I shall give my reason below for beginning the apodosis here, with most editors, not at *ὅστε* (line 16) with Jackson and Susemihl, who substitute a comma for Bekker’s full stop after *δικαιοσύνης* (line 16).

1130 b. 10. parison with that just mentioned, is that the words  $\omega\varsigma \mu\acute{e}ros \pi\rho\acute{o}s$  (or  $\kappa\acute{a}l$ )  $\ddot{\delta}lo\acute{v}$  given by all MSS. no longer seem to reverse the proper order of the two terms. So much for the internal grounds in favour of the  $\pi\acute{a}ra\acute{n}o\acute{m}o\acute{v}$  text.

For the external grounds in its favour see Bywater's *app. crit. ad loc.*, and Jackson's note, pp. 73, 74. It may be added that CCC agrees with Kb Pb and Camb. in reading  $\pi\acute{a}ra\acute{n}o\acute{m}o\acute{v} \pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v}$ , and with Kb in reading  $\kappa\acute{a}l \pi\rho\acute{o}s$ .

It remains to notice Spengel's view of this passage (pp. 208, 9)—a view which, I think, cannot be summarily rejected as wrong, although the MS. evidence seems to me to be rather against it than for it. At any rate it is a view which, whether right or wrong, is most instructive as a specimen of textual criticism. It is simply that the parenthesis ( $\tau\acute{o} \mu\acute{e}n \gamma\acute{a}p \pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v} \dot{\alpha}pa\acute{v} \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v}, \tau\acute{o} \delta\acute{e} \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v} o\acute{u} \pi\acute{a}n \pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v}$ ) is a later interpolation introduced to explain the foregoing words,  $\acute{e}pe\acute{i} \delta\acute{e} \tau\acute{o} \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v} \kappa\acute{a}l \tau\acute{o} \pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v}$ , by a scribe who understood them as Mich. Eph. does. The parenthesis omitted, the sentence runs clearly, and may be paraphrased thus— $\acute{e}pe\acute{i} \delta\acute{e} \tau\acute{o} \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v}$ —**τούτεστι τὸ πλέον**— $o\acute{u} \tauau\acute{t}o\acute{v} \tau\acute{w} \pi\acute{a}ra\acute{n}o\acute{m}o\acute{v} \acute{a}ll\acute{a} \acute{e}te\acute{r}o\acute{v} \omega\varsigma \mu\acute{e}ros \pi\rho\acute{o}s$   $\ddot{\delta}lo\acute{v}$ ,  $\kappa\acute{a}l \tau\acute{o} \acute{a}dikov \kappa\acute{a}l \acute{h} \acute{a}dikia \acute{u}v \tauau\acute{t}a \kappa.\tau.\lambda.$  Spengel's words are—‘Man streiche den Erklärungssatz  $\tau\acute{o} \mu\acute{e}n \gamma\acute{a}p \pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v} \dot{\alpha}pa\acute{v} \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v}, \tau\acute{o} \delta\acute{e} \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v} o\acute{u} \pi\acute{a}n \pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v}$  und alles ist richtig . . . Nicht den Unterschied von  $\acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v}$  und  $\pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v}$  will Aristoteles geben, sondern den von  $\pi\acute{a}ra\acute{n}o\acute{m}o\acute{v}$  und  $\acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v}$ ; er sagt, dieses  $\acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v}$  oder  $\pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v}$  (dieses hebt er hervor, weil die Ungerechtigkeit zumeist in der  $\pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{n}e\xi\acute{a}$  besteht) ist nur ein Theil von dem  $\pi\acute{a}ra\acute{n}o\acute{m}o\acute{v}$ , folglich das Fehlen in diesem nur  $\omega\varsigma \mu\acute{e}ros$  von dem gesammten  $\pi\acute{a}ra\acute{n}o\acute{m}o\acute{v}$ , d. h. die specielle  $\acute{a}dikia$  von der gesammten  $\acute{a}dikia$ .’ The reading  $\acute{e}pe\acute{i} \delta\acute{e} \tau\acute{o} \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v} \kappa\acute{a}l \tau\acute{o} \pi\acute{a}ra\acute{n}o\acute{m}o\acute{v}$  Spengel regards as due merely to the attempt to mend a text already put out of joint by the interpolated parenthesis, which itself, instead of being struck out, was altered into  $\tau\acute{o} \mu\acute{e}n \gamma\acute{a}p \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v} \dot{\alpha}pa\acute{v} \pi\acute{a}ra\acute{n}o\acute{m}o\acute{v}, \tau\acute{o} \delta\acute{e} \pi\acute{a}ra\acute{n}o\acute{m}o\acute{v} o\acute{u}v \dot{\alpha}pa\acute{v} \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v}$ . There is perhaps no place in the *E. N.* where the MSS. show so much confusion as they do here<sup>1</sup>, and I am far from feeling sure that the  $\pi\acute{a}ra\acute{n}o\acute{m}o\acute{v}$  text which I have adopted is *verbally* correct, although there can

<sup>1</sup> Of this confusion the Paraphrast's hopelessly unmeaning note is a fair measure— $\acute{e}pe\acute{i} \delta\acute{e} \tau\acute{o} \pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v} o\acute{u} \tauau\acute{t}o\acute{v} \acute{e}st\acute{t}i \tau\acute{w} \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v}, \acute{a}ll\acute{a} \acute{e}st\acute{t}i \tau\acute{o} \mu\acute{e}n \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v} \acute{w}so\acute{p}er \ddot{\delta}lo\acute{v}, \tau\acute{o} \delta\acute{e} \pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v} \omega\varsigma \mu\acute{e}ros$  ( $\tau\acute{o} \gamma\acute{a}p \pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v} \kappa\acute{a}l \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v}, o\acute{u} \pi\acute{a}n \delta\acute{e} \tau\acute{o} \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v} \pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v}$ )  $\acute{e}st\acute{t}i \tauis \acute{a}dikia \kappa\acute{a}l \pi\acute{e}ri \tau\acute{o} \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v} \acute{a}ll\acute{a} \acute{h} ai o\acute{u}k \acute{a}n \acute{e}le\acute{v} ai a\acute{u}ta\acute{l} \acute{a}dikia\acute{t}$   $\acute{a}ll\acute{a} \acute{h} \mu\acute{e}n \pi\acute{e}ri \tau\acute{o} \pi\acute{l}\acute{e}o\acute{v} \mu\acute{e}rik\acute{h} \acute{e}st\acute{t}ai \acute{a}dikia, \acute{h} \delta\acute{e} \pi\acute{e}ri \tau\acute{o} \acute{a}ni\acute{s}o\acute{v} \acute{a}dikia, \acute{a}ab\acute{h}lo\acute{v}$ .

be no doubt that the meaning which it gives is that which the writer 1130 b. 10. wished to convey. Spengel's text, however, gives this meaning equally well; but, as I have said, I think that the MS. evidence (such as it is) is rather against than for it. It is only this scruple which retains me from going even further than Spengel—viz. from striking out, not only the parenthesis, but the words *καὶ τὸ πλέον*, which he supposes to have suggested the parenthesis. K<sup>b</sup> and CCC with *καὶ πρός* might then be explained as giving a reading in which *καὶ*, necessitated by the insertion of *either καὶ τὸ πλέον or καὶ τὸ παράνομον*, had established itself without extruding *πρός*, which would alone be admissible if *neither καὶ τὸ πλέον nor καὶ τὸ παράνομον* were allowed a place in the text.

**ὡστε . . . b. 18. ὡσαύτως]** Rassow (p. 17) says ‘Diese Worte sind b. 16. ganz leer, da schon das vorhergehende Capitel von der justicia particularis gehandelt hat’; and Ramsauer brackets them saying—‘Quae deinceps, l. 16, adjungitur sententia (**ὡστε . . . ὡσαύτως**) hoc quidem loco post reliqua interposita, imprimis postquam bis dictum est **ξητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην** (a. 14) et **τίς δὲ καὶ ὅποια τις ληπτέον** (b. 7) ita est inanis ut ne excusari quidem possit.’ If this judgment is correct (and it may well be), the question of making the apodosis begin with **ὡστε** does not arise. As, however, ‘bracketing’ is a somewhat gratuitous act in the case of a sentence belonging to such a loosely organised passage as the present (§§ 7–11), it is perhaps better to leave the words **ὡστε . . . ὡσαύτως** in the text—not as introducing an apodosis (Jackson and Susemihl), but as a statement made in consequence of the conclusion *καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἄδικία* b. 13 . . . *δικαιοσύνης* b. 16, which is the real apodosis to the protasis introduced, b. 10, by *ἐπει*. That apodosis stated that particular justice is a *μέρος* of universal justice; then follows the clause before us which runs—‘So (**ὡστε**), since this *ἐν μέρει* justice exists, as distinguished above, we must discuss it.’

**§ 10. διοριστέον]** Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 93) conjectures *ἀφοριστέον*, b. 22. referring to *ἀφείσθω* in b. 20 above, and comparing *E. N.* i. 7. 12. 1098 a. 1. I think that *διοριστέον* is right, and that the clause means—‘And how the justice and injustice corresponding to these states are to be determined is easily explained’: then follows the explanatory clause with *γάρ*. The *διορισμός* here is easy, and is given on the spot; not so in the case mentioned in the next section, where it has to be postponed—*ὕστερον διοριστέον* 1130 b. 28.

- 1130 b. 22. σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων] ‘the great majority of the acts which are “according to law.”’ Mich. Eph. explains σχεδόν here by pointing out that there are νόμιμα which refer, not to the moral conduct of the citizens, but to the practice of the various arts and trades: he says—ἔστι δὲ οὖν τινὰ τῶν νομίμων ἃ οὐ περὶ τοῦ πᾶς δεῖ ζῆν διορίζεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πᾶς ἀν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι καὶ ἐνάρετοι γένουντο οἱ πολῖται, εἰσηγοῦνται. δὲ γὰρ ἔμφρων νομοθέτης οὐ μόνον περὶ τούτων νομοθετεῖ καθ’ ἃ δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς τῆς αὐτῆς πολιτείας μετέχοντας, οἶν περὶ οἰκοδόμων, περὶ ὑφαντῶν, περὶ ἀπλῶς πάντων τεχνιτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ γεωργῶν καὶ στρατηγῶν καὶ ἐμπορίων, καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν δὲ ὡν οἱ πολῖται συνίστανται, οὐ μόνον δὴ περὶ τούτων νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ δὴ πρότερον περὶ τῆς παιδείας τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ νομίμων πολιτῶν προαγορεύει. For τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενα (or προσταττόμενα) in this §, and τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὀλης ἀρετῆς in § 11, see note on v. i. 13. b. 17. For καθ’ ἔκαστην . . . κωλύει ὁ νόμος see same note.
- b. 23. § 11. παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν] ‘The education of a man as a citizen’—Peters: *i.e.* his education for (*πρὸς*) the life which he must lead as a member of the state, or *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία*.
- τῆς καθ’ ἔκαστον παιδείας] ‘the education of the individual as such’—Peters.
- b. 27. ἀπλῶς ἀνήρ ἀγαθός ἔστι] ‘simply a good man’—*i.e.* ‘good’ in the sense in which we use the term when we apply it to a man without the *πρόσθεσις* of such qualifying circumstances as we specify when, *e.g.* we call him ‘good, *as the citizen of an oligarchical state*’: for ‘good’ means one thing when applied to the citizen of an oligarchical state, and another thing when applied to the citizen of a democratical state—*i.e.* ‘a good citizen’ is a man who helps to maintain a particular social system, whether that system be good or bad: see *Pol. Γ. 2. 1276 b. 28* τῶν πολιτῶν . . . ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἔστι, κοινωνία δὲ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτεία· διόπερ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἔστι πλειώ πολιτείας εἴδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν. τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμὲν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὅντα σπουδαῖον μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ’ ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, φανερόν. What then is this ἀρετὴ καθ’ ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ—this goodness *without qualification* καθ’ ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνήρ ἀγαθός ἔστι? In the *Politics* Aristotle certainly identifies it with the goodness of a certain *citizen*, viz. the citizen of the Best, *i.e.* the Aristocratical State: *Pol. Δ. 5. 1293 b. 3* τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν

ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν 1130 b. 27. ἀνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιου προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐν μόνῃ γάρ ἀπλῶς δὲ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἔστιν, οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαῖς ἀγαθοῖ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσι τὴν αὐτῶν. Cf. *Pol.* Γ. 7. 1283 b. 43 πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν δὲ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἔστι, καθ' ἕκαστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἔτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμειος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν. This identification of the good citizen and the good man in the aristocratical state depends on Aristotle's doctrine that in that state the rulers are not a privileged caste distinct from the ruled, but the elders of a homogeneous people (*i.e.* a people consisting of citizens *who are all good*, *Pol.* Η. 12. 1332 a. 32 ἀλλὰ μὴν σπουδαία γε πόλις ἔστι τῷ τοὺς πολίτας τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαῖος· ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολῖται μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας) —the *natural*, not the arbitrarily constituted rulers. This result, however, he reaches through a dialectical process of considerable complexity: see *Pol.* Γ. 2. 1276 b. 40 ἐπειδὴ ἀδύνατον δομοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἀν εἴη ἀρετὴ μία πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ: but perhaps, he continues, we may identify the goodness of the good man and the goodness of a *particular* citizen—viz. the citizen who is a '*good ruler*'—1277 a. 13 ἀλλ' ἀρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα σπουδαῖον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον: then 1277 a. 20 εἰ δὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἄρχοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δὲ ἔστι καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀν εἴη ἀπλῶς πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός, τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου οὐ γάρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου. In the aristocratical state, however, the rulers are men who have learnt to rule well by being well ruled. The education in the ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἄρχοντος is begun and carried on in the person of the ἀρχόμενος. The distinction between ἄρχων and ἀρχόμενος is not an absolute one—the ἀρχόμενος is *δυνάμει* the ἄρχων. If we regard especially the *continuity* of the citizen's life in the Best State (and in the Best State—ἡ κατὰ φύσιν πόλις—the citizen's life is a *continuous natural development*), we shall say that the ἀρετὴ of the citizen and the ἀρετὴ of the good man, are identical; if we give prominence to the fact that there are always *two generations*—the younger and the older—the former of which is educated and ruled by the latter, we shall say that the ἀρετὴ of the good man (= good ruler), and the ἀρετὴ of the citizen, are different. See *Pol.* Γ. 2. 1277 b. 7 ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἄρχη καθ' ἥν ἄρχει τῶν ὅμοιων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. ταύτην γάρ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἄρχην, ἥν δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀρχόμενον μαθεῖν . . . διὸ

1130 b. 27. λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἄρξαι μὴ ἀρχθέντα. τούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω: then 1277 b. 25 ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἕστιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθῆς· ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλοποιὸς ὁ ἀρχόμενος, δὲ ἄρχων αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος. πότερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδάίου ἡ ἐτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἐτέρα, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. Cf. also *Pol.* H. 13. 1332 b. 32 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀναμφισβήτητον . . . ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαιρεσιν, ποιήσασα τῷ γένει ταῦτα τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὃν τοῖς μὲν ἄρχεσθαι πρέπει τοῖς δὲ ἄρχειν . . . ἔστι μὲν ἄρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἐτέρους. ὥστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ἔστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἐτέραν εἶναι. τόν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναι φασὶ δεῖν πρῶτον . . . 1333 a. 11 ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτικὸν καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός, τὸν δὲ αὐτὸν ἀρχόμενόν τε δεῖν γίνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄρχοντα ὑστερον, τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματεύεσθαι, ὅπως ἀνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γίνωνται, καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς. The outcome of all is that the legislator should strive to make his fellow-citizens *good men*. The answer given by the *Politics* to the question before us is—that it is *πολιτική*, and no other agency, which conducts the παιδεία καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἔστι. The virtue of the perfectly good *man* is determined πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν—*Pol.* Γ. 12. 1288 a. 39 φανερὸν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συστήσειν ἄν τις ἀριστοκρατούμενην ἡ βασιλευμένην, ὥστε ἔσται καὶ παιδεία καὶ ηθη ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικόν. But the writer of the Fifth Book of the *Ethics*, in the alternative ἡ ἐτέρας (v. 2. 11), seems to suggest a point of view which is foreign to the *Politics*—viz. that the good *man* may possibly spring up under influences, and manifest his goodness under conditions with which the legislator has nothing to do. This seems to be the *suggestion* thrown out in the present passage; and it may be thought that this suggestion appears as a definite doctrine at the end of the *E.E.* where the place of *καλοκαγαθία* is determined. But we must not make too much of the difference between the *καλοκαγαθία* of Eudemus and the ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός of the *Politics*. In both conceptions we have an ideal excellence which man approaches along the line traced for

him by *πολιτική*. Aristotle indeed describes the Chief End of man 1130 b. 27. as *θεωρία της* (*E.N.* x. 8. 8), and Eudemus as *τὸ τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν* (*E.E.* Θ. 3. 1249 b. 20); but these descriptions must not be allowed to mislead us. If the systems of Aristotle and of Eudemus, as wholes, have any weight, it is to impress the conviction that the Chief End, however described, is not something which we must pass through and out of social life to reach; but that, on the contrary, it is social life itself at its best. It is true that Aristotle's theory of the Best Life, *as a theory*, is defective. He is forced to pronounce the life 'impossible,' because theoretically he regards it as a *fixed type* of excellence. But his practice carries him beyond his theory. He urges us to *strive after* the ideal although it is 'impossible of attainment' (*E.N.* x. 7. 8). He thus divines that the ideal is, after all, not something *unrealisable*; that, on the contrary, *it is being always realised* in the amelioration of the life itself which we have inherited and transmit: just as the type *Horse* is not something *χωριστόν* which all horses *fail of attaining to*, but rather that which they *perfect* in their generations.

We may take it then that there can be no doubt about the view of Aristotle and Eudemus. In so far as a man is *σπουδαῖος* or *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός* it is *πολιτική* which makes him such.

If the writer of v. 2. 11 is neither Aristotle nor Eudemus, it is impossible of course to determine his view, as he does not return to the subject. He seems to suggest a view different from that of Aristotle and Eudemus: but, as he belongs at least to their school, the presumption is that he really shared their view, and that, after all, *ἡ ἔτερας* is surplusage. Grant seems to make too much of the present passage when he founds on it the statement 'Eudemus [with whom he identifies the Writer of the Fifth Book] would seem to have wished to take up the question where Aristotle left it, and —with the view of giving a separate existence to Morals as a science—to ask whether there is not a kind of education, not falling within the province of Politics, which aims at producing the virtues of the individual man, as distinct from those of the citizen.'

**οὐ γὰρ ἵσως . . . παντὶ]** This is Aristotle's view as expressed b. 28. e.g. in *Pol. Γ. 2. 1276 b. 34* (quoted in last note) *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὅντα σπουδαῖον μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἥν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, φανερόν*—a view which we have seen is not inconsistent with the doctrine that the *ἀρετὴ καθ' ἥν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ* is the work of *πολιτική*: but the writer of the passage before us (v. 2. 11) adduces it as if

1130 b. 28. it raised a presumption in favour of the supposition that an agency different from πολιτική may be instrumental in producing such ἀρετή. There is indeed much confusion of thought in the passage, and to found on it any conclusion so important as that regarding the writer's doctrine of the relation between 'Politics' and 'Morals' seems to be a very hazardous proceeding. The confusion is increased by the Paraph. Heliod. who seems to think that the reference is to a distinction between the good man and the good citizen similar to that drawn already (v. i. 20) between ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη.

The phrase τὸ ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι is equivalent to 'the notion "good man"—'the being a good man': see *de An.* ii. 1. 412 b. 12 ἥν μὲν γὰρ ἀν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο. *An. Post.* ii. 4. 91 b. 4 τὸ ζῷῳ εἶναι κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἀληθὲς γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ζῷῳ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ πάντα ἀνθρωπον ζῷον, ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε ἐν εἶναι. *Met. Γ.* 4. 1006 b. 22 εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει ἔτερον τὸ ἀνθρωπός καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀνθρωπός δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ· ὥστ’ ἔσται τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι· ἐν γὰρ ἔσται:—and further on 1007 a. 20 δλως δ’ ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι πάντα γὰρ ἀνάγκη συμβεβηκέναι φάσκειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἡ ζῷῳ εἶναι τί ἦν εἶναι μὴ εἶναι. *Met. Z.* 15. 1039 b. 20 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ οὐσία ἔτέρα τὸ τε σύνολον καὶ δύ λόγος (λέγω δ’ ὅτι ἡ μὲν οὕτως ἔστιν οὐσία σὺν τῇ ὑλῇ συνειλημμένος δύ λόγος, ἡ δὲ δύ λόγος δλως), ὅσαι μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγονται, τούτων μὲν ἔστι φθορά· καὶ γὰρ γένεσις τοῦ δὲ λόγου οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὥστε φθείρεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ γένεσις (οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ οἰκίᾳ εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ) ἀλλ’ ἀνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι οὐθεὶς ταῦτα γεννᾷ οὐδὲ ποιεῖ. *Phys.* iii. 5. 204 a. 23 τὸ γὰρ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι καὶ ἀπειρον τὸ αὐτό, εἴπερ οὐσία τὸ ἀπειρον καὶ μὴ καθ’ ὑποκειμένου—*i. e.* the notion of infinity and infinity are identical, for infinity is nothing but a notion—can never be concretely realised as an actual thing: see *Met. Θ.* 6. 1048 b. 14 τὸ δ’ ἀπειρον οὐχ οὕτω δυνάμει ἔστιν ὡς ἐιεργείᾳ ἐσόμενον χωριστόν, ἀλλὰ γνωστει: cf. *Met. Z.* 6. 1031 b. 11 ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, ὅσα μὴ κατ’ ἄλλο λέγεται ἀλλὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ καὶ πρῶτα. On the formula generally see Trendelenburg, *de An.* iii. 4. 7. (429 b. 10.) p. 472, first ed.

b. 30. § 12.] Particular Justice, concerned, as we have seen (v. i. 9), with τἀγαθὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία ἀ ἔστι μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά, τινὶ δ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ, is now divided into two species: (1) Distributive Justice manifested in the fair apportionment of these good things (social

position, property, and all other material advantages) among the 1130 b. 30. members of the Community, according to their deserts: (2) Corrective Justice concerned with the rectification of results at variance with the principle of fair apportionment which arise out of acts performed by members of the Community in the various circumstances in which, as individuals, they 'have to do with one another.' The term *συναλλαγμα* = *contractus* of Roman Law. The relation between these two species of Particular Justice is well stated by Trendelenburg, *Hist. Beiträge zur Phil.* vol. iii. p. 412: *τὸ διανέμειν κατ' ἀξίαν* is the primary form of Particular Justice: the *διανομή* may take place in the exchanges of trade (*ἀλλακτικὴ δικαιοσύνη*), or in the allotment of common goods (*διανεμητικὴ τῶν κοινῶν*): the secondary form of Particular Justice is *ἡ διορθωτική*: it comes into operation when the just relations according to the primary form are disturbed, and equalises the unequal.

§ 13. *τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο*] The members of the social *κοινωνία*, as 1131 a. 1. individuals, 'have to do with one another' (*συναλλάττονται*) in circumstances which may be assigned to one or other of two main heads, according as the will of both parties (*έκοιστα συναλλάγματα*), or of one party only—the other party being unwilling—(*ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*) is concerned in what is done. As results at variance with the principle of fair apportionment arise in each of these two sets of circumstances, and must be rectified, there will also be two kinds of Corrective Justice.

It is easy to see how the results of *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα* (assault, theft, &c.) are such as need rectification, and that it is in the *criminal* court that they are rectified. '*Έκοισια συναλλάγματα* (buying and selling, letting, &c.), on the other hand, being those in which both parties enter voluntarily into certain arrangements in view of results agreeable to both, might seem from their very nature to give results needing no rectification. It sometimes happens, however, without the fault of either contracting party, that a result other than that originally in view, and not agreeable to one of the parties, follows from an arrangement; and it may be right that a *civil* court should consider whether the result (unfortunate for one of the parties) should be rectified, and, if so, to what extent: *e.g.* A takes the lease of a farm from B for a number of years at a rent suitable to good times: if times become bad beyond all reasonable calculation, it may be right that A should be able to have the

**1131 a. 1.** question of the reduction of his rent judicially decided. It may perhaps be thought that a better instance of *τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἔκουσιοις συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν* might have been selected than this which suggests ‘interference with the freedom of contract.’ It is, however, the ‘rectification’ in the civil court which corresponds most logically with the ‘rectification’ made in the criminal court—it is the rectification of the original *συνάλλαγμα* itself. But I suspect that the writer of the present passage had not such a case of rectification by the civil court in his mind when he drew up his list of *ἔκούσια συναλλάγματα* here, but that he thought rather of the enforcement of the terms of such *συναλλάγματα*, and the settlement of disputes regarding their meaning, in the civil court (cf. v. 4. 7. **1132 a. 19** *ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσι ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγοντι*)—e.g. a tenant and landlord differ about the effect of a clause in their signed agreement, and take their dispute for settlement to a civil court; or a debt is recovered in a civil court. This last instance shows also how imperceptible the line may be dividing *ἔκούσια συναλλάγματα*, which require enforcement, from *τὰ λαθρᾶ* among *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*, for the man who has to be sued for the payment of a debt is sometimes not easily distinguishable from the man who intended from the beginning to cheat his creditor.

The judicial enforcement, then, of the terms of an *ἔκούσιον συνάλλαγμα*, and their judicial interpretation, must be distinguished from the judicial rectification of the terms themselves. But we must understand the phrase ‘rectification of the terms themselves’ to denote not only the judicial alteration of unfair terms already arranged (e.g. refusal of law courts to enforce agreements to pay interest above a certain rate; judicial revision of rents which have become too high—after all a comparatively rare and somewhat questionable kind of ‘rectification’), but also the prevention, by other than judicial means, of unfair arrangements which would inevitably be made if certain checks and methods of procedure did not exist. And here we can see that it is in the institution of *νόμισμα* that the principle of Corrective Justice is most largely and effectively embodied. On a system of barter almost every exchange involves a result at variance with the principle of fair apportionment. It is impossible, on such a system, to make really fair exchanges, there being objectively no common measure of the things exchanged, the accidents of temporary need and passing whim dominating all transactions. But the institution of *νόμισμα*

compels men to exchange on a uniform system, and therefore 1131 a. 1. fairly. It may be regarded as an omnipresent court of 'diorthotic justice'—'diorthotic' in the sense of *keeping straight* what would otherwise inevitably go wrong. It does not enforce or interpret the terms of arrangements already made, but provides *ab initio* that the terms shall be of a certain kind—*i. e.* reasonably fair, thus interfering, not indeed with 'free,' but with haphazard contract. And that the writer of the Fifth Book regarded the institution of *nόμισμα* in this light is probable from the similarity of the terms in which he describes its function with those in which he describes the function of the δικαστής, *E. N.* v. 4. 6. 1132 a. 18 ὡστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἀν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητώσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγοντιν τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἔναι τέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οὖν δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἔαν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δίκαιον τενέξομενοι μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῦ κ.τ.λ.—and *E. N.* v. 5. 10. 1133 a. 19 διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὃν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή. ἐφ' ὁ τὸ νόμισμα ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὡστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, πόσα ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἵστον οἰκίᾳ ἡ τροφῆ: cf. v. 5. 14, 15. 1133 b. 14 ff. What has been said of *nόμισμα*—the 'medium of exchange' *par excellence*—as 'diorthotic' applies to other contrivances—of which the railroad and the advertisement may be taken as two typical examples—whereby exchange is made easier, and the producer is consequently enabled to count on getting a fairer return for his commodity than he otherwise would get—*i. e.* on getting more nearly the share properly due to his *ἀξία*, or economic worth, in the industrial community.

In connexion with what has been said it may be convenient here merely to mention a point to which we shall have to return afterwards—viz. that, while the assignment of shares of booty to those who have taken part in a successful expedition, and the distribution of social distinctions among citizens, are very obvious cases of διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν (the agency of the central public authority being clearly seen in the definite order that such and such a distribution of booty shall be made, and in the constitutional law which provides that such and such gradations of social rank shall be recognised), yet there is another and more important case of διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν—the distribution of wages and profits among the members of the industrial community ac-

1131 a. 1. cording to 'economic laws'—which is apt to escape observation as a case of διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, because the existence of common property to be divided, and the agency of the state in dividing it, are not so immediately obvious as they are in the other cases. It is important, therefore, to call attention here to the fact that the exchange of products between individuals is by far the most important state agency at work in the distribution of the rewards of labour. The farmer receives the reward of his labour in the form of the coat *which a settled social system allows him to get* in exchange for his corn from the tailor. Νόμισμα and the other 'media of exchange' alluded to above are thus 'dianemetic' as well as 'diorthotic' agencies. As promoting exchange νόμισμα is a 'dianemetic' agency; but as keeping the exchange or distribution fair in circumstances in which unfair assignments would, but for its intervention, inevitably occur, it is a 'diorthotic' agency. Its 'dianemetic' and 'diorthotic' functions are after all only logically separate; its concrete work is *to promote the fair distribution of the national wealth by means of the exchange of commodities.*

a. 3. δανεισμός] 'lending at interest.' Jackson, Peters.

a. 4. χρῆσις] 'lending without interest.' Jackson, Peters. *Xrēsis* is the *commodatum* of Roman law, distinguished from *mutuum* by not being concerned, as *mutuum* is, with things *quae pondere numero mensurave constant*—e.g. wine and corn. The actual bushel of corn received by the person who benefits by the *mutuum* is not returned by him, but *another* bushel equivalent to it: the person, however, who benefits by a *commodatum* must restore *the very thing* which he has borrowed—e.g. the book. *Commodatum* differs from *locatio* in being gratuitous. See Smith's *Dict. of Cl. Antiquities*: Article *COMMODATUM*.

a. 5. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων] Mich. Eph. has πῶς συναλλάγματα ταῦτα λέγεται; ή ὅτι ὁ κλέψας ἀντὶ τῶν κλεμμάτων ὁ τε μὲν δίδωσιν ἔτερά τινα ὁ τε δὲ μαστιγοῦνται, καὶ γέγονε τρόπον τινὰ δόσις καὶ λῆψις . . . λαβῶν γὰρ χρήματα η ἄλλο τι ὁ κλέψας δέδωκεν ἀντ' ἐκείνων εὐθύνας.

## CHAPTER III.

## ARGUMENT.

*Concerning Distributive Justice.* Injustice being inequality, or too much to A and too little to B, justice will be equality, or the mean between too much to A and too little to B; i. e. it will involve four terms at least—two persons and two shares. If the persons are of equal merit, they will, in a just distribution, receive equal shares; if of unequal merit, they will receive proportionally unequal shares—in other words, in a just distribution the ratio between the persons and that between the shares will be equal. Although all men admit that distribution ought to be ‘in proportion to merit (*κατ’ ἀξίαν*)’, they are not agreed as to what constitutes merit. Democrats, oligarchs, and aristocrats adopt different standards of merit in their distributions of the good things of life.

The just then is that which is ‘in a proportion’; for concrete things (such as persons and their shares) stand in relations of proportion to one another no less than abstract numbers do.

The ‘proportion’ to which distributive justice conforms is that which mathematicians call geometrical proportion—discrete, with four terms, not continuous, for although continuous proportion has really four terms, it obtains that number by employing one term twice, whereas in the formula of distributive justice the four terms are separately present from the beginning—A and B the persons, and γ and δ their respective shares. Starting then from

$$A : B :: \gamma : \delta$$

we get alternando

$$A : \gamma :: B : \delta$$

and componendo

$$A + \gamma : B + \delta :: A : B$$

where the conjunction of A and γ and of B and δ (i. e. the assignment of γ to A and of δ to B) represents just distribution, i. e. distribution ‘according to merit’.

Unjust distribution violates this proportion, i. e. gives the one party too much good (or too little evil) in proportion to his merit, and the other too little good (or too much evil).

GRANT introduces this chapter with an excellent note, in which he refers to Plato, *Gorgias* 507 E, and *Laws* 757 B, as foreshadowing the Aristotelian doctrine of Distributive Justice: also to *Pol. Γ. 5. 1280 a. 6 sqq.*, where ‘though the name of distributive justice does not occur, yet the idea of it is fully developed.’

1131 a. 10. §§ 1-5.] The argument is—*τὸ δίκαιον* is *ἴσον*: but *τὸ ίσον* is *μέσον*: therefore *τὸ δίκαιον* is *μέσον* as well as *ἴσον*. When, however, we speak of ‘equal’ (*ἴσον*), or ‘a mean between’ (*μέσον*), we imply at least two *things*. But *τὸ δίκαιον* is more than an *ἴσον* or *μέσον* implying at least two *things*. As has been pointed out before (v. 1. 20, v. 2. 6), it has its *εἶναι*, or *δύναμις*, *ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἔτερον*: *i.e.* it implies a relation between *persons*. In other words, *τὸ δίκαιον* must be regarded under the two categories of Quantity<sup>1</sup> and of Relation: it is *an equality of things* which involves *a fair relation between persons*. Hence it implies four terms—two things and two persons, at least.

a. 13. § 3. *ἄνευ λόγου*] ‘without proof.’

a. 16. § 4. *καὶ πρός τι καὶ τισίν*] K<sup>b</sup> and CCC seem to stand alone in omitting *καὶ πρός τι*, and L<sup>b</sup> in omitting *καὶ τισίν*. Bekker, following K<sup>b</sup>, brackets *καὶ πρός τι*, Jackson follows L<sup>b</sup> in omitting *καὶ τισίν*, while Ramsauer and Susemihl omit the whole clause *καὶ πρός τι καὶ τισίν*. This last omission is, I think, unjustifiable. The argument of §§ 1-5 seems to require an explicit statement of the point that *τὸ δίκαιον* is to be regarded not only under the category of Quantity as *ἴσον*, but also under that of Relation—*πρός τι*. Moreover, the writer of the *M.M.* (i. 33. 1193 b. 31, quoted here by Jackson in his important note) lays great stress upon this point in the argument—*τὸ δέ γε ίσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν ἐγγίνεται τὸ ἄρα πρὸς ἔτερον ίσον εἶναι δίκαιον ἔστι, καὶ δίκαιος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀν εἴη. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐν δικαίῳ καὶ ίσῳ καὶ ἐν μεσότητι (καὶ Susem.) τὸ μὲν δίκαιον [ἐν om. Susem.] τισὶ λέγεται δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ίσον ἐν τισιν ίσον, τὸ δὲ μέσον τισὶ μέσον ὥστ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἔσται καὶ πρός τινας καὶ ἐν τισίν.* Jackson therefore retains *καὶ πρός τι* as the equivalent of the *πρὸς ἔτερον* of the *M.M.* This is unquestionably right: but it may be doubted whether he is right in omitting *καὶ τισίν* ‘as a gloss anticipatory of ἡ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν.’ The equivalent expression *καὶ τισίν* is certainly unnecessary after *καὶ πρός τι*: but it is in the manner of the writer to add such unnecessary explanations. As for the omission of *καὶ πρός τι* by K<sup>b</sup>—very little weight indeed should be attached to the omissions of K<sup>b</sup><sup>2</sup>. They are generally

<sup>1</sup> See *Met. Δ.* 15. 1021 a. 11 *ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ὅν μία ἡ οὐσία, ὅμοια δ' ὅν ἡ ποιότης μία, ίσα δὲ ὅν τὸ ποσὸν ἐν.*

<sup>2</sup> CCC in Book V has not independent authority. It is probably a transcript of a transcript of K<sup>b</sup>; see *English MSS. of Nic. Eth. Anecd. Ox.* p. 45.

as insignificant as its actual readings are significant. What is 1131 a. 16. really important is that the argument absolutely requires *καὶ πρός τι* (whatever may be thought of the origin of the gloss *καὶ τιοίν*), and that the writer of the *M.M.* seems to have read *πρός τι* (or *πρός τινας?*).

§ 5. *καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα]* *ἐν οἷς = τὰ πράγματα.* Jackson (fol. a. 20. followed by Susemihl) brackets the words *τὰ πράγματα* as a gloss on *ἐν οἷς*.

§ 6. *καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἴσοτης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς]* ‘There will be the same “equality” between the persons and between the things’: *i.e.* if the persons, as comparable *κοινωνοί* of the same social system, are absolutely equal, their shares will be also (*ἡ αὐτή*) absolutely equal: if they are not absolutely equal, but stand in a certain definite ratio of superiority and inferiority, their shares will also stand in the same (*ἡ αὐτή*) ratio. *Μάχαι καὶ ἐγκλήματα* arise when the ratio, whatever it be, subsisting between the persons is not observed exactly (*ἡ αὐτή*) in the apportionment of the shares. Ramsauer’s note on *ἡ αὐτὴ ἴσοτης* is good—‘Intelliges vocem *ἡ αὐτή* additum ad *ἴσοτης* tollere quasi notionem ipsius paritatis: “eodem modo quo haec paria vel erunt vel non erunt, et illa vel erunt vel non erunt.” “Ισα enim revera neque homines nec res, sed hinc ratio inter homines, illinc inter res ratio; et est *ἡ ἀναλογία ἴσοτης λόγων*, vs. 31.’

*ώς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὗτα κάκεῖνα ἔχει]* ‘I omit,’ says a. 21. Jackson, ‘the words *τὰ ἐν οἷς* which appear in all the MSS. except K<sup>b</sup> [and CCC], and in Bekker’s text, in order that here, as in the sentences before and after, the persons may take precedence of the things distributed.’ Susemihl and Ramsauer also omit the words. Certainly ‘the persons should take precedence of the things’ here; but even with the omission of *τὰ ἐν οἷς* the clause is not satisfactory. ‘*Ἐκεῖνα* referring to the more remote *οἷς* is then indeed correct: but instead of *κάκεῖνα* we ought to have *καὶ ταῦτα* referring to the nearer *ἐν οἷς*.

*ἀλλ’ ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι κ.τ.λ.]* Cf. *Pol. E. I. 1301 b. 28* ὅλως γὰρ a. 22. *τὸ ἵσον ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν.*

§ 7. *ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ’ ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον]* *τοῦτο* is the fact stated a. 24. above in § 5, that *τὸ δίκαιον* involves at least two persons and two things so related that there is *ἡ αὐτὴ ἴσοτης* between the persons and

1131 a. 24. between the things. This fact becomes more significant if we realise clearly that it implies that  $\tau\ddot{o}\ \delta\kappa\iota\omega\nu$  is ἀνάλογόν τι—for ἀνάλογία we already know as mathematicians is  $\iota\sigma\acute{\o}\tau\eta\varsigma\ \lambda\acute{\o}\gamma\omega\nu$  καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. Now, that  $\tau\ddot{o}\ \delta\kappa\iota\omega\nu$ , with its two persons and two things, is ἀνάλογόν τι is obvious from our use of the expression κατ' ἀξίāν, ‘according to merit.’ When we say that A and B are rewarded each ‘according to his merit’ (whatever that may be), we mean that each receives his ‘just’ reward. But when A and B are rewarded each ‘according to his merit,’ reward  $\alpha$  (*i. e.* A’s reward) stands to reward  $\beta$  (*i. e.* B’s reward) in the same ratio ( $\lambda\acute{\o}\gamma\oslash$ ) as A’s merit stands to B’s. Hence, just distribution of rewards being distribution ‘according to merit’ involves the ἀνάλογία, or  $\iota\sigma\acute{\o}\tau\eta\varsigma\ \lambda\acute{\o}\gamma\omega\nu$ —A : B ::  $\alpha$  :  $\beta$ . By means of the expression κατ' ἀξίāν, then, the writer is enabled to substitute for the ἡ αὐτὴ  $\iota\sigma\acute{\o}\tau\eta\varsigma$  of § 6 the more appropriate δ ἀντὸς λόγος of § 10.

For the expression κατ' ἀξίāν, as used in the *E. N.*, see the following passages quoted by Ramsauer in his note on v. 3. 7—viz. 1115 b. 19, where the ἀνδρεῖος is said κατ' ἀξίāν, καὶ ὡς ἀν δ λόγος, πάσσχειν καὶ πράττειν, *i. e.* in the manner indicated and required by λόγος, which grasps life as a whole, and gives each feeling and action *its due place in the ensemble*:—1119 a. 19, where the σώφρων is said μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶν τὰς τοιαύτας ἥδονάς τῆς ἀξίας, *i. e.* than they deserve:—1122 a. 26, where we have the expression κατ' ἀξίāν δαπανῶν: and 1100 a. 25 βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίāν: cf. also *E. E.* iii. 6. 1233 b. 6 ὁ δὲ κατ' ἀξίāν καὶ ὡς δ λόγος, μεγαλοπρεπής τὸ γὰρ πρέπον κατ' ἀξίāν ἔστιν οὐδὲν γὰρ πρέπει τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίāν: also *E. E.* iii. 7. 1233 b. 19 δ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ' ἀξίāν εὐ πράττουσιν ἔστιν: also *E. E.* viii. 3. 1249 a. 7 τῷ καλῷ κάγαθῷ καλά ἔστι τὰ φύσει ἀγαθά· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀξίāν ἀξίος δούτος τούτων καὶ τὸ πρέπον καλόν πρέπει δὲ ταῦτα τούτῳ, πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, δύναμις. In all these passages κατ' ἀξίāν means ‘according to merit,’ or ‘suitably to desert’—whether the ‘merit’ or ‘desert’ be the ground on which recognition is due to a *person* in the social *kouwalia*, or the reason why a *feeling*, an *action*, or a *circumstance* should have a certain place assigned to it in the *ensemble* of δ ἀνθρώπινος βίος. The expression κατ' ἀξίāν thus necessarily connotes the idea of ‘proportion’; hence we find the phrase τὸ κατ' ἀξίāν  $\iota\sigma\acute{\o}\nu$  = ‘the equality which characterises proportion,’ *i. e.*  $\iota\sigma\acute{\o}\tau\eta\varsigma\ \lambda\acute{\o}\gamma\omega\nu$ : see *Pol. E. I.* 1301 b. 29 ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ  $\iota\sigma\acute{\o}\nu$  τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίāν ἔστιν. λέγω δὲ ἀριθμῷ μὲν τὸ πλήθει ἡ μεγέθει ταῦτα καὶ  $\iota\sigma\acute{\o}\nu$ , κατ'

ἀξίαν δὲ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ, οἷον ὑπερέχει κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν ἵσφ τὰ τρία τοῦ δυοῖν 1131 a. 24. καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἐνός, λόγῳ δὲ τὰ τέτταρα τοῦ δυοῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἐνός· ἵσον γὰρ μέρος τὰ δύο τῶν τεττάρων καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς δυοῖς ἄμφω γὰρ ἡμίσην. Equality is either (1) numerical equality (*τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἵσον*), or (2) equality of ratios (*τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἵσον*).

*τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτήν κ.τ.λ.]* That ‘the recognition of merit’ is the principle on which all just distribution must proceed is universally admitted; but men are not agreed as to ‘what constitutes merit’—as to what is the underlying condition (*ὑπάρχειν*—bracketed, however, by Bywater: it is omitted by O<sup>b</sup>, P<sup>b</sup>, K<sup>b</sup>, and CCC, the two last having *κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι per dittographiam*<sup>1</sup> in its place) of preferential recognition. Those who think that the masses should rule hold that the being a free man (*ἐλευθερία*) is by itself a ‘merit’ overshadowing all other ‘merits,’ and entitling its possessor to share equally with all other ‘free’ members of the state: oligarchs think that the rich are entitled to more recognition than other members of the state; some, again, think that high birth constitutes a superior claim; and those who favour the rule of the Best and most Virtuous identify the highest ‘merit’ with goodness and culture: see *Pol.* Γ. 5. 1280 a. 7–1281 a. 8, where it is pointed out that *οἱ ὀλιγαρχικοί* make the mistake of supposing that if a man is ‘superior’ in a certain respect (*i. e.* in respect of wealth) he is superior in all respects; and *οἱ δημοκρατικοί* the mistake of supposing that if men are equal in one respect (*i. e.* in respect of being free men) they are equal in all respects. Both ignore the vital point (*τὸ κυριώτατον*, 1280 a. 25), that the State is an institution for the furtherance of human perfection, not an insurance or joint-stock company. Cf. also *Pol.* Γ. 7. 1282 b. 23 sqq., where the various claims to social recognition are examined. Does *any* superiority, he asks, give a man a right to a higher position in the State? Surely not. We cannot give a man a higher position on account of his finer complexion or superior stature. We do not give a better flute, among equal players, to the high-born player. In short, only those superiorities must be taken into account which have a distinct connexion with the well-being of the State. Noble birth, Freedom, and Wealth are superiorities which have a distinct connexion with the existence and well-being of the State, and their claims to recognition are accordingly pronounced

<sup>1</sup> This dittograph may have accidentally extruded *ὑπάρχειν*. O<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>b</sup> are scarcely independent evidence.

1131 a. 26. reasonable. There cannot be a city consisting entirely of poor men, or of slaves; and without ἀρετή, hereditary and acquired, there can be no good administration of the resources and energy supplied by wealth and freedom. Freedom, wealth, and high birth are all factors in the well-being of the State, if ἀρετή—enlightened moral interest in the κοινὴ συμφέρον—be present to coordinate them. The class which possesses this ἀρετή ‘merits’ the highest place in the State, just because it is its supremacy alone which ensures that other classes shall also receive what they severally ‘merit’ in the διανομὴ τῶν κοινῶν. The rule of ἀρετή is ἡ ὄρθη πολιτεία. But where the coordinating principle of ἀρετή is absent, freedom, wealth, and high birth struggle each for mastery: and, through various processes of στάσις, various παρεκβεβηκίαι πολιτείαι are consolidated, according as this, that, or the other ἀξία has succeeded, for the time, in securing exclusive recognition to itself.

In connexion with the use made of mathematical formulae by the writer of the Fifth Book it is interesting to note the elaboration with which his example is followed by a later writer on Justice, the Pseudo-Archytas, quoted by Stobaeus (*Flor.* vol. ii. p. 137, ed. Meineke, Mullach, *Fragm. Phil.* i. 560):—‘Αρχύτα Πυθαγορείου ἐκ τοῦ περὶ νόμου καὶ δικαιοσύνης· διὸ τὸ δίκαιον τοὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατικόν, τοὶ δὲ δαμοκρατικόν, τοὶ δὲ ὀλιγαρχικὸν ποιοῦντι. καὶ τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν κατὰν ὑπεναντίαν μεσότατα· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μέζοσι μέζονας τὰς λόγως, τοῖς δὲ μῆσι μῆνας διανέμει ἀ ἀναλογίᾳ αὗτα· τὸ δὲ δαμοκρατικὸν κατὰν γεωμετρικάν· ἐν γὰρ ταύτῃ τοὶ λόγοι ἵστοι τῶν μεζόνων καὶ μηδόνων μεγεθέων· τὸ δὲ ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν κατὰν ἀριθμητικάν· ἀντιάζει γὰρ αὐτὰ τῷ ὑπεναντίᾳ· τοῖς γὰρ μῆσι μέζονας τὰς λόγως, τοῖς δὲ μέζοσι μῆνας. ταὶ μὲν ὁν ἰδεῖται τὰς διανομὰς τοσαῦται· ταὶ δὲ εἰκόνες ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις καὶ τοῖς οἶκοις θεωρέονται. τιμαὶ τε γὰρ καὶ κολάσεις καὶ ἀρχαὶ ἡ ἔξιστος τοῖς μέζοσι καὶ μῆσι διανέμονται, ἡ ἔξιστος ἡ τῷ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχειν ἡ τῷ πλούτῳ ἡ καὶ δυνάμει. τὸ μὲν ὁν ἔξιστος τοσοῦτος δαμοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ ἔξιστος ἀριστοκρατικόν ἡ ὀλιγαρχικόν. See Mullach, *Fragm. Ph.* ii. 119, for an account of these three μεσότητες or ἀναλογίαι (in music)—(1) ἀ ἀριθμητικά, in which as the first term exceeds the second, so the second exceeds the third—*e.g.* 6, 4, 2. Here, as Nicomachus Gerasenus (ἀριθμητικὴ εἰσαγωγή p. 132, ed. Hoche) says, ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν ὅροις μείζονες οἱ λόγοι, ἐλάττονες δὲ ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν, *i.e.* the ratio 6 : 4 is smaller than the ratio 4 : 2; or as Archytas (?) quoted by Mullach (ii. 119) says, τὸ τῶν μειόνων ὅρων διάστημα μεῖον, τὸ δὲ τῶν μειόνων μεῖον: (2) ἀ γεωμετρικά, where οἱ μείζονες ἴστοι ποιοῦνται τὸ διάστημα καὶ οἱ μείονες: *e.g.* 8, 4, 2, ratio 8 : 4

being = ratio  $4 : 2$ ; (3) ἀ ὑπεναντίᾳ ἀν καλοῦμεν ἀρμονικάν (Archytas 1131 a. 26. apud Mullach ii. 119) ὅκα ἔωντι τοιοῦτοι ὡστε φῶ ἀν πρᾶτος ὄρος τῷ δευτέρῳ ὑπερέχῃ ἕαντὸν μέρει, ταύτῳ ὁ μέσος τῷ τρίτῳ ὑπερέχει τῷ τρίτῳ μέρει. γίνεται δὲ ἐν ταύτᾳ τῷ ἀναλογίᾳ τὸ τῶν μειζόνων ὄρων διάστημα μεῖζον, τὸ δὲ τῶν μειόνων μεῖον: e.g. 12, 8, 6, where 12 exceeds 8 by  $\frac{1}{3}$ rd of itself, and 8 exceeds 6 by  $\frac{1}{3}$ rd of 6, and the ratio 12 : 8 is greater than the ratio 8 : 6.

§ 8. μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ . . . δλως ἀριθμοῦ] ‘Proportion’ is not a. 30. peculiar to ‘number’ in pure arithmetic where *μονάδες*, or abstract ‘ones,’ indivisible and always equal to one another, are counted; but belongs to *all* ‘number’—*i. e.* also to ‘number’ as realised in concrete and unequally-sized things. This statement (introduced by *γάρ*) is added to meet a possible objection—that the schema of Proportion, applicable to numbers formed by the addition of abstract units (*μονάδες*), is not applicable to the concrete *οἷς* and *ἐν οἷς* with which *τὸ δίκαιον* is concerned. Mich. Eph. has the following commentary here—μοναδικὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγω φῶ ἀριθμοῦμεν, οἷον τὴν δεκάδα, φῶ ἀριθμοῦμεν τοὺς δέκα ἵππους ἢ τοὺς δέκα ἄνδρας, ὃς καὶ κυρίως ἀριθμὸς λέγεται . . . δλως δὲ ἀριθμοὶ λέγονται τὰ ἀριθμήματα, οἷον τοὺς δέκα βόας ἢ ἀνθρώπους. ἀναλογία γάρ φησιν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐκ μονάδων συγκειμένων καὶ ὡς μέτρων λαμβανομένων ἀριθμῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἢ καὶ ἡριθμημένων. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ὡς μέτρων ἀριθμῶν ἐστι τις ἀναλογία, ὡς δὲ ἢ (8) πρὸς τὸν δὲ (4), ὡς δὲ τὸ (6) πρὸς τὸν γ' (3), οὕτως ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἵππων, κυνῶν, γραμμῶν ἐπιπέδων, καὶ ἀπλῶν ὡν ἐστὶν ἀριθμός· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀναλογία ἐστίν· ἔχουσι γὰρ ἀριθμόν. δεῖ γὰρ ἴνα ἀναλογία τις ἢ, ἀριθμόν τινα εἶναι. Cf. Bonitz on *Met.* M. 6. 1080 b. 19. p. 545, ‘Eiusmodi numeris [*i. e.* the “extended units” of the Pythagoreans —τὸν γὰρ δλον οὐρανὸν κατασκευάζοντιν ἔξ ἀριθμῶν, πλὴν οὐ μοναδικῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνοντιν ἔχεν μέγεθος, 1080 b. 17] Ar. opponit τοὺς μοναδικὸν ἀριθμούς, *i. e.* eos numeros, quibus non certae quaedam res (cf. N. 5. 1092 b. 19: ἀεὶ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ὃς ἀν ἢ τινῶν ἐστίν, ἢ πύρινος ἢ γῆνος ἢ μοναδικός), sed ipsae unitates, abstractae ab omni rerum qualitate et varietate, individuae (cf. 8. 1083 b. 17) neque inter se distinctae (cf. 7. 1082 b. 16) numerentur. Ac talem quidem numerum quum investiget scientia arithmeticā, eundem numerum ἀριθμητικὸν et μοναδικὸν appellat, cf. 8. 1083 b. 17.’ Cf. Zell, ‘ἀριθμοὶ μοναδικοὶ sunt quos nostrates dicunt unbenannite Zahlen; numeri nude positi sine rebus numerandis.’ Jackson (p. 81) refers to Plato, *Phileb.* 56 D, ‘where arithmeticians who deal with μονάδας ἀνίσους

1131 a. 30. such as two armies, two oxen, &c., are distinguished from arithmeticians who deal with *μονάδες* which are all alike.'

a. 31. ή γὰρ ἀναλογία ἵστης ἔστι λόγων] See Euclid, v. Def. 3 λόγος ἔστι δύο μεγεθῶν ὁμογενῶν ή κατὰ πηλικότητα πρὸς ἄλληλα ποιὰ σχέσις: and v. Def. 8 ἀναλογία δέ ἔστιν η τῶν λόγων ταυτότης (v. l. ὁμοιότης). In his note here Mich. Eph. says—τὸ ἵστης ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁμοιότης ἀναλογία γάρ ἔστιν η τῶν λόγων ὁμοιότης—the reason for preferring ὁμοιότης to *ἵστης* apparently being that in γεωμετρικῇ ἀναλογίᾳ we have to do not with η κατ' ἀριθμὸν *ἵστης*, i.e. not with two equal quantities or ἀριθμοί, e.g. 4 = 4, but with two qualitatively identical ratios each of which yet involves different arithmetical conditions: e.g. the ratio 2 : 4 is qualitatively identical with the ratio 5 : 10; but each ratio is realised in quantitatively different terms. Now, if 2 and 4 be taken to represent the sides of one (say, right-angled) parallelogram, and 5 and 10 the sides of another, the two parallelograms (which thus represent diagrammatically the ἀναλογία 2 : 4 :: 5 : 10) are, in mathematical language, *similar* (*ὅμοια*), though of course not *equal* (*ἴσα*): see Euclid, vi. Def. 1. It is probable then that Mich. Eph. had 'similar' geometrical figures in view when he chose ὁμοιότης instead of *ἵστης* to express the *qualitative sameness* of the λόγοι in γεωμετρικῇ ἀναλογίᾳ: and in this usage he is supported by the authority<sup>1</sup> of *Met.* Δ. 15. 1021 a. 11 ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ὅν μία η οὐσία, δροια δ' ὅν η ποιότης μία, ίσα δὲ ὅν τὸ ποσὸν ἐν: cf. Mich. Eph. on v. 2. 12 ὅταν τοίνυν τῇ μὲν ποιότητι διαφέρωσι τῇ αὐτῇ, τῇ δὲ ποσότητι μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ η τοιαύτη ἀναλογία γεωμετρικὴ καλεῖται . . . ἀριθμητικῇ ἀναλογίᾳ ἔστιν η ποσὸν μὲν ίσουν ἐν ταῖς διαφοραῖς, ποιοῦ δὲ μὴ ίσουν η μὴ δροίον μετέχουσα.

a. 32. § 9. η μὲν οὖν διηρημένη . . . συνεχῆς] See Nicomachus Gerasenus ἀριθ. εἰσαγωγή ii. 21. §§ 5, 6. p. 121, ed. Hoche—συνημμένη ἀναλογία (= συνεχῆς of the present passage) οἷον α, β, δ (i.e. 1, 2, 4) κατὰ ποιότητα . . . , κατὰ ποσότητα δὲ α, β, γ (i.e. 1, 2, 3). Διεξεγμένη (= διηρημένη here) . . . οἷον κατὰ μὲν τὸ ποιὸν α, β, δ, η (i.e. 1 : 2 :: 4 : 8), κατὰ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν οὗτος α, β, γ, δ (i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4). The statement τῷ ἐνὶ ως δυσὶ χρῆται καὶ δις λέγει, made by the writer of the Fifth Book here must, of course, be taken as made with exclusive reference to the συνεχῆς ἀναλογίᾳ at present before him—viz. η συνεχῆς (ορ συνημμένη) η κατὰ ποιότητα.

b. 1. ως η τοῦ α . . . τοῦ γ] Jackson has an important note here: 'Throughout §§ 9, 11, 12, where I have given ordinal numbers [he

reads  $\dot{\eta}$  τοῦ πρώτου, &c., for  $\dot{\eta}$  τοῦ α, &c.], most of the editors write 1131 b. 1. cardinals ( $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta$ ). In order to avoid the arithmetical absurdity (1 : 2 = 3 : 4) thus produced, I proposed in the *Journal of Philology* 1872, iv. 310, to write (with Fritzsche) Α, Β, Γ, Δ: but on further consideration I am convinced that πρώτου, δευτέρου κ.τ.λ. should be substituted. The otherwise strange phrases δ α ὅρος, τοῦ α ὅρου in §§ 11, 12 suggest this alteration, and it is confirmed by several MSS., Ha and Kb [and CCC] throughout §§ 9, 11, 12, and Pb and Nb in §§ 9, 12, writing ordinals in full, whilst Pb pr. man. gives sometimes ordinals in full, sometimes  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta$  with superposed marks which may perhaps represent the terminations of ordinals, cf. Bast, *Comment. Palaeogr.* p. 850 [NC has ordinals in three places, and B<sup>1</sup> in two.] Michael Ephesius and Averroes seem to have had ordinals.' I follow Jackson in preferring the ordinals. As to the phrases  $\dot{\eta}$  τοῦ α (i.e. πρώτου, τὴν τοῦ β (i.e. δευτέρου)—Jackson asks, 'can they mean "the line which we take for our first term," "the line which we take for our second term"? Mich. Eph. comments as follows—τὸ δὲ τῆς λέξεως τῆς οἰον ὡς  $\dot{\eta}$  τοῦ πρώτου πρὸς τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου τοιοῦτον ἔστιν, ὡς  $\dot{\eta}$  τοῦ πρώτου ὅρου σχέσις τοῦ δόκτω πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον τὸν δ (qu. τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου τοῦ δ), οὐτως  $\dot{\eta}$  τοῦ δευτέρου τοῦ δ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τρίτου τοῦ β. But is this not a misuse of the word σχέσις? Cf. Eucl. El. v. Def. 3 quoted above. At any rate we may safely reject the alternative suggestion of Grant that στιγμή is to be supplied, as well as his theory that the proportionals are algebraical quantities.' I have little doubt that the reference here is to γραμμή, and that the writer has in his mind the συνεχῆς ἀναλογία κατὰ ποιότητα of the problem of τετραγωνισμός (Euclid, El. ii. 14, cf. vi. 13) in which the longer side of a rectangular parallelogram stands to a μέση γραμμή as the μέση γρ. stands to the shorter side: see *de An.* ii. 2. 413 a. 17 τί ἔστι τετραγωνισμός; τὸ ισον ἐτερομήκει δρθογώνιον εἶναι ισόπλευρον. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὅρος λόγος τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ τετραγωνισμός μέσης εὑρεσις, τοῦ πράγματος λέγει τὸ αἴτιον.

**§ 10.** διῆρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ἄ] 'for the same distinction b. 5. obtains between the persons and between the things.' Here ὁμοίως marks the *qualitative sameness* of the λόγοι: see note on § 8, a. 31. Jackson quotes *Pol. Γ.* 5. 1280 a. 17 διῆρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς.

§§ 11, 12, 13.] To take the Paraphrast's examples— $\alpha$  = Achilles

1131 b. 5. ( $\alpha\beta\gamma\delta$ );  $\beta$  = Ajax (50);  $\gamma$  = reward of Achilles (10);  $\delta$  = reward of Ajax (5):

$$(1) \alpha : \beta = \gamma : \delta$$

(2) ἐναλλάξ—alternando (Euclid v. 16.)

$$\alpha : \gamma = \beta : \delta$$

(3) ὁστε τὸ ὄλον πρὸς τὸ ὄλον (*sc.* ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον § 13)—componendo (Eucl. v. Def. 16).

$$\alpha + \gamma : \beta + \delta = \alpha : \beta.$$

The just distribution consists in putting together  $\alpha$  and  $\gamma$ ,  $\beta$  and  $\delta$ : . . . ἡ ἄρα τοῦ  $\alpha$  ὥρου τῷ  $\gamma$  σύζευξις τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιον ἔστι (§ 12).

b. 7. § 11. τὸ ὄλον πρὸς τὸ ὄλον] This phrase is elliptical: supply ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον as in § 13.

b. 8. ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει] ‘this is the combination which the distribution effects.’ Bywater’s suggestion ἀπερ (*i.e.* the two terms united in the ὄλον: see his *Contributions to the Text. Crit. of Nic. Eth.* p. 44) is tempting.

b. 9. § 12. σύζευξις] This, Jackson points out, is Euclid’s *σύνθεσις* (v. Def. 16): cf. *συντεθῆ* here. In Nic. Ger. ii. 23. 5. p. 125, Hoche, *σύνθεσις* is *multiplication*, not addition.

b. 10. καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἔστι,  $\langle$ τὸ δ’ ἀδικον $\rangle$  τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον] so Bywater, following Γ, which gives the words τὸ δ’ ἀδικον, and K<sup>b</sup>, L<sup>b</sup>, Γ, which read τό before παρά for the τοῦ of M<sup>b</sup> and other MSS.

b. 13. § 13. γεωμετρικήν] ἡ ἀναλογία ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν is called ‘geometrical’ on account of the large place which it occupies in geometry (see *e.g.* Eucl. Books v and vi), as compared with ἡ ἀναλογία ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, contrasted as ἀριθμητική. Ἀριθμός is ποσόν, whereas the ‘similar figures’ of geometrical proportion fall, as *σχήματα*, under the category of ποιότης (see *Cat.* 8. 10 a. 11). For γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία as ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν see Nicom. Ger. ii. 24. pp. 126, 127, Hoche—ἔστι δὲ ἡ γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία ὅταν . . . ποσότητι μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ διαφέρωσιν οἱ ὥροι ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ λόγου ποιότητι τῇ αὐτῇ, ἐναντίως ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς ὠφθῃ . . . οὖν β, δ, η, ὃν γὰρ λόγον ἔχει ὁ η πρὸς τὸν δ, τοῦτον καὶ δ πρὸς τὸν β καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, οὐ μὴν ἵσην ποσότητα μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων ἔχοντιν.

The Aristotelian explanation of Distributive Justice as κατὰ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν is derived from Plato: see *Gorgias* 507 and

*Lares* 757 quoted by Fritzsche, and by Grant in his introductory 1131 b. 13. note to this chapter. Cf. Plutarch, *Sympos.* viii. Quaest. 2, who asks why Plato represents God as a geometer. Among various explanations τοῦ ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖν τὸν θεόν he gives the following (*Symp.* viii. Q. 2. ch. 2, quoted by Fritzsche)—δὴ γὰρ Δικοῦργος, οἰσθα δῆπουθεν, ὅτι τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν, ὡς δημοκρατικὴν καὶ ὀχλικὴν οὖσαν [but cf. the Pseudo-Archytas quoted above in note on v. 3. 7, a. 26], ἐξέβαλεν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος ἐπεισήγαγε δὲ τὴν γεωμετρικήν, διλγαρχίᾳ σώφρονι καὶ βασιλείᾳ νομίμῃ πρέπουσαν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἵσον, ἡ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ κατ' ἄξιαν ἀπονέμει. καὶ οὐ πάντα δόμον μίγνυσιν, ἀλλὰ ἐστὶ χρηστῶν καὶ ποιηρῶν εὔσημος ἐν αὐτῇ διάκρισι, οὐδὲ κλήροις, ἀρετῆς δὲ καὶ κακίας διαφορᾷ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀεὶ διαλαγχανόντων. ταύτην δὲ θεός ἐπάγει τὴν ἀναλογίαν τοῖς πράγμασι, δίκην καὶ νέμεσιν, ὡς φίλε Τυνδάρη, προσαγορευομένην, καὶ διδάσκουσαν ἡμᾶς τὸ δίκαιον ἵσον, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ ἵσον δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι δίκαιον. ἦν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ διώκουσιν ἵστητα, πασῶν ἀδικιῶν οὖσαν μεγίστην, δὲ θεὸς ἔξαίρων ὡς ἄνυστόν ἐστι, τὸ κατ' ἄξιαν διαφυλάττει, γεωμετρικῶς τῷ κατὰ λόγον καὶ κατὰ νόμον δριζόμενος. Cf. Plutarch, *de Fraterno Amore* 12 (quoted by Zell, p. 173) δέ μὲν οὖν Σόλων ἀποφηνάμενος περὶ πολιτείας, ὡς ἵστης στάσιν οὐ ποιεῖ, λίαν ἔδοξεν ὀχλικῶς, ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ δημοκρατικὴν ἐπεισάγειν ἀναλογίαν ἀντὶ τῆς καλῆς γεωμετρικῆς.

§ 14. ἐστι δέ οὐ συνεχῆς αὗτη ἡ ἀναλογία] Of course the γεωμετρικὴ b. 15. ἀναλογία of distributive justice with its two persons and two things is not συνεχῆς: but there are cases in which γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία is συνεχῆς—see Nicom. Geras. quoted above in note on v. 3. 9, a. 32—the μέση γραμμή of Eucl. vi. 13 is one term used twice.

γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον] Injustice in distribution b. 17. being the violation of proportion, ‘it follows from this (*ἄρα*) that, in an unjust distribution, one term is made too large, and the other too small’—*i.e.* if the distribution is unjust the  $\delta\lambda\sigma\alpha\alpha$   $a+\gamma$  will be made too large, and the  $\delta\lambda\sigma\alpha\alpha$   $\beta+\delta$  too small, or *vice versa*, in proportion to the relation subsisting between  $a$  and  $\beta$  ( $\delta\pi\epsilon\rho\epsilon\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma\pi\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\sigma$   $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma$ ). The inference γίνεται *ἄρα* τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον becomes clearer if we supply in thought τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον μέσον (cf. line 11 above) immediately before γίνεται.

διπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει]. ‘And this is also what b. 18. actually takes place’—*i.e.* ‘actually takes place’ ( $\epsilon\pi\iota\lambda\tau\epsilon\tau\omega\pi\epsilon\acute{\epsilon}\rho\sigma\pi\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\sigma$   $\sigma\mu\beta\alpha\acute{\epsilon}\iota\epsilon\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota$ ), as well as ‘may be inferred from premisses’ ( $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$

1131 b. 18. *συμβαίνει*) in the proof τὸ δὲ ἀδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ ἔλαπτον.

b. 20. §§ 15, 16.] ‘A repetition of ch. I, § 10,’ Grant.

b. 23. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μεῖζον] τὸ μᾶλλον αἱρετὸν μεῖζον ἀγαθόν.

## CHAPTER IV.

### ARGUMENT.

The other kind of particular justice is that which ‘corrects’ inequalities arising out of transactions, voluntary and involuntary, between individuals. Justice in ‘correction’ is equality — not, however, that of ratios, as in geometrical ἀναλογία, but the equality which obtains in arithmetical ἀναλογία, where the mean is equally distant from each extreme. Thus the judge who ‘corrects’ an inequality arising out of a transaction neglects the possible inequality in ‘merit’ of the parties (which he could not do if ‘distribution’ had to be made), and takes account only of the difference produced by this particular transaction in the positions of parties whom he views simply as persons equally entitled to the undiminished possession of the ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά which happen to belong to them. The equality  $x=x$ . which subsisted before the transaction made a difference in the positions of the parties, is the arithmetical mean between their positions  $x+1$  and  $x-1$  after the transaction. The judge tries to make their positions equal again by reducing them to the arithmetical mean  $x$ . i. e. by taking from A’s too-much ( $x+1$ ) that part of it (1), which was acquired at B’s expense, and adding it to B’s too-little ( $x-1$ ). If we call A the ‘gainer’ and B the ‘loser’ by the transaction, we may define ‘corrective justice’ as the mean between gain and loss. Accordingly when people think that they are ‘losers’ they appeal to the judge or ‘middle-man,’ as to the embodiment of the just mean. We must remember, however, in defining corrective justice as the mean between gain and loss, that, on the one hand, it is only as something which has a value to be afterwards paid for in the criminal court, that a blow can be called the ‘gain’ of the assailant and the ‘loss’ of his victim; and, on the other hand, that ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ in the original sense of the terms, i. e. gain and loss incidental to trade, are not unjust, and therefore need no ‘correction.’

1131 b. 25. § 1. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τῷ διορθωτικόν κ.τ.λ.] See note on v. 2. 13. When distribution has to be made it is ‘just’ to give to each recipient a share proportioned to his ‘merit’: this is τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον, and its formula, as we have seen, is ή γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία. When a συνδιλαγμα between A and B has resulted in

the transference of part of A's merited share of τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά to 1131 b. 25. B, it is 'just' to correct the anomaly by transferring back to A from B either the part in question, or its equivalent. This is τὸ διορθωτικὸν (or ἐπανορθωτικόν, § 6) δίκαιον. Its mathematical formula is ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία (or μεσότης); for A and B are no longer regarded as possibly *unequally-meritorious* recipients in a distribution *to be made*, but as persons *equally entitled* to enjoy the undiminished possession of the shares, large or small, *which they have respectively received*: accordingly when, as the result of a συνάλλαγμα, B's share is increased at the expense of A's, the reduced share of A and the increased share of B will appear as extremes between which the equality of A and B, as persons entitled to the undiminished possession of their shares, will fall as the 'arithmetical mean.' Let  $x = x$  represent the equality in the eye of the law of A and B, as persons entitled to the undiminished possession of their respective shares—an equality which is not affected by the differences in personal character, working power, rank, &c., which would have to be considered if A and B came up as recipients in a distribution: a συνάλλαγμα between them reduces A's  $x$  to  $x - 1$  and increases B's  $x$  to  $x + 1$ . It is 'just' to 'correct' this inequality, and the correction is made by striking the 'arithmetical mean'  $x$  between  $x - 1$  and  $x + 1$ , i.e. by restoring, in short, the parties to the positions which they each occupied before the συνάλλαγμα.

In his note on this § Jackson quotes the following passage from Grant *ad loc.*—'The term "corrective justice" is itself an unfortunate name, because it appears only to lay down principles for restitution, and therefore implies wrong. Thus it has a tendency to confine the view to "involuntary transactions," instead of stating what must be the principle of the just in all the dealings between man and man.' On this Jackson remarks—'Apparently Grant forgets that it is the original transaction which is said to be either voluntary or involuntary, and that it is the rectification of wrong arising out of the original transaction with which corrective justice is concerned.' The example which Jackson gives of the rectification of 'wrong arising out of' a voluntary transaction is 'A borrows money from B (who is here ἔκών) and does not fulfil his engagement to repay the loan at a certain time; corrective justice takes from A the proper amount and restores it to B.' Here I would submit that A's non-fulfilment of his engagement is not a 'wrong arising out of the *original transaction*' in the same sense in which e.g. the loss

1131 b. 25. of my purse is a wrong arising out of the ‘original transaction’ with the pickpocket. A’s non-fulfilment of his engagement (his ability to repay being assumed) introduces a *new* relation, or *συναλλαγμα*, between the parties, being a form of *κλοπή*, and belonging to the *λαθραῖα* division of *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*, not to the class of *ἔκούσια συναλλάγματα*. It is properly this new *ἀκούσιον συναλλαγμα* out of which the wrong rectified in Jackson’s example arises. At the same time I am ready to admit that Jackson’s example of the *διόρθωσις* of ‘wrong arising out of a voluntary transaction’ is probably one which the writer of the Fifth Book would have accepted. As I remarked in my note on v. 2. 13, he probably thought rather of the enforcement against fraudulent or potentially fraudulent parties, of the original terms of *ἔκούσια συναλλάγματα*, and the settlement of disputes regarding the meaning of the original terms in the civil courts, than of the judicial rectification of unfortunate results, for which neither party is to blame, arising out of the *συναλλάγματα*—the terms of the *συναλλάγματα* not being in dispute—as e.g. when a Land Court ‘rectifies’ the result of a lease contracted in the open market. As it is, however, he gives no *examples* of *τὸ διορθωτικὸν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἔκουσίοις συναλλάγμασι*<sup>1</sup>. I limit myself to saying that he gives no *examples*, for I think that Grant goes too far when he asserts that ‘*all that is said* [in this chapter] applies only to the “involuntary transactions.”’ I take it that the words in § 7—*ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσι, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσι*—may refer to ‘voluntary’ as well as to ‘involuntary transactions.’

b. 26. § 2.] By *ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν διανομή* we must understand much more than the distribution made by some obvious central authority, such as a general who distributes prize money, or a board of directors who apportion dividends: far the most important form of the *διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν* is ‘the distribution of wealth’ which results from the operation of the ‘economic laws’ regulating wages and profits. The good workman contributes more (cf. the *εἰσενεχθέντα* of this passage) than the indifferent workman to the development of that wealth of the nation which is, as it were, the material body to which the State, as *ψυχή*, gives life and reality; and accordingly his reward is greater. Any attempt to interfere

<sup>1</sup> It is worth noticing that the difficulty of bringing the recovery of debt within the scope of judicial *διόρθωσις* was felt; see *E.N.* ix. 1. 9.

with the wages or profits determined by free competition is an 1131 b. 26. attempt to disturb a γεωμετρική ἀναλογία, and to violate τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον. No such attempt can, in the nature of things, succeed permanently, its hope being, not to change a merely conventional principle of διανομή, but to defeat the law of the victory of the strongest.

It is interesting to compare in this connexion the remarkable passage, *M. M.* i. 33. 1193 b. 36–1194 a. 25, in which distributive justice is described as determining the returns of labour, and regulating the exchanges which in *E. N.* v are discussed in the chapter on τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός (ch. 5). The writer of the *M. M.* differs from the writer of *E. N.* v in confining the principle of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός to criminal cases, *M. M.* i. 33. 1194 a. 29–1194 b. 2.

§ 3. κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν] Mich. Eph. defines ἀριθ. ἀναλογία as 1132 a. 1. follows: ἀναλογία ἀριθμητική ἔστιν ἡ ποσοῦ μὲν ἵσου ἐν ταῖς διαφοραῖς, ποιοῦ δὲ μὴ ἵσου ἡ μὴ ὁμοίου μετέχουσα: cf. Nicom. Ger. p. 124, ed. Hoche, ἔστιν οὖν ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης, ὅταν τριῶν ἡ πλειώνων ὅρων ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις κειμένων ἐπινοούμενων ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ ποσότητα διαφορὰ εὑρίσκηται μεταξὺ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχουσα, μὴ μέντοι λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς ὥροις πρὸς ἀλλήλους γίνηται οἷον α, β, γ, δ, ε. . . . μετέχει ἂρα ἡ τοιαύτη ποσοῦ μὲν ἵσου ἐν ταῖς διαφοραῖς ποιοῦ δὲ οὐκέτι ἵσου διὰ τοῦτο ἀριθμητική εἰ δ' ἔμπαλιν ποιοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου μετεῖχε, ποσοῦ δ' οὐ, ἢν ἀν γεωμετρικὴ ἀντὶ ἀριθμητικῆς.

οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.] When one man injures another man a. 2. (the examples in this § and the next are ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα exclusively), no account is taken of the possibly unequal ‘worth’ of the persons as recipients in a distribution, but only of ‘the difference produced by the hurt’ (*τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφοράν*) in the positions of parties who are *equally* entitled to enjoy the possession of their own.

In his note on this §, Grant says: ‘Corrective justice is here said to regard each case impersonally as an affair of loss and gain, and between these it strikes the middle point. It is the moral worth of persons that is ignored (*εἰ ἐπιεικῆς φαῦλον κ.τ.λ.*), for we find afterwards, ch. 5. §§ 3–4, that a consideration of the position and circumstances of persons *does* come in to modify the estimate of the loss sustained from an indignity,’ &c. It must be remembered, however, that in the cases here alluded to by Grant (v. 5. 4 οἶον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν . . . καὶ εἰ ἀρχοντα ἐπάταξεν), ‘the loss sustained [sc. by the

1132 a. 2. *individual himself*] from an indignity' is not the most important thing to be estimated, but rather the *public evil* arising from acts which tend to diminish the authority and *prestige* of a magistrate. I do not think that it is fair to the writer to assume (as Grant seems to do) that he regards in v. 5. 4 merely the individual's personal loss, and not also the public evil involved in the offence; but it must be admitted that he does not see at all clearly that the case *εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν* is not *sui generis*. Even when one ordinary citizen injures another ordinary citizen, the true nature of the situation created is misrepresented by the term *συνάλλαγμα* applied to it. We are not concerned merely with a relation between two individuals *in vacuo*, but with a sore in the body politic, which must be healed by means which take account of the whole organism. *Διόρθωσις* is much more than making the *ἀδικῶν* give 'compensation' to the *ἀδικούμενος*—indeed it is sometimes impossible to 'compensate' him at all. The words before us here (v. 4. 3)—*οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.*—are significant, as showing how abstract the writer's notion of *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον* is. He is thinking here only of the 'compensation' given to the individual. The good moral character of the *ἀδικῶν* does not indeed make the wrong which he inflicts one for which the *ἀδικούμενος* should get less 'compensation' than for an equal wrong inflicted by a bad man; but the claims of the *ἀδικούμενος* to compensation having been satisfied, it still remains to be considered by the 'court of correction' how far society has been endangered by the offence, and how much ought to be added to the penalty on that account; and here 'previous good character' is not irrelevant. The formula of the *ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης* seems to me to have stood in the way of the writer's taking a complete view of the nature of 'Corrective Justice.'

a. 7. § 4. *καὶ γὰρ ὅταν κ.τ.λ.*] 'for even when one man is struck, and another strikes, or one man kills, and another is killed, it is a case of unequal division between patient and agent'—*i. e.* the situation created by a theft is only a more obvious, but not a more real, case of 'unequal division' than that created by an assault or a murder.

a. 9. *ἄλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἴσταζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους*] I am inclined (though with considerable hesitation) to agree with Münscher (*Quaest. Crit.* p. 70) and Jackson that *ζημίᾳ* is not (as Mich. Eph. and others suppose) the instrumental dative here = 'by the penalty'

which he (the judge) inflicts,' but the impaired position of the injured party, as opposed to the *κέρδος*, or augmented position of the injuring party. The fact that in the context *ζημία* describes the position of the injured party seems to favour this view. Jackson's rendering is—‘*i.e.* πειράται τῇ ζημίᾳ ισάζειν τὸ κέρδος ἀφαιρῶν αὐτοῦ. “He endeavours to equalise the unjustly augmented advantages of the one (*τὸ κέρδος*) and the unjustly impaired advantages of the other (*τὴν ζημίαν*) by taking from the former and giving to the latter.”’ The gen. *ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους* (not *ἀφαιρῶν τὸ κέρδος*) seems to show that *κέρδος* stands here for the *whole* position of the *πλέον ἔχων*, not for the unjustly obtained *part* of it.

**§§ 5, 6. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν . . . καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία a. 10.  
τὸ δὲ κέρδος]** The terms *ζημία* and *κέρδος* are applied strictly (*οἰκείως*) only where A has come out of an *έκούσιον συνάλλαγμα* poorer (in respect of *ἀργύριον ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον*), while B has come out of it richer; still, metaphorically we speak of the *ζημία* of the man who has been struck, and of the *κέρδος* of the man who has struck him: it is not, however, till the damage done comes to be estimated, that the terms are thus metaphorically applied: *i.e.* the infliction of a wound could not be described as *κέρδος* to the person inflicting it, except for the reason that it has a value in the criminal court and has there to be paid for: see Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 122)—‘Trendelenburg (*Hist. Beiträge zur Ph.* iii. p. 425) denkt bei *μετρηθῆ* an schätzbare Klagen, und interpretirt im übrigen wie Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire: mais quand le juge a pu mesurer le dommage éprouvé, le profit de l'un devient sa perte, et la perte de l'autre devient son profit. Aber diese Auffassung ist schon wegen γέ unmöglich. Nach meiner Ansicht ist zu übersetzen: aber erst dann nennt man das eine *ζημία*, das andere *κέρδος*, wenn das Erlittene gemessen ist.’ Another objection to the view of Trendelenburg and Saint-Hilaire is that although the judge's rectification is certainly called (*καλεῖται*) *ζημία* (*i.e.* = penalty) so far as the *πατάξις* is concerned, its result for the *παθών* is never called *κέρδος*.

**§ 6. ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν . . . κέρδους]** I do not think that a. 18. there is any significance in the substitution here of *ἐπανορθωτικόν* for *διορθωτικόν*. A comparison of the words before us with § 14 below *ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιον ἔστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον* is well fitted to exhibit the difficulty in which the writer is placed by his conception of *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐκούσιοις συναλ-*

**1132 a. 18. λάγμασι.** In the clause before us (§ 6) we naturally assume that, in accordance with the statement made at the beginning of this chapter, τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον is τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους, not only in ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα (from which the examples are exclusively taken), but also in ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα. In § 13, however, he tells us that ζημία and κέρδος originally and properly mean that loss and gain (having less and having more than one started with) which the law, so far from attempting to correct, permits in voluntary exchanges, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὥνεισθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος, and that, where an attempt is made by the law to correct ζημία and κέρδος, it is not ζημία and κέρδος in such voluntary transactions as buying and selling, but in *involuntary* transactions; his final summing-up being (§ 14) ὡστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιον ἔστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον—‘accordingly (corrective) justice is the mean between gain of a certain kind and loss of a certain kind, *i.e.* between gain and loss in involuntary transactions.’ Here τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον, referring to and explaining κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας τινὸς, is an inexact abbreviation for τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκούσιοις συναλλάγμασι: so the Paraph.—ὡστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιον ἔστι λέγω δὲ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκούσιοις συναλλάγμασιν . . . τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἑκούσιοις συναλλάγμασι κέρδος οὔτε ἄδικόν ἔστιν οὔτε εὐθύνεται τούτων γὰρ ἄδειαν ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος. It is difficult to reconcile this summing-up with the position from which the writer starts, that corrective justice is the rectification of inequalities arising ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἑκούσιοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκούσιοις: but see note on v. 4. 14, b. 18 where Jackson’s view is discussed.

- a. 22. § 7. καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον] Fritzsche quotes Thuc. iv. 83 ἐτοῖμος ὅν Βρασίδᾳ μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν.
- a. 23. μεσιδίους] Zell quotes *Pol. E.* 5. 1306 a. 28 ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἄλλήλους ἐγχειρίζοντι τὴν φυλακὴν στρατιώταις καὶ ἄρχοντι μεσιδίῳ.
- a. 28. § 8. δίχα διαιρεθῆ] ‘to divide into two *equal* parts,’ Jackson, who refers to Eucl. *El.* i. 10, i. 9, iii. 30: cf. also Nic. Ger. *ἀριθ. εἰσαγ.* i. 8. 4, p. 15, Hoche.
- a. 29. § 9.] The sentence τὸ δ’ ἵσον . . . ἀναλογίαν Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 30) supposes to have changed places with διὰ τοῦτο . . . διχαστῆς —‘Die richtige Gedankenfolge wird hergestellt, wenn der Satz διὰ τοῦτο—διχαστῆς vor den Satz τὸ δ’ ἵσον—ἀναλογίαν gestellt und an

die etymologische Bemerkung angeschlossen wird, zu der er ganz 1132 a. 29. ersichtlich gehört. Erst dann gewinnt sowohl διὰ τοῦτο, als γάρ seine richtige Beziehung.'

**διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται . . . διχαστής]** See Alex. *Met.* p. 718. a. 30. 1. ed. Bonitz (on 1078 b. 21) δικαιοσύνη γάρ φασιν [οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι] ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς ὁ διαιρῶν τὴν δεκάδα δίχα. Cf. also *Theol. Arith.* p. 12 (Ast's edition), quoted here by Jackson, Δίκη τε, οἰονεὶ δίχη καὶ Ἱστις κ.τ.λ. It is scarcely necessary to remind the student that the original meaning of δίκη is *custom* or *usage*—cf. δίκη βροτῶν, ‘the way of mortals’; and that consequently δίκαιον = νόμιμον is earlier than δίκαιον = ἴσον.

**§ 12. ἵσται αἱ ἔφ' ὁν α α . . . κ.τ.λ.]** ‘The lines (*γραμμαῖ*) over b. 6. which we write α . . . α, β . . . β,’ i.e. ‘the lines α α, β β.’ As Jackson remarks, ‘the genitive and the dative appear to be used indifferently in such phrases’; hence, in b. 7, τὸ ἔφ' φ γ δ (Ob and CCC—though in CCC there are traces of erasure after φ) ought to be read for Bekker’s τὸ ἔφ' ὁν γ δ. ‘It will be observed,’ Jackson notes, ‘that the whole lines are described as ἡ α α, κ.τ.λ., and the segments of them as τὸ α ε, κ.τ.λ. Thus ἡ α α is what Euclid would call ἡ α α γραμμή, τὸ α ε what he would call τὸ α ε τμῆμα.’

**ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν . . . b. 11. τοιοῦτον]** All b. 9. MSS. give these words, both here, and (*without ὁν*) in ch. 5. § 9. 1133 a. 14, where they are explicable in the context. Here they are clearly out of place, and must have crept by some accident into the archetype of all existing MSS. If we suppose that in the MS. from which the archetype was copied, the text from 1132 b. 11 ἐλήλυθε to 1133 a. 14 *ἵστασθηναι* exactly filled the reverse side of one folio (A), and the obverse side of the next folio (B), we can see that the copyist, reaching τῷ γ δ 1132 b. 9 at the bottom of the obverse side of folio A, and accidentally turning over two leaves (A and B), instead of one<sup>1</sup>, would find the words *ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.* 1133 a. 14 at the top of the reverse side of folio B, and might transcribe them after γ δ 1132 b. 9, before he found out his mistake. If he marked them for omission, the next transcriber might easily fail to notice his mark.

The words having thus established themselves in v. 4. 12, their

<sup>1</sup> Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 38 note) gives an instance of this accident in the case of N<sup>b</sup>.

1132 b. 9. occurrence again in v. 5. 9 would, of course, be a difficulty for later scribes; and I cannot help thinking that the omission of *ἄντα* in the latter place was an awkward attempt on the part of a later, but very early scribe (for *all* the MSS<sup>1</sup>, and the Aldine edition omit *ἄντα* 1133 a. 15) to minimise the difficulty by making the writer appear to refer back with the imperfect *ἀνηροῦντο* to a statement already made. The result is, of course, an unjustifiable sentence. Aristotle *alludes* with the imperfect *ἦν* to a doctrine previously stated, but if he wishes to quote the exact words of a previous sentence he does so with *ὡς ἐλέγομεν πρότερον*, or some such phrase. It is conceivable, however, that a copyist in difficulty might ignore this distinction. At any rate I feel sure that it was by no mere accident, but on a *theory* of some kind or other, that a succession of scribes down to the time of the Aldine edition steadily refused to admit the grammatically necessary *ἄντα* in v. 5. 9, while they read it in v. 4. 12.

Whether the clause is genuine even in v. 5. 9 will be examined in the note on that §. The foregoing hypothesis to account for its presence in v. 4. 12 assumes only that it was present in v. 5. 9 before it appeared in v. 4. 12, but not that it is genuine, i.e. was always present, in v. 5. 9.

b. 11. §§ 13, 14.] See note on v. 4. 6, a. 18.

b. 15. § 13. *ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἀδειαν*] Grant has a good note here—‘In commerce of all kinds the law allows one to gain as much as one can. In involuntary transactions the law allows no gain to be made, but brings things always back to their level. This non-interference of the law with bargains becomes, if carried out, the principle of free-trade.’

b. 16. § 14. *ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ’ ἔλαττον ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ* {*τὰ add. Rassow, Bywater*} *δι’ αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασὶν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιούσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν*] Bekker’s full stop before *ὅταν* b. 16 should be removed: see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 94.

On the *αὐτὰ δι’ αὐτῶν* [or *αὐτῶν*] of the MSS., I quote Jackson’s note, in which he gives the various interpretations which the editors have offered of the words, and adds an interpretation of his own—‘*αὐτὰ δι’ αὐτῶν γένηται*.] The editors all read *δι’ αὐτῶν*, and most take these words in connection with *αὐτά*. “Nemo interpretum haec

<sup>1</sup> Jackson states that all the ten MSS. (including K<sup>b</sup>) examined by him omit *ἄντα* here. I can add that CCC and B<sup>123</sup> also omit it.

verba intellexit," says Michelet. "Felicianus verlit: *sed sua cuique* 1132 b. 16. *per se ipsa evaserint*; Argyropylus: *sed sua per se ipsa sunt facta*; Lambinus: *sed paria paribus respondent*. Cum § 13 dixisset, nomina κέρδος et ζημία orta esse ex contractibus voluntariis, iam § 14 proponit, ea nomina translata esse ad obligationes ex delicto, ita ut in iis solis usurpentur. Verte: *ubi vero neque plus neque minus habent, praeterquam quae per se ipsos facta sint, &c.*" Rassow (*Forschungen*, p. 94) proposes to insert τά before δι' αὐτῶν [Bywater adopts Rassow's τά], and to translate "das was man durch seine eigene Arbeit besass." Grant would construe "but result in being themselves by means of reciprocity, *i.e.* by mutual giving and taking, οὐτῶν being equivalent to ἀλλήλων." Finally, as I learn from a note to Williams' translation, Professor Chandler reads δι' αὐτῶν, and translates "But when, by buying and selling (δι' αὐτῶν), men have got neither more nor less than they had at first, but exactly the same." Agreeing with Professor Chandler in his rendering of πλέον, ἔλαττον, and αὐτά (*sc.* τὰ εὖ ἀρχῆς), I take δι' αὐτῶν γένηται to mean "comes into their possession." If we can say δι' αὐτῶν εἶναι "to be in their possession" *Polit.* vii. (vi.) 4. p. 182. 28, viii. (v.) 1. p. 194. 23. 6. p. 206. 2 (see Eucken, *über den Sprachgebrauch des A.* ii. 38), surely δι' αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι must also be admissible. The sentence thus means, as it ought to do, "But when people *get* what is their own, they are said to *have* what is their own." Cf. *Polit.* viii. (v.) 7. p. 208. 26 μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἔσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὐτῶν.' It may be conceded that δι' αὐτῶν γένηται would in certain contexts be good Greek for 'comes into their possession,' although it is to be noted that the idea of 'management,' in addition to that of mere 'possession,' seems to be conveyed in the passages on which Jackson relies; the difficulty, however, of accepting Jackson's interpretation of the words in the present case is that of breaking up the phrase αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν [or αὐτῶν], which seems to be an organic whole. The passages quoted by Jackson, after Eucken, perhaps throw light on δι' αὐτῶν [or αὐτῶν] γένηται, but not on αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν [or αὐτῶν]—viz. *Pol.* 1306 a. 16 τῆς πολιτείας δι' ὀλίγων οὕσης: 1301 b. 12 τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν προαιροῦνται τὴν αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῶν δὲ εἶναι βούλονται: 1293 a. 28 τὸ δι' αὐτῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχειν. It seems to me that αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν cannot be broken up, and that αὐτῶν is necessarily neuter, referring to the same subject as αὐτά. The phrase does not, it would appear, occur elsewhere in the Aristotelian Corpus; but in Theophrastus, *Met.* i. 1 (Brandis, p. 309) we have, οὗτ' ἄγαν εὔσημος

1132 b. 16. ἡ [sc. τῶν μαθηματικῶν] συναφὴ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς . . . οἶν γὰρ μεμηχανημένα δοκεῖ δι' ἡμῶν εἶναι σχῆματά τε καὶ μορφὰς καὶ λόγους περιτιθέντων, αὐτὰ δὲ δι' αὐτῶν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει φύσιν: i.e. geometrical truths are thought to be arbitrarily constructed by us, and to have *in and of themselves* no independent reality: cf. also Plutarch, *Consol. ad Apollon.* I οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν ἱερῶν πρὸς τὰς ἀθρόας τῶν ῥευμάτων ἐπιφορὰς εὐθὺς προσφέρουσι τὰς διὰ τῶν φαρμάκων θοηθείας, ἀλλ' ἔώσι τὸ βαρῦνον τῆς φλεγμονῆς διὰ τῆς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπιχρίστων ἐπιθέσεως αὐτὸ δι' αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν πέψιν.

I take *αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν* [or *αὐτάν*] then in the present passage as one expression in which *δι'* *αὐτῶν* strengthens *αὐτά*, and explain: ‘But when there has resulted neither more nor less [than what they started with], but simply the original amount itself’—i.e. the original amount not affected from without in any way, but remaining ‘*in and through itself*’ the same. Rassow’s easy emendation gives good sense, but I prefer the *αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν* of the codd. explained as above.

b. 18. ὁστε κέρδους . . . ὕστερον] see note on v. 4. 6, a. 18. Jackson’s view alluded to at the end of that note is as follows, p. 86 ‘τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἔκούσιον] This is not inconsistent with 2. § 13 and 4. § 1, because, whether the original transaction was ἀκούσιον or ἔκούσιον, the *result* must have been *παρὰ τὸ ἔκούσιον* in regard to the person injured, else there would be nothing to rectify’: and he translates the clause—‘Thus τὸ [διορθωτικὸν] δίκαιον is a mean between a sort of profit and a sort of loss in matters which are not voluntary—the possession of exactly as much after the transaction as before it.’ Jackson’s point here then is that *τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἔκούσιον* is not, as the Paraph. assumes it to be, equivalent to *τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκούσιοις συναλλάγμασι*, but serves to mark that kind of *ζημία* (resulting, it may be, from an *ἔκούσιον συνάλλαγμα*) which the losing party resents, and can have judicially rectified, as distinguished from that other kind of *ζημία* which he accepts as bad luck in business. I admit that this interpretation of *τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἔκούσιον* is ingenious, and would be plausible, if we could be sure that we were dealing here with the unbroken statement of a consistent doctrine of corrective justice. In the absence, however, of anything like certainty on this point, I think that it is safer to explain the two passages, §§ 5, 6, and §§ 13, 14 (whether written by the same author or not cannot be settled, and does not matter much) independently of each other. Sections 5 and 6 regard the *κέρδος* and *ζημία*, between which τὸ

ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον is said to be τὸ μέσον, as *eminently* the κέρδος and 1132 b. 18. ζημία which result from ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα: and *illegal* κέρδος and ζημία arising out of ἔκούσια συναλλάγματα, though theoretically implied, are not prominent in the writer's mind. Sections 13 and 14, I think, are to the following effect—‘ζημία and κέρδος strictly so called are in voluntary exchanges, and are allowed, *i.e.* are “just”: hence where ζημία and κέρδος are not allowed, *i.e.* are “unjust,” they are so called in a metaphorical sense, *i.e.* they are the ζημία and κέρδος which result from *involuntary transactions*.’ These are undoubtedly the most eminent examples of ‘unjust’ ζημία and κέρδος—and the passage, I believe, confines itself to them; whether because the writer purposely limited his statement, or because the sections (13, 14) are, as Ramsauer supposes p. 315, fragmentary, I do not undertake to decide. The consistency of ch. 4 would have to be much more evident, I think, than it is, to make it likely that τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἔκούσιον is not opposed to τῆς ἔκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς b. 13, and does not stand for τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκούσιοις συναλλάγμασι.

## CHAPTER V.

### ARGUMENT.

Some have thought that ‘*suffering or receiving in return*,’ meaning by this ‘*suffering or receiving the same in return*,’ is an adequate definition of justice. But this definition does not explain the nature either of distributive or of corrective justice. Corrective justice does not proceed on the principle of ‘*an eye for an eye*; it takes account of circumstances and motives, and also makes the offender suffer, not the same thing, but that which is equivalent; and it is a return equivalent to the product of his labour, but not the same in kind, which distributive justice assigns to each member of the community; in other words, the subsistence of the social community requires that each labourer shall receive from other labourers in exchange for his product, not the same product, but an equivalent amount of other products. Thus, if labourers *A* and *B*, and their respective products *a* and *b*, be arranged in a square

*A*      *B*

*a*      *b*

we may say that exchange is ‘*cross-conjunction*,’ *i.e.* the conjunction of *A* and *b* and *B* and *a*. Since, however, the values of the unit products of different labourers differ, there could be no fair exchange unless it were possible to determine in each case what amount of one product is equivalent to what

amount of another product. This is possible by means of money, which is a 'medium of exchange' or 'common measure of things exchanged.' Of course 'need' or 'demand' is the real medium; and money is merely its conventional representative; but it is necessary to 'represent' or universalize need; since need in the concrete, i. e. the need of this particular product, varies too much to be a standard of value, whereas money which enables a man to get anything he needs is something which he always needs equally—or nearly equally (for the value of money fluctuates slightly); i. e. money is something which he is always willing to take in exchange for his product.

From what has been said it is plain that 'doing justice' is striking the mean between the position of the party who injures and that of the party who is injured, and that the habit of justice is a mean state, not however in the same sense in which the other virtues are mean states, but because, in the apportionment of external good things, it produces a mean, i. e. always assigns an amount which is the mean between the too much and the too little which injustice assigns. The just man deliberately assigns to himself and to others that amount which is exactly proportioned to his and their 'merit' in each case, neither too much nor too little. The unjust man deliberately assigns too much of that which is good, and too little of that which is evil, to himself; and where he does not himself come in for a share, tends to give undue preference to one or other of the two parties between whom he makes distribution.

1132 b. 21. § 1. τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός] The writer having explained the two εἴδη of Particular Justice, now proceeds in ch. 5 to discuss certain points, some connected with Distributive Justice, and some with Corrective Justice, which might have been discussed in chapters 3 and 4 under their own heads, but seem to come before the reader more naturally and suggestively when allowed to arise out of the criticism of a famous theory of justice with which he is already familiar.


Τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, literally 'that which has suffered or received in return,' is somewhat strangely used instead of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθένται. 'Αντιπεπονθένται in mathematics<sup>1</sup> is 'to be reciprocally proportional': ἀντιπεπόνθησις is 'reciprocal proportion'; and τὰ ἀντιπεπονθότα are 'magnitudes which are reciprocally proportional': see Euclid, *El.* vi. Def. 2.—'Two sides of one figure are said to be reciprocally proportional to two sides of another, when one of the sides of the first is to one of the sides of the second, as the remaining side of the second is to the remaining side of the first.' The enunciation of Euclid *El.* vi. 15 is τῶν ἵσων καὶ μίαν μιᾶ ἵσην ἔχόντων γωνίαν τριγώνων ἀντιπεπόνθασιν αἱ πλευραὶ αἱ περὶ τὰς ἵσας γωνίας· καὶ ὁν μίαν μιᾶ ἵσην ἔχόντων γωνίαν τριγώνων ἀντιπεπόνθασιν αἱ πλευραὶ αἱ περὶ τὰς ἵσας γωνίας, ἵσα ἐστὶν ἑκείνα.

<sup>1</sup> I wish to acknowledge indebtedness to Jackson's note, p. 93.

Let (1) and (2) be equal triangles having angles  $A$  and  $X$  1132 b. 21. equal.

Then  $AB : XY :: XZ : AC$ .

Or let  $AB : XY :: XZ : AC$ , and angle  $A = X$ , then the triangles are equal.



Here the *ἀντιπεπόνθησις*, or ‘reciprocal proportion,’ consists in this, that if triangle (1) is superior in respect of its side  $AB$  to (2) in respect of its side  $XY$ , on the other hand (2) is equally superior in respect of its side  $XZ$  to (1) in respect of its side  $AC$ .

In mathematics the term *ἀντιπεπονθός*, *ἀντιπεπονθέναι*, or *ἀντιπεπόνθησις*, thus means unambiguously ‘reciprocal proportion.’ But when we apply this technical mathematical term to express the concrete case of the ‘just reciprocation’ which ought to subsist between two persons, it immediately becomes ambiguous. When we say that ‘it is just that A should get or suffer in return what he has given to or inflicted upon B,’ do we mean that he should get or suffer *the same thing*, or *something different but ‘equivalent’?* And if something different, but ‘equivalent,’ what is to be the standard of equivalence? In the so-called *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα* a natural instinct of the primitive man calls aloud for ‘the same thing.’ This instinct found formal expression in the law, ‘an eye for an eye,’ of ancient penal codes, and still asserts itself in those modern codes which retain the death-punishment for murder. It was only comparatively late reflection which suggested that the ends of criminal justice were, in most cases at least, best served by a retribution equivalent to the injury, but not the same in kind. In the case of the *ἔκούσια συναλλάγματα*, however, men necessarily saw from the very first that *ἀνταπόδοσις* could not be corn for corn, but must be corn for something else, and that the *ἀνταπόδοσις* would be fair, only if the *value* of the corn given in return equalled the *value* of the thing received. Thus the notion of *value*, *ἀξία*, proportion, forced itself upon them from the very first in the case of *ἔκούσια*

1132 b. 21. συναλλάγματα, but was long absent from their reflection upon ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα.

In the present passage the writer accuses the Pythagoreans, together with others, of confounding justice with ‘simple reciprocation’; ‘simple reciprocation’ being ‘retaliation,’ or that reciprocation which proceeds according to the principle of ‘an eye for an eye.’ ‘But there are some who think that simple reciprocation, or “suffering the same in return,” is all that is involved in the notion of justice. This was the opinion of the Pythagoreans, who defined justice simply (*i. e.* without any  $\pi\rho\sigma\theta\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota s$  or qualification) as “reciprocation,” or “suffering the same in return”—an opinion which in § 3 is identified with that of the line  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \kappa\epsilon\ \pi\acute{a}\theta\iota\iota\ \kappa.\tau.\lambda.$  Here then the charge brought against the Pythagoreans is that they confounded justice, as a whole, with the *lex talionis* which, as we have seen, recommends itself to a primitive instinct as the law of ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα. The writer’s criticism (§§ 2–5), and consequent construction (§§ 6 &c.)—in which the famous conception of  $\tau\acute{o}\ \acute{a}n\tau\acute{i}\pi\acute{e}\pi\acute{o}\nu\theta\acute{o}s$  is not cast aside, but skilfully used—consist in turning the reader from these ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα which are so misleading in this connexion, if attended to exclusively, and asking him to observe  $\tau\acute{o}\ \acute{a}n\tau\acute{i}\pi\acute{e}\pi\acute{o}\nu\theta\acute{o}s$  in ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα as well, in order to obtain there a truer view of its nature, and return with this truer view to the explanation of it in the ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα.

It seems to be very likely, however, that, in charging the Pythagoreans with the identification of ‘justice’ and ‘retaliation,’ the writer is mistaken. There can be no doubt, of course, that they spoke of justice as  $\acute{a}n\tau\acute{i}\pi\acute{e}\pi\acute{o}\nu\theta\acute{o}s$ : but it is probable that, in doing so, they thought merely of the mathematical implication of the term, without pledging themselves to the doctrine of ‘an eye for an eye,’ or indeed to any doctrine which could be said to have much *ethical* significance. This would be entirely in keeping with their treatment of the other ‘virtues,’ which they explained fantastically, by mathematical formulae, without, apparently, paying much attention to their concrete content: see Alex. on *Met.* A. 5. 985 b. 26 (quoted by Jackson from Zeller i. 360)  $\tau\acute{h}s\ \mu\acute{e}n\ \gamma\acute{a}\rho\ \delta\acute{i}kaios\acute{u}n\eta s\ \acute{i}d\acute{i}o\nu\ \acute{n}\acute{p}\acute{o}\lacute{a}m\acute{p}\acute{a}n\acute{o}n\acute{t}\acute{e}s\ \acute{e}n\acute{v}\i\ t\acute{o}\ \acute{a}n\tau\acute{i}\pi\acute{e}\pi\acute{o}\nu\theta\acute{o}s\ t\acute{e}\ k\acute{a}\l\ \i\acute{s}\acute{o}n,\ \acute{e}\n\ t\acute{o}\i\ \acute{a}\acute{r}\acute{i}\th\acute{m}\acute{o}\i\ t\acute{o}\u0304\acute{u}t\acute{o}\ \acute{e}\n\acute{v}\i\ r\acute{i}\s\acute{k}\acute{o}n\acute{t}\acute{e}s\ \acute{e}\n\acute{v}\i\ n,\ d\acute{i}\acute{a}\ t\acute{o}\u0304t\acute{o}\ k\acute{a}\l\ t\acute{o}\u0304\ i\acute{s}\acute{a}k\acute{i}s\ \i\acute{s}\acute{o}n\ \acute{a}\acute{r}\acute{i}\th\acute{m}\acute{o}\i\ p\acute{r}\acute{a}t\acute{o}t\acute{o}\ \acute{e}\l\acute{e}y\i\ o\i\ \acute{e}\n\acute{v}\i\ k\acute{i}kaios\acute{u}n\eta\ .\ .\ .\ t\acute{o}\u0304t\acute{o}\ d\acute{e}\ o\i\ \mu\acute{e}n\ t\acute{o}\u0304\ t\acute{e}\s\acute{s}\acute{s}\acute{a}r\acute{a}\ \acute{e}\l\acute{e}y\i\ o\i\ \acute{e}\n\acute{v}\i\ n\acute{e}\a\:$  see also *Theol. Arith.* p. 28 (Ast), quoted by Jackson, ‘where the Pythagorean definition of justice is said to be δύναμις

ἀποδόσεως τοῦ ἵσου καὶ τοῦ προσήκοντος, ἐμπεριεχομένη ἀριθμοῦ τετραγώνου 1132 b. 21. περισσοῦ μεσότητη.' The other virtues were similarly formulated: see *M. M.* i. 1182 a. 11 πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ἐνεχείρησεν δὲ Πυθαγόρας περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ὅρθως δέ τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκείαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο· οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἴστικις ἵσος. I think then that there is good reason for doubting whether the Pythagoreans with their mathematical expression τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, pledged themselves to the doctrine of simple retaliation with which the writer of the Fifth Book charges them. At any rate the pseudo-Archytas (apud Stob. *Flor.* ii. 138 ed. Meineke), who, I suppose, hoped to pass for a Pythagorean, gives a very different account of the expression from that ascribed to the Pythagoreans by the writer of the Fifth Book. Discoursing περὶ νόμου καὶ δικαιοσύνης, this 'Pythagorean' says δεῖ δὴ τὸν νόμον τὸν κάρρον καὶ τὰν πόλιν ἐκ πασᾶν σύνθετον εἶμεν τὰν ἄλλαν πολιτειῶν· καὶ ἔχεν τι βασιλῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ Δακεδαίμονι· τοὶ μὲν γὰρ βασιλέες τὰς μοναρχίας, τοὶ δὲ γέροντες τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας, τοὶ δὲ ἔφοροι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἵππαγρέται δὲ καὶ κόροι τὰς δαμοκρατίας· δεῖ τοίνυν τὸν νόμον μὴ μόνον ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν ἡμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀντιπεπονθέναι τοῖς αὐτῷ μερέεσσιν [legem igitur oportet non solum bonam et honestam esse, sed etiam singulis suis sive reipublicae partibus oppositam—Mullach, *Frag. Phil.* i. 560]. οὗτος γὰρ ἴσχυρὸς καὶ βέβαιος· τὸ δὲ ἀντιπεπονθέναι λέγω αὐτῷ, καὶ ἄρχεν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι τὰν αὐτὰν ἀρχάν [partibus singulis eam oppositam esse dico, ita ut idem magistratus aliis imperet aliis obediatur], ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ εὐνομωτάτῳ Δακεδαίμονι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ βασιλεῦσιν τοὶ ἔφοροι ἀντικάθηται, τούτοις δὲ οἱ γέροντες, μέσοι δὲ οἱ κόροι καὶ ἵππαγρέται· ἐφ' ὁ γὰρ ἀν ρέψωντι τοὶ πλεονεκτέοντες τὰν ἀρχόντων, οὗτοι τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑποτίθενται.

ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ] ἄλλῳ seems to be given only by K<sup>b</sup> P<sup>b</sup> and b. 23. CCC<sup>1</sup>; and Jackson omits it, 'because it is grammatically impossible to combine it with ἀντιπεπονθός.' (The ἀντιπεπονθέναι τοῖς αὐτῷ μερέεσσι of the ps.-Archytas quoted above seems to show that it is not impossible.) He suspects 'that ἄλλῳ is a corruption of ἄλλως prefixed to one of the double readings which in the following sentence are preserved by P<sup>b</sup>, and therefore may have occurred in the common progenitor of P<sup>b</sup> and K<sup>b</sup>.' The reading of P<sup>b</sup> is ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ, τὸ δὲ ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νόμιμον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολιτικόν, πολιτικὸν δὲ λέγω τὸ κοινωνικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀντιπεπονθός,

<sup>1</sup> B<sup>1</sup> has ἄλλων.

1132 b. 23. κ.τ.λ. Camb. has the same interpolation (with *νόμικον sic*, for *νόμιμον*), and on the margin, in a later hand, the word *περιττεύει*.

§ 2. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθός οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει] ‘receiving, or suffering, the *same* in return’ is a definition of justice which is inapplicable, whether we consider justice as distributive or corrective; and there is no third kind of justice. Mich. Eph. has an interesting note here—*ἀλιάται δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τῶν Πυθαγορίων τὸ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός δίκαιον, καὶ μὴ διορίσαι, μηδὲ προσθεῖναι τὸ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τὸ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀντιπάσχειν ἔκαστον ὁ πεποίκεν οὐδαμῶς δίκαιον. οὐδ σημεῖον παρέθετο τὸ μὴ ἐφαρμόττειν αὐτὸς μήτε τῷ διανεμητικῷ δικαίῳ μήτε τῷ διορθωτικῷ εἰς ἄ τὸ δίκαιον διήρηται· ἀλλὰ πᾶς οὐκ ἐφαρμόζει ἑκείνοις; ἡ ὅτι ἑκείνων ἔκάτερον ἐν ἀναλογίᾳ ἔστι, τὸ μὲν γὰρ γεωμετρικὴ τὸ δ' ἀριθμητικὴ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν οὐδετέρᾳ τῶν ἀναλογιῶν ὑποπίπτει. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός ταῦτὸν τῷ διανεμητικῷ οὐδὲ κατὰ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν ἀναλογίαν δῆλον· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἑκείνῳ τὸ ἵσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἥν τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀντιπεπονθότι οὐκ ἔστι· ποῦ γὰρ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν εἰ δοῦλος εὐγενῆ καὶ σπουδαῖον μίαν πληγὴν πλήξει, καὶ αὐτὸν μίαν ἀντιπληγῆναι, ἡ εἰ ιερέα λακτίσει ἀντιλακτισθῆναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ διορθωτικῷ ταῦτὸν τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διορθωτικὸν οὕτ' αὐτὰ ἀξιοῖ ἀντιπάσχειν τοὺς ποιήσαντας· οὐ γὰρ ὁδόντα ἀντὶ ὁδόντος ἀξιοῖ ἐξαιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τιμᾶσθαι πόσου καὶ οἵου ἄξιος ὁ ὁδόντος ἡ ὁ δόθαλμός, ἡ εἴτι ἀν ἥ τὸ μέλος, οἷον εἰ δέκα νομισμάτων, ταῦτα ἀπαιτεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιήσαντος καὶ διδόναι τῷ πεπονθότι τὴν στέρησιν τοῦ ὁδόντος ἡ τοῦ δόθαλμον.* It will be noticed that Mich. Eph. in this passage thinks of a ‘Distribution of Punishments’ *κατ' ἀξίαν*. He says that to punish, on the *ἀντιπεπονθός* principle, a slave who strikes a gentleman would be inconsistent with the *διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον*. The Paraphrast is, I think, more fortunate in his illustration. He says—*Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὐδενὶ εἴδει τοῦ δικαίου. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τοιοῦτόν ἔστιν, οὔτε τὸ διορθωτικὸν· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς διανομῆς οὐ δυνατὸν ἀεὶ τὸν πολίτην ἑκεῖνα πάσχειν εὑ̄ ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἄπερ ἐποίησεν· εἰ γὰρ τύραννον ἀπέκτεινε, πᾶς τὸ αὐτὸς πείσεται;* ‘Receiving the same in return’ is an erroneous account of distributive justice, because in it the dividend which a man receives *ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ* is not the same in kind as the contribution which he makes to the common capital: *e.g.* the musician is not paid in music, but in money according to his skill. It is also an erroneous account of corrective justice, because it makes punishment merely a matter of immediate personal revenge, ignoring the interests of society, which demand the establishment of an impartial court able

to take account of the position and circumstances of the parties as 1132 b. 23. members of the State, and to estimate carefully degrees of responsibility.

§ 3. καίτοι βούλονται γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθυος δίκαιον] b. 25. i. e. the Pythagoreans appeal to the venerable authority of Rhadamanthus.

τά τ'] the conjecture of Coraes and Jackson for the τά κ' of the b. 27. MSS. is probably correct.

δίκη κ' ιθεῖα] Fritzsche quotes Hom. *Hymn. in Cer.* 152 ιθείησι δίκησι, and compares Latin *rectus*, Germ. *Recht*.

§ 4. πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ] i. e. in many cases just correction b. 28. and simple retaliation do not agree. The examples introduced by οἷον seem to refer only to correction, unless we are to follow Mich. Eph. in thinking of a 'distribution of punishments.'

οὗτον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων κ.τ.λ.] As was pointed out in note on v. 4. 3, the writer, in this remark, probably recognises the public aspect of punishment. Hitherto he has described punishment or 'correction' as affecting the ἀδικῶν and ἀδικούμενος only. We can in this instance see the advantage of the method in morals which builds upon foundations discovered by the examination of ἐνδοξα. Had the writer not found the so-called Pythagorean position imperfect, it would perhaps not have occurred to him to remove a vital imperfection in his own theory of 'correction,' even in the slight and insufficient way in which he does so in the present passage. The Paraph. Heliodorus has a discriminating note here—ό γὰρ τὸν ἄρχοντα τυπτήσας, τὴν τάξιν τῆς πολιτείας ἀνεῖλε, καὶ οὐ τυπτήσεται, ἀλλ’ ἀποκτανθήσεται· καὶ ὁ τὸν γάμον τοῦ πέλας διαφθείρας, πείσεται μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς κακῶς, οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ δέ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. Cf. *Probl.* ΚΘ. 14. 952 b. 28 (referred to by Fritzsche) οἷον καὶ ἐάν μέν τις ἄρχοντα κακῶς εἴπῃ, μεγάλα τὰ ἐπιτίμια, ἐάν δέ τις ἰδιώτην, οὐδέν καὶ καλῶς· οἴεται γὰρ τότε οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸν ἄρχοντα ἔξαμαρτάνειν τὸν κατηγοροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὑβρίζειν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ λιμένι κλέπτοντα οὐ μόνον τὸν ἰδιώτην βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν αἰσχύνειν.

§ 5. ἔτι τὸ ἕκουσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκουσιον διαφέρει πολύ] The Par. b. 30. Heliod. merely says εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀκουσίως καὶ ἀγνοῶν ἔβλαψε τὸν πέλας, οὐ δίκαιον ἔστιν δμοίως ἀντιβλαβῆναι, and Mich. Eph. says εἰ . . . ἔκῶν δέδρακεν ἡ ἄκων ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐπανορθωτικῷ δικαίῳ ἔξετάζεται, καὶ εἰ μὲν

1132 b. 30. εὐρέθη ἔκών δράσας εὐθύνεται μειζόνως εἰ δ' ἄκων μετριωτέρως· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀντιπεπονθότος οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἔξετάζεται. So far as the impulse to retaliate in kind is an irrational one, it will not stop to enquire whether an injury is intended (*έκούσιον*), or is merely due to accident (*ἄκούσιον*); but perhaps the words before us imply something more than this, which the writer of the *M. M.* (i. 33. 1194 a. 37) has expressed—οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, εἴ τις τὸν ὄφθαλμὸν ἔξεκοψεν τινός, ἀντεκοπῆναι μόνον, ἀλλὰ πλείστα παθεῖν, ἀκολουθήσαντα τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ἡρξε πρότερος καὶ ἡδίκησεν, i. e. if justice is ‘receiving the same in return,’ the aggressor whose assault is voluntary, and perhaps entirely unprovoked, will suffer in return exactly what he has inflicted on his perhaps innocent victim: but he ought to suffer more.

b. 31. § 6. ἀλλ' . . . ἡ πόλις] The editors quote *Pol.* B. 2. 1261 a. 30 διόπερ τὸ ἵστον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός σώζει τὰς πόλεις ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον—where τὸ ἵστον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός=τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός κατ' ἀναλογίαν of the present passage.

*Tὴν πόλιν* is probably to be supplied as the object of *συνέχει*.

Tὸ ἀντιπεπονθός κατ' ἴσοτητα is ‘receiving *the same* in return’—a conception which does not explain either punishment, or the distribution of profits, wages, and rewards generally, according to the ‘merit’ of the recipient. Tὸ ἀντιπεπονθός κατ' ἀναλογίαν is ‘receiving that which is *equivalent* to what one has done.’ Just punishment, notwithstanding the venerable authority of the natural man to the contrary, proceeds upon this latter principle: it is not a *wound* such as he has inflicted that the assailant receives in return, but a damage *equivalent to the injury caused by the wound*: the mere repetition of the wound itself is not equivalent to the injury caused, which includes not only the suffering of the individual assaulted, but something much greater—the violence done to public order. As for the ‘distribution of wealth’—it obviously proceeds on the principle of ‘receiving that which is equivalent to what one has done.’ The carpenter *e.g.* contributes to the national well-being by his work, and receives in return for his contribution, not his own product back again, but its equivalent in the shape of the products of other workmen who are not carpenters. He *apparently* receives this equivalent from the individuals with whom he deals in the so-called ἀλλακτικὰ κοινωνίαι into which he enters for the disposal of his product: but in truth these ἀλλαγαί are only the machinery, so to speak, of the vast διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν in which the members of

the State receive according to their *εἰσενεχθέντα*. It is only as 1132 b. 31. members of the ‘social organism’ that individuals have anything to exchange. What they seem, as mere individuals, to do, they really do as expressing the State which sustains them. But ‘the State,’ like Nature, *lebt in lauter Kindern—und die Mutter—wo ist sie?* It is this intangibility of ‘the State’ which, it would seem, has led some editors (*e.g.* Jackson) to distinguish for the writer of the Fifth Book three kinds of particular justice—distributive, corrective, and commercial (*i.e.* τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς κοινωνίαις). This view errs in failing to recognise in ἡ ἔκουσιος ἀλλαγὴ the most important instance of ἡ διανομὴ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν—that in which the ‘distribution of wealth’ is made according to ‘economic laws’ which express the ‘will of the State,’ or reveal its essence, more significantly than any legislative or executive measures dealing with ‘distribution’ can do. The law which sustains the State as an organism is ‘reaction equivalent to action’ (*τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον*). A is benefited by B’s action in a certain way, and must benefit him in return equally, but not in the same way—that is to say, if the relation between them be a commercial one, or one of friendship *καθ’ ἵπεροχήν* (*E.N.* viii. 7, §§ 1, 2), for in perfect friendship (and in the most genuine form of friendship διὰ τὸ ἥδυ) τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ’ ἀμφοῖν (*E.N.* viii. 6. 7). A benefits B by the product of his labour; B must benefit A equally by the product of his (different) labour. It may be that A’s unit product is the result of more labour or skill than B’s unit product; it is evident, then, that B must compensate for the inferior value of his units by their greater number, if there is to be any *μετάδοσις* between him and A. Thus the qualitatively different products of A and B must be equalised (*τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον* § 8), the process of equalisation starting from an estimate of the labour and skill which A and B have put into their respective products—*i.e.* an estimate of *the cost of production* in each case, which gives what economists call *the natural value* of each product<sup>1</sup>. About the natural value oscillates *the market value*, as the relation between supply and demand varies from time to time. When the market value of A’s unit product (*e.g.* house) has been compared

<sup>1</sup> Need, or Demand, is of course always assumed as the final cause of production. A thing which is ‘costly to produce,’ and is yet produced, is ‘needed’ much. Labour is what Aristotle would call *τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον*—the material cause of production, and must be paid for; but Need is the final cause.

1132 b. 31. with that of B's unit product (pair of shoes), as it can be easily and accurately compared in a society which employs *νόμισμα*, or 'a medium of exchange,' when, consequently, it has been determined πόσα ἄττα ὑπονήματα ἵσον οἰκίᾳ (§ 10), then the μετάδοσις which follows will realise the law of τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον, or of 'equivalent effects produced by each upon each.'


The fundamental importance in the social organism of this law of τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον is indicated by Plato in his theory of the division of labour as characteristic of ἡ ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις: see *Rep.* 369 B γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, πόλις . . . 370 B ὅταν, ἥ δὲ ὅσ, εἴς μιαν. Cf. *Pol.* B. I. 1261 a. 22 οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐκ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων ἔστιν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων. οὐ γάρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὅμοιων. ἔτερον γάρ συμμαχία καὶ πόλις. τὸ μὲν γάρ τῷ ποσῷ χρήσιμον, κανὸν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν τῷ εἴδει (Βοηθείας γάρ χάριν ἡ συμμαχία πέφυκεν), ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ σταθμὸς πλείου ἐλκύσει (διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους . . .). ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ ἐν γενέσθαι, εἴδει διαφέρει. διόπερ τὸ ἵσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον.

1133 a. 1. [δουλεία] i.e. so far as a man is not in a position to assert himself against competitors in legitimate business, and to defend himself by invoking the assistance of the law against those who treat him unjustly, to that extent he is not really a 'member' of the πόλις, but outside it, as a δοῦλος is. To be really a *citizen*, a man must be able to hold his own in the city—i.e. be in a position to *perform his function* in the body politic.

a. 3. § 7. διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται] Mich. Eph. explains ἐμποδὼν by ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, the Paraph. Heliod. by ἐν ἐκάστῃ τῶν πόλεων, and the Schol. Par. (according to Zell) by μεταξὺ τῶν πόλεων. Jackson, translating 'in some frequented place,' adds that 'the word does not seem very appropriate,' and suggests ἐν πόλεσιν. He refers to Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας (Gomperz *Herkulanische Studien*, ii. 81)—τὸν Δία νόμον φησὶν εἶναι καὶ τὰς Χάριτας τὰς ἡμετέρας καταρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν. Pausanias saw a representation of the Graces (attributed to Socrates) in the Propylaea of the Athenian Acropolis (ix. 35). The position of this group answered well to the description ἐμποδὼν given here. It may be noted also that certain Athenian coins bore representations of the Graces; see Miss Harrison's *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, p. 376.

§ 8. ποιεῖ δὲ . . . σύζευξις] ‘The exchange of equivalent products 1133 a. 5. (the quantity and quality of the one product being reciprocally proportional to the quantity and quality of the other product) is effected by conjoining, or adding together, the diametrically opposite terms.’ Let *οἰκοδόμος* Α, *σκυτοτόμος* Β, *οἰκία* Γ, and *ὑπόδημα* Δ stand at the four corners of a square thus, so that his product is placed immediately beneath each workman. Exchange of products then is effected by conjoining, or adding together, Α and Δ, Β and Γ, the terms which stand at the diametrically opposite corners:—or more simply, *λαμβάνει* ὁ οἰκοδόμος παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκείνω μεταδίδωσι τὸ αὐτοῦ.

Jackson is certainly justified in taking exception to Grant’s translation of *ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις*—‘joining the diagonal of a square,’ because the mathematical term for the junction of the diagonal is *ἐπίζευξις*, not *σύζευξις*. But Grant’s explanatory note gives, I think, the writer’s meaning (which indeed is obvious) more correctly than Jackson seems to admit. Grant, after drawing and lettering a diagram as I have done above, says ‘The joining of the diagonal gives each producer some of the other’s work, and thus an exchange is made; but the respective value of the commodities must be first adjusted, else there can be no fair exchange.’ This note explanatory of the diagram which he has drawn, seems to me to clear Grant at least from the charge which Jackson brings against ‘the editors’ that ‘they fail to show why “the junction of the diagonal” is mentioned.’ Nor do I think that the Paraph. Heliodorus either lays himself open to Jackson’s charge. His words are—Δεῖ τοίνυν ἐν ταῖς χάρεσι τηρεῖν τὴν ἴσοτητα· πλὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἦν ποιεῖ ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις· διάμετρος μὲν γάρ ἔστιν ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς γωνίας τοῦ παραλληλογράμμου ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναντίον γωνίαν ἐπίζευγνυμένη εἰθεῖα. ἔστω δὲ ὥσπερ τετράγωνον οἱ τέσσαρες ὅροι ὁ οἰκοδόμος, ὁ σκυτοτόμος, τὸ ὑπόδημα, ἡ οἰκία· ὁ οἰκοδόμος μὲν ἐφ’ οὖν τὸ α, σκυτοτόμος δὲ ἐφ’ οὖν τὸ γ, οἰκία ἐφ’ οὖν τὸ β, ὑπόδημα ἐφ’ οὖν τὸ δ· ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὑπὸ τὸν σκυτοτόμον τὸ ὑπόδημα τίθεται, ὥσπερ τὸ δ ὑπὸ τὸ γ, καὶ ὑπὸ τὸν οἰκοδόμον ἡ οἰκία, ὥσπερ τὸ β ὑπὸ τὸ α, ἐν ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαις συναφθήσεται μὲν ὁ οἰκοδόμος τοῖς ὑποδήμασιν, ὥσπερ



1133 a. 5. συνάπτεται τὸ α τῷ δ· δὲ σκυτοτόμος τῇ οἰκίᾳ, ὥσπερ τὸ γ τῷ β. καὶ οὕτως ἔσονται αἱ κοινωνίαι κατὰ διάμετρον· οὐ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ ἀνάλογα.

Again, I cannot follow Jackson when he says ‘ἐφ’ φ A κ. τ. λ. are lines, not, as in Grant’s figure, points: for if we take points as our proportionals, what is the use of introducing the notion of proportion at all?’ If lines had been intended, should we not have had ἐφ’ ḡ A κ. τ. λ.? Moreover, Grant does not take ‘points’ (in the mathematical sense) for proportionals, but *quantities* (*ὅροι*) marked A B Γ Δ, and arranged for convenience round the corners of a square. The ‘joining the diagonal’ is indeed an unfortunate translation, because it suggests a geometrical construction as such—viz. the process of connecting the points A and Δ, B and Γ, considered merely as geometrical points, by the diagonals AA and BG—it is unfortunate, that is to say, because it suggests what is known by the technical name of *ἐπίζευξις*, whereas the writer (as Grant, in spite of his unfortunate translation, sees well enough) has before his mind not a geometrical square, as such, but only a square arrangement of terms or *ὅροι*, and means, not that geometrical point A is joined to geometrical point Δ by the geometrical line AA, but that the term Δ, representing a certain quantity, is *added to* the term A, which also represents a certain quantity: to express which meaning he uses the same word, *σύζευξις*, as he used before in v. 3. 12 ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν τῇ διανομῇ δίκαιον ἔστιν. In the present passage he might have said—ἡ τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ δ (sc. ισασμένῳ § 12) καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ γ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀλλαγῇ δίκαιον ἔστιν. This latter *σύζευξις*, however, is, according to the square arrangement of the *ὅροι* adopted, distinguished as ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον *σύζευξις*<sup>1</sup>. It must be understood

<sup>1</sup> In his interesting note (p. 95) on ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον *σύζευξις*, Jackson refers to *E. E.* vii. 10. 1242 b, 6 ff.—‘where we are told that in an unequal friendship the ὑπερέχων conceives his claims to be represented by the formula ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττων οὕτω τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐλάττονος γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρὸν αὐτοῦ, but that the ὑπερεχόμενος τούναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν. That is to say, if A and B are the persons, C and D their claims, A, the superior in rank, thinking himself entitled to superior advantages, argues that  $\frac{A+C}{B+D} = \frac{A}{B}$ , or  $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{C}{D}$ : on the other hand B, the inferior,


holding that “noblesse oblige,” maintains that  $\frac{A+D}{B+C} = \frac{A}{B}$ , or  $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{D}{C}$ . These opposing views are reconciled here in the same way as in the *Nic. Eth.*,

that the remark *ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ’ ἀναλογίαν οὐ κατὰ διά-* 1133 a. 5. *μετρον σύζευξις*, assumes that  $\Gamma$  and  $\Delta$  have been ‘equalised’: i.e. that  $\Delta = x\delta = \Gamma$ , where  $\delta$  stands for the shoemaker’s unit product, one pair of shoes, and  $\Gamma$  for the builder’s unit, one house. By multiplying his  $\delta$ ’s by  $x$ , the shoemaker  $B$  makes himself as good a man, for the occasion of this particular *ἀλλακτικὴ κοινωνία*, as the builder  $A$ ; accordingly,  $A$  being  $= B$ , and  $x\delta = \Delta = \Gamma$ , we get the following *ἀναλογίαι*:—

- (1)  $A : B :: \Delta : \Gamma$
- (2)  $A : \Delta :: B : \Gamma$
- (3)  $A + \Delta : B + \Gamma :: A : B$

i.e. two persons who are, for the occasion, exactly equal, get, in a distribution made according to *γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία*, exactly equal shares,  $A$ ’s share being paid in  $B$ ’s wares and  $B$ ’s share in  $A$ ’s wares.

Let  $A$  be a workman of exceptional skill whose day’s work is worth  $B$ ’s week’s work.  $A$ ’s economic *ἀξία* will thus be six times as great as  $B$ ’s, if we consider  $A$  and  $B$  as contributing throughout a lifetime to the sum of the national well-being; and  $A$ ’s entire receipts will be six times as large as  $B$ ’s; but that part of his entire receipts which  $A$  gets in the form of  $B$ ’s product, and that part of his entire receipts which  $B$  gets in the form of  $A$ ’s product, must be earned by exactly equivalent labour on the part of  $A$  and of  $B$  respectively: what  $A$  receives (*πάσχει*) from  $B$ , and what he does (*ποιεῖ*), i.e. causes  $B$  to receive, must exactly balance each other, the superiority of  $A$ ’s quality being compensated for by the superiority of  $B$ ’s quantity; i.e.  $A$ ’s quantity and quality being reciprocally proportional to  $B$ ’s quantity and quality.  $A$  and  $B$  are thus, *quād* exchanging equivalent products, i.e. for the occasion, *ἴσοι*. Let the lines  $AA'$  and  $BB'$  represent by their lengths ( $AA'$  being the longer) the estimated total value of the labour performed in the working years of a man’s life by these workmen  $A$  and  $B$  respectively: and let the equal parts  $A'x$ , taken from  $AA'$ , and  $B'x$ , taken from  $BB'$ , represent by their equal length the equal value of the products which  $A$  and  $B$  exchange. It is plain here



i.e. the *ὑπερέχόμενος* is held to be entitled to superior service, the *ὑπερέχων* to superior respect; and consequently *κέρδος* and *τιμή* must be bartered against one another, just as the house and the shoes are bartered in commerce.’

1133 a. 5. that although  $A'x$  is equal to  $B'x$ , it bears a smaller proportion to  $AA'$  than  $B'x$  does to  $BB'$ . This means that the exchange of equivalent products ‘takes more out of’ B than ‘out of’ A. A and B are indeed *for the occasion* *ἴσαι*, else they could not be *κοινωνοί* (see § 12): but, regarded *generally* as shareholders receiving dividends in virtue of labour contributed to the common fund of the national well-being, they are not *ἴσαι*: A is superior to B; and it may be a question for B, considering his economic inferiority to A, whether he can afford *to equal himself for the occasion* to A, i.e. whether he can afford to deal with A at all.

The double point of view from which (as I have tried to show) the *κοινωνοί* in an *ἀλλαγή* must be regarded—as (possibly) unequal workers in the economic field, and yet as equal for the purpose of the particular exchange—is excellently presented by the writer of the *M.M.* in a passage (i. 33. 1193 b. 38–1194 a. 25) which should be carefully compared with the passage now before us—  
 $\tauὸ δ' ἀνάλογον ἐν τέτταροι . . . . . \varepsilon\sigmaτιν δ' ή ἀναλογία αὔτη· ὡς γὰρ ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ· ὅμοίως τῷ σκυτεῖ, τῷ ὑφάντῃ, τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσιν ή αὐτὴ ἀναλογία πρὸς ἄλλήλους γίνεται· καὶ συνέχει δὴ αὐτῇ ή ἀναλογία τὴν πολιτείαν. ὥστε τὸ δίκαιον ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ ἀνάλογον. τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον συνέχει τὰς πολιτείας, τὸ αὐτὸ δ' ἔστι τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀνάλογον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ οἰκοδόμος πλείονος ἀξιοῦ ποιεῖ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον ή ὁ σκυτεύς, καὶ ἦν ἔργον ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι [καὶ] τῷ σκυτεῖ πρὸς τὸν οἰκοδόμον, ἀνθ' ὑποδημάτων δ' οὐκ ἦν οἰκίαν λαβεῖν, ἐνταῦθα ἦδη ἐνόμισταν, οὐ ταῦτα πάντα ὠνητὰ ἔστιν, ἀργύριον προσαγορεύσαντες νόμισμα, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν ἀξίαν ἔκαστον ἔκαστον διδόντας τὴν ἄλλαξιν ποιεῖσθαι παρ' ἄλλήλων, καὶ τούτῳ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν.$

a. 9. **τὸ ἔκείνου ἔργον . . . τὸ αὐτοῦ]** Bywater after Mb Γ. Bekker, following Kb, Lb, Ob, reads **τοῦ ἔκείνου ἔργου**. Bekker's **τὸ αὐτοῦ** adopted by Bywater does not seem to have any MS. authority, except, apparently, that of Γ. All Bekker's MSS. give **τοῦ αὐτοῦ**. See Bywater's *Contrib. to Text. Crit. of the Nic. Eth.* p. 45.

a. 10. **τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον]** is the equality obtained by taking account of the relation which subsists between the unit products of A and B in respect of value (their value being determined by ‘the worth of the persons,’ or, in modern phraseology, by the cost of production and conditions of the market), and, if they are of unequal value, multiplying the less valuable product, so as to get

a resultant equivalent to the more valuable. This equality must exist (*ἢ*), before a just exchange can take place (*γένηται*).

**τὸ λεγόμενον]** a fair exchange—*ἢ ἀντίδοσις ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν*.

a. 11.

**συμμένει]** sc. *ἢ κοινωνία*.

a. 12.

**§ 9. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο . . . καὶ τοιοῦτον]** See note on 4, § 12, b. 9, a. 14. where it was said that the words, as they occur here, ‘are explicable in the context.’ More, I think, cannot be said for them. The passage would run better without them. The sentence, a. 16 *οὐ γὰρ . . . ισασθῆναι* must be taken closely with the sentence *οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει . . . ισασθῆναι*, a. 14 at the end of § 8, which it explains: ‘there is nothing to prevent the product of one of the two contracting parties being better than that of the other (§ 8); for contracts are between those who, like physician and husbandman, differ, and are consequently often *not equal*’ (§ 9). The sequence of thought traced in the above paraphrase suffers from the parenthesis of the words before us; and it may be that they are interpolated here, as well as in ch. 4, § 12. Here, however, they make a natural enough side remark or note, which could not be said for them in ch. 4, § 12: a scholastic note about the relation of **τὸ ποιοῦν** and **τὸ πάσχον** is not entirely out of place in a discussion of **τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός** or **τὸ ἀντιποιεῖν**. In view, then, of the fact that, to say the least, they are parenthetical here, it will be convenient to explain these words as they might be explained in accordance with Aristotelian doctrine, if they stood as an isolated aphorism without context.

Accepting the insertion of *δ* before *ἐποίει* (see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 18), I would render the aphorism as follows—‘The arts would perish, unless, as the active element put forth action in each case to such and such an extent and in such and such a mode, the passive element received the impression of this action (*ἐπασχε τοῦτο*) conformably in each case to the extent and to the mode.’ In other words—The existence of the arts depends upon the presence of two elements, an active and a passive, so related that, while the former exerts a force which in each case is definite in amount and mode, the latter receives an impression which corresponds exactly to the amount and mode of the force in each case exerted: e.g. there could be no art of sculpture, if marble yielded to the force of the chisel in a less or in a greater degree (*εἰ μὴ ἐπασχε τοῦτο τοσοῦτον*)

1133 a. 14. than that measured by the *ποιητικὴ αἰτία*, or ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ,—the will of the artist; or if it failed to assume a form representing his idea (*εἴ μη ἔπασχε τοῦτο τοιοῦτον*).

This seems to me to be the natural interpretation of the words before us, considered, as I believe they ought to be considered, apart from their present context, as an Aristotelian aphorism, embodying the doctrine stated or illustrated in such passages as the following:—*de An.* iii. 5, 430 a. 10 ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ὕσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἔστι τι τὸ μὲν ὅλη ἔκαστω γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἔκεινα), ἔτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὅλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς· καὶ ἔστιν δὲ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὅντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. καὶ οὗτος δὲ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀμιγῆς καὶ ἀπαθής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἀεὶ γάρ τιμιότερον τὸ πουοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὅλης (here the *νοῦς παθητικός* is said to be so called *τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι* under the plastic power of that other *νοῦς*—or aspect of *νοῦς*—which is what it is *τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν*: moreover we are warned against supposing the relation between the active and the passive Reason to be that of *ἀντιπεπονθέναι*, for we are expressly told that the active Reason is ἀπαθής): *Met.* Θ. 5, 1048 a. 13 τὸ δυνατὸν κατὰ λόγον ἀπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὀρέγηται, οὐ τ' ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔχει δὲ παρόντος τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὡδὶ ἔχοντος ποιεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, ποιεῖν οὐ δυνήσεται (i.e. the δύναμις μετὰ λόγου of the τεχνίτης realises itself in a given ποίησις only if the material receptive of the influence of that particular ποίησις be present): *Cat.* 4. 2 a. 3 ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμνει, καί εἰ πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεται, καί εται. With these Aristotelian passages may be compared a passage in Plato's *Gorgias* 476 B-D (referred to by Ramsauer in his note on *E. N.* v. 4. 12), which recalls the phraseology of the Aristotelian passages, and more especially of *E. N.* v. 5. 9, so strongly that it seems certain that it served as a model. Σω. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἀρά εἰ τις τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος; Πωλ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Σω. ἀρά τοῦτο πάσχον, δὲ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιοῦτον, οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι; Πωλ. ἀνάγκη. Σω. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἡ ταχὺ ὁ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι; Πωλ. ναι. Σω. τοιοῦτον ἀρά πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἔστιν, οἷον ἀν τὸ τύπτον ποιῆ; Πωλ. πάνυ γε. Σω. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάι τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι; Πωλ. πῶς γάρ οὐ; Σω. καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάι ἡ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι τὸ καόμενον,

ώς ἀν τὸ κῶν κάγ ; Πωλ. πάνυ γε. Σω. οὐκοῦν καί, εἰ τέμνει τις, ὁ αὐτὸς 1133 a. 14. λόγος ; τέμνεται γάρ τι. · Πωλ. ναί. Σω. καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἡ βαθὺ τὸ τμῆμα ἡ ἀλγειόν, τοιοῦτον τμῆμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον, οἷον τὸ τέμνον τέμνει ; Πωλ. φαίνεται. Σω. συλλήθδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ δμολογεῖς ὁ ἄρτι ἔλεγον περὶ πάντων οἷον ἀν ποιῆ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν. Πωλ. ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ.

In these passages, which may be taken as fairly representing what Aristotle, following Plato, has to say about the relation between *τὸ ποιοῦν* and *τὸ πάσχον*, we find nothing about the *reaction* of the latter upon the former: *τὸ πάσχον* is simply that which *πάσχει*: it is not represented as, in its turn, a *ποιοῦν* which makes the original *ποιοῦν* a *πάσχον*: and I cannot see how more can be fairly got out of the passage (v. 5. 9) before us, than out of these passages, or out of the Platonic passage which it resembles so closely in phraseology. But those who try to explain the passage before us *in its context*, find it necessary to believe that it implies the doctrine of the *reaction* of the *πάσχον* upon the *ποιοῦν*. Thus Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 18) says—‘Der Gedanke, den man nach dem Zusammenhange erwartet, ist dieser: die Künste würden nicht bestehen können, wenn sich nicht eine völlige Gleichheit der Leistungen und Gegenleistungen herstellen liesse. Deutlicher würde dies ausgedrückt sein, wenn für *ἐπασχε* etwa *ἀντεποίει* oder *ἀνταπεδίδου* gesetzt wäre; aber auch so, wie die Worte lauten, scheinen sie mir dem geforderten Gedanken zu entsprechen. Man muss nur bedenken, dass, wie es bei dem *ἀντιπεπονθός* nöthig ist, *beide* Theile geben und empfangen, dass also das *ποιεῖν* auch ein *πάσχον* und das *πάσχον* auch ein *ποιοῦν* ist.’ Jackson, agreeing with Rassow that this is the meaning of the passage, is constrained however to admit that it is not one which ‘the text naturally and properly bears.’ He endeavours to extract the meaning by altering the punctuation: see his note pp. 97, 98. But, it may be asked, if *ἐπασχε*=*ἀντεποίει*, what does *ἐπασχε τοιοῦτον* mean? *Κοινωνὸς* B may be said *ἀντιποιεῖν τοσοῦτον* *ὅσον ποιεῖ κοινωνὸς* A, but not *τοιοῦτον οὗτον*. The point is that the *κοινωνοί* exchange *qualitatively different* products.

While maintaining, then, that the present passage ought not to be forced to mean more than it expresses—viz. that, as *τὸ ποιοῦν* (e.g. the seal) acts, so *τὸ πάσχον* (e.g. the wax), *quād δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἴδους*, is affected by its action; while deprecating, therefore, the attempt to reconcile the present passage with its context by making

1133 a. 14. *ἐπασχε = ἀντιποίει*—against the evidence afforded by the representative passages quoted above, in which (in *de An.* iii. 5 expressly) *τὸ ποιοῦν* is presented as *ἀπάθητος*: while maintaining, in short, that the passage before us has nothing to do with *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός* or *mutual action and passion*, but only with the relation between the agent *considered simply as agent*, and the patient *considered simply as patient*, I do not forget that the distinction of agent and patient is merely a logical one (cf. *Theaet.* 157 A), and that, in the concrete worlds of nature and of art, the so-called patient, in receiving the impress of the so-called agent, becomes in turn the good of the agent—that which perfects the agent: thus, the artist gives form to the marble, and the formed marble in return is the glory of the artist: the root nourishes the leaf, and the leaf gives life to the root: each is for the sake of each; each is both maker and thing made.

In opening these remarks I said that ‘a scholastic note about the relation between *τὸ ποιοῦν* and *τὸ πάσχον* is not entirely out of place in a discussion of *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός*.’ It is not entirely out of place, inasmuch as the simple relation of *ποιοῦν* to *πάσχον* is implied in the double relation of *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθένται*: but it is so unnecessary that it seems probable that we have to do with an interpolation here as well as in v. 4. 12. Ramsauer, indeed (p. 319), regards the words with as much suspicion here as in v. 4. 12. On one ground only do I think that the genuineness of the words as they occur in v. 5. 9 may be plausibly maintained. It may be argued that the writer wishes to show that *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθένται* must be between *ἔτεροι*, and that to do so he refers parenthetically to the simple relation between *ποιοῦν* and *πάσχον* which according to *de Gen. et Corr.* i. 7. 323 b. 31 are *τῷ γένει μὲν ὅμοιον καὶ ταῦτό, τῷ δὲ εἴδει ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐναντίον*: as if he said—the parties to an *ἀλλαγή*, each of whom is a *ποιῶν* acting upon the other as a *πάσχων*, must indeed belong to the same social system of fellow-workers (*τῷ γένει ὅμοιοι*), but must be of different trades (*τῷ εἴδει ἀνόμοιοι*), otherwise they could not act and react. This is practically the line of interpretation followed by Mich. Eph<sup>1</sup>.

This defence of the genuineness of the words before us is, as I have said, plausible; but I cannot attach much weight to it

<sup>1</sup> Mich. Eph. does not comment on the words before us when he comes to v. 5. 9. His note on v. 4. 12 however deals with them in connexion both with *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον* (the subject of their context in v. 4. 12), and with *ἀλλακτικὴ κοινωνία* (the subject of their context in v. 5. 9).

against the reasons which seem to me to make for their spurious- 1133 a. 14.  
ness here, as well as in ch. 4, § 12.

§§ 10-15.] Only things, or amounts of things, which are equal in a. 19.  
value, are normally exchangeable. There must therefore be some  
means of comparing things, in order to ascertain, in each case,  
whether they are equal or unequal in value; and when they are  
found to be unequal, there must be some means of equalising them.  
In the first place, the unit product of A must be compared with the  
unit product of B in respect of 'cost of production'—*i.e.* the  
labour (including ability, risk, time, &c.) involved in the production  
of each from beginning to end must be estimated, and the result of  
the estimate, in each case, must be numerically expressed. Let the  
cost of producing A's unit product  $a$  and B's unit product  $b$  be the  
same. If B *needs*  $a$  as much as A needs  $b$ ,  $a$  and  $b$  are of equal  
value (for the purpose of the particular exchange), and may accord-  
ingly be exchanged. But if A needs  $b$ , while B does not need  $a$  at  
all, or so much, what can A do? He must (were *special* need the  
'medium of exchange') either fail to obtain  $b$ , or obtain it at a  
ruinous cost; and, in conceivable circumstances, he might find  
himself *compelled* to obtain it even at such a cost. But the institu-  
tion of money removes the difficulty by substituting *general* need for  
*special* need as 'the medium of exchange' or 'bond.' Although B  
may not need  $a$  at all, or so much as A needs  $b$ , he *always needs*  
*something equivalent to  $a$*  as much as A needs  $b$ . A can always  
obtain  $b$  from him in exchange for that amount of money which is  
earned by labour equal to the labour required to produce  $b$ : for B,  
although he does not need  $a$ , is always willing to take A's money  
made by selling  $a$  to those who need it, because this money enables  
him to obtain  $c$ , which he needs, from its producer, who, again,  
may not need  $b$ , but is always willing to take B's money, in order  
to obtain for himself  $x$ , which he needs. Thus all men may be  
said always to 'need' equal sums of money equally; but particular  
products, though representing the same labour, *i.e.* having the  
same 'natural value,' are often 'needed unequally': hence, if A needs  
 $b$  very much, and B needs  $a$  very little, and A can procure  $b$  only  
by getting B to take a certain amount of  $a$ , it is evident that the  
result of exchange will be that A has too little in proportion to his  
labour, and B too much. Under a system of mere barter every  
transaction thus tends to result in inequality. But by means of a

1133 a. 19. system of *σύμβολα* which entitle the bearer to anything he happens to need, the fluctuating standard, dependent on the varying relation between A's need of the particular product *b* and B's need of the particular product *a*, is superseded by the fixed standard constituted by the circumstance that A's need of *b* is always equalled by B's need of *something* which he cannot obtain without the money obtained by selling *b* to A. Money is a system of *σύμβολα*, or tickets, enabling the bearer to get what he happens to need. These *σύμβολα* being, in their higher denominations, of precious metal, their number cannot, in a short time, be largely increased, and therefore bears a tolerably constant relation to the sum-total of exchangeable products of industry existing at a given time. Thus the various unit products come, according to the labour expended upon them and the demand for them, to be associated with definite parts of the sum-total of money existing in the community at a given time. In this way the value of each unit product is expressed in money, and it becomes easy to compare as to value products which seemed incomparable:—πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι ὃν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή (§ 10) . . . δεῖ ἄρα ἐνί τινι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι . . . τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἡ χρεία ἡ πάντα συνέχει (§ 11) . . . τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείων ἐνδέχεται ἰκανῶς (§ 14) . . . οἷον δὲ ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην (§ 11) . . . πάντα γάρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν (§ 10). Money, as a calculus, makes it easy to compare products; but without this calculus it would still have been possible to compare them roughly, by taking account of the labour expended upon them. It would, however, be impossible to exchange them fairly—indeed it would often be impossible to exchange them at all—without money as a system of *σύμβολα*. It is important to distinguish between these two functions of money—(1) as supplying a calculus (*μετρεῖται πάντα νομίσματι* § 15), and (2) as guaranteeing the satisfaction of any need (*οἷον ἐγγυητής ήμῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ τὸν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἄν δεθῆ* § 14). In respect of both functions money is, as remarked above in note on v. 2. 13, a. 1, an ever-present diorthotic judge preventing the unfair distribution of the rewards of labour, which, on a system of barter, would be inevitable—*i.e.* without the aid of the calculus supplied by money, men would only be able to compare products so roughly that the exchange of them would, in most cases, result in one party getting too much and the other too little; and without a system of

*σύμβολα*, a producer would often be unable to dispose of his product, or be obliged to dispose of it to someone who did not need it much, and therefore made only an inadequate return for it. That the writer of the Fifth Book himself thought of *νόμισμα* as a 'diorthotic' agency seems, as was remarked in note on v. 2. 13, to be a fair inference from the similarity of the terms in which he describes its functions, with those in which he describes the function of the δικαιοστής: see *E. N.* v. 4. 6. 1132 a. 18 sqq., and v. 5. 10. 1133 a. 19 sqq.

Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 18, 19) believes that in §§ 10-16 the same thought is repeated in three parallel passages, no one of which has greater claims to be considered genuine than the other two have. These passages, which he prints in parallel columns, are—

- (1) § 10. 1133 a. 19 διό . . . . 25 ἔσται.
- (2) §§ 11-14. 1133 a. 25 δεῖ . . . b. 14 μᾶλλον.
- (3) §§ 14-16. 1133 b. 14 διὸ δεῖ . . . 28 κλῖναι.

It is certainly true that §§ 10-16 are full of repetitions. But what is the character of these repetitions? They seem to me to be various expressions of the thought—'there must be a fixed standard of comparison,' and so far I agree with Rassow; but I differ from him in thinking that each repetition, by its slightly altered form, suggests a fresh point of view important in the doctrine of currency. Thus in the first of Rassow's parallel passages the train of thought is—'products must be *συμβλητά*: so there must be a *μέτρον*, i.e. one standard: this is *νόμισμα*, which measures.' In the second passage the train of thought is—'But what do we mean by saying that *νόμισμα* becomes the standard of measurement? The true standard is *χρεία*: *νόμισμα* is its conventional representative: and the advantages of having this conventional representative of *χρεία* are great: *χρεία* itself is subject to great fluctuations, whereas its representative is not; and, when sometimes the absence of *χρεία* would put a stop to business, the presence of the representative guarantees its continuance—οἷον ἐγγυητής ἐσθ' ἡμῖν.' Rassow's third passage is distinguished by the introduction of the term *σύμμετρα*—'since *νόμισμα* is a *μέτρον*, the things which it measures must be *σύμμετρα*. But how can things so different as corn and shoes have a common measure? Are they not heterogeneous? *Quād* useful, and *ἐν χρείᾳ*, they are homogeneous: and *νόμισμα* enables us to compare and measure them in respect of their common quality of usefulness.' I do not pretend that the repetitions (especially in

1133 a. 19. the third passage) do not give reason for the suspicion that §§ 10-16 have come down to us in a somewhat altered form; but I maintain that new points arise in every passage in the midst of the repetitions. I cannot therefore follow Jackson when he says (p. 98) that 'the chapter would gain in perspicuity if §§ 11-16 were rejected.' Probably the Fifth Book itself would gain in perspicuity if half of it were rejected. But it is not a question of 'perspicuity.' If §§ 11-16 were rejected the discussion of currency would lack several highly important topics which are not touched in § 10, but are at least dealt with—whether perspicuously or not is another question—in §§ 11-16.

a. 20. § 10. γίνεται πως μέσον πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν] Mich. Eph. points the analogy between νόμισμα and the δικαστής thus: καὶ ὅμης ὅπως τὰ νομίσματα ἀνάλογον ἐστὶ τῷ δικαστῇ· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐπανορθωτικοῦ δικαίου τῇ τοῦ δικαστοῦ μεσότητι ἐγινώσκομεν πόσον δεῖ ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ πλεονέκτου καὶ προσθεῖναι τῷ ἀδικηθέντι μέσον γὰρ πίπτων ὁ δικαστής τοῦ ἡδικηκότος καὶ ἡδικημένου, ἐποίει ἀμφοτέρων τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν δῆλην, οὕτως κάνταῦθα τῇ παραθέσει τῶν νομισμάτων, εὑρομεν τὴν τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ὑπεροχὴν· καλῶς ἄρα εἴρηκεν ὅτι γίνεται πως μέσον τὸ νόμισμα, κανὼν γὰρ καὶ κριτήριον γίνεται τῆς ἀρετῆς τοῦ οἰκοδήματος καὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων, ὡς καὶ ὁ δικαστής τῆς πλεονεξίας καὶ μειονεξίας.

a. 22. δεῖ τοίνυν . . . τροφήν] i.e. (given normal conditions of the market) as the labour required for the production of the house (this is what the writer means by *οἰκοδόμος*) is to the labour required for the production of the pair of shoes, so must the number of pairs of shoes be to unity—i.e. to the one house. In other words—the sum obtained from the sale of this number of pairs of shoes will be equal to the value of the house: or, when the shoemaker comes forward with this sum, he is equal to the builder and can deal with him, the *ἀναλογία* being as given by the writer of *M.M.* (i. 33. 1194 a. 13) ὡς ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ.

a. 27. § 11. εἰ γὰρ . . . ἡ αὐτή] Without need there would be no exchange at all; with unequal need (*εἰ μὴ ὁμοίως δέουτο*), exchange would not be the same as it is—i.e. unequal instead of equal products would be exchanged. I doubt much whether *ἡ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή*, as the alternative of *ἡ οὐκ ἔσται*, can have *directly* the meaning

which Ramsauer gives it—‘*Si aut nulla χρεία fuerit, aut alterius 1133 a. 27. multo minor, cessaret commercium aut ad paritatem non perveniret (οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀλλαγῆ).*’

**ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας**] That which represents need as medium a. 29. of exchange: what Plato (*Rep.* 371 B) calls *ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκα*—a ticket received in view of future *χρεία*, where there is no present *χρεία*.

**κατὰ συνθήκην**] ‘by agreement among men’—cf. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως § 15.

**ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἔστι . . . ἄχρηστον]** cf. *Pol.* i. 3. 1257 b. a. 30. 8 καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλάκις τιθέασι νομίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτον εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δὲ οὐδέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔστι, καὶ νομίσματος πλούτῳ πολλάκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἀποπον τοιούτον εἶναι πλοῦτον οὐ εὐπορῶν λιμῷ ἀπολεῖται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδαν ἐκεῖνον μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς πάντων αὐτῷ γινομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. It is only this or that particular monetary system which is *νόμῳ* and can be changed and disused; the institution of money itself is *φύσει*, just as speech is *φύσει*; i.e. like speech, it is essential to the realisation of that **πολιτικὴ κουνωνία** in which man attains his true *φύσις*. With a system of barter, as with a system of dumb signs, man could never have become a **πολίτης**, but would have remained an isolated savage. And it is easy to exaggerate the change which *νόμος* or agreement can produce even in a given monetary system. Speaking generally, we may say that agreement cannot supersede the precious metals. If they are to be superseded, it will be, not by agreement, but by the operation of a natural law. As things are, however, and have always hitherto been, it is as ‘natural,’ i.e. as *necessary*, that standard coins should be made of a precious metal, as that knives should be made of a hard metal. The statement ἐφ' ἡμῖν ποιῆσαι *ἄχρηστον* applies only to tokens made of a base metal, and to paper. Gold and silver have ‘an intrinsic value’ which cannot be taken from them—the value which belongs to them as practically the *only* materials of which standard coins can be made. They have, of course, a further intrinsic value as materials of which articles other than coins are made; but it is not going too far to

1133 a. 30. say that if coins ceased to be made of them, they would cease to be ‘precious’ metals. Since then a currency is necessary to that *πολιτικὴ κουνωνία* in which man realises his *φύσις*, and since a currency must be based on the employment of the ‘precious metals,’ we may say that money made of these metals is ‘natural.’

a. 31. § 12. *ἔσται δὴ . . . γεωργοῦ*] As the labour required for the production of the more valuable unit stands to the labour required for the production of the less valuable, so must the number of the less valuable units stand to unity. This will be a case of *ἀντιπεπονθός*, or reciprocal proportion, for the number of the less valuable units will compensate for their qualitative inferiority. The Paraph. Heliod. has—*κείσθω δὴ τὸν γεωργὸν πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα διπλάσιον λόγον ἔχειν, ἔσται δὴ καὶ ὁ σῖτος διπλάσιος τῇ ἀξίᾳ τῶν ὑποδημάτων εἰ τοίνυν ἔσται ὡς γεωργὸς πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα, τὰ ὑποδήματα πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ἢ τὸν σῖτον, διπλασίονα ἔσται τὰ ὑποδήματα τοῦ σίτου, καὶ οὕτως ἔσονται ἀξιαὶ τοῦ σίτου.* As we have seen, the writer of the *M. M.* expresses the proportion thus—*ὡς ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷ γεωργῷ* (i. 33. 1194 a. 13).

b. 1. *εἰς σχῆμα . . . ἴσασμένον δ]* I believe that this puzzling sentence merely puts into other words what has already been said in § 8—viz. that it must be settled *before the exchange* how many of B’s qualitatively inferior units are equivalent to A’s unit, the *ἀντιπεπονθός κατ’ ἀναλογίαν*, or *ἰσόρροπος ἀλλαγή* as the Paraph. Heliodorus calls it, depending on this equivalence. Let A = *οἰκοδόμος*, B = *σκυτοτόμος*, Γ = *οἰκία*, Δ = *ὑπόδημα*. Since A : B :: Γ : Δ, the simple *σύζευξις* of distributive justice will be expressed by A + Γ : B + Δ :: A : B, where A and B have the results of their industry (*ἔχοντοι τὰ αὐτῶν*), and do not exchange (*οὐκ ἀλλάττονται*). An exchange is effected by *σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον*, but the *σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον* must not be made till Δ (the qualitatively inferior unit) has been multiplied to give a resultant equivalent to Γ: i. e. the *σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον* must not be made unless A and Γ, B and Δ, are reciprocally proportional magnitudes, thus—A : B :: Δ (*ἴσασμένον*) : Γ. This A : B :: Δ (*ἴσασμη*) : Γ is the *σχῆμα τῆς ἀναλογίας* to which the terms ‘must not be brought after the exchange (*ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται*)’ i. e. to which they must be brought *before* the exchange, when A has still his Γ, and B his Δ’s. It is only then that it is possible (by ‘the higgling of the market’) to make Δ equal to Γ, and so to make A and B *ἴσοι*. A and B having thus been made *ἴσοι*, are *κουνωνοί*, or

can exchange fairly. In other words, having first brought the 1133 b. 1. terms to the *ἀναλογία*  $A : B :: \Delta$  (*ἰσασμένον*) :  $\Gamma$ , we may proceed, through  $A : \Delta$  (*ἰσ.*) ::  $B : \Gamma$ , to the *σύζευξις κατὰ διάμετρον*  $A + \Delta$  (*ἰσασμένον*) :  $B + \Gamma :: A : B$ . But if exchange take place without a previous equalisation of  $\Delta$  to  $\Gamma$ , and A get simple  $\Delta$  (one pair of shoes) and B get  $\Gamma$  (a house), A and B are placed in the position of extremes, or *ἄκρα*, in relation to the *μέσον* or *ἴσον* which the exchange has ignored; and of these *ἄκρα* B ‘will have both superiorities’—will have the advantage over A in the transaction by the two parts mentioned in ch. 4, § 10; for, A with his house and B with his (say) 1000 pairs of shoes being *ἴσοι*, the house has been taken from A and given to B, who still practically retains all his shoes—999. In fact, whenever an article is sold too cheap, the buyer *ἔχει ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς*—(1) that part of the article for which he has not paid, and (2) the money which he ought to have paid for that part. In this interpretation I have followed, in the main, the lines laid down by Jackson, who starts from the view of H. Richards (*Journal of Philology*, 1872, iv. 150) that *ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς* is to be explained by reference to the *δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον* of v. 4. 10. 1132 a. 33.

The words before us, as thus explained, seem to state, in unnecessarily obscure language, the obvious truth that wares must be equalized *before* they are exchanged: and I should have less confidence than I have that they do not mean something more profound, were it not for the circumstance that in *E.N.* ix. 1. §§ 8, 9 a remark to nearly the same effect is made in plain language. The question there propounded is—When there is no previous *διομολογία*, who is to fix the value of the return expected by the giver—the giver or the receiver? The receiver; but he must make the value of the return equal to what he valued the gift at *before he got it*—*δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα*. He must put himself back in the position in which he would have been if he had had to ‘higgle in the market’ about the price of the article.

The explanations offered by Mich. Eph. and Michelet on the one hand, and by Grant and Peters on the other, both ignore the reference to ch. 4. § 10 in *ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς*, and therefore, as it seems to me, miss the writer’s simple (though hidden) point. Mich. Eph. says that if no previous equalization has taken place, but the *οἰκοδόμος* gets a pair of shoes, and the *σκυτεύς* a house, *each*

1133 b. 1. *of the terms* (as if he read ἔκάτερον), viz. οἰκοδόμος and σκυτεύς, will exhibit both ὑπερβολή and ἐλλειψις (ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς)—the οἰκοδόμος exhibiting ὑπερβολή *quā* superior producer and ἐλλειψις *quā* receiving only one pair of shoes; the σκυτεύς exhibiting ἐλλειψις *quā* inferior producer and ὑπερβολή *quā* receiving a house. His words are: ή ὑπεροχὴ λέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως· καὶ ἔθος ἐστὶ λέγειν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ἐδόθη αὐτῷ πολλά· καὶ ἔμπαλιν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ἐδόθη αὐτῷ ὀλίγα. καὶ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὅδε πλούσιος ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπερβολὴν ὅδε πένης, ἵσον λέγοντες τῷ λίαν ἔχει ὅδε χρήματα πολλά, καὶ λίαν ὅδε ὀλίγα. καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς λέξεως τοιοῦτον· δὲ λέγει τοιοῦτον ἄν εἴη. τὰς ἀναλογίας τῶν τεχνιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἡ ἐργάζονται δεῖ ποιεῖν πρὸ τοῦ ἀλλάξασθαι κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον. γινομένης γάρ τῆς ἀναλογίας πρὸ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τῆς ἀνταλλαγῆς, ἐσται ἡ ἀντίδοσις καὶ ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἵση καὶ δικαία. καὶ εἰς τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἀναλογίας ἀναχθήσεται ὡς εἶναι ὡς ὁ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς τὸν σκυτοτόμον, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα μετὰ τῶν ὑποδημάτων. ὡς γάρ ὑπερέχει ὁ γεωργὸς τοῦ σκυτέως, οὕτω καὶ ὁ γεωργὸς μετὰ τοῦ σίτου, τοῦ σκυτέως μετὰ τῶν ὑποδημάτων, πρὸ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς δηλονότι. καὶ δεῖ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀνισότητα τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήμata ἵσασθῆναι. ἵσασθήσεται δὲ οὕτως. ἐπεὶ γάρ διπλῇ ἐστὶν ἡ οἰκία τῶν ὑποδημάτων, ἄν διπλασιασθῇ τὰ ὑποδήμata, β' ὅντα καὶ γένηται δ', ἐσται δ' ὑποδήμata ἵσα τῇ οἰκίᾳ· καὶ οὕτως τῆς ἰσότητος γεγονούσας εἰ λήψεται ὁ μὲν οἰκοδόμος τὰ δ' ὑποδήμata, καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς τὴν οἰκίαν, ἐσται ὁ οἰκοδόμος μετὰ τῶν δ' ὑποδημάτων ἵσος τῷ σκυτεῖ μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας, ἐπεὶ γάρ διὰ τὴν οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήμata ὑπεροχὴν ἐλέγετο ὁ οἰκοδόμος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ σκυτέως, ἵσασθέντων τῶν ὑποδημάτων τῇ οἰκίᾳ, ἐσται ὁ οἰκοδόμος ἵσος τῷ σκυτεῖ· τοῖς δὲ ἵσοις ἵσα ἔαν προστεθῇ, τὰ δла ἵσα ἐσται· εἴη ἄν καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος μετὰ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἵσος τῷ σκυτεῖ μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας. δεῖ οὖν φησὶν πρὸ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀναλογίαν, καὶ ἵσαζειν δι' αὐτῆς τὰ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀμφοτέρας ἔχει τὰς ὑπεροχάς· τουτέστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ χωρὶς ἀναλογίας ἀλλάξονται, ἐκάτερα τῶν ἄκρων, ἥτοι ὁ οἰκοδόμος καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς, ἀμφοτέρας ἔχει τὰς ὑπεροχάς· ἄν γάρ λάβῃ ὁ οἰκοδόμος τὰ β' ὑποδήμata, ἐσται μὲν ὑπερέχων ὡς οἰκοδόμος, ὑπερεχόμενος δὲ καὶ ἐλλείπων ὡς τὰ β' ὑποδήμata ἔχων· καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς ὁμοίως· ὡς μὲν σκυτεύς ἐλλείπων καὶ ὑπερεχόμενος, ὡς δὲ ἔχων τὴν οἰκίαν ὑπερέχων. ὥστε τοὺς οὕτως ἀπλῶς δηλονότι ἀλλασσομένους, μάταιον ἐστὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀλλαγὴν πειρᾶσθαι εἰς σχῆμα ἄγειν ἀναλογίας, καὶ οὐ μόνον μάταιον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατον· οὐ γάρ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς τῆς δίχα ἀναλογίας γεγονούσας εἶναι ὡς ὁ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα, οὕτως ὁ οἰκοδόμος μετὰ τῶν β' ὑποδημάτων πρὸς τὸν σκυτέα μετὰ τῆς οἰκίας, διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀλλασσομένων ἀνισότητα. δῆτι δὲ δύναται ἵσασθῆναι τὰ ὑποδήμata τῇ οἰκίᾳ, εἴρηται. διὰ γὰρ τῶν νομισμά-

*των, ἡ ἀλλον τινός.* Michelet follows Mich. Eph. Grant's view is 1133 b. 1. different. He says—‘After an exchange has been made, or, in short, after the price of an article has once been expressed in money, it is no longer the time to talk of “the quality of labour,” or for either side to claim an advantage on this account. If he did he would have “both superiorities” reckoned to him, *i.e.* his own superiority over the other producer, and the superiority of his product over that of the other. . . . ὅταν δὲ λάξωνται can mean nothing else than “when they *have exchanged*”, ὅταν with the aorist implying a completed act. It seems unnecessary to say that the value of a thing is not to be settled after it is sold. Rather it is after the goods have come to market, and had a market price put upon them, that considerations of their production must cease. The expression, therefore, is not clear, but the above interpretation seems the most natural that can be given of the passage. . . . “Both the superiorities” must be those named or implied in §§ 8–10, the superiority of the one product over the other, and the superiority of the one producer over the other.’ Peters follows Grant in explaining ἀμφοτέρας ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἔτερον ἄκρον to mean that ‘one of the two parties would get both the advantages—*i.e.* have his superiority counted twice over. His (*e.g.* the husbandman’s) superiority over the other party (the shoemaker) has been already taken into account in fixing the price of a quarter of corn as equal to three pairs of shoes: this is one advantage which is fairly his; but it would be plainly unfair if, at the time of exchange, the husbandman were to demand 50s. worth of shoes for 25s. worth of corn, on the ground that he was twice as good a man: cf. Munro, *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, vol. ii.’

οὐ δεῖ . . . εἰ δὲ μή] for this construction cf. *de Gen. et Corr.* i. 4. 319 b. 23.

εἰ δὲ μή . . . ἄκρον] Grant, Jackson, Susemihl, and Bywater treat these words as parenthetical, remove Bekker’s full stop after ἄκρον, and place a full stop after αὐτῶν b. 3 instead of Bekker’s comma. I do not think that it makes much difference whether we accept this or Bekker’s punctuation. In any case, ὅταν δὲ λάξωνται and ὅταν ἔχωσι are contrasted, and αὐτῇ ἡ ισότης is that of Δ made equal to (ισασμένον) Γ. While A and B still retain their respective Γ and Δ, they are in a position to determine how many

1133 b. 1. Δ's shall be held equal to Γ, *i.e.* they can make themselves (*ad hoc*) *ἴσοι*, for as the Schol. puts it—έπει διὰ τὴν τῆς οἰκίας πρὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα ὑπεροχὴν ἐλέγετο ὁ οἰκοδόμος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ σκυτέως, ἵσασθέντων τῶν ὑποδημάτων τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἔσται ὁ οἰκοδόμος ἴσος τῷ σκυτεῖ. Having made themselves *ἴσοι* in this way, they can become *κοινωνοί* in a mutually satisfactory *ἀλλαγή*.

b. 8. § 13. ὕσπερ . . . ἔξαγωγήν] Bekker follows K<sup>b</sup> in reading *ἔξαγωγής*. With *ἔξαγωγής* the construction is—*ὕσπερ* (*sc. ἀλλάττονται*) *ὅταν οὖ* *ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηται τις οἶνον οἴνου, διδόντες* (*sc. οἴνον*) *στίν* *ἔξαγωγής*—‘giving wine in return for the privilege of exporting corn.’ Jackson, reading *ἔξαγωγήν*, objects to *ἔξαγωγής* on two grounds, (1) because the separation of the words *οἶνον οἴνου* from *διδόντες*, which *ἔξαγωγής* involves, complicates the sentence unnecessarily, and (2) because ‘the weight as well as the bulk of the MS. authority is against *ἔξαγωγής*<sup>1</sup>.’ *Ἐξαγωγήν* is certainly the easier reading: but a difficult reading given by K<sup>b</sup> alone comes with great weight. An original *ἔξαγωγής* would inevitably be changed into *ἔξαγωγήν*, as soon as a scribe, aware that *ἔξαγωγή* does not mean ‘a cargo,’ but ‘the privilege of exporting,’ and that therefore *ἔξαγωγής* could not be the partitive genitive, took *οἶνον οἴνου* with *διδόντες* instead of with *οὖ* *ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηται τις*. On the whole, I am not willing to reject *ἔξαγωγής* without scruple, though, of course, the circumstance that *διδόνται* *ἔξαγωγήν* is a regular phrase is in favour of reading *ἔξαγωγήν* as the object of *διδόντες*. *Ἐξαγωγή* is ‘the privilege of exporting’: see Isocrates, *Trapez.* 370 b. *ἄξιον δὲ καὶ Σατύρου* (Satyrus I, king of Bosporus B. C. 407–393) *καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐνθυμηθῆναι, οἱ πάντα τὸν χρόνον περὶ πλείστου τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὑμᾶς ποιοῦνται, καὶ πολλάκις ἥδη διὰ σπάνιν στίν τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἐμπόρων ναῦς κενὰς ἐκπέμποντες, ὑμῖν ἔξαγωγὴν ἔδοσαν.* It is doubtless this Black Sea trade which the writer of the Fifth Book has in his mind here.

The plural *διδόντες*, which ‘belongs grammatically to both the parties concerned, whereas in sense it refers only to one of them’ (Jackson), need not surprise us<sup>2</sup>.

b. 10. δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἵσασθῆναι] *τοῦτο* is the inequality of the *σῖτος* and *οἶνος* which must be equalised.

<sup>1</sup> Pr. K<sup>b</sup> seems to stand alone with *ἔξαγωγής*: CCC has *ἔξαγωγήν*—one of the few cases in which it varies from K<sup>b</sup> in the Fifth Book.

<sup>2</sup> This note on 1133 b. 8 was written before the publication of Bywater’s *Contributions* (see p. 46), and is printed without alteration. Bywater supposes that *ἔξαγωγής* represents a blunder—*ἔξι ἀγωγής*, and (to account for *διδόντες*) suspects a lacuna between the two halves of the passage.

§ 14. ἐγγυητής] The *χρεία* which *νόμισμα* represents is the 1133 b. 12. abiding need of *something*, as distinguished from the fluctuating need of *this particular thing*: see the Paraph. Heliodorus—έπει δὲ πολλάκις ὁ μὲν γεωργὸς δεῖται τὸν ἔργου τοῦ τέκτονος, ὁ δὲ τέκτων οὐ δεῖται τοῦ γεωργικοῦ, ἵνα τὰ ἀλλάγματα καὶ αἱ κοινωνίαι μηδέ τοτε κωλύωνται, παρελήφθῃ τὸ νόμισμα· καὶ τοῦτο διδοὺς ὁ γεωργὸς τῷ τέκτονι, λαμβάνει παρ’ ἐκείνου τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον· ὁ δὴ τὸ νόμισμα καθάπερ ἐγγυητής ἔστι πρὸς τὸν τέκτονα, ὅτι ἐπειδὴν τῶν τοῦ γεωργικοῦ δεηθῆ, δὲ’ αὐτοῦ λήψεται παρὰ τοῦ γεωργοῦ ὅν ἐν χρείᾳ κατέστη. καὶ οὕτω κἀνταῦθα διὰ τὴν μέλλουσαν τοῦ τέκτονος χρείαν ἡ ἀλλαγὴ καὶ ἡ κοινωνία γίνεται. Καὶ τὸ νόμισμα δυνάμει ἔστι πάντα σχεδὸν ὃν δεῖται ἔκαστος.

δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 94) suggests ἀεὶ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι ἔσται λαβεῖν.

πάσχει . . . μένειν μᾶλλον] Money is affected in the same way b. 13. as other commodities are<sup>1</sup>, but not to the same extent—*i.e.* it fluctuates in value as the demand for it, or need of it, is greater or less. Its natural tendency, however, is to fluctuate less in value than other commodities. Mich. Eph. has the following note—πότε δύναται πλεῖον τὸ νόμισμα ἡ πότε ἔλαττον ἡ οὐδέν; ἡ ἐν μὲν ταῖς εὐθηνείαις πολὺ δύναται, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄγαν σιτοδείαις καὶ ἀφορίαις πάντων τῶν καρπῶν οὐδέν; οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν ἔχόντων σῖτον μὴ ἀρκοῦντα ἔαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἔαυτοῦ ἀνταλλάσσειν τότε προθυμεῖται. In a passage very similar to the above the Paraph. Heliodorus expressly gives as the reason why *νόμισμα* is more stable in value than other commodities, the fact that it is δυνάμει πάντα σχεδὸν ὃν δεῖται ἔκαστος. It represents the ever-present need of something as distinguished from the passing need of this thing. Accordingly, so long as the relation between the quantity of exchangeable commodities and the quantity of *νόμισμα* in the community remains pretty constant, the value of a given piece of money does not fluctuate seriously. Mich. Eph. and the Paraph., it will be observed, allude only to variations in the quantity of exchangeable commodities, apparently assuming that variations in the quantity of *νόμισμα* may be neglected. These latter variations, however, are far more serious than might at first be supposed. Under the conditions of modern trade, sudden rises and falls in what is really the quantity of *νόμισμα*

<sup>1</sup> Bywater (*Contributions* p. 46) suspects τὸ αὐτό as an alternative reading for τοῦτο, and suggests that πάσχει may be taken absolutely = ‘is subject to modification or change.’

1133 b. 13. in the community take place to such an extent that, had they come within the observation of the sceptical Greek, they must have made the plausible λῆπος τὸ νόμισμα seem more plausible than ever. Under the conditions of modern trade the tolerably constant quantity of visible tangible money (which the ancients regarded exclusively) is increased by a singularly fluctuating quantity of invisible intangible money—*i.e.* by *Credit*, which now swells to enormous proportions, and raises all prices, *i.e.* diminishes the value of a given standard coin, now contracts, and lowers all prices, leaving the holders of standard coins in possession of the field—*i.e.* with coins of augmented value. ‘In consequence of changes in credit alone,’ says Giffen (*Essays in Finance*, p. 294), ‘the serviceableness of the same quantity of money varies indefinitely in comparatively short periods; the scale of prices is in constant oscillation; no conceivable changes in the quantity of money itself could at all have the effects which are constantly being produced by changes in credit alone.’ ‘When credit is good all prices rise, that is, the standard depreciates in value’ (p. 200).

b. 18. μὴ οὐσῆς συμμετρίας] Cf. Plato, *Laws* 918 Β πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εὐεργέτης πᾶς ὁς ἀν οὐσίαν χρημάτων ὡντινων ἀσύμμετρον οὖσαν καὶ ἀνώμαλον δμαλήν τε καὶ σύμμετρον ἀπεργάζεται; τοῦτο ἡμῖν χρὴ φάναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος ἀπεργάζεσθαι δύναμιν, καὶ τὸν ἔμπορον ἐπὶ τούτῳ τετάχθαι δεῖ λέγειν· καὶ μισθωτὸς καὶ πανδοκεὺς καὶ ἄλλα, τὰ μὲν εὐσχημονέστερα, τὰ δὲ ἀσχημονέστερα γιγνόμενα, τοῦτό γε πάντα δύναται, πᾶσιν ἐπικουρίαν ταῖς χρείαις ἔξευπορεῖν καὶ δμαλότητα ταῖς οὐσίαις.

τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ . . . ίκανῶς] Things so different as wine and corn are not commensurable in the strict sense of the term, for they are not homogeneous in the strict sense: *practically*, however (ἐνδέχεται ίκανῶς), they are commensurable, because practically homogeneous—*i.e.* homogeneous as being *both useful*. Money is the measure of their common usefulness: see Mich. Eph. τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα, σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, εἰ κυρίως σύμμετρα τὰ δμογενῆ δύνανται γενέσθαι, οἷον ἀριθμοὶ ἀριθμοῖς, καὶ μεγέθη μεγέθεσι· τὰ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων τοσοῦτον διεστῶτα, ἀδύνατον σύμμετρα γενέσθαι· τὰ γὰρ σύμμετρα κοινῷ μορίῳ καταμετροῦνται, ἀριθμοὶ ἀριθμῷ, τὰ μεγέθη μεγέθεις τὸ δὲ νόμισμα οὐκ ἔστι μόριον τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀλλαγῇ οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ὑπόδημάτων ἔστι μόριον, οὔτε τοῦ οἴνου· ἦν γὰρ ἀν η οἶνος η ὑπόδημα. οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδενός γίνεται δὲ μέτρον τῆς κατὰ τὴν χρείαν αὐτῶν συμμετρίας—*i.e.* money measures them both *qua* needed or useful: being needed

or useful is their common quality. Cf. also Acciaiolus *ad loc.*—1133 b<sup>7</sup> 18.

'Res quae sunt diversorum generum et rationum non videntur mensurari posse ex parte naturae (only ex instituto hominum), quia mensura debet esse de genere eorum quae mensurantur; ut quantitas continua mensuratur quantitate continua, non discreta. Nam si res per mensuram debent mensurari, habere debent illam mensuram quae fit pars illarum rerum. Quare nummus ipse medius cadit inter res mensurandas propter indigentiam: quia imponitur pretium alteri rei, et sic etiam alteri, et in nummo et pretio conveniunt, et hoc pacto ex instituto est nummus quodammodo mensura.'

§ 15.] ἐξ ὑποθέσεως] *i.e.* κατὰ συνθήκην, § 11.

b. 21.

ἢ ισον] 'that is, equal to.'

b. 24.

§ 16.] For the history of exchange see *Pol.* i. 3. 1257, a. 6-41. b. 26. The passage ends with—ξενικωτέρας γάρ γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας . . . ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τοῦ νομισμάτος ἐποίσθη χρῆσις· οὐ γάρ εὐβάστακτον ἔκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων· διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτον τι συνέθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ δὲ εἰχε τὴν χρείαν εὑμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἷον σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερον, τὸ μὲν πρᾶτον ἀπλῶς ὁρισθὲν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλόντων, ὥ' ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως αὐτούς· διὸ γὰρ χαρακτῆρα ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημεῖον.

πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι] Bywater (*Contrib.* p. 47) suggests πρὶν ἡ τὸ νόμισμα ἐλθεῖν.

§ 17. ἡ δικαιοπραγία] 'doing justice,' Peters. The man who b. 30. 'does justice,' as judge, strikes the mean between the position of the party who injures and the position of the party who is injured; and, in his private capacity, neither injures other people, nor allows himself to be injured by them—ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἔστι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι. At the end of next § 1134 a. 12, however, we have τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, from which it would seem that in the passage before us δικαιοπράγημα might have been used instead of δικαιοπραγία.

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη . . . ἄκρων] Rassow (*Forsch.* 61) seems to be b. 32. right in preferring the reading adopted by Susemihl and Bywater to Bekker's ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἔστιν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότερον ἀρεταῖς, κ.τ.λ.

1133 b. 32. The Paraph. Heliodorus explains the sentence as follows—*καὶ η δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστὶν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς προτέραις ἀρεταῖς τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἔκαστη μέση ἐστὶ δύο κακιῶν τὴν μὲν ὑπερβάλλουσα τῆς δὲ ἐλλείπουσα· η μὲν γὰρ σωφροσύνη μεταξὺ τῆς ἡλιθιότητος καὶ τῆς ἀκολασίας ἐστὶν η δὲ ἀνδρίᾳ μεταξὺ τῆς δειλίας καὶ τῆς θρασύτητος, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ὁμοίως· η δὲ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἔχει παρ' ἔκατερα δύο κακίας αἱς ἀντίκειται, ἄλλὰ μόνη τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἀντίκειται· μέση δὲ ἐστὶν, ὅτι τῆς ἀδικίας ἀνισότητα εἰσαγούσης, τὸ ἵσον αὐτὴν ἡτεῖ καὶ τούτου ἐστὶ ποιητική. ὁ δὴ ἵσον μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὴ μὲν μεσότης ἐστὶν η δὲ ἀδικίᾳ ἀκρότης, ὅτι τῶν ἄκρων ἐστί. Mich. Eph. has a note to the same effect—viz. that every one of the other virtues has two vices contrary to it, but justice has only one vice (*ἀδικία*), and this one vice, he explains, *θεωρεῖται ἐν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀδικουμένῳ, ὃν οἱ μὲν ἀδικῶν ἐστὶν οἱ τὸ πλέον ἔχων, οἱ δὲ ἀδικούμενος οἱ τὸ ἔλαττον.* This is not correct, for the *ἔξις* of *ἀδικία*, of which he is speaking, is not seen in the *ἀδικούμενος* at all, but in the *ἀδικῶν*, who manifests himself in acts both of *ὑπερβολή* and of *ἔλλειψις*—in taking too much good and too little evil as his own share; and, where his own share is not involved, in assigning to other people too much or too little good or evil. Peters, who follows the Par. and Mich. Eph., translates—‘We see also that the virtue justice is moderation [or a mode of observing the mean], but not quite in the same way as the other virtues hitherto spoken of. It does indeed observe a mean, but both the extremes fall under the single vice of injustice’—and in a note he adds the following explanation—‘whereas in other fields the two extremes are chosen by different and opposite characters (*e.g.* the cowardly and the foolhardy), the unjust man chooses both, too much good to himself and too little to his neighbour<sup>1</sup>, too little evil to himself and too much to his neighbour, too much good to his partisan and too little to his opponent.’ According to this view, then, of the passage before us, the point is in the words *η δὲ ἀδικίᾳ τῶν ἄκρων*: ‘justice is not a *μεσότης* in quite the same way as the other virtues are *μεσότητες*, because, although “it does indeed observe a mean,” “both the extremes fall under the single vice of injustice.”’ Is it this alone that constitutes the difference? I think not. The chief point of difference, as it seems to me, is marked by the words *ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν*, and a difference of*

<sup>1</sup> ‘Too much good to himself’ and ‘too little to his neighbour’ are only verbally two. The one thing which he does in all cases is to choose too much good to himself at the expense of other people.’

merely secondary importance is constituted by the fact that ‘both 1133 b. 32. the extremes fall under the single vice of injustice.’ That the stress is upon ὅτι μέσου ἔστιν is plain from the words ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἔστιν in § 18; i. e. δικαιοσύνη is a μεσότης because τοῦ μέσου ἔστι, just as ἀδικία is ὑπερβολή and ἐλλείψις because ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἔστι. That ἀδικία ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἔστι (i. e. ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων ἔστι) is another, and, I think, subordinate point of difference.

In what sense, then, can δικαιοσύνη be said τοῦ μέσου εἶναι in which ἀνδρεία is not? The gloss τοντέστιν ἵσου which some MSS. read after τοῦ μέσου ἔστιν, and Mich. Eph. recognises, seems to me to answer this question. All the virtues, δικαιοσύνη included, are indeed μεσότητες περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, i. e. they are μεσότητες in the sense of being μετριότητες—phases of man’s adaptation to a difficult social environment; but δικαιοσύνη is a μεσότης also in a more literal sense of the term, in as much as it realises itself in a definitely measurable external μέσον, i. e. in the choice of that which is objectively ἵσον. Justice (the writer confines himself here to Particular Justice) is that one of the virtues which is concerned with the ἵσον as distinguished from the other νόμιμα. The just man is μέσος in a sense in which the σώφρων e. g. is not μέσος—i. e. he is μέσος καὶ ἵσος. There is nothing, in short, in the passage before us, which is not implied in the division of τὸ δίκαιον into τὸ νόμιμον and τὸ ἵσον.

I take it then that the meaning which the writer wishes to convey is that the μεσότης Particular Justice differs from the other virtuous μεσότητες (1) in realising itself in the production of that to which, as μέσον or ἵσον, a definite numerical value can be assigned; and (2) in having (nominally) only one ἐναντία κακία—ἀδικία or ‘unfairness,’ productive of objective measurable inequality: but surely this does not amount to a virtual admission, that ‘the original theory of ἀρετή as a μεσότης is a failure so far as justice is concerned’ (Jackson, p. 100). If there is any hesitation in the present passage about applying the term μεσότης to δικαιοσύνη, the same hesitation exists about applying it to ἀρετή generally; for in *E. N.* ii. 6. 13 we read μεσότης τις ἄρα ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετή, στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. Justice, equally with the other moral ἀρεταί, is a ἔξις προαιρετική ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα—a habit of regulating conduct by reason in the midst of temptations held out by the sensibility. It is the regulation of those feelings which, if unregulated, lead a man to act wrongly

1133 b. 32. in relation to property, as *σωφροσύνη* is the regulation of those which, if unregulated, lead him to act wrongly in relation to bodily pleasure. The *σώφρων* does what is objectively right in circumstances which are such that we cannot test the rightness of his acts by exact measurement (cf. iv. 5. 13 οὐ γὰρ ἥδιμον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι κ.τ.λ. . . . ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστα κάν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις); whereas the *δίκαιος* does what is objectively right in circumstances which allow us generally to test the rightness of his acts by figures. His action, in short, produces an *ἴσον*—a quantitative result—which may be calculated beforehand. *Δικαιοσύνη* is a *μεσότης* (or mode of adaptation to the social environment) manifesting itself externally in acts of *measurably equal division*; *σωφροσύνη* is a *μεσότης* (or mode of adaptation to social environment) manifesting itself in acts the rightness of which can be judged only by the qualitative test of *αἰσθῆσις* (iv. 5. 13, ii. 9. 8). The recognition of this difference surely does not amount to a virtual admission that ‘the original theory of *ἀρετή* as a *μεσότης* is a failure so far as justice is concerned.’ If narrow technical ground be taken, and it be urged that *δικαιοσύνη* is not a *μεσότης* in the true sense because it has only one extreme, *ἀδικία*, it may be answered that, although the possibility of *μειονεξία* as the contrary of *πλεονεξία* is perhaps excluded by the result reached in chapters 9 and 11 of this Book, yet two kinds of unfairness to other people may be logically distinguished—that of giving strangers (from whom one has nothing to expect) too little, and that of giving friends (from whom one has expectations) too much, and that the one or the other of these kinds of unfairness may be specially characteristic of a given *ἀδικος*.

It remains to notice Grant’s view. He says—‘Justice is a mean state or balance in a different sense from the other virtues. It is not a balance in the mind, but rather the will to comply with what society and circumstances pronounce to be fair (*τοῦ μέσου ἔστιν*). Justice, according to this view, is compliance with an external standard. While in courage, temperance, and the like, there is a blooming of the individual character, each man being a law to himself, in justice there is an abnegation of individuality, in obedience to a standard which is one and the same for all. It must be remembered that the account of *ἐπιείκεια* in this book supplements that of justice and takes off from its otherwise over-legal character.’

I think that the habit of justice is as truly ‘a balance in the

mind' as the other virtuous habits are—*i.e.* it is one of the modes 1133 b. 32. in which the civilised man has learnt to control his sensibility, in the interest of the System of Life which Reason presents to him. Inasmuch as this System is an objective order of things, it is 'an external standard,' to which the *σπουδαῖος*, not merely *quād δίκαιος*, but *quād* possessing the other virtues, conforms himself. In conforming himself, whether as *σώφρων*, or as *ἀνδρεῖος*, or as *δίκαιος*, to the objective standard of Reason, he 'is a law to himself,' because he realises his true self in so doing: and the only 'abnegation of individuality' to which he submits (and he submits to it *quād σώφρων* or *ἀνδρεῖος* as well as *quād δίκαιος*) is the abnegation of his merely sensitive nature. His true 'individuality'—his rational nature, he cannot abnegate. Finally, it is very misleading to distinguish the standard of justice, as 'one and the same for all,' from that of temperance or courage. The standard of the Noble Life is an indivisible whole, one and the same for all men who have the eye of Reason to see it clearly. Each of two good men who are friends is a *ἕτερος αὐτός* to the other. Both live up to one and the same objective standard, and, in living up to it, are a law to themselves.

*κατὰ προαιρεσιν]* See note on v. I. 3.

1134 a. 2.

§ 18. ἡ δ' ἀδικία τούναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου] *i.e.* ἡ δ' ἀδικία τούναντίον a. 6. ἔστι καθ' ἥν ὁ ἀδικος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαιρεσιν τοῦ ἀδίκου.

*ἐπὶ δὲ τῷν ἄλλων . . . ἔτυχεν]* 'Where other people are concerned a. 11. (*i.e.* where the unjust man himself as *διαινέμων* does not take a share), although the result, as a whole, is the same (*i.e.* the violation of proportion), the way in which the proportion is violated (*i.e.* whether the unjust man gives A or B the unfair advantage) is a matter of chance.' Here, in accordance with the doctrine of v. chapters 9 and 11, the writer assumes that *μειονεξία*—the habit of accepting less than one's due—does not exist (see note on v. I. 9, b. 1). I think that it has as much right to formal recognition as the equally obscure *ἀναισθησία* of *E. N.* iii. 11. 7.

τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος . . . μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν] The *result* of injustice a. 12. (*τὸ ἀδικῆμα*) is an unequal division, wherein the part which is too small is 'being injured,' and the part which is too large is 'injuring.' There is no reference here, as some commentators seem to think, to the question, whether *ἀδικεῖν* or *ἀδικεῖσθαι* is the *greater evil*, dis-

1134 a. 12. cussed in v. 11, §§ 7 and 8. The writer here simply analyses the formal content of the notion *ἀδίκημα*, as he has analysed in § 17 that of the notion *δικαιοπραγία*.

## CHAPTER VI.

### ARGUMENT.

*But a man may perform an act which is unjust without being unjust himself. By what mark, then, shall we know the acts which stamp the man who performs them as unjust? There is no distinguishing mark attaching to the acts. The acts are outwardly the same of the man who yields to a sudden passion, and of the man who deliberately chooses; and yet the latter is and the former is not ‘an unjust man’ \* \* \* \* \**

*But we must remember that hitherto we have described justice in the abstract only, and that we have to complete our account by saying something about justice as concretely realised in the state—civil justice.*

*Civil justice is the bond which unites, in a common life, persons who are free and equal. This common life is its own end, or self-sufficient. It is regulated not from without, but by the inner principle of its own nature—Law. Conformity with law, then, is civil justice. But where there is law and justice, we, as a matter of fact, find also injustice. We find that individuals tend to seek their own private good, and must be restrained by the law of their common life. Accordingly we do not allow the individual as such to rule, for he would become a tyrant; but we set the law or the constitution over the ruler, making him thus the guardian of justice and equality; giving him, however, a recompence in the form of honour and privilege, lest, being but human, he should say—‘What am I profited if I am just and do not take advantage of my position to give myself more than my share of good things?’ Indeed there are rulers who are not satisfied with all the honour and privilege that can be bestowed upon them, but, becoming tyrants, recompense themselves for their trouble by more solid advantages at the expense of their subjects.*

*Between those who are not free and equal persons associated in a commonwealth regulated by the law of its own constitution, the relations are ‘just’ only in a metaphorical sense. Thus it is only in a metaphorical sense that we can speak of ‘justice’ in the relation subsisting between (1) husband and wife, (2) father and child, (3) master and slave. These relations are characterised by the power of the paterfamilias over his own, not by the unanimity of independent persons. The relation between husband and wife, however, resembles that between fellow-citizens more nearly than do the relations between father and child and between master and slave.*

1134 a. 17. §§ 1, 2.] I believe, with Rassow (p. 38), Jackson (p. xvii, &c.), and Ramsauer that these sections are foreign to the present

context; but I do not venture to designate any other context 1134 a. 17. in the Fifth Book as their original locus. They certainly refer to a subject which is discussed in chapter 8; but this does not seem to me to warrant Jackson's insertion of them in § 8 of that chapter after *βλάβη*: for why should it be assumed that, being interpolated where we now find them, they belong originally to the Fifth Book at all? It is often tolerably safe to say that a passage is an interpolation; but almost always unsafe to assign it to another locus. The student may refer to Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 35 &c.) for an excellent examination of the various views which have been advanced concerning the locus of the sections before us. He regards the examination of these views as principally useful in showing 'wie wenig wir im Stande sind mit Sicherheit zu urtheilen' —a valuable lesson, where 'dislocations in the text' are concerned.

The passage before us, then, is best regarded as a fragment. It may be paraphrased as follows—'Since one may perform an unjust act, and yet not be an unjust man, by what mark shall we know, under the various categories of crime, those unjust acts, the performance of which is, of itself, sufficient to stamp the agent as an unjust man in this or that respect—as a thief *e.g.*, or an adulterer, or a robber? Surely the criterion is not to be found in the *acts*. Two men may perform, from different motives, acts which are externally indistinguishable. One man may steal under the influence of a pressing, but transitory, feeling; the other from deliberate choice. The former is not a thief; the latter is: but their *acts* are indistinguishable.'

On the words *ἢ οὗτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει* which are equivalent to *ἢ κατὰ μὲν τὰς πράξεις οὐδὲν διοίσει* Mich. Eph. has the following note:—*ἢν ἀν σαφεστέρα ἢ λέξις εἰ οὕτω πῶς εἰχεν ἐπεὶ ἀδικήματα ἔστι τὸ κλέπτειν τὸ μοιχεύειν τὸ πορνεύειν τὸ ἱεροσυλᾶν καὶ ἀπλῶς πάντα τὰ παράνομα, ποῖα ἐκ τούτων πράττων τις ἀδικεῖ, καὶ ποῖα ὅμοιως οὐκ ἀδικεῖ; εἰσὶ γὰρ τινὰ ἄδικα ἢ πράττει μέν τις, ἄδικος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι. πῶς δὴ τοῦτο; δῆτι οὐκ εἰς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀποσκοποῦντες τὰ πράγματα κρίνομεν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸ οὖ ἔνεκα. ὁ γὰρ τοῦ μαινομένου τὴν μάχαιραν κλέψας μεθ ἡς ἔμελλεν ἑαυτὸν ἀνελεῖν, ἔκλεψεν μέν, κλέπτης δὲ οὐκ ἔστι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον σωτὴρ καὶ εὐεργέτης, οὐδὲ μοιχὸς ὁ τὴν πλωσίαν διαφθείρας ἐπιθυμίᾳ χρημάτων, ἀλλὰ φιλοχρήματος. ἔρωτήσας δὴ ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν, ἄδικος ἔστιν, ἀποκρίνεται λέγων ἢ οὗτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; ἔστι δὲ ὁ λέγει. οὗτω μέν, δίχι προσδιορισμοῦ λεγόμενον, δόξειεν ἀν μηδεμίαν ἔχειν διαφοράν, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὸν*

1134 a. 17. ἄδικόν τι πράττοντα εἰνθύ καὶ ἄδικον εἶναι. εἰ δέ τις ἐπιβλέπει εἰς τὸ τέλος καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ ἄδικον, εὑρίστει πολλοὺς ἄδικα μὲν πράττοντας, ἄδικοις δὲ μὴ ὅντας.

Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 37) supposes, with Muretus, that some words have fallen out after *διοίστει*, because ‘In dem mit γάρ angefügten Beispiele wird nämlich nicht, wie man erwarten sollte, angegeben, worin der ἄδικῶν dem ἄδικος gleich, sondern worin er von ihm verschieden ist.’ Muretus (p. 430) restores the clause thus—*ἡ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίστει, ἐπιβλέποντι δὲ εἰς τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα διοίστει*, and suggests that the repeated *διοίστει* occasioned the omission. I do not think that it is necessary to suppose an omission. The words *καὶ γὰρ ἀν συγγένοιο γυναικί κ.τ.λ.* are equivalent to *καὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ* (*i. e.* τὸ συγγενέσθαι γυναικί) *πράττουσιν ὅ τε διὰ πάθος ποιῶν καὶ ὁ προαιρούμενος, ἀν ὁ μὲν προαιρούμενος ἄδικος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ διὰ πάθος οὐ,* and explain *ἡ οὕτω μὲν (i. e. κατὰ τὰς πράξεις)* οὐδὲν διοίστει;

a. 20. οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχήν] Cf. *E. N.* iii. 3. 17 παύεται γὰρ ἔκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον.

a. 22. § 2. οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ] Münscher, Hampke, and Ramsauer bracket these words, because, the case of the *μοιχός* having been already selected in § 1 to illustrate the point under consideration, cannot again be used as an *additional* illustration. Rassow merely notes the remarkable carelessness revealed by the words: ‘eine auffallende Nachlässigkeit ist es, wenn in den letzten Worten neben dem *κλέπτης* der *μοιχός* genannt wird, ungeachtet das *μοιχεύειν* in Vorhergehenden als Beispiel benutzt ist’—(*Forsch.* p. 37). Those who *bracket* words like these in the Fifth Book take too little account, I think, of the carelessness of the writer, or writers. The substitution of *οὐ* (K<sup>b</sup>, P<sup>b</sup>, Camb., CCC Sus., Byw.) for Bekker’s *οὐδέ* before *κλέπτης*, however, makes the whole clause less awkward.

a. 23. § 3. πῶς μὲν οὖν . . . πρότερον] Here, again, we have a section which is bracketed as an interpolation by many editors. It differs, however, from §§ 1 and 2 in this important respect—it does not contain a piece of argument foreign to the context, but merely surprises the reader by reminding him rather irrelevantly of a previous discussion. It is therefore not so obviously an interpolation as §§ 1 and 2. At the same time, I would say that it is probably one of those rather numerous recapitulatory and connecting sentences which we may

attribute to the care of an early editor, who, finding δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθά· 1134 a. 23. νειν κ.τ.λ. a somewhat abrupt beginning, inserted words to facilitate the transition to τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον from that aspect of τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον which had been discussed in the previous chapter under the head of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός. I therefore think that it is unnecessary to try, with Jackson, to find another locus for the words before us. Jackson places them at the beginning of ch. 10 (on ἐπιείκεια), where they do very well—but, as the head of one statue may sometimes be made, by a clever restoration, to do very well on the body of another.

It is worth mentioning that the writer of the *M.M.* does not recognise §§ 1 and 2, but passes *immediately* from his criticism of the Pythagorean ἀντιπεπονθός to τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. His criticism of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός ends i. 33. 1194 b. 2; and at 1194 b. 3 we read—ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον πολλαχῶς λέγεται, διοριστέον ἀν εἴη ὑπὲρ ποίου δικαίου ἔστιν ή σκέψις· ἔστι δὴ δίκαιον τι, ὡς φασίν, οἰκέτη πρὸς δεσπότην καὶ νιῷ πρὸς πατέρα. τὸ δὲ ἐν τούτοις δίκαιον ὁμονύμως ἀν δόξειν λέγεσθαι τῷ πολιτικῷ δίκαιῳ (ἔστιν γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον, ὑπὲρ οὖν ἔστιν ή σκέψις, τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον). We may suppose the writer of the *M.M.* with a text of the Fifth Book before him in which chapter 6 began with a reference to the subject of chapter 5—πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον εἴρηται. Such a connecting clause might well be genuine. But, whatever its origin may be, I feel sure that it was written to stand *here*—that is, to make the transition from the subject of ch. 5 to that of ch. 6.

§ 4. δεῖ δὲ μὴ . . . πολιτικὸν δίκαιον] ‘It must be remembered, a. 24. however, that our subject is not only Justice in the abstract, but Justice as concretely realised in the State’—*i.e.* ‘not only what is just in itself, but what is just as between citizens.’ Hitherto the *formal conditions* of Particular Justice have been discussed—*i.e.* the ἀναλογίαι, geometrical, arithmetical, and reciprocal, which it involves have been explained; the writer now proceeds to indicate the mode of its concrete appearance—to sketch its natural history in the State. It was, of course, impossible to explain its formal conditions without frequent references to its concrete manifestation in the State; but as yet there has been no connected treatment of the latter. With the antithesis τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον—τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον we may compare the antithesis ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ἀπλῶς—ὁ ἀγαθὸς πολίτης, as presented in v. 2. 11, and in the passages quoted

1134 a. 24. in the note thereon. The *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἀπλῶς* is the ideally good man, the man who is conceived as realising perfectly (*sc.*  $\epsilon\nu\tau\eta$  *ἀριστη* *πολιτείᾳ τῇ κατ’ εὐχήν*) the formal notion of goodness; the *ἀγαθὸς πολίτης* is the man who corresponds accurately with the conditions of a given *πολιτεία*, good or bad, but, except as citizen of  $\eta$  *ἀριστη* *πόλις*, realises the formal notion of goodness more or less imperfectly. The conditions of even the best existing *πολιτεία* are such as always to prevent the actual coincidence of the *ἀρετή* of the *πολίτης* with that of the *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἀπλῶς*. Similarly, it is only in  $\eta$  *πολιτείᾳ*  $\eta$  *κατὰ φύσιν* (see v. 7. 5) that *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* coincides with *τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον*. That is, *it is possible to conceive ideal circumstances* in which the justice of citizens realises perfectly the formal notion of justice. The definition of this formal notion, carefully elaborated in chapters 1–5, is epitomised with sufficient accuracy in ch. 5, § 17 *καὶ η μὲν δικαιοσύνη . . . πρὸς ἄλλον*.

What, then, are the conditions of the (doubtless imperfect) realisation of Justice in the State? Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the present chapter answer this question. Justice is realised in the common life, under *νόμος*, of individuals who are free and equal. The individual, left to himself, is not *πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαιρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου καὶ διανεμητικὸς τοῦ ἵσου τοῦ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν*, as the definition of *τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον* requires. The constraint of *νόμος* is necessary to make him act justly—*i. e.* *νόμος*, or *λόγος*, representing the race, must supersede *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, the individual: and since, after all, individuals must be entrusted, as *ἄρχοντες*, with the administration of this *νόμος*, a sop must be offered to their thwarted *πλεονεξία* in the shape of *μισθός τις*; though, even with this, they often become *τύραννοι*. It is only in the *πολιτείᾳ κατ’ εὐχήν*, where *λόγος* rules in the soul of every citizen, that a system of external restraints and inducements is unnecessary.

From the discussion of *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* the writer passes naturally to that of the relations between the various members of the *οἰκία*, which is the unit *κοινωνία* out of which the *πόλις* has grown.

Distinguishing, then, *τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον* and *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* as the formal notion of justice, and its (necessarily imperfect) realisation in the State, I cannot agree—(1) with Michelet, who says (pp. 177, 178) ‘*Id justum quod quaerimus est et simpliciter justum et civile justum*, ita ut materia hujus libri non sit duplex justum, ut partitur Acciajolus, simpliciter justum et justum civile; jus enim civile est ipsum simpliciter justum vel, ut dicit Paraphrastes, *κυρίως δίκαιον*. Sed justum civile est id simpliciter justum, quod non proposito

tantum et animis agentium continetur, sed etiam legibus sancitum **1134 a. 24.** est'; or (2) with Grant, who says, 'Τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον is opposed to τὸ καθ' ὄμοιότητα. It is not meant here to separate τὸ ἀπ. δίκ. from τὸ πολ. δίκ.: rather it is implied that they are both the same. The only justice that can be called so without a figure of speech is that between fellow-citizens'; or (3) with Rassow, who says (*Forsch.* p. 123), 'τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον und τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον sind verschiedene Ausdrücke für dieselbe Sache, was u. a. Hildenbrand und Tredelenburg verkannt haben. Der Gegensatz, um den es sich hier handelt, ist der zwischen dem ἀπλῶς δίκαιον und dem δίκαιον καθ' ὄμοιότητα. Das erstere ist eben das politische Recht, das zweite das väterliche, das häusliche und das Herrenrecht. So richtig Zeller (*Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 2. p. 500), und Grant'; or (4) with Peters, who says (p. 161, note), 'These are not two distinct kinds of justice; justice proper, he means to say, implies a state.'

In opposition to these views, then, I believe that τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον and τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον are here distinguished as the formal notion (*τί ἦν εἶναι ορ οὐσία ἀνευ ὑλῆς*)<sup>1</sup> and the concrete realisation (*σύνολον*). It is only in the ideal State that τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον and τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον coincide—that is, they never actually coincide. In actual States those individualistic tendencies which are specially dwelt on below in §§ 4–7, as characteristic of the persons between whom τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον (*as distinguished from τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον*) subsists, are never eliminated.

**ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου]** The *ἐπί* is a dittogr. of *ἔστιν*. *Bίος* is here **a. 26.** man's life as a *πολιτικὸν ζῷον*: cf. *E. N.* x. 6. 8 *εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον.*

**πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν]** cf. *Pol.* Γ. 1. 1275 b. 17 *τίς μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν* φῷ γὰρ ἔξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἥδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταῦτης τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἵκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν—and *Pol.* A. 1. 1252 b. 28 ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνίᾳ τέλειος πόλις ἥδη, πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐτάρκειας—and *Pol.* Γ. 5. 1280 b. 29 φανερὸν τοίνυν δτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ὑπαρχόντων τούτων ἥδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὐ

<sup>1</sup> Of course the formal notion of justice cannot be conceived independently of the formal notion of the State.

1134 a. 26. ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζῶσι τελέας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα κατοικούντων τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις. διὸ κηδεῖαι τ' ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ διαγωγὴ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προαιρέσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὴ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζῶσι τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους (χάριν). τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν, ὡς φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων [χάριν] θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν—and *E. N.* i. 7. 6 τὸ δ' αὐταρκεῖ λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ δῆλος τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. The state (*ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία*) is an organism (*αὐταρκές τι*), and the law of its members is *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον*.

a. 27. ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν] Each member of the social organism must, in order to be a member at all, have an initiative of his own (*ἐλευθερία*), which he exercises for the common good. This initiative cannot be exercised by an individual whose inferiority, in *πολιτική ἀρετῇ* or *δύναμις*, to the other individuals with whom he is associated, sinks beneath a certain level, fixed differently in different *πολιτεῖαι*. All individuals on, and above, this level are *equally members* of the social organism (*ἴσοι*), inasmuch as each one of them, *quād βίον κοινωνῶν* or *καλῶν πράξεων μετέχων*, initiates, in his own sphere, a social function essential to the *σωτηρία* of the commonwealth, even as each member of a ship's crew contributes his share to the prosperity of the voyage: see *Pol. Γ. 2. 1276 b. 26* ἡ γὰρ *σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας* ἔργον ἔστιν αὐτῶν πάντων (*i. e.* τῶν πλωτήρων, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὅντων τὴν δύναμιν) . . . ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὅντων, ἡ *σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας* ἔργον ἔστι, κοινωνία δ' ἔστιν *ἡ πολιτεία*. Mechanical pressure from without (*τυραννίς*), taking the place of, or limiting, the constitutional action (*βίος*) of its members, is foreign to the conception of the State as *αὐταρκές τι*, or an organism. The individual member is indeed limited—but by the immanent law of the organism to which he belongs (*νόμος*), and that, not in his *ἐλευθερία*, which is realised in obedience to the law of the organism, but in his tendency to *πλεονεξία*.

The *δοῦλος* has no initiative which can be exercised for the good of the State. He does not live for the State, but for his master; and the law which regulates his function is an external

one—the will of his master. To occupy a status which places 1134 a. 27. life above the will of a master is, then, the first condition of citizenship. All who occupy this status are, of course, *equally free*; but it is only in a pure democracy that they are *politically equal*—*Pol. E. I. 1301 a. 29 δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ Ἰσούς δτιοῦ ὄντας οἰκοδαι ἀπλῶς Ἰσούς εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὅμοιως, ἀπλῶς Ἰσοὶ εἶναι νομίζουσιν)*. Such a democracy makes all its freemen *absolutely equal citizens*—*Ἰσοὺς καὶ ἀριθμόν*. Other constitutions recognise *grades* among freemen constituted by differences of birth, culture, or wealth. Some of these constitutions draw such a sharp line between the highest grade and the grades beneath it, as to exclude from the functions of the citizen all except those who are *ἴσοι* within the limits of the highest grade. Here, again, *οἱ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας* may be said to be absolutely equal—*ἴσοι καὶ ἀριθμόν*, the freemen belonging to the lower grades not coming into comparison with them at all. But there are certain other constitutions—the so-called mixed constitutions (*Pol. Δ. 6 and 7*), which include within the pale of effective citizenship the members of several grades. Their citizens are *ἴσοι καὶ ἀναλογίαν*, i.e. *ἴσοι* inasmuch as they all perform political functions, and are comparable on this common ground; *ἴσοι καὶ ἀναλογίαν*, because comparison shows grades in the dignity and importance of their respective functions. Strictly then, it is incorrect to identify, as Mich. Eph. does, the *ἴσοι καὶ ἀριθμόν* of the present passage, with the citizens of a pure democracy, and the *ἴσοι καὶ ἀναλογίαν* with those of an oligarchy or aristocracy. The citizens of a pure democracy are, of course, *ἴσοι καὶ ἀριθμόν*—‘on a footing of absolute equality’ (Peters), but so are the members of a close oligarchy, for they are themselves a homogeneous body of peers, and those whom they exclude from all share in the government of the city cannot be compared with them in an *ἀναλογία* having for its basis political *ἀξία*. It is only in a mixed constitution that we can correctly speak of the citizens as being *ἴσοι καὶ ἀναλογίαν*—‘on a footing of proportionate equality’ (Peters). As a matter of fact, however, most of the ‘aristocracies’ and ‘oligarchies’ noticed by Aristotle in the *Politics* are mixed constitutions, recognising grades within the body of effective citizens, and the description *ἴσοι καὶ ἀναλογίαν* is therefore applicable to their citizens; while the description *ἴσοι καὶ ἀριθμόν* remains as specially applicable to the citizens of a pure democracy, as described in *Pol. Z. I. 1317 a. 40—1318 a. 10.*

1134 a. 29. ἀλλά τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὅμοιότητα] Freemen, standing on a footing of equality either absolute or proportionate, are related by *political ties* (*τούτοις ἔστι πολιτικὸν δίκαιον*); i.e. they are persons whose unanimity (*ὅμονοια*, see *E.N.* ix. 6) can create and maintain a *πολιτεία*. What such persons do *quid metéχοντες τῆς πολιτείας*, and in accordance with its spirit and requirements, is *just in the political sense of the term*. And this is the proper sense of the term; for man's true nature, or form, is realised in the performance of political function (*φύσει πολιτικὸν δὲ ἀνθρωπος*). But, that man may be able to realise his true form in the creation and maintenance of a *πολιτεία*, certain material conditions are necessary, the most important of which is that the *oikiai*, or families, of which the *πόλις* is composed, shall be well regulated. In the *oikia* the citizen, as husband, father, and master, no longer *μετέχει βίου* with free equals *τοῦ εὐ ζῆν ἔνεκα*, but exercises authority, *τῆς ἀναγκαῖας ζωῆς χάριν*, over inferiors, some of whom are not even free. It is in another, that is in a metaphorical sense (*καθ' ὅμοιότητα*), then, that the term *just* must be applied to the relations subsisting between him and these inferiors.

a. 30. οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς] *καὶ* indicates that *δίκαιον* and *νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς* are merely different expressions for the same relation. 'Just relations' are equivalent to 'relations constituted by *νόμος*'. Persons *οἷς νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς* are persons whose conduct is determined, not by individual impulse, or by the force of a master, but by the manifold influences (examples, customs, laws, ideals) exerted by a system of common life, which they have been born into, and are 'of one mind' (*ὅμονοοῦσι*) to maintain and adorn.

a. 31. νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία] This is not to be understood, as by Michelet, to mean that *νόμος presupposes ἀδικία*—'legem propter injustitiam institutam esse.' The social order is not a mere police system for the suppression of injustice—*Pol.* Γ. 5. 1280 b. 29 φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν' ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ὑπαρχόντων τούτων ἀπάντων ἥδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὐ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελέας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. *Νόμος* is essentially the law of man's rational self-realisation, as *πολιτικὸν ζῶον*: but since he is impeded in his rational self-realisation by the irrational part of his nature, this law of his self-realisation is forced

to assume, as δίκη, judicial functions, and, for this reason, is often 1134 a. 31. (wrongly) regarded as nothing but a repressive agency operating ἐν οἷς ἀδικίᾳ. The words before us seem to imply this opinion; and so do the remarks which follow in §§ 5, 6, and 7. *Nόμος* seems to be presented as an invention specially introduced to combat πλεονεξία, as Hobbes' commonwealth is introduced to put an end to the evils of the state of nature. But the Aristotelian conception of νόμος, as elsewhere presented (*e.g.* in *Pol.* Γ. II. 1287 a. 28 δ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον· η τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τὸν ἄριστον ἄνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἀνεν δρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἔστιν) gives such prominence to its god-like, that is, creative and constitutive efficiency, that we must not find too much fault with the phraseology of the present passage, which, after all, is intended (as I believe) to point the distinction between τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, justice in the abstract, and τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, justice in the concrete, and does so by insisting on the highly complex character of the conditions which determine the manifestation of the latter. The presence of ἀδικίᾳ among those οἷς νόμος πρὸς αὐτοὺς is the ὥλη (or constitutes the greater part of the ὥλη) which prevents, even in the so-called ὄρθαι πολιτεῖαι, the perfect realisation of τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον in τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον.

[ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικίᾳ . . . οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικίᾳ] This clause is rejected a. 32. by Zell, Jackson, and others from the present context. I am inclined to agree with Ramsauer, who brackets only the latter half of it (made parenthetical by Sus. and Bywater), viz. ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικίᾳ. These words might very naturally have been added, for the sake of antithesis, by a scribe who remembered the ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἀδικον εἶναι of § 1. Without them, the passage runs smoothly, τοῦτο (which cannot in any case refer to ἀδικίᾳ, for ἀδικίᾳ is not the *act* of τὸ νέμειν) referring to the immediately preceding τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

[τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν] From these words it would appear that the a. 33. writer in this discussion of τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον has merely *particular* justice in view.

[ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν] M. Eph. says—λέγει δὲ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τὰ τῇ a. 34. ἑαυτῶν φύσει τοιαῦτα, ἀ καὶ ὡς δυνάμεις λέγεται καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· οἷον πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια, πενία, δυσγένεια, καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἔστι καὶ πάλιν κακά. συντελοῦσι

1134 a. 34. γὰρ τῷ μὲν σπουδαίῳ πρὸς τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείας, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ εἰς τὰς κατὰ κακίαν.

a. 35. § 5. διὸ . . . τύραννος] See *Pol.* Γ. 10. 1286 a. 8, where the question is put—πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων; and *Pol.* Γ. 11. 1287 a. 18, where the general conclusion is reached τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔνα τινά, the reason being that τῷ μὲν νόμῳ τὸ παθητικὸν οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' ἔχειν πᾶσαν (Γ. 10. 1286 a. 18)—a reason further insisted on in a passage (Γ. 11. 1287 a. 28) quoted above, note on a. 31. It must be remembered, however, that the conclusion τὸν νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔνα τινά is true, not of all communities, but of those composed of ὅμοιοι καὶ ἴσοι: see *Pol.* Γ. 11. 1287 b. 41 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φανερὸν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὅμοιοις καὶ ἴσοις οὕτε συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὕτε δίκαιον ἔνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὕτε μὴ ὄντων νόμων, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὕτε νόμων ὄντων, οὕτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὕτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μηδὲ ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ ἀν κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἀμείνων ἢ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δὲ ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέον. The exception here alluded to is explained as follows—Γ. 11. 1288 a. 15 ὅταν γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔνα τινὰ συμβῇ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ’ ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὥσθ’ ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάντων καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἔνα τοῦτον. With Aristotle's discussion of the question πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων, Jackson compares the discussions in Plato, *Politicus* 293 E sqq., and in Legg. 874 E sqq. The latter passage especially is worth careful study in connexion with Aristotle's view. As to the point raised by Plato ποῖα δὴ νομοθετητέον τε καὶ ποῖα ἀποδοτέον κρίνειν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις (Legg. 876 A), Aristotle expresses the following opinion in *Rhet.* i. 1. 1354 a. 31 μάλιστα μὲν οὖν προσήκει τοὺς ὄρθως κειμένους νόμους, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται, πάντα διορίζειν αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι ἐλάχιστα καταλείπειν ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνοντι. We shall return to this subject in the chapter on ἐπιείκεια (v. 10).

λόγον] MS. authority is strongly in favour of λόγον against νόμον: and cf. *E. N.* x. 9. 12 δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὁν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ.

ἔαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ] i.e. ἔαυτῷ τὸ πλέον νέμει.

b. 1. γίνεται τύραννος] *tυραννίς* is the worst of those παρεκβεβηκνῖαι πολιτεῖαι in which the governors rule for their own advantage, not

for the common good: see *E. N.* viii. 10. 2 ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ 1134 b. 1. ἔαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων—cf. *Pol.* Γ. 5. 1279 b. 6 ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστι μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος.

§§ 6, 7.] There exists a general opinion (*δοκεῖ*) that one gets no b. 2. advantage from being just—that, in fact, one merely confers advantage on other people, justice being ‘the good of other people.’ Since rulers are apt to share this opinion, the State, in order to secure their services, must remunerate them with honour and privilege: as it is, there are rulers who are not satisfied with such intangible remuneration, but become tyrants and remunerate themselves by plundering the State. Here the clauses *οὐ γὰρ νέμει . . . πρότερον* express the reasoning of the persons who hold the opinion (*δοκεῖ*), *οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον, εἰπερ δίκαιος*, and are rightly treated by Susemihl and Bywater as parenthetical: while the words *μισθὸς ἄρα κ.τ.λ.* give the practical conclusion which the writer draws from the undoubted fact of the existence of this opinion. It is an opinion which in his view implies a false theory of life; nevertheless it exists, and a practical legislator must take account of it, and try to avert its worst consequences.

§ 6. διὸ ἔτέρῳ πονεῖ] Bekker’s *ποιεῖ* seems to be entirely without b. 4. MS. authority. Shall we then accept *πονεῖ*, for which the MS. authority is unimpeachable? It is difficult to refuse to do so. At the same time, *πονεῖ* and *ποιεῖ* are palaeographically very like. Were it not for the MS. consensus in favour of *πονεῖ*, I should decide for *ἔτέρῳ ποιεῖ = ἔτέρῳ τὸ πλέον νέμει*, because it answers to *ἔαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ = ἔαυτῷ τὸ πλέον νέμει* in § 5, and because *πονεῖ* seems to me to be an unsuitable word to express the action of *τὸ νέμειν* with which the work of the just ruler is here identified. Ramsauer thinks that it is self-evident that *ἔτέρῳ ποιεῖ* cannot = *ἔτέρῳ τὸ πλέον νέμει*, although *αὐτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ* above is rightly, he admits, taken as = *ἔαυτῷ τὸ πλέον νέμει*. I confess that I cannot see the ground on which this distinction is made. But even granting that *ἔτέρῳ ποιεῖ* could not mean *ἔτέρῳ τὸ πλέον νέμει*, we might argue that the words in *Rep.* 343 C *οἱ δὲ ἀρχόμενοι ποιοῦσι τὸ ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον* are in favour of reading *ἔτέρῳ ποιεῖ* here = *ἔτέρῳ ποιεῖ τὸ συμφέρον*. However, for the reasons against *ποιεῖ* (which, after all,—whether from accident or not—has no MS. backing) see Jackson’s note *ad loc.*

1134 b. 5. ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν] See note on v. 1. 17, a. 3.

b. 6. § 7. *μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας*] ‘Here, as in the unequal friendships, the assistance rendered by the superior and the honour and respect which compensate it are equated by means of τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός’ (Jackson). ‘The exchange of equivalent amounts of honour and just government’ describes the relation between ἄρχων and ἀρχόμενοι, as it is conceived by those who hold that justice is ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν—a good thing handed over to one’s neighbour, for which one must be careful to get from him an adequate return. Nor is the writer himself unwilling to regard the relation as an *exchange*; for the inference *μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος* is undoubtedly his. He believes that in society, as it is, the ruler must be remunerated with honour of a more or less material or external kind. But the more perfect society becomes—the more ‘constitutional’ government becomes, the less appropriate becomes the formula of ‘exchange’ to the relation between ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενοι. The *τιμὴ* which the ruler who is nobly *φιλότιμος*, or, it may be, *μεγαλόψυχος*, seeks, is not an external reward, but the approbation of his own ‘conscience.’ He gives his services to the State, because he is ‘public-spirited’ or ‘patriotic.’ And, further, those whom he rules are not a passive caste of mere ἀρχόμενοι. They too are public-spirited, and patriotic, and *help* him to rule. Indeed, where the relation between ruler and ruled is not, to a considerable extent, one of *mutual help* in the work of carrying out a system of common life, *τυραννίς*, in some form or other, must inevitably supervene. If the ruled are those who do not *help*, but merely *remunerate* the ruler, the latter is sure to bid for ever higher ‘remuneration.’ ‘Remuneration’ is, indeed, *materially necessary* in the case of the ἄρχων, as in that of the *ἰατρός*. But, as *οἱ χαρίεντες τῶν ιατρῶν* do not follow their profession *for the sake of* the fees, so the true ἄρχων does not govern for the sake of ‘honour.’ The final cause of his government is the public good, not his own advantage. In a noble community the good ruler is the object of the highest *τιμή*—the loyal devotion of his people. But how absurd it would be to say that he rules *for the sake of* their devotion! His consciousness of it is only an *ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος*: his real *τέλος* is the *ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν* which results in the welfare of his loyal and devoted people. Thus the relation between ruler and ruled is misrepresented in its *essential character* when it is simply described as an ‘exchange.’ As an exchange it certainly presents itself *concretely* to the interested

parties; and the wise legislator tries to make it appear to them 1134 b. 6. a tolerably fair exchange; but, even in the worst *πολιτεία* that still deserves the name, the fact that there is government at all implies a nisus towards social organisation, which is no more accounted for by the self-seeking of the governors, than the existence of *ἰατρική* is explained by the fact that it is practised as a *μισθαρική τέχνη*.

§§ 8, 9.] Passing from the *πόλις* to its unit the *oikia*, we find three b. 8. kinds of *δίκαιον*, resembling that between *πολῖται* and yet differing from it—viz one kind appearing in the relation between husband and wife (*τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον*), another in the relation between father and children (*τὸ πατρικὸν δίκαιον*), and another in the relation between master and slaves (*τὸ δεσποτικόν*). These three kinds of *δίκαιον* resemble the *δίκαιον* between *πολῖται*, in so far as they appear in relations involving the conduct of a *πολίτης* (the paterfamilias) towards those who, though not *πολῖται*, are individuals *ῶν ἄνευ οὐκ ἀν εἴη πόλις*: they differ from it, because the relations in which they appear are not between *ελεύθεροι καὶ οἱστοι*—not between independent persons standing on a footing of equality. The slave and the child, as such, are not independent persons, but are, as it were, parts of the paterfamilias: he cannot therefore injure them, any more than he can injure himself: if we speak of justice or injustice appearing in his conduct towards them, it must be in a metaphorical sense. It is only towards his *fellow-citizens* that a man can act justly or unjustly in the strict sense. Justice, strictly so called, appears in those relations which exist between men *quād* rational beings, striving to attain *εὐδαιμονία* by united action; it does not, except in a metaphorical sense, appear in those domestic relations, which, after all, are common to the irrational animals with man. For the three *μέρη τῆς οἰκίας* cf. *Pol. A.* 2. 1253 b. 1–10, and *Pol. A.* 5. 1259 a. 37; in both passages *οἰκονομική* is divided into three parts—*δεσποτική*, *πατρική*, and *γαμική*: cf. also *E.N.* viii. 10. §§ 4–6 for the analogues of these three domestic relations in *πολιτεῖαι*.

§ 8. *ταῦτὸν τούτοις*] Ramsauer conjectures *ταῦτὸν τούτων*.

b. 9.

*οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς*] Peters takes *ἀπλῶς* with *ἀδικία*—‘We cannot speak (without qualification) of injustice towards what is part of one’s self’: but it perhaps ought to be taken with *τὰ αὐτοῦ* (*sc. μέρη*), which would then be distinguished,

1134 b. 9. as 'parts strictly so called,' from slave or child which is ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ: so, apparently, *M. M.* i. 33. 1194 b. 10-14.

b. 10. κτῆμα] 'slave.' For the rationale of this use of the term see *Pol. A.* 4. 1253 b. 23 sqq., and cf. *Oecon.* i. 5. 1344 a. 23.

b. 11. ἔως ἀν ἡ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ] Reading μή before χωρισθῇ (*L<sup>b</sup>, M<sup>b</sup>*), we must translate ἔως—'so long as.' But the omission of μή (*K<sup>b</sup>, O<sup>b</sup>*) is strongly supported by *M. M.* i. 33. 1194 b. 14, 15 ὥσπερ γὰρ μέρος τί ἐστι τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ νίος· πλὴν ὅταν ἥδη λάβῃ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάξιν καὶ χωρισθῇ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τότ' ἥδη ἐν ἴστρητι καὶ ὅμοιότητί ἐστι τῷ πατρὶ.

ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ] See *Pol. A.* 4. 1254 a. 9 τὸ δὲ κτῆμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον. τό τε γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλου· δομοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κτῆμα· διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μόνον, ἐκείνου δ' οὐκ ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότου δοῦλος ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δολως ἐκείνου. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον (διὸ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἀλλ' ἄλλον ἀνθρωπος ἀν, οὗτος φύσει δοῦλος ἐστίν, ἄλλου δ' ἐστίν ἀνθρωπος, ὃς ἀν κτῆμα ἡ [δοῦλος ἐστίν], κτῆμα δὲ ὅργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν). In *E. N.* viii. 12. 2, 3 a physiological explanation of στοργή (the germ of all social feeling) is found in the fact that τὸ τέκνον ἐξ αὐτοῦ, i. e. μέρος αὐτοῦ.

αὐτὸν δ' οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν] This anticipates the conclusion reached in chapters 9 and 11. Βλάπτειν (*sc. παρὰ τὸν νόμον*) μετὰ προαιρέσεως=ἀδικεῖν.

b. 12. § 9. διὸ οὐκ ἐστιν ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν] Ramsauer's conjecture αὐτά, adopted by Susemihl, is very tempting, the argument being—'Since no man chooses to harm himself, and since his slaves and children are parts of himself, it follows (διό) that he cannot be unjust towards them (αὐτά)—i. e. civil justice and injustice do not appear in his relations to them—οὐδὲ ἄρα ἀδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικὸν (*sc. πρὸς αὐτά*).'

b. 13. κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει . . .] A reference to § 4. For a discussion of the question, How far Aristotle is right in holding that νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς has nothing to do with the maintenance and regulation of the relation between master and slave, see note on *E. N.* viii. 11. 7. That faithful slaves have rights the recognition of which tends to place them in a quasi-political position, is admitted in *Oecon.* i. 5. 1344 b. 14 χρὴ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὠρίσθαι πᾶσιν. δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἀθλον.

That the State has a right—*e.g.* in the interest of humanity—to 1134 b. 13. interfere with a man's treatment of his slaves is, of course, another matter, and does not imply that *between* him and his slaves there is *nόμος*: for the State may also interfere with his treatment of animals: cf. Ramsauer—‘ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος. Ἐν οἷς: etenim περὶ αὐτῶν, velut περὶ τεκνοποιίας, τροφῆς, παιδείας, leges esse, quibus parentes vel etiam heri quam maxime obligati sint, infitari sane non est in animo.’

**οὗτοι δὲ ήσαν . . . ἄρχεσθαι]** This remark has not been made in b. 14. the *Ethics*: but cf. *Pol.* Γ. 7. 1283 b. 42 πολίτης δὲ κοινὴ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἔστι, καθ' ἕκαστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἔτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν.

**διὸ μᾶλλον . . . καὶ κτήματα]** This is the doctrine of *Pol.* A. 5. b. 15. 1259 a. 39 καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἄρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς. Mich. Eph. has the following note here—ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἰσότης, καθὸ ἀμφοῖ ἐλευθεροῖ, καὶ ἔστι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλο ὅν τοῦ πολιτικοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ ἰσότητι εἰσὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡς παρὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸν ἄνδρα ἄρχειν, δεῖ μέντοι καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν τινῶν· τῶν θεραπαινίδων δηλονότι καὶ τῆς τῶν εἰσκομιζομένων σωτηρίας καὶ φυλακῆς.

**τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον]** According to *Pol.* A. 5 οἰκονομική is the b. 17. genus, and δεσποτική, πατρική, and γαμική the species.

The following is the version which the writer of the *M. M.* (i. 33. 1194 b. 5-29) gives of this chapter—ἔστιν δὴ δίκαιον τι, ὡς φασίν, οἰκέτη πρὸς δεσπότην καὶ νιῷ πρὸς πατέρα. τὸ δὲ ἐν τούτοις δίκαιον ὁμονύμως ἀν δόξειεν λέγεσθαι τῷ πολιτικῷ δίκαιῳ (ἔστιν γὰρ *(τὸ)* δίκαιον, ὑπὲρ οὐ ἔστιν ἡ σκέψις, τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον). τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστά ἔστιν ἐν ἰσότητι (κοινωνοὶ γὰρ οἱ πολίται τινες, καὶ ὄμοιοι βούλονται εἶναι τῇ φύσει, τῷ δὲ τρόπῳ ἔτεροι), τῷ δὲ νιῷ πρὸς πατέρα καὶ οἰκέτη πρὸς δεσπότην οὐκ ἀν δόξειεν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐθέν. οὕτε γὰρ τῷ ποδὶ τῷ ἐμῷ πρὸς ἐμὲ οὕτε τῇ χειρὶ, ὄμοιώς δὲ οὐδὲ ἕκαστῳ τῶν μορίων· ὡσαύτως ἀν οὖν δόξειεν ἔχειν καὶ δὲ νιὸς πρὸς πατέρα· ὥσπερ γὰρ μέρος τί ἔστι τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ νιός. πλὴν ὅταν ἥδη λάβῃ τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάξιν καὶ χωρισθῇ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τότ' ἥδη ἐν ἰσότητι καὶ ὄμοιότητι ἔστιν τῷ πατρί· οἱ δὲ πολίται τοιοῦτοι τινες ἐθέλουσιν εἶναι. ὡς δὲ αὐτῶς οὐδὲ οἰκέτη πρὸς δεσπότην ἔστι δίκαιον διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· τοῦ γὰρ δεσπότου τί ἔστιν ὁ οἰκέτης. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτῷ δίκαιον, τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔστιν. οὐ τοῦτο δέ γε ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ

1134 b. 17. τὸ πολιτικόν ἐν ἴσοτητι γάρ καὶ ὁμοιότητι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον ἔοικεν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἐν γυναικὶς καὶ ἀνδρὸς κοινωνίᾳ δίκαιον ἐστιν ἐγγὺς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου χείρον μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἀλλ’ οἰκειότερον, καὶ μετέχει ἴσοτητός πως μᾶλλον, διότι ἐγγὺς τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ὁ βίος αὐτῶν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα μᾶλιστά πως ἥδη τῶν ἄλλων πολιτικὸν ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστι δίκαιον τὸ ἐν πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ ὅν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁ δίκαιος περὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον ἔσται.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ARGUMENT.

*In civil justice there are two elements, a natural and a conventional. That which is naturally just is always and everywhere equally just, whether people deem it just or not; that which is only conventionally just was originally indifferent, and has been made just by law or fashion. Some maintain that there are no human institutions which are more than conventionally just, arguing that what is naturally of a certain kind is so invariably (e.g. fire is invariably hot), whereas the justice of human institutions varies—what is right at home is not necessarily right in Persia. To this it may be replied: The Divine nature is indeed invariable; but we are here concerned with human institutions: their justice certainly varies; but this does not prove that there is not a natural as well as a conventional element in them; for in the concrete world variations are natural. Which are natural and which merely conventional among human institutions, although both those which are natural and those which are conventional vary, is as plain as it is which hand is naturally the stronger, although either may be the stronger. In proportion as a given constitution falls short of the ideal constitution, its institutions will exhibit more of the conventional element.*

*A just rule is a universal which has just acts under it as particulars. ‘Unjust act’ and ‘unjust rule’—‘act of justice’ and ‘just rule’ differ. The ‘unjust rule,’ whether unjust naturally or conventionally, is prior to the ‘unjust act.’ Similarly, the ‘just rule’ is prior to the ‘act of justice,’ or rather to the ‘just act,’ for the expression ‘act of justice’ ought to be retained to mark the rectification of an unjust act.*

b. 18. § 1.] That which is *naturally* right (*τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον*) is right in itself always and everywhere, whether it be deemed right or no; that which is *conventionally* right (*τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον*), in itself neither

right nor wrong, has been made right by the *vόμος* of a community, 1134 b. 18. and continues to be right only so long as the *vόμος* declares it to be right. It is perhaps scarcely necessary to point out that *νομικόν*, as here distinguished from *φυσικόν*, must not be confounded with *νόμιμον* as distinguished from *τὸν* in v. 1. 8. Τὰ *νόμιμα* are all those things which are recognised as right by the law and fashion (*vόμος*) of a community; some of these are *naturally*, or in themselves, right (*φύσει δίκαια*), others are only *conventionally* right (*vόμῳ δίκαια*). It is also to be noticed that (here in § 1) the writer, in describing *τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον*, seems to have in view only things which, being in themselves *neither right nor wrong*, are made right by *vόμος*. He apparently forgets that also things which are in themselves *wrong* often become conventionally right. But in § 5 he uses words which may be understood to imply that both things indifferent and things wrong may become *vόμῳ δίκαια—όμοιῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ’ ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταῦτα πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη*. Here the reference must be to the *παρεκβεβηκναι πολιτεῖαι* in which much that is *παρὰ φύσιν*, or in itself wrong, is deemed right, *i.e.* is conventionally right—in which, in fact, the *bad man* is the good citizen. The more perfect a *πολιτεία* is—*i.e.* the nearer it approaches to the ideal of *ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη*, the more fully will its *νόμιμα* realise the requirements of *τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον*, the element of *νομικὸν δίκαιον* in its institutions and customs being small and consisting of what was originally *indifferent*, rather than of what is in itself *wrong*.

**τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ]** K<sup>b</sup> and CCC omit these words, and read *γάρ* before *φυσικόν*. The omission may be easily explained as a slip of the eye caused by the similarity of the last words of ch. 6 and the omitted first words of ch. 7. K<sup>b</sup> has frequent omissions of this kind. On the other hand, the interpolation of *πολιτικοῦ* here, per dittographiam, would be very natural. At any rate, it seems certain that the writer of the *M. M.* read here *τοῦ δὲ δίκαιον* instead of *τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δίκαιον*, for his version (i. 33. 1194 b. 30) not only begins—*τῶν δὲ δίκαιων ἔστι τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ νόμῳ*, but ends (1195 a. 5) with words which, if they mean anything, mean that it is not *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* which is divisible into *τὸ φυσικὸν* and *τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον*.—*βελτιον οὖν δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ νόμου. ἀλλ’ ὁ ἔητοῦμεν, δίκαιον ἔστι πολιτικόν· τὸ δὲ πολιτικόν ἔστι τὸ νόμῳ, οὐ τὸ φύσει.*

1134 b. 18. The difference between the Fifth Book with *τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου κ.τ.λ.* and the *M. M.* with *τὸ πολιτικόν ἔστι τὸ νόμῳ οὐ τὸ φύσει* seems to be due to the fact that the writer of the *M. M.* does not keep clearly before his mind the distinction which the writer of the Fifth Book marks by the terms *νόμιμον* and *νομικόν*.

b. 22. *μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι*] Jackson's note is—‘the editors point out that this passage is inconsistent with Herod. vi. 79 *ἄποινα δέ ἔστι Πελοποννησίοισι δύο μνέαι τεταγμέναι κατ' ἄνδρα αἰχμάλωτον ἐκτίνειν*, and v. 77 *χρόνῳ δὲ ἔλυσάν σφεας διμένως ἀποτιμησάμενοι*. But, as Blakesley remarks, the prisoners in the latter case being the Chalcidian Hippobotae, two minae “may be considered as the ransom of a man-at-arms, not of an inferior soldier.” One mina, then, may have been the ransom of men of the lowest rank.’

*ἢ τὸ αἷγα . . . πρόβατα*] Jackson's note here is—‘On the strength of Herodot. ii. 42 δσοι μὲν δὴ Διὸς Θηβαίεος ἴδρυνται ἱρὸν ἡ νομοῦ τοῦ Θηβαίον εἰσί, οὗτοι μέν νυν πάντες δύων ἀπεχόμενοι αἷγας θύουσι, Muretus proposed to read αἷγα Διὶ θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ πρόβατα. Cf. N.E. ix. 2. § 6, de Mirabilibus 844 a. 35. (In Athen. iv. 138 f. θύουσι δὲ ἐν ταῖς κοπίσιν αἷγας ἀλλο δὲ οὐδὲν ἵερειον Zeus is not the divinity honoured.) But the addition of Διὶ does not explain the awkward antithesis of the singular *αἷγα* and the plural δύο *πρόβατα*. Is it possible that ἀλλὰ μὴ is a corruption of *μίαν ἢ?*’ Tὸ αἷγας θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ πρόβατα μηδὲ ὑσ might be suggested; but Zell's conclusion is perhaps the safest—‘Mureti conjectura admodum blanditur; sed cum Aristoteles aliam rem h. l. significare potuerit sibi et popularibus suis tam notam, quam nobis nunc ignotam, ab auctoritate codicum recedere nolui.’

b. 23. *θύειν Βρασίδᾳ*] See Thuc. v. 11.

b. 24. *τὰ ψηφισματώδη*] The distinction between a *νόμος* which embodies the permanent necessities of the State and is presumably in accordance with ‘the *natural* fitness of things,’ and a *ψήφισμα* which meets an unexpected and presumably temporary condition of affairs, is a commonplace in Greek political thought. One of the characteristics which mark the declension from *φύσις* of ἡ ἐσχάτη δημοκρατία is that government by *ψηφίσματα*, or special decrees of the people, has taken the place of the rule of *νόμος*, or the Constitution: see *Pol. Δ. 4. 1292 a. 2 ἔτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ἢ πολίτης, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὸν νόμον*.

ἔτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τάλλα μὲν εἶναι ταύτα, κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος 1134 b. 24. καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ διάτομος. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ' οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσὶν ἐν προεδρίᾳ ὅπου δ' οἱ νόμοι μὴ εἰσὶ κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί. μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσιν οὐχ ὡς ἔκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες. "Ομηρος δὲ ποίαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι πολυκοιρανίην, πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείους ὕστιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἔκαστος, ἄδηλον. ὁ δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος, ἀτε μόναρχος ὅν, ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, ὥστε οἱ κόλακες ἔντιμοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ δῆμος οὗτος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχῶν τῆς τυραννίδος. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἥθος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἀμφώ δεσποτικὰ τῶν βελτιώνων, καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὰ ἐπιτάγματα, καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον. καὶ μάλιστα δ' ἔκατεροι *(παρ')* ἔκατέροις ἴσχυοντιν, οἱ μὲν κόλακες παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις, οἱ δὲ δημαγωγοὶ τοῖς δήμοις τοῖς τοιούτοις. But, although *government by ψηφίσματα* is thus opposed to that by *νόμος*, as caprice is opposed to reason, it is none the less true that *a single ψηφίσμα* may be the vehicle of reason—may secure the realisation of that which is really or ‘naturally’ right, in an exceptional case which the general rule laid down by *νόμος* could not meet: see v. 10. 6.

§ 2. *ἐνίοις*] See note on *E.N.* i. 3. 2. Cf. Grant, *Ethics*, Essay ii. vol. i. p. 150 on the opposition between Law and Nature.

ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] The *ἕνοι* referred to argue—Nature is invariable; the b. 25 institutions of men (*τὰ δίκαια*) vary; therefore they have no ‘natural’ foundation. The writer meets this argument in §§ 3 and 4, by pointing out that ‘being variable’ and ‘having a natural foundation’ are not incompatible characteristics. While all human institutions (as distinguished from the functions of the godhead) are ‘variable,’ some of them are ‘natural’ and some of them are ‘conventional.’ Which are ‘natural’ and which ‘conventional’ is as plain as it is which hand is ‘naturally’ the stronger.

καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις] The editors compare the *Minos* 315 E—316 A, b. 26. where these words occur in a similar context.

§ 3. *τοῦτο δ' . . . b. 30 οὐ φύσει*] This is a very awkward passage. b. 27. *Τοῦτο* is apparently *τὰ δίκαια κινεῖσθαι*. This statement is untrue, and yet true in a sense. ‘Among the gods’ *κινεῖται τὰ δίκαια οὐδαμῶς*—*i.e.* justice in the abstract is ‘eternal and immutable’;

1134 b. 27. ‘among men,’ however, *κινητὸν πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον*—all human institutions are mutable; but not mutable in the sense of being entirely arbitrary: their mutability is not inconsistent with *τὸ εἶναι τι καὶ φύσει* in them. In the sphere of mathematics, and in the sphere of inorganic nature (*e.g. τὸ πῦρ*), there are no variations; but in the sphere of biological adaptation, to which *τὰ δίκαια*—man’s actions—belong, *variations are natural*. Then follow the words *ἀλλ’ ὅμως . . . οὐ φύσει*, which are unnecessary because they have been anticipated by the words *ἔστι μέν τι καὶ φύσει*. Jackson makes the whole section *τοῦτο δ’ . . . οὐ φύσει* parenthetical; but this, after all, removes formally rather than practically the difficulty inherent in the sequence—*παρ’ ἡμῖν δ’ ἔστι μέν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι πᾶν, ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἔστι τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ’ οὐ φύσει*. However, we must not expect too much logical order from the present writer, who, moreover, expresses himself so awkwardly as to seem guilty of the inaccuracy of ascribing *δίκαια* (through *ἀκίνητα δίκαια*) to the gods, contrary to the express teaching of his school (see *E.N.* x. 1178 b. 10). It is to relieve him of responsibility for such an inaccuracy that Susemihl brackets the whole clause *καίτοι παρά γε* 28 . . . *οὐ φύσει* 30. But perhaps we need not understand *κινεῖται τὰ δίκαια* after *οὐδαμῶς* 29, with Grant, Jackson, Susemihl, and Peters. It may be allowable to supply *κινεῖται τὸ φύσει*.

b. 34. § 4. *πάντας*] Bekker reads *τίνας*, against all the MSS. apparently, and against *M.M.* i. 33. 1194 b. 33.

1135 a. 2. § 5. *ἀνοῦνται . . . πωλοῦσιν*] *sc. οἱ ἔμποροι*, Jackson. Dealers buying up corn or wine in large quantities compute by means of large units of measurement; but when they retail their stock they find it convenient to use smaller units—*e.g.* bottles instead of hogsheads. It may be useful to append here the passage in which the writer of the *M.M.* discusses the distinction between *τὸ φύσει δίκαιον* and *τὸ νόμῳ δίκαιον*—i. 33. 1194 b. 30 *τῶν δὲ δικαίων ἔστι τὰ μὲν φύσει τὰ δὲ νόμῳ*. *δεῖ δ’ οὖτος ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ ὡς μηδέποτε ἀν μεταπεσόντας καὶ γὰρ τὰ φύσει ὄντα μεταλαμβάνουσι μεταβολῆς*. *λέγω δ’ οἷον εἰ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ μελετῷμεν πάντες ἀεὶ βάλλειν, γνοίμεθα ἀν ἀμφιδέξιον ἀλλὰ φύσει γε ἀριστερὰ ἔστιν, καὶ τὰ δεξιὰ οὐδὲν ἥττον φύσει βελτίω ἔστι τῆς ἀριστερᾶς, καν πάντα ποιῶμεν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ καθάπερ τῇ δεξιᾷ*. *οὐδ’ ὅτι μεταπίπτουσι, διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν φύσει ἀλλ’ εἰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸν πλείω χρόνον οὗτοι διαμένει ἡ ἀριστερὰ οὐσα ἀριστερὰ καὶ ἡ δεξιὰ δεξιά, τοῦτο φύσει ἔστιν*. *ώσαύτως ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει δικαίων, μή, εἰ μεταβάλλει διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν*

χρῆσιν, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιον φύσει, ἀλλ' ἔστιν. τὸ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 1135 a. 2. πολὺ διαμένον, τοῦτο φύσει δίκαιον προφανές. ὁ γὰρ ἀν ἡμεῖς θώμεθα καὶ νομίσωμεν, τοῦτο καὶ ἔστι δίκαιον ἥδη καὶ καλοῦμεν κατὰ νόμου δίκαιον. βέλτιον οὖν δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ νόμου. ἀλλ' ὁ ζητοῦμεν, δίκαιον ἔστι πολιτικόν. τὸ δὲ πολιτικόν ἔστιν τὸ νόμω, οὐ τὸ φύσει.

§§ 6 and 7.] ‘We have a transition of subject now,’ says Grant, a. 5. ‘a return from the digression on civil justice, to inquire into individual responsibility, &c. The transition is made by saying that the principles of justice and injustice (*τὸ δίκαιον* and *τὸ ἄδικον*) are universals, and differ from just and unjust acts.’ See *M. M.* i. 33. 1195 a. 8 τὸ δ’ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκημα δόξειεν ἀν εἶναι οὕτω ταῦτον, οὐκ ἔστι δέ τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικόν ἔστιν τὸ νόμῳ ὠρισμένον, οἷον τὸ τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποστερῆσαι ἄδικον ἔστι, τὸ δ’ ἀδίκημά ἔστιν τὸ ἥδη ἄδικως τι πρᾶξαι. δομοίως δὲ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ δικαιοπράγμα οὐ ταῦτον τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον τὸ τῷ νόμῳ ὠρισμένον, τὸ δὲ δικαιοπράγμα τὸ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν.

§ 7. καθ’ ἔκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν . . . ἐπισκεπτέον] Ramsauer is perhaps a. 13. right in suspecting that these words are interpolated. The word *υστερον* can scarcely point to anything so near as the following chapter, to which Zell and Michelet make it refer. The *Politics* (‘intended book or books περὶ νόμων’ Jackson) or *Rhet.* (i. 13. 1373 b. 1 sqq.) could not be referred to in this way by the writer of the Fifth Book.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### ARGUMENT.

*Just and unjust acts being what we have described, to act justly or unjustly a man must perform them voluntarily. If he perform them involuntarily, they are accidentally or nominally, not really, just or unjust acts; i.e. they are merely just or unjust acts, not his just or unjust acts. Thus, if a man restore a deposit involuntarily under compulsion, he ‘acts justly’ in a nominal, not in a real sense. Further, a voluntary act may be done either with or without deliberate choice, i.e. either after we have turned it over in our minds, or without previous thought. Now, to apply these distinctions to the classification of the ways in which one member of society may ‘hurt’ another—*

(1) *When one man hurts another without knowing that he is doing so, and in circumstances in which he could not be expected to know, we say that ‘an accident’ has happened.*

(2) But when he might have known, though acting without evil intent, we say that his act is ‘culpable’—for an act which can be traced to something in the man (here to his not knowing when he might have known) is ‘culpable,’ an act which is due to something external to the man (e. g. to his not knowing when it was impossible for him to know) is a mere ‘accident.’

(3) When a man hurts another knowingly, but without premeditation, e. g. in anger, his act is an ‘act of injustice,’ but he is not himself in virtue of it ‘an unjust man.’

(4) If, however, he hurt, deliberately choosing to do so, i. e. with premeditation, he is ‘an unjust man,’ and his act is an ‘act of injustice’ in the strict sense, i. e. one for which strictly no excuse can be found. But where sudden anger causes a man to inflict hurt, premeditation is excluded, and an extenuating circumstance may be found in the provocation which roused his anger; for anger arises when a man thinks that he is unjustly treated; and in judging the act which springs from his anger, we have to ask—‘Has he been unjustly treated?—How far has he received real provocation?’ Here it is evident that both parties may dispute in good faith, each believing that he has justice on his side. Not so where the question is not about the justice of an admitted act, but whether (e. g. in a business transaction) something has been done or not, e. g. if A asserts that he has paid B, and B denies A’s assertion, one of the parties must be deliberately trying to treat the other unjustly, unless the whole dispute be due to a slip of memory.

It is of course with the discrimination of the different degrees of guilt attaching to voluntary transgressions that a court of criminal justice has mainly to do. But there are certain involuntary actions which it cannot overlook—those involuntary actions which are not done accidentally in consequence of an excusable ignorance of mere particulars, but are blindly and ignorantly done under the influence of brutal and unnatural impulses.

1135 a. 15. § 1.] *Rhet.* i. 13 should be read carefully with this chapter. The following is the version of the subject of this chapter given by the writer of the *M. M.*—he does not seem to have had the chapter before him in the form in which we have it—*M. M.* i. 33. 1195 a. 14 πότε οὖν τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ πότε οὐ; ὡς ἀπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ προαιρεσιν καὶ ἔκουσίως (τὸ δὲ ἔκουσίως ὁ ἡν, ἐρηται ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω ἥμιν), καὶ ὅταν εἰδὼς καὶ οὖν καὶ φῶς καὶ οὖν ἔνεκα, οὕτως δίκαιον πράττει. ὄμοίως καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ἔσται ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ οὖν καὶ φῶς καὶ οὖν ἔνεκα. ὅταν δὲ μηθὲν τούτων εἰδὼς πράξῃ τι ἄδικον, ἄδικος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀτυχὴς δέ. εἰ γὰρ οἱόμενος τὸν πολέμιον ἀποκτείνει τὸν πατέρα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἄδικον μέν τι ἔπραξεν, ἄδικεī μέντοι οὐθένα, ἀτυχεῖ δέ. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ μὴ ἄδικεī τὰ ἀδίκα πράττοντα ἐν τῷ ἀγνοεῖν ἔστι τοῦτο, ὁ καὶ μικρὸν ἐπάνω ἐλέγετο, ὅταν μὴ εἰδὼς μήθ’ οὖν βλάπτει μήθ’ φῶς μήθ’ οὖν ἔνεκεν ἀλλ’ ἥδη καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν διοριστέον ἔστιν, πῶς ἀν γνομένης τῆς ἄγνοιας, οὖν βλάπτει, οὐκ ἄδικησει. ἔστω δὴ οὗτος ὁ διορισμός. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἄγνοια αἰτία γίγνεται τοῦ πρᾶξαί τι, οὐχ ἔκὼν τοῦτο πράττει, ὥστε οὐκ ἄδικεī ὅταν δὲ τῆς ἄγνοιας αὐτὸς γίγνεται.

αἴτιος, καὶ πράττη τι κατὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἡς αὐτὸς αἴτιος ἐστίν, οὗτος ἥδη 1135 a. 15. ἀδικεῖ, καὶ δικαίως ἀδικος ὁ τοιοῦτος κληθήσεται. οἶν ἐπὶ τῶν μεθυόντων. οἱ γὰρ μεθύοντες καὶ πράξαντες τι κακὸν ἀδικοῦσιν τῆς γὰρ ἀγνοίας αὐτοὶ εἰσιν αἴτιοι ἐξῆν γὰρ αὐτοῖς μὴ πίνειν τοσοῦτον, ὥστ' ἀγνοήσαντας τύπτειν τὸν πατέρα. ὅμοίως [καὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἀγνοιῶν ὅσαι μὲν γίνονται δι' αὐτούς, οἱ κατὰ ταύτας ἀδικοῦντες ἀδικοι· ὅν δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ εἰσιν αἴτιοι, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀγνοία κάκείνοις ἐστὶν αἴτια τοῖς πράξασι τοῦ πρᾶξαι, οὐκ ἀδικοι. ἐστιν δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀγνοία ἡ φυσική, οἶν τὰ παιδία ἀγνοοῦντα τοὺς πατέρας τύπτουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐν τούτοις ἀγνοία φυσική οὖσα οὐ ποιεῖ διὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν ταύτην τὰ παιδία λέγεσθαι ἀδικα· ἡ γὰρ ἀγνοία αἴτια τοῦ πράττειν ταῦτα, τῆς δὲ ἀγνοίας οὐκ αὐτὰ αἴτια, διὸ οὐδὲ ἀδικα λέγονται.

§ 1. ἔκών] see *Rhet. i. 13. 1373 b. 27* ἐστι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ a. 17. ἐκόντος τὰ ἀδικα πάσχειν<sup>\*</sup> τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὥρισται πρότερον ἐκούσιον εἶναι.

οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε . . . πράττουσιν] i. e. τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός δίκαια ἡ a. 18. ἀδικα πράττουσιν.

§ 2. ἐσται τι ἀδικον] i. e. ἀδικον κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

a. 22.

§ 3. πρότερον] cf. *E. E. ii. 9. 1225 b. 1. sq.* and *E. N. iii. 1. 20. a. 23.*

οὐ (ἔνεκα) . . . τίνος ἔνεκα] the tendency or result of the act: see a. 25. Grant's note on iii. 1. 18.

κάκείνων ἔκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μηδὲ βίᾳ] 'mistake and a. 26. compulsion being excluded in each case.' Τύπτειν τὸν πατέρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός would be to beat him, mistaking him for some one else; τύπτειν τὸν πατέρα βίᾳ, to beat him in the circumstances described in line 27. Mich. Eph. is right in explaining μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός here as equivalent to μὴ δι' ἀγνοιαν. His words are—τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι τὰ καθέκαστα· κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ γνωρίζοι ἀν τις ταῦτα ὅν ἡ ἀγνοία ἀκούσιον ἐποίει τὸ γινόμενον, οὔτως ὡς αὐτὸς δείκνυσιν<sup>\*</sup> ὁ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα τύπτων ἐν νυκτομαχίᾳ, καὶ γνωρίζων μὲν ὅτι ἀνθρωπον τύπτει, ἀγνοῶν δὲ ὅτι ὁν τύπτει ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀν εἴη περὶ τὸν πατέρα ἡ πρᾶξις, ὡς πρὸς μὲν ἀνθρωπον καθ' αὐτό, ὡς δὲ πρὸς πατέρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥστε καὶ ἀκούσιος ἡ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὑβρις τοῦ νιοῦ.

τὸ δὴ ἀγνοούμενον, ἡ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὅν, ἡ βίᾳ, a. 31. ἀκούσιον] Have we a three-fold or a two-fold division of ἀκούσια here? Mich. Eph. tells us—a two-fold division. He says—δεῖ δὲ ἐν τῇ λέξει τῇ ἡ βίᾳ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡ τὸ ἀλλὰ γράφειν . . . τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ βίᾳ ἀκούσιον. According to this view, then, ἡ is not disjunctive but explanatory, and we have the old division into τὰ δι' ἀγνοιαν and τὰ

1135 a. 31. *βίᾳ*. I have little doubt that a three-fold division is really intended, the clause πολλὰ γάρ κ.τ.λ. explaining and giving illustrations of τὸ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὸν, as distinguished from both τὸ ἀγνοούμενον and τὸ βίᾳ. Τὰ φύσει ὑπάρχοντα are opposed to τὸ βίᾳ (cf. for this opposition *Met.* I. 1. 1052 a. 23 εἴ τι φύσει τοιοῦτον καὶ μὴ βίᾳ, *Phys.* Γ. 5. 205 b. 5 εἴη γάρ ἂν τί που βίᾳ καὶ οὐχ οὖν πέφυκεν). So far as τὰ βίαια are concerned, πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν εἰδότες: but these βίαια are not the only ‘involuntary actions’ which we perform εἰδότες: πολλὰ γάρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων (as well as τὰ βίαια) are involuntary, and yet εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν. The words ὃν οὐθὲν οὐθὲν ἔκούσιον οὔτ' ἀκούσιόν ἔστιν Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 95) has shown conclusively, I think, to be wrong. Γηρᾶν and ἀποθνήσκειν belong to the same class of φυσικά as θερμαίνεσθαι, ἀλγεῖν, and πεινῆν, which in *E.N.* iii. 5. 7 are said to be μήτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν μήθ' ἔκούσια, the implication being that they are ἀκούσια. Accordingly Rassow proposes to read here ὃν οὐθὲν οὐτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐθὲν ἔκούσιόν ἔστιν instead of the ὃν οὐθὲν οὐθὲν ἔκούσιον οὔτ' ἀκούσιόν ἔστιν of the MSS. Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* p. 211) had proposed simply to read ὃν οὐθὲν ἔκούσιόν ἔστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ή ἀποθνήσκειν. Οὔτ' ἀκούσιον is, I think, plainly an interpolation; and the passage iii. 5. 7. 1113 b. 19 sqq., quoted by Rassow, is certainly in favour of his conjecture οὔτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐθὲν ἔκούσιον, for the collocation occurs twice in it. But looking simply at the palaeographical conditions of the present passage itself, should we not be safer in accepting Spengel’s suggestion?<sup>1</sup>

b. 3. § 4. καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός] The force of *καὶ* (omitted however by Ha, Mb, Q, CCC) is explained by Mich. Eph.—καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβ. καὶ τὸ καθ' αὐτό. CCC and Pb read *καὶ* after δμοίως.

For the distinction drawn here see Plato, *Legg.* ix. 862 B σχεδὸν γάρ, ω̄ φίλοι, οὔτ' εἴ τις τῷ δίδωσί τι τῶν ὄντων οὔτ' εἰ τούναντίον ἀφαιρεῖται, δίκαιον ἀπλῶς ή ἀδίκον χρή τὸ τοιοῦτον οὕτω λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ηθεὶ καὶ δικαίῳ τρόπῳ χρώμενός τις ὠφελῇ τινά τι καὶ βλάπτῃ, τοῦτο ἔστι τῷ νομοθέτῃ θεατέον, καὶ πρὸς δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλεπτέον, πρός τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην.

b. 8. § 5.] Cf. *E.E.* ii. 10. 1226 b. 30 ὃστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἐφ' αὐτῷ δὸν η̄ πράττειν η̄ μὴ πράττειν, ἐάν τις πράττῃ η̄ ἀπράκτῃ δὶ αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ δὶ

<sup>1</sup> If it be thought still safer to retain the reading of the MSS., we must remember that the clause πολλὰ γάρ καὶ κ.τ.λ. is introduced to explain a list of ἀκούσια, and therefore can only mean that these φύσει ὑπάρχοντα are *not voluntary*. Jackson’s parenthesis a. 19 ἀδίκημα—a. 33 ἀκούσιον, separating this clause from what immediately precedes, cannot, I think, be right.

ἄγνοιαν, ἔκῶν πράττει ἡ ἀπρακτεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων πράττομεν οὐ 1135 b. 8.  
Βουλευσάμενοι οὐδὲ προνοήσαντες, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν προαιρετὸν ἀπαν ἐκούσιον  
εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐκούσιον μὴ προαιρετόν, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαιρεσιν πάντα ἐκούσια  
εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἀκούσια μὴ πάντα κατὰ προαιρεσιν. Cf. E. N. iii. 2. 16 ἐκούσιον  
μὲν δὴ φαίνεται (τὸ προαιρετόν), τὸ δὲ ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν· ἀλλ’ ἀρά  
γε τὸ προβεβούλευμένον;

§§ 6–9.] There are three forms of *βλάβη*—viz. *ἀτύχημα*, *ἀμάρτημα*, b. 11. and *ἀδίκημα*. When the hurt is inflicted *μετ’ ἄγνοιας* and the agent is not the cause of the *ἄγνοια*—the circumstances being such that he could not be expected to foresee what is going to happen—the hurt is an *ἀτύχημα*, an *accident*, or misadventure. It belongs to the class of *τὰ δι’ ἄγνοιαν* (E. N. iii. 1. 13). When the hurt is inflicted *μετ’ ἄγνοιας*, but the agent is the cause of the *ἄγνοια* (*i. e.* acts *ἄγνοῶν*—E. E. ii. 9, E. N. iii. 1. 14—as a drunken man does—but not with the *ἄγνοια* of the *μοχθηρός*—E. N. iii. 1. 14—for the words *ἄνευ δὲ κακίας* exclude that kind of ignorance), and might be expected, but for this voluntary *ἄγνοια*, to foresee what is going to happen, the hurt is a *ἀμάρτημα*—*culpable*. When a man inflicts hurt *εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβούλευσας δέ*, under the sudden influence of one of the natural elementary passions of human nature—especially *θυμός*—the hurt is an *ἀδίκημα*—an *injury*. But we cannot infer from an injury inflicted under such circumstances that the agent is a bad or *unjust man*. If, however, the injury is inflicted deliberately, with premeditation, then we may infer that the agent is a bad or unjust man.

There are thus really *four* kinds of *βλάβη* which a court of justice has to distinguish. A hurts B. It is for the court to find out whether the hurt is an *ἀτύχημα*, or a *ἀμάρτημα*, or an *ἀδίκημα* *ἄνευ προνοίας*, or an *ἀδίκημα ἐκ προνοίας*.

§ 6. *βλαβῶν*] *βλάβη* is hurt or damage as such generically; while wilful hurt, *i. e.* injury, is *ἀδίκημα*: see Liddell and Scott s. v. *βλάβη*.

*μετ’ ἄγνοιας*] not, as Rams. seems to think, equivalent to *δι’ b. 12. ἄγνοιαν*. The writer uses *μετ’ ἄγνοιας* as a neutral phrase to cover *τὰ δι’ ἄγνοιαν*, *i. e.* *ἀτυχήματα*, and *ἃ ἄγνοῶν πράττει*, *i. e.* *ἀμαρτήματα* strictly so called.

*ἀμαρτήματα*] ‘here includes *ἀτυχήματα* as well as *ἀμαρτήματα* in the narrower sense in which the word is used in § 7.’ Jackson.

ἢ οὐχ ὁ] ὁ vulg. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 61) restores ὁ, the reading b. 16. of K<sup>b</sup> (and CCC), as being consistent with *τούτῳ*, line 14 above.

1135 b. 16. § 7. ὅταν . . . ἀμάρτημα] The editors compare *Rhet.* i. 13. 1374 b. 6 ἔστιν ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μῆτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τε ἔστιν· τὰ γὰρ δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας. Ramsauer very appositely quotes *Phys.* B. 197 a. 18 καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναι τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ὁρθῶς. ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων, ἡ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἡ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γνωμένοις παρὰ ταῦτα. The Paraph. Heliod. illustrates the difference between ἀτύχημα (τὸ δὲ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν) and ἀμάρτημα (τὸ ἀγνοοῦντα πράττειν) as follows—Καὶ ἀμάρτημα μέν ἔστιν, ὅταν τις βλάψῃ τινὰ ἀκούσιας μέν, παρασχὼν δέ τινα τῆς βλάβης αἰτίαν· οἷον, εἴτις ἐν ὁδῷ τοξεύων, ἐν ἥ ἐνεδέχετο ἄνθρωπον παριέναι, ἐφόνευσέ τινα· οὗτος γὰρ ἄκων μὲν ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, παρέσχε δὲ αἰτίαν τοῦ φόνου τὸ ἐν τοιούτῳ τόπῳ τοξεύειν. Ἀτύχημα δέ ἔστιν, ὅταν παρὰ πᾶσαν προσδοκίαν ἡ βλάβη συμβῇ. οἷον, εἴ τις τοξεύων ἐπ' ἐρημίας, οὔτω συμβάν, παριόντα τινὰ ἀπέκτεινεν· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ παράλογός τις ἡ βλάψη συνέβη καὶ παράδοξος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐσ αὐτὸς συνετέλεσεν ὁ βλάψας, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν ἡ αἰτία πᾶσα τοῦ φόνου.

b. 17. ἀνευ δὲ κακίας] added (as μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας is added in the passage quoted from the *Rhet.*) to exclude the chronic ἄγνοια of the μοχθηρός, as distinguished from the temporary ἄγνοια of the μεθύων. What is called in *E.N.* iii. 1. 14 the ἄγνοια of ὄργη is also excluded: for the θυμῷ ποιῶν is said in § 8 of the present chapter to act εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβούλεύσας δέ. In *E.N.* iii. 1. 14 he is coupled with the μεθύων as ἀγνοῶν—see Jackson's note on v. 8. 6, in which he calls attention to this difference between the 'Aristotelian' view and the 'Eudemian.' It is to be noted, however, that in § 12 of the present chapter the writer speaks of those who act διὰ πάθος (μῆτε φυσικὸν μῆτ' ἄνθρωπινον, it is true) as ἀγνοοῦντες.

We are to understand the ἀμαρτήματα, then, of this section as βλάψαι inflicted by a drunken or careless (but not necessarily vicious) person. Such a person would be *culpae reus*, in the language of Roman law. Βλάψαι inflicted under the influence of anger belong to the class of ἀδικήματα—injuriae dolo commissae—not to that of ἀμαρτήματα. Ἀτύχημα is the *casus* of Roman Law: cf. Gaius iii. § 211 (p. 227, ed. Gneist)—‘Is injuria autem occidere intelligitur cuius dolo (resulting in ἀδίκημα) aut culpa (resulting in ἀμάρτημα) id acciderit, nec ulla alia lege damnum (*i.e.* βλάψη) quod sine injuria datur reprehenditur: itaque inpunitus est qui sine culpa et dolo malo, casu (resulting in ἀτύχημα) quodam damnum committit.’

*Cf.* Menander apud Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* ii. 8 (Meineke, vol. iv. p. 198) 1135 b. 17.

ἀτύχημα καδίκημα διαφορὰν ἔχει | τὸ μὲν διὰ τύχην γίγνεται, τὸ δὲ αἰρέσει.

The following passage from Justinian iv. 3. §§ 3–8 (p. 227, ed. Gneist) may be compared to illustrate the nature of *culpa* (resulting in *ἀμάρτημα*), and its difference from *casus* (resulting in *ἀτύχημα*)—  
 ‘Ac ne is quidem hac lege tenetur qui casu occidit, si modo culpa ejus nulla inveniatur . . . . Itaque si quis, dum jaculis ludit vel exercitatur, transeuntem servum tuum trajecerit, distinguitur. Nam si id a milite quidem in campo, eoque ubi solitum est exercitari, admissum est, nulla culpa ejus intelligitur; si alias tale quid admiserit, culpae reus est. Idem juris est et de milite, si is in alio loco quam qui exercitandis militibus destinatus est id admisit. Item si putator ex arbore dejecto ramo servum tuum transeuntem occiderit, si prope viam publicam aut vicinalem id factum est, neque proclamavit, ut casus evitari possit, culpae reus est; si proclamavit, neque ille curavit cavere, extra culpam est putator. Aequa extra culpam esse intelligitur, si seorsum a via forte vel in medio fundo caedebat, licet non proclamavit, quia eo loco nulli extraneo jus fuerat versandi. Praeterea si medicus qui servum tuum secuit dereliquerit curationem, atque ob id mortuus fuerit servus, culpae reus est. Imperitia quoque culpae annumeratur, veluti si medicus ideo servum tuum occiderit, quod eum male secuerit aut perperam ei medicamentum dederit. Impetu quoque mularum quas mulio propter imperitiam retinere non potuerit, si servus tuus oppressus fuerit, culpae reus est mulio. Sed et si propter infirmitatem retinere eas non potuerit, cum alias firmior retinere potuisse, aequa culpae tenetur. Eadem placuerunt de eo quoque qui cum equo veheretur impetum ejus aut propter infirmitatem aut propter imperitiam suam retinere non potuerit.’

ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῆς αἰτίας] ‘It is plain,’ says b. 18. Jackson, ‘that this sentence ought to restate the distinction already drawn between *ἀτύχημα* and *ἀμάρτημα*: but it is difficult to see how ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῆς αἰτίας—so the MSS., except H<sup>a</sup> M<sup>b</sup> [and B<sup>2</sup>] (which have *κακίας*), and all the editors—can be equivalent to μὴ παραλόγως, and ὅταν ἔξωθεν το παραλόγως. Moreover, ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας is a strange phrase. Hence I have supposed *αἰτίας* to be a corruption of *ἀγνοίας*, and I find the strongest possible confirmation of my conjecture both in the *E. N.* and in the *M. M.* Cf. *E. N.* iii. 5. § 8: also § 7: and *M. M.* i. 33. 1195 a. 27 . . . b. 4.’ Susemihl

1135 b. 18. adopts Jackson's *ἀγνοίας*. It is true that *ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας* (= *principium causae*) is a strange phrase; and I should feel tempted to mend it, either by substituting another word for *αἰτίας*<sup>1</sup>, or by retaining *αἰτίας* in another sense, as equivalent to *criminis* instead of *causae*, were it not for the fact that I find Hippocrates (*περὶ ἀρχαίνης ἰητρικῆς* 1. ed. Littré vol. i. p. 570) using the same expression *ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας = principium causae*—δόκοσι ἐπεχείρησαν περὶ ἰητρικῆς λέγειν ἡ γράφειν, ὑπόθεσιν σφίσιν αὐτέοισιν ὑποθέμενοι τῷ λόγῳ, θερμόν, ἡ ψυχρόν, ἡ ὑγρόν, ἡ ξηρόν, ἡ ἄλλ' ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλωσιν, ἐσ βραχὺ ἄγοντες, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αἰτίης τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι τῶν νούσων τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου, καὶ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτέην, ἐν ἡ δύο προθέμενοι, ἐν πολλοῖσι μὲν καὶ οἷσι λέγοντες καταφανέες εἰσὶν ἀμαρτάνοντες. The fact that the phrase does elsewhere occur (though not in the Aristotelian writings), to my mind turns the balance in favour of retaining it here.

b. 20. § 8. εἰδώς] ‘Thus ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν is accounted εἰδώς. In *N. E.* iii. 1. § 14 he is classed with the μεθύων as an ἀγνοῶν: ἔτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἡ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δέ, ἀλλ' ἄγνοῶν.’ Jackson, *ad loc.*

b. 21. ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἡ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] Jackson points out that this second *ὅσα* is the subject of *συμβαίνει*. He accordingly removes Bekker's commas after *πάθη* and *φυσικά*. Mich. Eph. distinguishes between *φυσικά* and *ἀναγκαῖα πάθη*—*εἰσὶ δὲ πάθη φυσικά, ἔρωτες, λῦπαι, φόβοι· ἀναγκαῖα δὲ πεῖνα δίψα*: but I think it is doubtful whether any distinction is intended. The writer probably wishes merely to point out that certain normal appetites (called indifferently *φυσικά* or *ἀναγκαῖα*) common to all men, breaking out suddenly to seek satisfaction, may occasion injurious acts which must be treated differently in the criminal court from injurious acts deliberately planned for the satisfaction of these (natural) or other (factitious) appetites. It is true, however, that in vii. 4. 2 the *ἀναγκαῖα* with which the *ἀκρατῆς ἀπλῶς* is concerned are identified with *τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν*, and that another sphere is

<sup>1</sup> E. g. *αἰκίας*: this term (see v. 2. 13), well known to Athenian law, occurs in Plato, *Legg.* ix, to which the present chapter is so deeply indebted; and in *Pol.* ii. 4. 1262 a. 26 *αἰκίαι* committed by persons who are *ἀγνοοῦντες* are distinctly contemplated. H<sup>a</sup>, M<sup>b</sup>, and B<sup>2</sup>, with *κακίας*, might be supposed to exhibit a divergent form, which, when compared with the *αἰτίας* of other MSS., would point to an original *αἰκίας*.

assigned to the ἀκρατής θυμοῦ. Accordingly, if it is necessary to 1135 b. 21. suppose that the writer means to distinguish ἀναγκαῖα and φυσικά here, it would be true to say that (as Jackson explains *ad loc.* p. 112) φυσικὰ πάθη are ὅσα κοινὰ πᾶσι καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοινά (*E. N.* vii. 6. 2), and ἀναγκαῖα πάθη a species of the φυσικά, including ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν κ.τ.λ.

οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ b. 23. βλάβη·<sup>1</sup> ὅταν δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός] i.e. the merely instinctive operation of these natural passions, resulting in injurious acts, does not argue a bad character. It is when these passions are made ‘objects of reflection,’ and when the means of gratifying them to the injury of other people are deliberately sought out, that we can infer a bad character. It is obvious that among these natural passions there are some which call in the aid of reflection more readily than others: cf. vii. 6. 3, where ἐπιθυμία generally, as distinguished from θυμός, is described as ἐπιβούλος. Hence the prominence given in the present passage to τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ as examples of τὰ μὴ ἐκ προνοίας.

For the distinction between injurious acts produced by the unpremeditated operation of ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ πάθη, and injury inflicted deliberately—especially in the form of συκοφαντία—in order to gratify spite or greed, see *Probl.* ΚΘ. 13. 951 b. 27 (quoted by Zell and Ramsauer)—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικεν καὶ δὲ ὁργὴν καὶ διὰ φόβον καὶ δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ δὲ ἄλλα πολλὰ γίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐκ προνοίας τὸ δὲ ἄδικῶς ἔγκαλεν ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἐκ προνοίας ἔστιν.

§ 9. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται] τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ, b. 25. acts done in the heat of sudden anger. In the *Laws* (ix. 866 D-867 B—a passage referred to by Bywater, *Journal of Philology*, 1874, v. 115, and, after him, by Jackson, for the explanation of ὁ δὲ ἐπιβούλευσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ at the end of § 10 below), Plato distinguishes between two classes of οἱ θυμῷ ποιοῦντες, viz. οἱ ἔξαιφνης καὶ ἀπροβούλεύτως πράττοντες, and οἱ μετ' ἐπιβούλησης ὕστερον χρόνῳ τιμωρούμενοι. His words are—’Εὰν δὲ ἄρα τις αὐτόχειρ μὲν κτείνῃ ἐλεύθερον, θυμῷ δὲ γὰρ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἐκπραχθέν, διχῇ δεῖ πρώτον τὸ τοιούτον διαλαβεῖν. θυμῷ γὰρ δὴ πέπρακται καὶ τοῖς ὅσοι ἀν ἔξαιφνης μὲν καὶ ἀπροβούλεύτως τοῦ ἀποκτεῖναι πληγαῖς η̄ τινι τοιούτῳ διαφθείρωσί τινα παραχρῆμα τῆς δρμῆς γενομένης, μεταμέλειά τε εὐθὺς τοῦ πεπραγμένου γίγνεται, θυμῷ δὲ καὶ ὅσοι προπηλακισθέντες λόγοις η̄ καὶ ἀτίμοις ἔργοις, μεταδιώκοντες

<sup>1</sup> Jackson inserts ch. 6. §§ 1 and 2 here: see his Introduction, pp. xvii–xix.

1135 b. 25. τὴν τιμωρίαν, ὑστερον ἀποκτείνωσί τινα βουληθέντες κτείναι, καὶ τὸ πεπραγμένον αὐτοῖς ἀμεταμέλητον γίγνηται. διτοὺς μὲν δὴ τοὺς φόνους, ὡς ἔοικε, θετέον, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀμφοτέρους θυμῷ γεγονότας, μεταξὺ δέ που τοῦ τε ἔκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου δικαιότατ' ἄν λεγομένους. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰκὼν ἐσθ' ἔκάτερος' ὁ μὲν τὸν θυμὸν φυλάττων καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἔξαιφνης ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἐπιβούλῆς ὑστερον χρόνῳ τιμωρούμενος ἔκουσίων ἔοικεν, ὁ δὲ ἀταμεύτως ταῖς ὄργαις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα εὐθὺς χρώμενος ἀπροβούλεύτως δόμοιος μὲν ἀκουσίῳ, ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ οὗτος αὖ παντάπασιν ἀκούσιος ἀλλ' εἰκὼν ἀκουσίου. διὸ χαλεποὶ διορίζειν οἱ τῷ θυμῷ πραχθέντες φόνοι, πότερον ἔκουσίους αὐτοὺς ἢ τινας ὡς ἀκουσίους νομοθετητέον. βέλτιστον μὴν καὶ ἀληθέστατον εἰς εἰκόνα μὲν ἀμφω θεῖναι, τεμεῖν δὲ αὐτῷ χωρὶς τῇ ἐπιβούλῃ καὶ ἀπροβούλᾳ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετ' ἐπιβούλῆς τε καὶ ὄργῃ κτείνασι τὰς τιμωρίας χαλεπωτέρας, τοῖς δὲ ἀπροβούλεύτως τε καὶ ἔξαιφνης πραοτέρας νομοθετεῖν. According to Jackson the ἐπιβούλεύσας (§ 10, 1135 b. 33)—‘the man who deliberately attacks his neighbour [whether by way of revenge, or otherwise]’ cannot plead ἄγνοια—mistake about injury received—because he ‘has had time to consider the matter.’ Surely it is often the case that ‘time to consider the matter’ does not contribute to the discovery of the original mistake, especially if a man ‘broods over his supposed wrong before he retaliates.’ The retaliatory act of such a man is, of course, *ἐκ προνοίας*, and must be more severely judged than the sudden act of the θυμῷ ποιῶν: still such an ἐπιβούλεύσας may plead ἄγνοια: he may say, with truth, that he planned revenge because he thought that he had been injured—the question before the court is still *περὶ τοῦ δικαίου*, not *περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι*. For this reason I am inclined to think that the ἐπιβούλεύσας of § 10, 1135 b. 33 is not ‘the man who takes time to retaliate,’ but rather the *συκοφαντῶν* or *ἀδίκως ἔγκαλῶν* of *Probl. ΚΘ. 13. 952 a. 1 sqq.*

§§ 9, 10.] In trying a case of assault, the court, having first satisfied itself that the assault, alleged by the ὄργισας as διώκων, and admitted by the θυμῷ ποιῶν as φεύγων, was committed in the heat of sudden anger, and therefore without premeditation, allows the θυμῷ ποιῶν to plead in justification of his offence so committed, and in mitigation of its penalty, that the ὄργισας provoked it by what either really was unjust treatment, or might naturally in the circumstances be mistaken for unjust treatment. The question before the court is—Was there provocation, or apparent provocation, sufficient to justify the assault in any degree?—*περὶ τοῦ δικαίου*

*ἀμφισβητεῖται.* The finding *may be* that the διώκων is μοχθηρός, but 1135 b. 25. *cannot be* that the φεύγων is μοχθηρός. It is only in cases where the fact of the offence alleged by the διώκων is denied by the φεύγων (*ὅταν περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητῶσι*), that one or other of the two parties (it is uncertain which) *must be* μοχθηρός, and guilty of deliberately wronging the other—either the διώκων in bringing an accusation which he knows to be false, or the φεύγων in having committed an offence which he does not attempt to justify, but denies; see *Rhet.* iii. 17. 1417 b. 27 (quoted by Jackson)—μὴ λαυ-θανέτω δ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει (i.e. τῇ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι) μόνη τὸν ἔτερον εἶναι πονηρόν οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ἄγνοια αἰτίᾳ, ὅσπερ ἂν εἴ τινες περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῦν: cf. *Pol.* Δ. 13. 1300 b. 25 (quoted by Grant, Jackson and Ramsauer) περὶ τε τῶν ἐκ προνοίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκοντίων, καὶ ὅσα δμολογεῖται μέν, ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου.

I said above that I do not agree with Bywater and Jackson in identifying the ἐπιβουλεύσας of § 10 either entirely or partly with the man ‘who takes time to *retaliate*’—ό τὸν θυμὸν φυλάττων καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἔξαιφνης, ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς ὑστερον χρόνῳ τιμωρούμενος of *Legg.* ix. 867 A. ‘The man who takes time to *retaliate*’—ό μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς τιμωρούμενος—does not lose sight of the φαινομένη ἀδικίᾳ, because he ‘takes time’; and his act of retaliation is, as often as not, done openly, and its reason avowed afterwards. The issue before the court would then be περὶ τοῦ δικαίου and not περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι. But the ἐπιβουλεύσας of § 10, I take it, as contrasted with the θυμῷ ποιῶν (ό οἰόμενος ἀδικεῖσθαι) is a person whose conduct does not raise the issue περὶ τοῦ δικαίου. He cannot therefore be identified with the μετὰ ἐπιβουλῆς τιμωρούμενος who avows his premeditated act, and pleads justification—with success, as we sometimes see in the French and Italian law-courts. Nor can it be right to identify him (as the Paraph. does) with the ὄργισας, who may be entirely innocent of the ἀδικίᾳ attributed to him by the θυμῷ ποιῶν. It only remains that we identify him with the man who deliberately injures his neighbour *not by way of revenge* for real or imagined wrong. A good example of such an ἐπιβουλεύσας is οἱ ἀδίκως ἔγκαλῶν, or οἱ συκοφαντῶν of *Probl.* ΚΘ. 13. 951 b. 29, and 952 a. 1, who, as διώκων, accuses the φεύγων of having done something, which the latter denies having done. In such an ἀμφισβήτησις περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι, if the jurors’ votes are divided equally for the διώκων and for the φεύγων, the verdict is, of course, given in favour of the

1135 b. 25. latter—but the writer is at pains to explain why—because the διώκων, if he has really brought a false accusation against the φεύγων, must be held to have done so knowingly and ἐκ προνοίας, whereas the φεύγων, if he committed the offence charged, may have committed it ἀνευ προνοίας. The passage runs as follows—τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δι’ ὄργὴν καὶ διὰ φόβου καὶ δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ δι’ ἄλλα πολλὰ γίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐκ προνοίας· τὸ δὲ ἀδίκως ἔγκαλεῖν ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἐκ προνοίας ἐστίν. ὅστε ἐπεὶ ἵσται αἱ ψῆφοι γεγόνασι, τὸ δὲ ἀδίκως τὸν ἔγκαλοῦντα ἔγκαλεῖν καὶ τὸν φεύγοντα ἀδικεῖν, φαύλου κριθέντος τοῦ ἀδίκως ἔγκαλοῦντος τὸ νικᾶν τῷ φεύγοντι δὲ νομοθέτης ἀπένειμεν. . . 952 a. 1 ἔτι μείζω μὲν ἀδικεῖ δὲ ἐκ προνοίας ἀδικῶν ή δὲ μὴ ἐκ προνοίας. δὲ μὲν δὴ συκοφαντῶν δεὶ ἐκ προνοίας ἀδικεῖ, δὲ ἐτερόν τι ἀδικῶν τὰ μὲν δι’ ἀνάγκην τὰ δὲ δι’ ἀγνοιαν, τὰ δὲ ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἀδικεῖν αὐτῷ συμπίπτει. ὅταν δὲ ἵσται γένωνται αἱ ψῆφοι, δὲ μὲν διώκων κέκριται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμίσεων ἐκ προνοίας ἀδικεῖν, δὲ φεύγων ὑπὸ τῶν λοιπῶν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν μὲν οὐ μέντοι γε ἐκ προνοίας, ὅστε ἐπεὶ ἀδικεῖν μείζω κέκριται δὲ διώκων τοῦ φεύγοντος, εἰκότως δὲ νομοθέτης νικᾶν ἔκρινε τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω ἀδικοῦντα.

The ἐπιβούλεύσας, then, being the man who deliberately injures his neighbour (by bringing a false accusation against him, or otherwise) without having received provocation, the δὲ μέν b. 33 will be the θυμῷ ποιῶν—the man who retaliates in the heat of anger—and the δὲ δέ will be the ἐπιβούλεύσας as just described. I think that the whole passage from διό b. 25 to δ’ οὐ 1136 a. 1 is of the nature of a parenthesis; and that the words ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ, ἀδικεῖ a. 1 resume the main thread of the discussion by repeating, in a slightly altered form, what had been said before the parenthesis, viz. ὅταν δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀδικος καὶ μοχθηρός b. 25. The sense of the whole parenthesis from διό to δ’ οὐ may be brought out thus—An act done in the heat of anger is not treated at law as an act pre-meditated by the agent: for (1) it arises from provocation received from another; and (2) the agent as φεύγων admits the act, and pleads in justification the provocation which he has received. He stands on an entirely different footing from that one of the two parties in an ἀμφισβήτησις περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι who is proved guilty—for one or other of them *must* be guilty of premeditated wrong—either the φεύγων of committing an act which he knows cannot be justified, and therefore denies, or the διώκων of bringing an accusation which he knows to be false. The party found guilty in such a case differs from the θυμῷ ποιῶν in not being unaware of having plotted an injury (δὲ ἐπιβούλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ), and in not thinking that he has received an injury which justifies his act

(ὅ μὲν [ἰ. e. ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν] οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δὲ [ἰ. e. ὁ ἐπιβούλευσας] οὐ).

Mich. Eph., Coraes, Michelet, Nötel, and Peters, refer ὁ μὲν and ὁ δέ to the ὄργίσας and the θυμῷ ποιῶν (they differ, however, as to which is which), thus treating the words ὁ δὲ ἐπιβούλευσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ as parenthetical (Nötel rejects them from the text—*Quaestitionum Aristotelearum specimen*, p. 43). The objection to this interpretation is that the ὄργίσας may or may not be conscious of having done something to merit the retaliation of the θυμῷ ποιῶν, and accordingly the statement ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι would not always be true of him. But it is always true of the θυμῷ ποιῶν, whose sudden ὄργη is ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ ἀδικίᾳ. Nor could the words ὁ δὲ οὐ (sc. οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι<sup>1</sup>) always apply to the ὄργίσας. If he is conscious of having done nothing to merit the attack of the θυμῷ ποιῶν, he will think that he has been unjustly treated. It seems plain, then, that the words ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι refer to the θυμῷ ποιῶν, and the words ὁ δὲ οὐ to the ἐπιβούλευσας, who, as I have tried to show, is neither the man ‘who takes time to retaliate’ (Jackson), nor the ὄργίσας, but that one of the two parties in an ἀμφισβήτησις περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι who is proved to be μοχθηρός. The words ὁ δὲ ἐπιβούλευσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ are thus not to be treated as parenthetical.

ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche compares *E. N.* vii. 6. 1.

b. 28.

ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι] The Paraph. Heliod. has—οὖ γάρ, ὁσπερ b. 29. ἐν τοῖς ἔκουσίοις συναλλάγμασιν ἔχει, οὕτω κἀνταῦθα ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις γίνεται· ἐν ἑκείνοις μὲν γάρ ἡ πρᾶξις ἀμφισβήτεῖται οἶον, εἰ ἔλαβε τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἡ τὸ δάνειον, καὶ λαβὼν οὐκ ἀπέδωκε, κἀν τοῦτο δειχθῆ, πονηρὸς εὐθὺς καὶ ἀδικός ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἐπιλαθόμενος ἀρνεῖται—i. e. the reference is to ἔκούσια συναλλάγματα—e.g. B sues A for an alleged debt; and A swears that he has already paid it: one of the two must be μοχθηρός, unless the one in error has simply forgotten the circumstance in dispute—B the circumstance of his having been paid, or A the circumstance of his not having paid.

ἄν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸν δρῶσιν] ‘I think,’ says Jackson *ad loc.*, b. 31. ‘that the subject of δρῶσιν is ὁ τε ὄργίσας καὶ ὁ ὄργισθείς, who do not raise the issue of fact unless they do it through forgetfulness, i.e.

<sup>1</sup> This seems to be the only legitimate way of completing the clause. Nötel (p. 43) supplies οἴεται ἑκείνον ἀδικεῖσθαι, in the interest of his interpretation of the passage.

1135 b. 31. the forgetfulness which results from anger. These words are commonly understood to refer to the two parties concerned in a *συνάλλαγμα*, “ubi fieri non potest quin eorum alter qui ita controversant pravus sit, nisi forte oblivio intercessit” (Victorius on *Rhet.* iii. 17): but (1) why is *αὐτὸς δρῶσιν* in the plural? and (2) what precise idea do these words convey? According to my interpretation, they stand for *περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητῶσιν*.’ I confess that I do not see any difficulty in reconciling the plural with the common interpretation. The words *ἄν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸς δρῶσιν* are added to qualify the immediately preceding statement, *ἄν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν*, the subject of *δρῶσιν* being *οἱ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦντες*, and *αὐτός* being *τὸ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητεῖν*. It is practically, if not exclusively, among *ἀμφισβητήσεις* arising out of *ἔκούσια συναλλάγματα* that these exceptional cases of *τὸ διὰ λήθην δρᾶν* will occur. It is just possible, however, that in an action arising out of an *ἀκούσιον συνάλλαγμα*, such as assault, the *θυμῷ ποιῶν* might *διὰ λήθην* maintain erroneously that he had not committed the assault.

1136 a. 1. § 11. καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' κ.τ.λ.] These words, as Ramsauer and Jackson point out, are closely connected with the immediately preceding *ἀδικεῖ*, after which, accordingly, a comma, not a full stop (Bekker), should be placed.

a. 2. ὅταν παρὰ . . . ισον] when his act is inconsistent with the *γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία* of Distributive Justice, or the *ἀριθμητικὴ ισότης* of Corrective Justice.

a. 3. ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ] This answers to *ἴαν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ*, *ἀδικεῖ* above.

a. 4. δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ] as distinguished from *προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ*.

a. 5. § 12.] This section states the principle according to which *συγγνώμη* is to be extended to actions or withheld from them, and, as Ramsauer points out, naturally follows sections in which the writer has laid down principles in accordance with which degrees of guilt may be discriminated in a court of justice: ‘*συγγνώμη enim necessario ad τὸν κρίνοντα pertinet*.’ Jackson has an important note here—‘These words [τῶν δ' ἀκούσιων] answer to *τῶν δὲ ἔκουσιν* in § 5: but it must be observed that the *ἔκούσια* of the present section include actions which do not appear at all in the foregoing classification. The *ὅσα μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀμαρτάνοντιν*

are the ἀτυχήματα of § 7: the ὅσα μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν 1138 a. 5. διὰ πάθος δὲ μῆτε φυσικὸν μῆτ' ἀνθρωπικὸν are neither the ἀμαρτήματα nor the ἀδικήματα of §§ 7, 8, but acts characteristic of the inhuman πάθη . . . compare vii. 5. The acts in question are ἀκούσια because the perpetrators of them are not responsible agents, but they are not συγγνωμονικά, because they are even more detestable than ordinary vicious acts.' Cf. Grant *ad loc.*—'The police-courts afford frequent instances of the infliction of brutal injuries which are "not forgivable," though the perpetrators seem hardly responsible beings.' Mich. Eph. accordingly is wrong when he says—ἀκούσια νῦν ἔοικε λέγειν πάντα τὰ παρὰ προαιρεσιν γινόμενα· τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πάθος γινόμενα πρὸ δλίγου ἐκούσια μὲν εἶπεν ἀπροαιρετα δέ, νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσιοις ὑπάγει καὶ ταῦτα· καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν εἰ ἐκούσια λέγων ταῦτα πάλιν ἀκούσια φησιν· ἐκούσια μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι καθ' ὅσον οὐ δι' ἄγνοιαν γίνεται, ἀκούσια δὲ αὖ πάλιν καθ' ὅσον οὐ κατὰ προαιρεσιν: wrong also, when he illustrates τὰ διὰ πάθος μῆτε φυσικὸν μῆτ' ἀνθρώπινον by τὸ τοιᾶσδε τροφῆς ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ τοιοῦδε τινος πόματος, οῶν σαρκὸς πέρδικος καὶ οὕνου γλυκέος, adding that ὁ διὰ ταῦτα ἀμαρτήσας οὐκ ἔστι συγγνώμης ἄξιος. If the μῆτε φυσικὰ μῆτ' ἀνθρώπινα πάθη of the present section are thus, as Mich. Eph. explains, merely the ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι ἐπιθυμίαι of iii. 11. 1, and not τὰ θηριώδη πάθη of vii. 5, it would not perhaps be inconsistent with the terminology of Book iii to say that the man who acts under their influence does so ἀγνοῶν, and it is not inconceivable that even the writer of the present section might—carelessly perhaps—say so; but it would be in direct opposition to the doctrine common to the Fifth and Third Books to speak of the ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι ἐπιθυμίαι as producing acts which are ἀκούσια. Since the acts are said to be ἀκούσια, we can only understand that the μῆτε φυσικὰ μῆτ' ἀνθρώπινα πάθη which cause them are θηριώδη πάθη.

## CHAPTER IX.

### ARGUMENT.

*It may make our conception clearer of the relation between 'treating unjustly' and 'being treated unjustly,' if we try to answer, or at least to state, distinctly some difficult questions connected with the subject—*

*Can a man consent to be treated unjustly?*

*Or is it always against his will that a man is treated unjustly?*

*Or is it sometimes with his consent, and sometimes against his will, that a man is treated unjustly?*

‘Treating unjustly’ is always a voluntary act: from which it might be inferred that ‘being treated unjustly’ is always against the sufferer’s will. But on the other hand, although ‘treating justly’ is always a voluntary act, we find that just treatment is not always voluntarily accepted—for the criminal who is punished is treated justly against his will. What is true, then, of ‘being treated justly’ may be true also of ‘being treated unjustly’—it may be true that sometimes a man receives unjust treatment voluntarily, and sometimes against his will. But when we are told that a man sometimes receives unjust treatment voluntarily, we must refer to a former distinction, and ask—Is the unjust treatment inflicted by an unjust agent, i. e. by one who deliberately intends to inflict unjust treatment? For if not, then it is only nominally and not really that the sufferer is ‘treated unjustly,’ and it may be true that he voluntarily accepts what is thus nominally unjust treatment, although he could not voluntarily accept what is really unjust treatment, viz. treatment intended to injure him—i. e. could not accept it as intended. Take the case of the incontinent man: with full knowledge of all the circumstances he voluntarily hurts himself, or allows another to hurt him: therefore, it may be argued, a man can voluntarily treat himself unjustly, or injure himself, and voluntarily accept injury from another. But does such a man wish to be treated unjustly, i. e. does he make his own loss or ruin his end? Surely not. He still wishes for his own good, i. e. makes his good his end. What he voluntarily inflicts upon himself, or allows another to inflict, is hurt, not injury. Our answer, then, to the question, Can a man consent to be unjustly treated or injured? is ‘No,’ for he cannot wish to be injured, i. e. he cannot make his own loss or ruin his end. In short, whenever a man is injured, there must be another person to injure him by acting against his wish, i. e. by ignoring his personality. Accordingly, when a man ‘gives away gold for brass,’ or, as the equitable man often does, assigns to himself in a distribution less than his legitimate share, he is not really injuring himself. He does not make his own loss or ruin his end; nay, he may have his own good in the form of popularity or honour distinctly in view.

In distribution the charge of injustice attaches to the distributor, not to the party to whom he has awarded too much: and it is never himself but always other people that the distributor injures. If he distribute unfairly, under compulsion or in unavoidable ignorance of essential circumstances, the distribution is of course in itself an unfair one, but the distributor is not held to be an unfair man. If, however, he distribute or decide unfairly with full knowledge of what he is doing, he has generally a personal interest in the form which his award takes—appropriating to himself, if not a bribe, its equivalent in the gratitude of the favoured party, or in the satisfaction of his spite against the unfairly treated party.

Neglect of the distinction on which we have insisted between the nominally and the really just or unjust act, has given rise to the opinion that it is an easy matter to perform just acts, and that the just man has the faculty of performing both just and unjust acts. But, to be really just, acts must be performed by a just man, and a just man is the result of long and difficult training, as a good

*doctor is the result of long study and experience. Moreover, the formed character of the just man is not a faculty capable of producing contraries, but manifests itself only in just acts.*

*Justice exists only for a being whose participation in the enjoyment of good things may be greater and less than his desert, i. e. it exists for the normal man, not for the gods whose desert is infinitely great—not for the incurably wicked who are harmed by the smallest share of such good things.*

§ 1. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ἰκανῶς διώρισται] See *Argument* of this 1136 a. 10. chapter *sub init.* for the connexion with the subject of last chapter. In that chapter certain principles by which δικασταὶ must be guided in estimating the guilt of various offences were laid down. The present chapter pursues the same subject, discussing questions evidently important for δικασταὶ—viz. How far can a man consent to receive injury? If he consent, is he really *injured*, and does the offender really injure him, or only do him harm? Or, must we look more to the intention of the offender than to the consent (whatever that may mean) of the sufferer, in estimating the guilt of the offender? Ramsauer indicates the connexion between this chapter and the last by the words—‘*Judicis vero quantum intersit, si verum sit volenti non fieri injuriam, nemo non videt.*’

Εὐριπίδης εὔρηκε] Mich. Eph. has—παρατίθεται τὰ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἱμβέα a. 11. ἐκ τοῦ Βελλεροφῶντος εἰς πίστευσιν τοῦ ἔστιν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. Wagner (*Eurip. Fr.* p. 40), followed by Dindorf (*Eur. Fragm.* Ἀλκμέων A et B) supposes that we have two lines of a στιχομήθια from the Ἀλκμαίων διὰ Ψωφίδος (referred to in *E. N.* iii. 1. 8). The first line (in which he reads κατέκταν for the κατέκτα of the extant MSS.—the MS. from which the *vet. trans.* is derived seems to have had κατέκταν) he assigns to Alcmaeon (who has killed his mother), and the second line (after which he places a note of interrogation) he assigns to Phegeus. Fritzsche, adopting a conjecture of Grotius, inserts οὐ before θέλονσαν (codd.), comparing Eurip. *Hippol.* 319 φίλος μ' ἀπόλλυντος οὐχ ἐκούσαν οὐχ ἐκών. Susemihl also reads η̄ οὐ θέλονσαν: Jackson and Bywater read η̄ οὐχ ἐκούσαν.

§§ 1, 2. πότερον γάρ κ.τ.λ.] The reasoning may be exhibited as a. 15. follows:—

ἀδικεῖν is always ἐκούσιον: Is ἀδικεῖσθαι then always ἀκούσιον? Or, is it sometimes ἐκούσιον, sometimes ἀκούσιον?

Perhaps the analogy of δικαιοπραγεῖν and δικαιοῦσθαι may help us:—

δικαιοπραγεῖν is always ἐκούσιον: But, do we find that δικαιοῦσθαι is always ἐκούσιον?

1136 a. 15. No: *δικαιοῦσθαι* is sometimes *έκούσιον*, sometimes *ἀκούσιον*:

So, the analogy of *δικαιοπραγέν* and *δικαιοῦσθαι* does not favour the inference that, because *ἀδικεῖν* is *always* *έκούσιον*, *ἀδικεῖσθαι* is *always* *ἀκούσιον*. It rather favours the inference that *ἀδικεῖσθαι* is sometimes *ἀκούσιον*, sometimes *έκούσιον*.

a. 16. § 1. καὶ ἀρα κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 40) raises a difficulty here. If the question *πότερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* be answered to the effect that *ἀδικεῖσθαι* is *πᾶν ἀκούσιον*, the question *καὶ ἀρα πᾶν οὗτος ἢ ἐκείνως*; is excluded: if, on the other hand, it be answered that *ἀδικεῖσθαι* is not *πᾶν ἀκούσιον*, what is the use of going on to ask whether it is *τὸ μὲν ἔκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον?* No one, surely, would suppose that it could be *πᾶν ἐκείνως*—*i.e.* *πᾶν ἔκούσιον*.

The confusion indicated by Rassow doubtless exists. But it need not surprise us. It is caused by the writer's formalism. He makes a point of stating all the formally possible alternatives. There seems to be no suspicion about the substantial soundness of the text, although the words *ῶσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἔκούσιον* l. 17 are probably a dittograph of the identical words in the line above.

a. 17. ἢ τὸ μὲν ἔκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον;] ‘or is *ἀδικεῖσθαι* sometimes voluntary, sometimes involuntary?’

a. 19. § 2. *ῶστ' εὐλογον ἀντικεῖσθαι όμοιώς καθ' ἔκάτερον, τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἔκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι*] Bywater, following K<sup>b</sup> [and CCC], omits *τό* before *δικαιοῦσθαι*. This seems to dispose of the difficulty which Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 96) finds in taking *τ'* as coupling the whole clause *τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι . . . ἀκούσιον εἶναι* with what goes immediately before, and to make it unnecessary to consider the conjecture—*καὶ* for *καθ'* before *ἔκάτερον*—with which he proposes to meet the difficulty.

a. 23. § 3. *ἐπειτα κ.τ.λ.*] I hardly think that Bywater's *ἐπειτα* (to correspond with *πρῶτον μέν* a. 11), for the *ἐπει* of the codd., is a necessary change. See *Argument* of this chapter (§§ 3-6) for the further step taken in the discussion here. The writer's feeling when he wrote *ἐπει* may be expressed thus—‘*ἀδικεῖσθαι* is really (*ὡς ἀληθῶς*) always *ἀκούσιον*: and cases adduced to prove that it is *not always* *ἀκούσιον* (just as *δικαιοῦσθαι* is *not always* *έκούσιον*) are deceptive: for (*ἐπει* § 3), if we examine them, we shall find that they are only cases of *ἄδικα πάσχειν*, not of *ἀδικεῖσθαι*. Now, *ἄδικα πράττειν* carries with it only *ἄδικα πάσχειν*, not *ἀδικεῖσθαι*. To injure B, A must hurt him

wishing to hurt him. If A hurt B without wishing to hurt him 1136 a. 23. then B is hurt (*βλάπτεται*, *ἀδικα πάσχει*), but not injured (*οὐκ ἀδικεῖται*) by A. To apply this principle to the case of the *ἀκρατής* so commonly adduced to prove *ὅτι ἔστιν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι*, or *ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν*—the *ἀκρατής* either hurts himself *proprio motu* (§ 4), or allows another person to persuade him to hurt himself (§ 5). His act is admittedly voluntary. But what is its real object, as that object presents itself to him at the moment of action? His own pleasure, not his hurt. He does not wish to hurt himself, or be hurt by another person; he merely desires pleasure. When he is hurt by himself, his passive side cannot complain of injury (*τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι*), for his active side, not being able to wish what his passive side is unwilling to suffer, cannot wish to hurt the latter. Hence *οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν*. But where the *ἀκρατής* is not agent and patient in one, but patient yielding to the solicitations of another person, he may receive injury (*τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι*) from that other person in so far as he is seduced to do, because pleasant to his feeling, what his tempter, even while he tempts him, knows to be hurtful, perhaps ruinous to his person. He is injured (*ἀδικεῖται*), because his tempter injures him (*ἀδικεῖ*). But he cannot be his tempter's *accomplice* against himself. He is with his tempter as holding out a pleasure to feeling, but not as ignoring his person: *οὐκ ἀδικεῖται ἔκών ὁ ἀκρατής ἵπ' ἄλλον*.

Jackson explains the present passage by distinguishing two successive stages in *τὰ κατ' ἀκρασίαν*. ‘According to Eudemus,’ he says, p. 117, ‘we must distinguish in *τὰ κατ' ἀκρασίαν* two successive stages: (1) that in which the *βούλησις* resists, and therefore the man is *ἄκων*, and (2) that in which, the *βούλησις* having given way to the *ἐπιθυμίᾳ*, the man is *ἔκών*, but *οὐθὲν παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν*. Thus the *ἀκρατής* is not *simultaneously* *ἔκών* and *παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πάσχων*, and therefore the phenomena of *ἀκρασία* do not countenance the theory that a man may *ἔκών ἀδικεῖσθαι*:—and again p. 118, ‘in the first stage A is not *ἔκών*, because *βούλησις*, being dominant, resists: in the second stage A is *ἔκών* but not *ἀδικούμενος*, because *ἐπιθυμίᾳ*, being dominant, assents to B’s solicitations, *βούλησις* having now given way.’ Of course it is quite true that in the *ἀκρατής* there is a struggle between *ἐπιθυμίᾳ* and *λόγος*, in which the former eventually prevails. This struggle takes time, and two stages may very properly be distinguished in it. But it is scarcely correct to speak of the *ἀκρατής* being ‘not *ἔκών*’ in the first stage—i.e.

1136 a. 23. *before he acts.* A man is *έκών*, or not *έκών*, properly only at the moment of acting (see iii. i. 6). Now, it is agreed that the *ἀκρατής* at the moment of acting is *έκών*—whether he tempt himself, or be tempted by another. The question is—what is *the real object* of his voluntary action, as that object presents itself to him at the moment of acting? His real object, thus determined, is present pleasure, not his own hurt. He acts to satisfy an isolated *ἐπιθυμία*, not to do harm to his personality, as that is represented to him; more or less adequately, by his *βούλησις*—the principle of self-conservation within him. In yielding incontinently to pleasure he indeed violates the principle of self-conservation within him by a voluntary act, but without realising that he does so. Hence, in the language of the present passage, *οὐκ ἀδικεῖ αὐτὸς αὐτόν*—when acting alone he does not plot his own hurt; and *οὐκ ἀδικεῖται έκών*—when yielding to the solicitations of another he does not conspire with that other to hurt himself.

a. 26. *ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων]* i.e. *ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν.* As Mich. Eph. explains—*ἐνδέχεται τὸν δικαιούμενον κατὰ συμβέβηκὸς μεταλαμβάνειν τοῦ δικαίου, ὅταν ὁ δικαιοπραγῶν κατὰ συμβέβηκὸς δικαιοπραγῇ*—i.e. when the agent *πράττει* *οἰς συμβέβηκε δικαίοις εἶναι* (v. 8. i), the patient *πάσχει* *οἰς συμβέβηκε δικαίοις εἶναι*.

a. 27. *ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων]* The omission of *ἐπὶ* has been suggested. The suggestion is plausible: but the MSS. are apparently all against it.

a. 29. *ἀδύνατον γάρ κ.τ.λ.]* Fritzsche and Grant quote *Rhet.* i. 13. 1373 b. 27 *ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἔκόντος τὰ ἀδικα πάσχειν.*

a. 31. *§ 4. ἀπλῶς]* explained by Mich. Eph. as= *ἄνευ προσθήκης*, ‘without qualification.’ The qualification or addition necessary is supplied in § 5—*παρὰ τὴν ἔκεινον βούλησιν.* *Ἀδικεῖν* is not simply hurting voluntarily, but hurting voluntarily for the sake of hurting. The victim cannot, without denying his own personality, be a party to this. He must always wish to be himself intact. That *βούλησις*, as distinguished from *ἐπιθυμία*, expresses—often inadequately enough—the personality or self is a doctrine which Aristotle shares with Plato: see notes on iii. 4. It plays a great part also in the philosophy of Plotinus—cf. especially a passage *Enn.* vi. 8. p. 747 sqq., the key-note of which is—*οὐχ ὅπερ ἔτυχέν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἡ βούληθη αὐτός.*

a. 34. *ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἀπορουμένων]* Discussed afterwards in

chapter 11. The words before us come in strangely here. They 1136 a. 34. seem to refer back to a list of *ἀπορούμενα*: but no list has been given.

§ 5. ὁ διορισμός] = ὄρισμός: viz. that given at the beginning b. 3. of § 4.

§ 6. βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν . . . οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται] βλάπτεσθαι may b. 5. be *έκουσιον*, but *ἀδικεῖσθαι* cannot be: for no one can conspire against his own personality. The words *οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται*, ‘no man knowingly denies his own personality’—‘no man makes his own hurt his *end*’ (see iii. 4. 1 ἡ δὲ βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἔστιν), are equivalent to *ἀδικεῖται οὐδεὶς ἐκών*—‘no man submits voluntarily to hurt which he feels to be simply hurt, and knows that his assailant regards as simply hurt.’

οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται . . . πράττειν πράττει] cf. E. E. ii. 7. 1223 b. 7. b. 6 βούλεται δ' οὐδεὶς ὁ οἴεται εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος οὐχ ἀ βούλεται ποιεῖ τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὁ οἴεται βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἔστιν.

οὐχ ἀ οἴεται] This is the reading of K<sup>b</sup> alone, preferred by b. 8. Bekker and Bywater. Other MSS. read ὁ οὐκ, preferred by Jackson and Susemihl. Jackson however calls attention to E. E. ii. 7. 1223 b. 7, where ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος οὐχ ἀ βούλεται ποιεῖ seems to be in favour of Bekker’s preference.

§ 7. Ὁμηρος] *Iliad* vi. 236.

b. 9.

§ 8. ἔτι δ' ὅν προειλόμεθα δύο ἔστιν εἰπεῖν] The first of these two b. 15. questions (*πότερον ποτ'* ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας) has not been mentioned before as a question to be discussed; and the second (*εἰ* ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν) has already been partly discussed (§§ 4 sqq.) in connexion with the question *εἰ* ἔστιν ἑκόντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι, from which, however, the writer evidently wishes to distinguish it, for he says περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὅτι οὐχ ἔκουσιον δῆλον. ἔτι δ' ὅν κ.τ.λ.

The word *προειλόμεθα* is certainly strange in the absence of a definite list of *ἀπορίαι* to which reference might be made—as Ramsauer says, ‘Contra usum Aristotelis est ad *προαιρεσίν τινα* quam inter scribendum habuerit animo absconditam se verbis revocare’. Perhaps Zell is right in supposing the reference to be to § 1 of the present chapter—*ἀπορήσειε δ'* ἀν τις *εἰ* ἵκανως διώρισται περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν πρῶτον μὲν *εἰ* ἔστιν . . . ἔκοντα ἀδικεῖσθαι.

1136 b. 15. Having discussed this first question, and summed up the result with *περὶ μὲν οὐν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὅτι οὐχ ἔκουσιον δῆλον* (§ 8), he goes on with *ἔτι δὲ* to discuss two other questions contemplated (but not announced) at the beginning of the chapter.

b. 17. § 9. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται] ‘These questions seem to be connected, for if . . .’, Jackson.

τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν] the former alternative in the first question, viz. ἀδικεῖ δὲ νείμας—explained by the epexegetical clause καὶ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ’ οὐχ δὲ ἔχων τὸ πλέον.

b. 21. ἐλαττωτικός] see v. 10. 8.

τοῦτο] τὸ ἐλαττον αὐτῷ νέμειν. This statement must not be taken ἀπλῶς. We must qualify it with the πρόσθεσις, e. g. τοῦ ὀφελίμου—έτερου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον τοῦ καλοῦ.

b. 22. τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ] ἀπλῶς is perhaps used here to distinguish the καλόν itself, truly so called, from δόξα the appearance of it.

b. 23. λύεται κατά] Bekker inserts καὶ before κατά without MS. authority Jackson’s note is ‘καὶ Ob?’

τὸν διορισμόν] § 5 above.

b. 24. διά γε τοῦτο] i. e. in consequence of τὸ ἐλαττον αὐτῷ νέμειν.

b. 25. § 10. φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ . . .] He has hitherto treated the first of the two questions stated in § 8 in its bearing on the second. He now treats it on its own account.

b. 26. ἔχων ἀεὶ] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 61) expunges ἀεὶ, conjecturing (with much plausibility, I think) that it is the corruption of an old ditto-graph ἀδικεῖ which K<sup>b</sup> now alone retains (in place of ἀεὶ after ἔχων). If we retain ἀεὶ we can hardly take it, with Zell, as in the idiom δὲ ἀεὶ ἄρχων: the meaning must be that, although the πλέον ἔχων is often a πλεονέκτης in the ordinary sense of that term, he is not *always* so.

b. 27. ὑπάρχει] Grammatically ὑπάρχει goes with the second φ̄ as well as with the first; but logically it goes with the first only, thus—οὐ γὰρ φ̄ τὸ ἀδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ’ δὲ ἔκουσιος τοῦτο ποιῶν. It is not the material presence of τὸ ἀδικον in a man’s circumstances (*ὑπάρχοντα*), but its formal presence in his disposition, and efficiency in his will, which makes the ἀδικῶν. I think that Jackson is wrong

with φ<sup>ῳ</sup> τὸ ἄδικον [*sc. ποιεῖν*] ὑπάρχει—note on § 11. The reading 1136 b. 27. ἄδικον ἔχω ὑπάρχει given by pr. Kb suggests ἄδικον ἔχειν ὑπάρχει, which would be a tolerably satisfactory reading, although the special force of ὑπάρχει as opposed to ποιεῖν would be lost.

τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως] τοῦτο is τὸ ἐκόντα ποιεῖν—‘the b. 28. initiation of a voluntary agent (*τὸ ἐκόντα ποιεῖν*) is the efficient cause of the action; and this resides in the distributor, not in the receiver.’

§ 11. οὐκ ἄδικεῖ μέν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα] Zell and Michelet make b. 31. the λαμβάνων the subject of these verbs. As a slave, at the bidding of his master, may perform an unjust act, without being himself chargeable with injustice, so the λαμβάνων may participate in an unjust act (*ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα*), without being himself unjust in respect of it (*ἀδικεῖν*). Mich. Eph., Grant, and Ramsauer, on the other hand, make the διανέμων the subject. This latter is the more plausible construction of the two, because the διανέμων is the subject in § 10 and also in §§ 12 and 13, and because it does not require us to stretch the meaning of *ποιεῖν* so as to include what is after all πάσχειν. Jackson adopts a third course. He takes the § closely in connexion with § 10, omits ἔτι (as a dittograph of the first two letters of ἔπει), and makes ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης the subjects of the verbs ἄδικεῖ and ποιεῖ. ‘I suppose the sentence thus altered,’ he says, ‘to be a justification of the distinction just made between φ<sup>ῳ</sup> τὸ ἄδικον [*sc. ποιεῖν*] ὑπάρχει and φ<sup>ῳ</sup> τὸ ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν. The Paraph. seems to have understood the sentence as I do.’ The following are the Paraphrast’s words—Φαίνεται δέ, ὅτι ὁ διανέμων ἄδικεῖ καθ’ αὐτό, ὁ δὲ λαμβάνων κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐκείνος γὰρ ἄδικεῖ καθ’ αὐτό, ὃς ἐκὼν τοῦτο ποιεῖ. ‘Ἐκὼν δέ τις ποιεῖ, ὅταν ἢ παρ’ αὐτῷ τῆς πράξεως ἡ αἰτία καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ποιεῖν τῆς δὲ διανομῆς ἡ ἀρχὴ παρὰ τῷ διανέμοντι ὁ ἄρα διανέμων τὸ πλέον ἄδικεῖ καθ’ αὐτό, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁ δεχόμενος οὐ γὰρ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχή, καθὼς εἴρηται. Οὐ γὰρ ὁ ποιῶν τὰ ἄδικα ἄδικεῖν λέγεται, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥσπερ λέγεται καὶ ἡ χεὶρ φονεύειν, ἡ μάχαιρα, ἡ λίθος, παρ’ οἷς οὐκ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τοῦ φόνου, οὐδὲ ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν πράττουσιν ἄδικα μὲν γὰρ ποιοῦσιν, ἄδικοῦσι δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

It seems to me that we cannot thus regard the λαμβάνων or ἔχων as a ποιῶν, and take ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης as parallel to him. But it would be possible to follow Jackson in omitting ἔτι, and making ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης the subjects of the verbs, and yet not regard these agents as parallel to the λαμβάνων. One might regard them

1136 b. 31. as examples of *τὰ ποιοῦντα* in the sense of *ὅργανα*, as distinguished from *τὰ ποιοῦντα κυρίως*, or *ἀρχαὶ ὅθεν πρώτως ἡ κίνησις*, to which latter class the *διανέμων*, as *ἐκών*, has been assigned. Thus the words *ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως* in § 10 would suggest § 11, and the connexion between the two §§ might be exhibited thus—‘the *ποιεῖν* of the *διανέμων*, as voluntary initiator or *ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως*, is *ποιεῖν* in the *primary* sense, for (*ἐπει*) *ποιεῖν* has a secondary sense in which *ὅργανα* are said *ποιεῖν*.’ For *ἐπει* introducing a similar parenthesis, see *E. N.* vii. 12. 2, b. 36. But is it necessary to omit *ἔτι*, and refuse to regard the sentence as simply saying—‘If the *διανέμων* be a mere instrument in the hands of another *οὐκ ἀδικεῖ* but *ποιεῖ τὰ ἄδικα*?’ The case indeed seems hardly worth mentioning: but is it less worth mentioning than that—*εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν*, mentioned in § 12? Jackson’s note on § 12 is—‘The argument is contained in the words *εἰ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡ χάριτος ἡ τιμωρίας*. The words *εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν τὸ πρῶτον* merely set aside the case of ignorance as irrelevant to our present remarks.’ Why then, it may be asked, may not § 11 merely set aside the case of *compulsion* as irrelevant to our present remarks? It is indeed quite in the writer’s manner to give us a complete list of formally possible cases.

On the whole, then, I am inclined, with Mich. Eph., Grant, and Ramsauer, to make *ὁ διανέμων* (conceived as *ποιῶν ἄλλου ἐπιτάξαντος*) the subject of *ἀδικεῖ* and *ποιεῖ*—as if we read, *ἔτι, ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος—ἐπιτάξαντος μὲν οὖν εἰ ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα*. The reading of K<sup>b</sup> N<sup>b</sup> P<sup>b</sup> and New Coll.—*μέν* after *ἐπιτάξαντος* instead of after *ἀδικεῖ*—is worth notice as pointing to a ‘fault’ in the juncture of the vulgate.

For *τὰ ἄψυχα* b. 30, cf. *Met.* A. 1. 981 a. 30 διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἔκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἵστασιν, τοὺς δὲ ὕσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄψυχων ἔνια, ποιεῖν μέν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ. Fritzsche refers to Plato *Legg.* ix. 873 Ε ἐὰν δὲ ἄψυχόν τι ψυχῆς ἄνθρωπον στερήσῃ . . . δικαστὴν μὲν αὐτῷ καθιζέτῳ τῶν γειτόνων τὸν ἔγγυτατα ὁ προσήκων γένει. He refers also to Pausan. vi. 11 Δράκων Ἀθηναῖος θεσμοὺς γράψας φονικούς, ὑπερώρισε καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, εἴ γε ἐμπεσόν τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποκτείνειν ἄνθρωπον—also to Aeschines *Contra Ctes.* 244 καὶ γὰρ ἀν εἴη δεινόν, δ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ τὰ μὲν ξύλα καὶ τοὺς λίθους καὶ τὸν σίδηρον, τὰ ἄφωνα καὶ ἀγνώμονα, ἐάν τῳ ἐμπεσόντα

ἀποκτείνη, ὑπεπορίζομεν, καὶ ἐάν τις αὐτὸν διαχρήσηται, τὴν χεῖρα τὴν τοῦτο 1136 b. 31.  
πράξασαν χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος θάπτομεν Δημοσθένη δέ . . : see also the  
'ΑΘ. πολιτεία ch. 57 p. 145 ed. princ. δικάζει δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ οἱ  
φύλοβασιλεῖς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀψύχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων—and Pausan.  
i. 28 τὸ δὲ ἐν Πρυτανείῳ καλούμενον, ἔνθα τῷ σιδήρῳ καὶ πᾶσιν ὅμοίως τοῖς  
ἀψύχοις δικάζουσιν.

§ 12. ἀγνοῶν] ἡ ἀγνοία ἡ καθ' ἔκαστα, not ἡ καθόλου, must be under- b. 32.  
stood here. An unjust decision made in unavoidable ignorance  
of particulars is not unjust in the eye of the law of the State (*τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον*), but nevertheless it violates 'the fitness of things'  
(*τὸ πρῶτον, i. e. τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον*). The Paraph. seems to be wrong  
in supplying *τοὺς νόμους* after ἀγνοῶν. Of a judge who decided in  
ignorance of the νόμοι of his State it could hardly be said *οὐκ ἀδικεῖ*  
*κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον*. In M. M. i. 33. 1196 b. 1 the distinction  
marked here by the words *οὐδὲ ἀδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἐστι δὲ ὡς ἀδικος*  
is explained thus—*ἔστι μὲν ἡ ἀδικεῖ ἔστι δὲ ἡ οὐκ ἀδικεῖ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ  
τῆς ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τῆς φύσει ὃν δίκαιον μὴ ἔκρινεν ταύτη μὲν ἀδικεῖ, ἡ δὲ τὸ  
αντῷ δοκοῦν εἶναι δίκαιον, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ*.

πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτός] If the διανέμων, with full knowledge of the 1137 a. 1.  
law under which he is acting, and of the circumstances of the  
particular case, make an unfair distribution between A and B, he  
must do so to serve some personal end. Not only will the favoured  
party ἔχει τὸ πλέον (perhaps without being chargeable with ἀδικία),  
but more than that (*καὶ*), the διανέμων himself too will ἔχει τὸ πλέον.

§ 13. τοῦ ἀδικήματος] the material result of τὸ ἀδικεῖν—the unfair a. 2.  
share assigned to the favoured party.

διὰ ταῦτα] διὰ χάριν ἡ τιμωρίαν.

καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἔκείνῳ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας] This is the reading of K<sup>b</sup> a. 3.  
adopted by Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 62) and Bywater, ἐπ' ἔκείνῳ meaning  
ἐπὶ τῷ μερίσασθαι τοῦ ἀδικήματος. The reading of other MSS. is  
ἐπ' ἔκείνων ὁ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας, where ἔκείνων are *οἱ μερισάμενοι τοῦ  
ἀδικήματος*—the unfair distributor and the favoured receiver who  
share between them the profits of the transaction, the former  
getting a bribe, the latter too large a share in the distribution.  
Jackson paraphrases this § well—'If the judge secures to himself  
χάρις or τιμωρία by giving an unjust award, he is just as much a  
πλεονέκτης as if he were to share the plunder with the receiver.  
For it is not essential that the unfair distributor should take a share

1137 a. 3. of the property distributed, since even if his share takes a more substantial form than *χάρις* and *τιμωρία*, he may receive it, not in land (land being the article distributed), but in money.'

- a. 4. §§ 14-16.] Jackson places these §§ after ch. i. § 3, giving his reasons for doing so on pp. xiii-xvi of his *Introduction*. I am ready to admit that these §§ suit the context of the first chapter better than they suit that of the ninth; but I cannot admit that this proves, or even renders probable, the conclusion that the first chapter is their original locus. The Fifth Book, especially in its latter part, is, to my mind, a collection of materials waiting for arrangement, rather than a treatise which has fallen into disarrangement. Nothing that I have read (English or foreign) on the subject of 'Dislocations in the Text' has made me doubt the correctness of what, after all, is bound to be the *prima facie* view—that the order (or disorder) of the Fifth Book is *substantially* that in which the original compiler threw his materials. There are doubtless many omissions and interpolations in the text as we have it which add to the original confusion of the compilation: but the numerous transplantations (often of short passages to distant places), which we are asked by certain modern critics to assume, are quite a different thing. It may be admitted, however, that the place which the chapter on *ἐπιείκεια* now occupies (cutting in two, as it does, the discussion of *τὸ ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι* and *τὸ αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν*) is inconsistent even with the low standard of arrangement actually attained in the Book.
- a. 7. καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον] I agree with Williams against Jackson that this means 'delivering a bribe'—a vicious action, like the other actions mentioned—perhaps suggested by the *ἀργύριον* of § 13.

- a. 8. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὄδην ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥάδιον οὔτε ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς] The Paraph. Heliodorus has—*τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρᾶξαι τὰ δίκαια η̄ τὰ ἀδίκα, καὶ η̄ δοῦναι ἀργύριον η̄ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον, ῥάδιόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ βουλομένου τὸ δὲ η̄ δικαιοσύνης ἔξιν ἔχων η̄ ἀδικίας, ὁ χρόνον καὶ ἀσκήσεως δεῖται, δι’ ἀσ ἔξεις η̄ δίκαιος τις η̄ ἀδικος λέγεται, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἐστιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ὥστε ἂμα τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ ῥάδιον εἶναι κτήσασθαι.*

- a. 9. § 15.] See E.N. ii. 4. §§ 3-6.

- a. 11. ἀλλ’ οὐ ταῦτ’ κ.τ.λ.] 'but it is only *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* that actions prescribed by law are identical with *τὰ δίκαια*' (Jackson). It is not

enough, in order to perform ‘just actions,’ to find out the actions <sup>1137 a. 11.</sup> which the law declares to be just, and perform them according to pattern. Actions are ‘just’ only when they spring from the habit of justice, which no mere study of the requirements of the law will give a man.

*νεμόμενα*] Perhaps suggested by the *διανέμων* of §§ 8–13. K<sup>b</sup>, a. 13. M<sup>b</sup>, H<sup>a</sup> have *γενόμενα*, which seems to be a mere blunder.

*τοῦτο δὴ πλέον ἔργον κ.τ.λ.]* Bywater (*Contrib.* p. 49) says—‘in lieu of *τοῦτο δέ* I restore *τοῦτο δὴ*, or if any one prefers it, *τοῦτο [δὲ]*, in order to keep up the correspondence in construction and sense between this clause and that which comes just after, in l. 16: in the one case an act is said to be *πλέον ἔργον κτέ.* and in the other *τοσοῦτον ἔργον κτέ.*’ This seems decisive against Bekker’s *συνιέναι*, ἀλλ’ οὐ ταῦτ’ ἔστι τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ’ ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλά πως πραττόμενα καὶ πως *νεμόμενα* δίκαια τοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ. With either text, however, the meaning is—To learn to ‘know’ δίκαια, as the *φρόνιμος* (who must have the *ἔξις* of δικαιοσύνη) knows them, is more difficult than to learn to know *ὑγεινά* as the experienced *ἰατρός* ‘knows’ them. The commentators compare *M. M.* ii. 3. 1199 a. 27 οὐ γὰρ σκοπεῖ ὁ ἄδικος οὐδὲ δύναται κρίνειν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνει. τῆς δὲ φρονήσεως τοῦτο ἔστι, τὸ ὅρθῶς δύνασθαι ταῦτα θεωρεῖν, δμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν κατ’ *ἰατρικὴν* τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς *ὑγιεινὸν* καὶ τὸ *ὑγιείας ποιητικὸν* οἴδαμεν ἀπαντεῖς, ὅτι ἐλλέβορος καὶ τὸ ἐλατήριον καὶ αἱ τομαὶ καὶ αἱ καύσεις *ὑγιεινά* εἰσιν καὶ *ὑγιείας ποιητικά*, ἀλλ’ ὅμως οὐκ ἔχομεν τὴν *ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην* οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οἴδαμεν τὸ καθ’ *ἴκαστον ἀγαθόν*, ὥσπερ ὁ *ἰατρὸς* οἶδεν τίνι ἔστι τοῦτ’ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς διακειμένῳ ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ἥδη ἡ *ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη*. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς *ὑγιεινὰ* εἰδότες ὅμως οὐδὲ παρακολουθεῖ ἡμῖν ἡ *ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη* ώς δ’ αὐτῶς ὁ ἄδικος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡ *τυραννίς ἀγαθὸν* καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ *ἔξουσία*, οἶδεν ἀλλ’ εἰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἡ μῆ, ἡ πότε, ἡ πῶς διακειμένῳ, οὐκέτι οἶδεν. Jackson quotes Plato, *Phaedr.* 268 A–C, where the person who ἐκ βιβλίου ποθέν ἀκούσας ἡ *περιτυχῶν φαρμακίος* *ἰατρὸς* οἴεται εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἐπαῖων τῆς τέχνης is described as *μαινόμενος*.

*§ 16. δι’ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο] τὸ οἴεσθαι ἐφ’ αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν.* The a. 17. opinion criticised in this § ignores the distinction between a *δύναμις* and a *ἔξις* stated in v. 1. 4—*δύναμις* μὲν γὰρ καὶ *ἐπιστήμη* δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, *ἔξις* δ’ ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ. ‘This opinion that justice implies its contrary, as if it were an art (*δύναμις*), would be a consequence,’ says Grant, ‘of the Socratic doctrine that justice is knowledge. Plato saw what this doctrine led to, and drew out

1137 a. 17. the paradoxical conclusion, *Rep.* 334 A (*εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ κλέπτειν δεινός*), *Hipp. Min.* 375–6 (*οὐκοῦν ἡ δυνατωτέρα καὶ σοφωτέρα αὕτη (sc. ψυχή) ἀμείνων οὖσα ἐφάνη καὶ ἀμφότερα μᾶλλον δυναμένη ποιεῖν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ περὶ πᾶσαν ἐργασίαν* 375 E). The Aristotelian theory that justice is a moral state (*ἔξις*) set the difficulty at rest.'

a. 26. § 17.] Jackson places this § in chapter 1, § 9 after *τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά* (see his Introd. p. xvi).

*τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν]* Mich. Eph. points out that *τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά* or ‘things good in themselves’ are of two kinds—viz. (1) things good in themselves in the sense of being always and without qualification good—the *ἀρεταὶ* and the *ἐνέργειαι κατ’ αὐτάς*: and (2) things good in themselves in the sense of being good in the abstract, but not necessarily good in all circumstances—money good in itself, or generally, but bad in the possession of the profligate. It is with *τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά* in this second sense that *δικαιοσύνη* has to do: for in respect of *τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά* in the first sense there can be no *πλεονεξία*. His note is interesting and may be transcribed—*ἢν ἀν σαφεστέρᾳ ἡ λέξις, εἰ οὕτως πως εἰχεν· τῶν δικαίων τὸ μὲν ὡς εἴρηται νεμητικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπανορθωτικόν· ταῦτα δὲ τὸ διανεμητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν ἐν τούτοις ἔστιν τοῖς μετέχουσι τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἐν οἷς ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀγαθά ἔστι κυρίως τὰ τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει ἀγαθά, οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ κατ’ αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι· δεύτερον δὲ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ τὰ ὄργανικὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ἀγαθὰ ὅντα τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν οὐ τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν. τίνα δέ ἔστι τὰ ὄργανικὰ ἀγαθὰ· καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, σαφηνίζων, ἐπήγαγεν ἐν οἷς ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, πλοῦτος τιμαί, δυναστεία πολιτική, ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῖς ταῖς ἀρεταῖς· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὠρισμέναις οὔσαις καὶ μεσοτήτεσιν, ὡς δέδεικται, ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐν οἷς δὲ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ μειονεκτεῖν. κατ’ ἀρετὴν δὲ οὐ γίνεται πλεονεξία. οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε τινὸς ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν βιασάμενον τὸν ἔχοντα, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων γίνεται· ἐν γὰρ τούτοις καθ’ ὥραν ἀφαιρεῖται βίᾳ ὅδε τοῦδε τὸ χωρίον τὴν ἀμπελὸν τινος, τὰ λοιπά. τὴν ἀνδρείαν τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἀφελέσθαι, ἡ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ἐπιστήμονος βίᾳ οὐδεὶς δύναται. δῶν οὖν ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν, ἐν τούτοις τὰ δίκαια. τὸ γὰρ δύνασθαι τούτων τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ πλέον τι ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον, περὶ τὴν τούτου νομὴν καὶ ἐπανίσωσιν τὰ δίκαια ἔστιν. ἐπεὶ οἷς γε μηδέν ἔστι τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν, τούτοις οὐδὲ ὑπερβολὴ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲ ἔλλειψις ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ μη ἀνται, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν ἡ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐν οἷς οὐ*

πλούτος, οὐ δόξα, οὐ τιμή, οὐκ ἀρχή, οὐκ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν, 1137 a. 26. οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὔτε διανεμητικὸν οὔτε διορθωτικὸν ὑπάρχει. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἱς ἔστιν, οὗσι δὲ ἀνιάτοις ὑπὸ τρυφῆς καὶ ἀκολασίας καὶ πάσης ἀσελγείας, οὐδὲ ἐν τούτοις ἔστιν δίκαιον τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν] Kb and L<sup>b</sup> omit ἐν a. 27. τούτοις. I do not think that ἐν τούτοις = ἐν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῖς, although coming immediately after ἐν τούτοις = the persons, need trouble us much in careless writing like the present.

μέχρι του] sc. ὡφέλιμα: cf. E. N. vii. 13. 4 καὶ εὐτυχία ὑπερβάλλοντα a. 30. ἐμπόδιός ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.

διὰ τοῦτο ἀνθρώπινόν ἔστιν] i.e. man is neither θεός nor θηρίον. At present ἔστιν has no evident subject. Should we read διό instead of διά? Susemihl (Bursian's *Jahresb.* 1876, p. 278) points out that this alteration was suggested by Zwinger' (Jackson). Is the reading of Γ—τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἔστιν not worth consideration? Τοῦτο would be τὸ μέχρι του ὡφέλιμα εἶναι τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά. On the margin of CCC I find γρ. διὰ τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἔστιν. May not the διά of the vulgate represent a dittograph δέ? It is easy to imagine a scribe, with an original μέχρι του τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἔστιν before him, writing μέχρι τοῦτο δὲ τοῦτο δὲ ἀνθρώπινόν ἔστιν: and it is not a difficult step from this to the μέχρι του διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀνθρώπινόν ἔστιν of the margin of CCC. The contractions for διά and δέ are easily confounded.

## CHAPTER X.

### ARGUMENT.

*Concerning Equity.* The relation of *Equity* to *Justice* has caused some difficulty. The two strike us as not being exactly the same; and yet, on the other hand, since 'equitable' is popularly used as a term of praise for 'good,' it seems illogical to distinguish it from 'just,' which, in its wide sense, is the same as 'good.' If 'equitable' and 'just' are to be distinguished, one of them, it would appear, is not 'good'; and if both are 'good,' why distinguish them? The solution of this difficulty is that the 'equitable' and the 'just' are generally the same, i. e. both 'good,' but the 'equitable' is the better. *Equity* is a higher form of justice; it is not the justice of the letter of the law, but that of the spirit which corrects the letter. The law, by reason of the complicated

nature of its subject-matter, is necessarily general in its terms, and sometimes fails to meet the just claims of an individual case. Here equity steps in and supplies the defect. Indeed there are some cases about which we cannot have a law at all, but must provide for them, as they arise, by special decree. Where the stones are irregularly shaped the builder must use a flexible rule.

The 'equitable' then is 'just,' being better, not than the 'just' as such, but than its necessarily imperfect realization in law. It is the correction of law where it falls short by reason of its generality. The equitable man is the man who habitually makes such correction, and although he may have the letter of the law on his side, is unwilling to press his legal right harshly, preferring to take less than his due.

*Introductory Note.*—It seems to be generally agreed that this chapter is misplaced here in the MSS. Jackson puts it at the end of the Book; Ueberweg (*Hist. Phil.* vol. i. p. 147, English Transl.) inserts it (preceded by chapter 9, §§ 14–17, 1137 a. 4–30) after chapter 8, *i.e.* after *συγγνωμονικά* 1136 a. 9. The reasons for preferring Ueberweg's rearrangement are (1) that the constructive treatment of Justice becomes continuous, and the *ἀποφάσιαι* contained in chapters 9 and 11 of the vulgate form an appendix to the Book: (2) that the remarks on *ἐπιείκεια* follow closely on the discussion contained in chapter 8. A comparison of *Rhet.* i. 13 makes it probable that they ought to follow even more closely than they do in Ueberweg's rearrangement—*i.e.* that chapter 9, §§ 14–17 ought not to intervene between the end of chapter 8 and the beginning of chapter 10, but be otherwise disposed of—I do not venture to suggest how. In *Rhet.* i. 13 the discussion of *ἐπιείκεια* arises immediately out of a discussion, closely resembling that in *E. N.* v. 8, of the various degrees of guilt attaching to the *βλάβαι* which come before the courts of justice. If, as seems probable, the writer of *E. N.* v. 8 had *Rhet.* i. 13 before him, or in his recollection, when he wrote, he would naturally go immediately on from *συγγνωμονικά* (1136 a. 9) to the discussion of *ἐπιείκεια*.

Ueberweg accounts for the disorder in the text of the last three chapters of *E. N.* v by the misplacement of the leaves of an archetype MS.

It may be only an accidental coincidence—but it seems worth noticing in connexion with this hypothesis of misplaced leaves—that the mass of text from 1176 a. 11 to 1177 a. 30 (*E. N.* x. ch. 5, § 9–ch. 7, § 4) omitted by K<sup>b</sup> is twice as large as that contained in the chapter on *ἐπιείκεια*, v. 10; twice as large as that

contained in v. 11; and equal to that intervening between the end of chapter 8 (1136 a. 9) and the beginning of the chapter on ἐπιείκεια, chapter 10. There are 88 Bekker's lines in the passage (1176 a. 11–1177 a. 30) omitted by K<sup>b</sup>; 43 in the chapter on ἐπιείκεια; 43 in the following chapter, v. 11; and 87 from the end of v. 8 to the beginning of v. 10.

The lacuna in K<sup>b</sup> was probably caused by the absence of two leaves (each containing about 43 Bekker's lines) from the ancient manuscript of which K<sup>b</sup> is a transcript. Fol. 121<sup>r</sup> in K<sup>b</sup> ends with τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τούς (1176 a. 11) and fol. 121<sup>v</sup> (the other side of the same leaf) begins with μὲν κεχορηγημένων ὁ μέν (1177 a. 30), the lacuna not being indicated in any way by the scribe, who, it would seem, was unconscious of its existence.

On the other hand it would be going too far if we were to say that the disorder in the text of v. 9–11 was probably caused by a misplacement of archetype leaves containing each about 43 Bekker's lines. The 'disorder' to be explained by the hypothesis is, after all, not a definite indisputable fact like the lacuna in K<sup>b</sup>. At any rate it would be satisfactory, before attaching much importance to the quantitative relation subsisting between the lacuna in K<sup>b</sup> and certain passages in v. 9–11, to be able to point to other cases of 'disorder' in the *E. N.* which could be explained by the hypothesis of an archetype leaf of 43 Bekker's lines. I confess that as yet I have not found any such cases. The space intervening between v. 4, 12 (1132 b. 9) and v. 5, 9 (1133 a. 14), to which I turned first, does not seem to have anything to do with an archetype leaf of 43 lines.

I append *Rhet.* i. 13. 1373 b. 25–1374 b. 23 for future reference, and to show how naturally the chapter on ἐπιείκεια takes its place between ch. 8 and ch. 9, after συγγωμονικά 1136 a. 9: ἀπάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων διηρημένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους, ἀναλαβόντες τί ἔστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, λέγωμεν. οἵτι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἔκόντος τὰ ἀδικα πάσχειν τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὥρισται πρότερον ἔκούσιον εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀκονσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραὶ εἰσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ εἴρηται καθ' αὐτὰ πρότερον, καὶ τὰ ἔκούσια, οἵτι οἵτινα ἔστιν ὅσα εἰδότες, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἡ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἡ ἀγνοοῦντος καὶ ἀκοντος ἡ ἔκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος. περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥῆθησται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἴρηται πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δὲ

διμολογοῦντες πολλάκις πεπραχέναι ἡ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἡ περὶ δὸ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐ κλέψαι, καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλ’ οὐ μοιχεῦσαι, ἡ κλέψαι μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἴεροσυλῆσαι, οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι, ἡ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐ δημοσίαν, ἡ διειλέχθαι μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλ’ οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέουν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τί κλοπή, τί ὑβρις, τί μοιχεία, ὅτως ἐάν τε ὑπάρχειν ἐάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα δεικνύναι, ἔχωμεν ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον. ἔστι δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἡ μὴ ἀδίκον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδίκειν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων προστημαίνει τὴν προαιρέσιν, οἷον ὑβρις καὶ κλοπή· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξεν πάγτως ὑβριστεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἔνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκείνων ἡ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι. οὐδὲ πάντως, εἰ λάθρᾳ ἔλαβεν, ἔκλεψεν, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τούτου, ἀφ’ οὐ ἔλαβε καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἔαντον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἦν δύο εἴδη· τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ’ ἄγραφα, περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν ἔρηται, τῶν δ’ ἄγράφων δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ἐφ’ οἷς ὀνειδη καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαί, οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ καὶ ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα καὶ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα. τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἐκόντων τὰ δὲ ἀκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθῃ, ἐκόντων δ’ ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται διορίσαι, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ἢ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ἢ δέ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. καὶ ὅσα μὴ ῥάδιον διορίσαι δι’ ἀπειρίαν, οἷον τὸ τρῶσαι σιδήρῳ πηλίκῳ καὶ ποίῳ τινὶ ὑπολείποι γὰρ ἀν διαριθμοῦντα. ἀν οὖν ἢ ἀδρίστον, δέη δὲ νομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ὥστε καν δακτύλιον ἔχων ἐπάρηται τὴν χεῖρα ἡ πατάξῃ, κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἔνοχος ἔσται καὶ ἀδικεῖ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀλιγθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτο ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικές, φανερὸν ποιά ἐστι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ποῖοι οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἀνθρωποι· ἐφ’ οἷς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῆ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἵσου ἀξιοῦν, μηδὲ τὰ ἀτυχήματα· ἔστιν ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ δόσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τε ἐστίν· τὰ γὰρ δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώπινοις συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές. καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἄλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἄλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου σκοπεῖν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἄλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαιρέσιν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ μέρος ἄλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, μηδὲ ποῖός τις νῦν, ἄλλὰ ποῖός τις ἦν ἀεὶ ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.. καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν μᾶλλον ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀγαθῶν ἡ κακῶν, καὶ

ἀγαθῶν ὡν ἔπαθε μᾶλλον ή ἐποίησεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον λόγῳ ἐθέλειν κρίνεσθαι ή ἔργῳ. καὶ τὸ εἰς δίαιταν μᾶλλον ή εἰς δίκην βούλεσθαι λέναι· ὁ γάρ διαιτητὴς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ὄρā, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς τὸν νόμον· καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα διαιτητὴς εὑρέθη, ὅπως τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἴσχυῃ. περὶ μὲν οὐν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

In the *M. M.* (ii. I. 1198 b. 24) ἐπιεικεῖα is discussed in connexion with εὐγνωμοσύνη—*i.e.* among the intellectual ἔξεις, in a context corresponding to *E. N.* vi. II. I.

§ I. καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] *i.e.* 1137 a. 35. ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα—‘from men (ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον) we transfer the term ἐπιεικές to things also (μεταφέρομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα) as a term of praise instead of the term ἀγαθόν’—or ‘we use ἐπιεικές as a general term of praise instead of ἀγαθόν.’ See Grant’s note on this §, and Fritzsche’s note on *E. N.* viii. II. 5 for the history of the meanings of ἐπιεικής. Derived from *eikos*, it means originally (as in Homer) ‘meet’ or ‘suitable’—*i.e.* in the particular circumstances of a case. Thus in v. 4. 3 the ἐπιεικής is the morally good man as distinguished from the *φαῦλος* or bad man; in ix. 6. 2 οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, the honourable citizens, are opposed to ὁ δῆμος; while, in the present chapter (§ 8), the ἐπιεικής or equitable man is opposed to the *ἀκριβοδίκαιος*. In all cases the ‘goodness’ marked by the term ἐπιεικές would seem to be that which consists in correspondence, as exact *as possible*, with given conditions, as distinguished from *absolute* perfection—τὸ ἀκριβές. A man is ἐπιεικής *quā polītēs*; but it would be a solecism to call him ἐπιεικής *quā σοφός*: and in Isocrates *Helene* 209 a. b τὸ ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν, ‘to form probable opinions’ (Jebb, *Attic Orat.* vol. ii. p. 52), is opposed to τὸ ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι, ‘to have an exact knowledge’: πολὺ κρείττον ἔστι περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιεικῶς δοξάζειν ή περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι.

τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι] *i.e.* if we follow out the logical implication b. 2. of the conception ἐπιεικές.

ἢ γάρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, η̄ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο] b. 4. The easiest way out of the difficulty involved in these words is to omit οὐ δίκαιον with Giphanius, Coraes, and more recent editors. T and Nb omit οὐ δίκαιον εἰ, the former having vel enim justum non studiosum, vel epiices aliud. Michelet (followed by Fritzsche), retaining the words οὐ δίκαιον εἰ ἄλλο, places the comma after οὐ

7 b. 4. instead of after *δίκαιον*. It is very unsafe, however, to accept as final any suggestion which may be offered for the emendation of a passage like this consisting of short clauses introduced by *η* and *ει*. Such clauses were often omitted by scribes, and often repeated. Bywater has perhaps shown proper caution in leaving the text as the majority of the MSS. give it.

b. 8. § 2. *δικαίου τινός*] explained below as *τοῦ νομίμου δικαίου*.

b. 11. §§ 3, 4.] Fritzsche and Jackson compare Plato, *Politicus* 294 A-C; see especially the words—οὐκοῦν ἀδύνατον εὖ ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ μηδέποτε ἀπλᾶ τὸ διὰ παντὸς γεγνόμενον ἀπλοῦν. Cf. also *Rhet.* i. 13 quoted above in introductory note to this chapter.

b. 13. § 4. *αἴτιον*] ‘Causa unde duplex illud justum exsistat, ostenditur.’ Ramsauer.

b. 19. *εὐθύς*] See Bonitz on *Met.* Γ. 1004 a. 5—‘ἰπάρχει γὰρ εὐθὺς γένη ἔχοντα κ.τ.λ. Similem usum adverbii *εὐθύς*, cf. *Cat.* 12. 14 a. 32, *An. Pr.* i. 16. 36 a. 6. Ens et unum, ait, suapte natura, *εὐθύς*, in genera quaedam dividuntur.’

*τοιαύτη*] *ἀόριστος* Paraph.—i. e. περὶ ἣς οὐχ οἶόν τε ὁρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλον.

b. 21. § 5. *τότε ὁρθῶς ἔχει κ.τ.λ.*] Fritzsche aptly compares here *Rhet.* i. 13. 1374 b. 11 ἐπιεικὲς τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου.

b. 23. *εἰπεν*] This is the reading of K<sup>b</sup> alone. It is to be preferred to the *εἴποι* of all other MSS. ‘because,’ as Jackson says, ‘it is distinctly assumed that the *νομοθέτης* is not present and therefore does not pronounce.’

b. 25. § 6. οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀμαρτήματος] τὸ ἀπλῶς *δίκαιον* is justice not qualified in relation to the requirements of this or that particular case—the justice of the general rule; τὸ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀμάρτημα is the failure of the general rule, by reason of its generality (*διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς*), to meet the requirements of a particular case: cf. with the ἀπλῶς of this passage the use of ἀπλᾶ in the sentence quoted from the *Politicus* 294 C in note on §§ 3, 4, b. 11. A rule, in so far as it is general and unqualified, cannot fit individual cases, in so far as they are never unqualified, but always particularly qualified—ἀδύνατον εὖ ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ μηδέποτε ἀπλᾶ τὸ διὰ παντὸς γεγνόμενον ἀπλοῦν.

I cannot agree with Jackson that *ἀμαρτήματος* is suspicious, or 1137 b. 25. that the Paraphrast's *ἀμαρτάνοντος* may possibly be the right reading. *Αμάρτημα*, I take it, has been carefully selected to mark the *concrete result* (cf. *ἀδικήματος* v. 9. 13) of the application of the general rule.

*διὰ τὸ καθόλου]* exactly equivalent to *διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς* above. b. 27.

*ψηφίσματος]* See note on *τὰ ψηφίσματά δη* v. 7. 1, b. 24. b. 29.

§ 7. *τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας δο μολίβδινος κανών]* By *Λεσβία οἰκοδομία* we are to understand 'Cyclopean building' in which large polygonal stones were employed, and fitted together, as at Tiryns; and the *μολίβδινος κανών* is to be explained as a flexible piece of lead which was first accommodated to the irregular surface of a stone already laid in position, and then applied to other stones with the view of selecting one of them with irregularities which would fit most closely into those of the stone already laid. Fritzsche, in his important note here, quotes an authority who mentions that a flexible rule is still used at Verona when a wall is being built of polygonal stones.

The parallel between the easy morals for which the Lesbians were noted and their *μολίβδινος κανών* was not likely to escape the notice of later littérateurs (see quotations in Zell and Coraes—especially from *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce*, t. ii. ch. 3). Fritzsche cannot be right when he supposes that 'Cyclopean building' was called 'Lesbian' because its *κανών* was flexible like the Lesbian morality.

The form *οἰκοδομῆς*, which all other MSS. apparently give here for the *οἰκοδομίας* of K<sup>b</sup> and P<sup>b</sup>, came into use later for *οἰκοδόμησις* or *οἰκοδομία*. If *οἰκοδομῆς* is right here, it is only here that it occurs in the Aristotelian corpus.

Before we pass on, it may be well to notice a fragment of Aeschylus which Grant quotes. He merely appends it to a note in which the 'Cyclopean' explanation of *Λεσβία οἰκοδομία* is accepted; but it might perhaps be taken to suggest another explanation. The fragment is given by Dindorf (*Fr. 72*), as from the *Θαλαμοποιοί*, in the following form—

ἀλλ' ὁ μέν τις Λέσβιον φατνώματι  
κῦμ' ἐν τριγώνοις ἐκπερανέτω ρύθμοῖς.

The *κῦμα* or *κυμάτιον* is a moulding on an architrave or elsewhere. The Doric *κῦμα* is a simple hollow; the Lesbian an undulating

- 1137 b. 30. moulding, either concave above and convex below (*cyma recta*), or the reverse (*cyma reversa*). See Smith's *Dict. of Ant.* article *cyma*. Is it suggested that the *μολίβδινος κανών* had anything to do with the *Lesbian κύμα*?
- b. 33. § 8.] On the Equity of the Roman Law, see Maine's *Ancient Law*, ch. iii, 'Law of Nature and Equity.'

## CHAPTER XI.

### ARGUMENT.

*A man cannot act unjustly towards himself either in the general or in the special sense of 'acting unjustly.' Murder e.g., committed in anger, is unjust in the same general sense in which all other vicious acts forbidden by law are unjust. The man who commits suicide, then, in anger acts unjustly. Towards himself? No. Towards the State; for it is the State that punishes him. Nor can a man act unjustly in the special sense towards himself; for that would mean that the same thing could at once be taken from and given to the same person. Unjust treatment implies at least two persons, one of whom deliberately makes an aggression on the rights of the other. The same person cannot be both aggressor and victim, agent and patient; and moreover, if the agent of injustice, who must be a voluntary agent, were also the patient, then the latter would be a voluntary patient of injustice, which, as we have shown, is impossible. Further, if we pass in review all the modes in which unjust treatment may be received (and it must be received in some particular mode), we find no case in which the agent is also recipient: a man does not commit adultery with his own wife, break into his own house, steal his own money—in short, injure himself in any one of the particular modes in which injury can be inflicted.*

*The general answer, however, to the question—Can a man inflict injury on himself? is No; for he cannot voluntarily receive injury.*

*To inflict injury and to receive it are both evil, for both involve a departure from the mean—the agent having too much and the patient too little; but to inflict injury is the worse, for it implies more or less evil in the agent, while receiving injury does not involve evil in the patient. Indirectly, of course, the reception of injury may lead to consequences which are worse for the patient than the infliction of injury is for the agent; but in itself the infliction is a greater evil than the reception of injury.*

*The view that a man can injure himself owes much of its plausibility to a confusion between the self as a whole and a part of the self. Because the irrational part may encroach upon the just prerogatives of the rational part of*

*the self, it is thought that a man may act unjustly towards himself. But the supremacy of the rational part over the irrational part is at most only ‘just’ in the metaphorical sense in which we have seen that the rule of the father over his child or the master over his slave is ‘just.’*

§ 1. πότερον δ'] This chapter (with the exception of §§ 7 and 8) 1138 a. 4. is placed by Jackson after § 13 in chapter 9.

ἘΚ ΤῶΝ ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΩΝ] Jackson says ‘i.e. from 9. §§ 1-13.’ But does not the explanatory clause τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. oblige us to suppose rather that the reference is to the distinction made in ch. 1. § 8 τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἵσον?

Οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτιννύαι ἔαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει.] a. 6. Jackson's note here is—‘οὐ κελεύει] “Does not allow,” i.e. forbids. Cf. the well-known use of οὐκ ἔāv as the correlative of κελεύειν. The words ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει are explanatory of the phrase οὐ κελεύει. So Victorius, quoted by Cardwell. Eudemus wishes to say—“What the law bids is δίκαιον, what the law forbids is ἀδίκον.” Cf. 1. § 14 προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν . . δροῖσις δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας, τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δὲ ἀπαγορεύων. Not appreciating this idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύω, Grant remarks “the extraordinary assertion is made that whatever the law does not command it forbids. We might well ask, Did the Athenian law command its citizens to breathe, to eat, to sleep, etc.?” This criticism [i.e. Grant's] is endorsed by Rassow (*Forschungen*, p. 42).’ I cannot believe that the writer's meaning here is correctly represented by the tautology ‘What the law does not allow it forbids.’ If we understand by νόμος, not merely statute law, but custom and fashion, it is absolutely correct to say ‘What νόμος does not enjoin it forbids’: see note on *οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων*, v. 1. 13, b. 14. As for the ‘idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύω’—οὐκ ἔā means ‘forbids’; but does οὐ κελεύει? If exception is to be taken to Grant's remark quoted by Jackson, it is not, I think, on the ground of its non-appreciation of the ‘idiomatic use of οὐ κελεύω,’ but because it understands νόμος in too narrow a sense—as *law*, not as *law and custom*. The same error deprives Michelet's note of point—‘Cum apud Graecos leges non juris tantum, sed virtutis causa fermentur, legibus praecepta continebantur, quibus magistratus edicebant, quae fieri vellent. Apud nos autem, stricto jure inter Romanos jam orto, lex nihil jubet, sed quae fieri

1138 a. 6. nolit, edicit, ita ut contraria Aristoteli jam nunc obtineat regula: *Quae lex non jubet, permittit.* Nor is it necessary, with Acciaiolus, to suppose that ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει ἀπαγορεύει applies only to things obviously wrong. *Custom* (fashion, public opinion) forbids the most innocent actions, if it does not enjoin them.

a. 12. § 3. ἡ πόλις ζημιοῦ] The commentators quote Aeschines, *Contra Ctes.* 244 ἐάν τις αὐτὸν διαχρήσηται, τὴν χεῖρα τὴν τοῦτο πράξασαν χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος θάπτομεν, and Plato, *Legg.* ix. 873. The pollution of the city caused by the suicide was probably regarded as the chief part of the injury inflicted by his act: other effects would be those noted by Mich. Eph.—καθ' ὁ ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν πόλιν στρατηγὸν ἡ στρατιώτην ἡ τεχνίτην ἢ τινα τοιοῦτον.

a. 14. § 4. ἔτι] In §§ 1-3 the writer has shown that οὐκ ἔστιν ἄδικον πρὸς αὐτόν, where ἄδικον = παράνομον. He now proceeds to show that the same is true where ἄδικον = ἄνισον.

καθ' ὁ ἄδικος μόνον ὁ ἄδικῶν] μόνον ὁ is the conjecture of Lambinus for the ὁ μόνον of the codd., and is approved by Zell, Ramsauer and Bywater. The meaning is—‘Further, if we take ὁ ἄδικῶν in the narrow sense of ἄδικος (ἄδικος μόνον=ἄνισος or πλεονέκτης), and not in the wide sense (ὅλως φαῦλος=παράνομος), it is impossible ἄδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν.’ No MS. apparently gives μόνον ὁ, and all, with two exceptions, ὁ μόνον. The two exceptions are CCC with ἄδικος ὁ μὲν ἄδικῶν, and H<sup>a</sup> with ἄδικος ὁ ἄδικῶν. An omitted μόνον supplied above the line or on the margin might very easily get into the wrong place after ὁ; and would retain that place by suggesting to careless scribes and readers that the distinction with which the sentence is concerned is not that between the ἄνισος and the παράνομος, but that between ὁ τὰ ἄδικα πράττων and ὁ ἄδικῶν, as given e.g. in ch. 9. § 3.

a. 15. τοῦτο γάρ ἄλλο ἔκείνου] Mich. Eph. has—τοῦτο γάρ φησιν ἄλλο ἔκείνου· τουτέστιν τοῦτο τὸ κατὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἄδικον ἔτερόν ἔστιν ἔκείνου τοῦ καθόλου ἄδικον.

a. 16. ἔστι γάρ πως . . . πονηρίαν] i.e. there is a sense in which the ἄδικος is an offender coordinate with the δειλός e.g., and not an offender generally. Ἀδικία in one sense is πλεονεξία—a specific form of πονηρία, just as δειλία, ἀσωτία, are specific forms. It has however a generic sense also, in which it is equivalent to ὅλη πονηρία.

οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην] κατὰ τὴν μερικὴν ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία (Paraph.), 1138 a. 17. I prefer Bekker's punctuation here to Susemihl's and Bywater's. The words ἄμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. are to be taken closely with ὅστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ.

ἀδικεῖ] K<sup>b</sup> has ἀδικεῖ ἄν. Can ἄν be a corruption of αὐτόν, which a. 18. the sense requires?

ἄμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] see *M. M.* 1. 33. 1196 a. 9 ἀλλὰ μὴν δ ἀδικῶν, ἢ ἀδικεῖ, πλείον ἔχει, δ ἀδικούμενος, ἢ ἀδικεῖται, ἔλαττον. εἰ ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ, ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ πλείον ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

ἐν πλείσιν] 'implies more than one person': cf. v. 3. 4, 5. a. 19.

§ 5. Εἴτι δὲ . . . πρότερον] 'The words ἑκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως,' a. 20. says Jackson, 'are not necessary to the argument. Indeed τὸ ἀδικεῖν is not necessarily ἐκ προαιρέσεως: I have therefore translated the phrase "voluntary or deliberate, and aggressive." But see below, note on ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε a. 21.'

πρότερον] sc. τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

a. 21.

ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε κ.τ.λ.] Jackson's note here is—'οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας 8. § 9.' Does this mean that ὁ τὸ αὐτὸν ἀντιποιῶν of the present passage and ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν of 8, § 9 are identical? If they are, then the argument is—'ἀδικεῖν is deliberate and aggressive: for the θυμῷ ποιῶν, who does not act deliberately and is not an aggressor, οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν.' This, however, is hardly consistent with v. 8. 9.

Εἴτι εἴη ἀν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι]—which has been shown to be a. 23. impossible ch. 9. §§ 1-6. Ramsauer asks—'quid hoc post verba ἀδικεῖται δ ὀνθεὶς ἑκών, vs. 12?' Surely because it helps to prove the conclusion—that the ἀδικῶν *quid ἄντος* cannot injure himself. In § 3 it helped to prove another conclusion—that the ἀδικῶν *quid παράνομος* cannot injure himself.

§ 6. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις] 'If, instead of arguing from our conception a. 24. of ἀδικία, we examine special cases of it, we come to the same conclusion' (Jackson). Τὸ ἀποκτιννύναι ἑαυτόν, already discussed in §§ 2 and 3, is, of course one of τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀδικήματα, but it does not stand in the same position as the ἀδικήματα mentioned in this §. As soon as they are mentioned, we see that they are not cases of

1138 a. 24. τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἔαυτόν. But τὸ ἀποκτιννύαι ἔαυτόν looks, at first sight, like a case of τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἔαυτόν, and it is only the reflection—ή πόλις ζημιοῦ—which makes us aware that it is not. The difference between the ἀδικήματα of the present section and those of which τὸ ἀποκτιννύαι ἔαυτόν in §§ 2 and 3 is an example is that marked in *Rhet.* i. 13. 1373 b. 18 πρὸς οὓς δὲ διώρισται [τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα] διχῶς διώρισται· ή γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ή πρὸς ἓν τῶν κοινωνούντων, ὃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν. διὸ καὶ τὰδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν· ή γὰρ πρὸς ἓν καὶ ώρισμένον ή πρὸς τὸ κοινόν ὃ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινὰ τῶν ώρισμένων, ὃ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν. Thus ὁ σφάττων ἔαυτόν injures τὸ κοινόν by depriving it of a soldier. Similarly, the ἀκόλαστος or ἄσωτος who, at first sight, might seem to injure himself, really injures the State by depriving it of the services which health or wealth enables a citizen to render. The μοιχεύων, on the other hand, is regarded rather as injuring an individual. I therefore understand the present § (6) to contain another argument to show that the ἀδικῶν *quād̄* ἄνισος cannot injure himself—cannot treat himself as another individual whose ‘fair share’ he encroaches upon. The arguments to show that he cannot injure himself *quād̄* παράνομος were concluded in § 3.

The writer of the *M. M.* would seem to have these two classes of ἀδικήματα—τὰ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν and τὰ πρὸς ἕν—in his mind. His words are (i. 33. 1195 b. 35)—ἀλλ’ ἵσως ἐνταῦθα πάλιν ἀπορήσειν ἀν τις, ἀρά γε ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν; ἐκ μὲν δὴ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦσας σκοπουμένῳ ἔοικεν ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ πάλιν οὕτως. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὁ νόμος πράττειν τάττει, ταῦτα ἔστιν δίκαια, ὃ μὴ πράττων ταῦτα ἀδικεῖ· καὶ εἰ πρὸς ὅν κελεύει πράττειν, πρὸς τοῦτον εἰ μὴ πράττει, τοῦτον ἀδικεῖ, ὃ δὲ νόμος κελεύει σώφρονα εἶναι, οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι, σώματος ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὃ ἄρα ταῦτα μὴ πράττων ἀδικεῖ αὐτόν. εἰς οὐθένα γὰρ ἀλλον τῶν τοιούτων ἀδικημάτων ή ἀναφορὰ ἔστιν—ἀλλὰ μὴ ποτε ταῦτα οὐκ ἀληθῆ ἦν, οὐδὲ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν αὐτόν. τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πλεῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον, οὐδὲ ἔκόντα ἄμα καὶ ἀκοντα· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ ἀδικῶν, ἢ ἀδικεῖ, πλεῖον ἔχει, ὃ δὲ ἀδικούμενος, ἢ ἀδικεῖται, ἔλαττον. εἰ ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ, ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ πλεῖον ἔχειν καὶ ἔλαττον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν.—ἔτι ὃ μὲν ἀδικῶν ἐκῶν ἀδικεῖ, ὃ δὲ ἀδικούμενος ἄκων ἀδικεῖται, ὥστε εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν, ἐνδέχοιτο ἄν ἄμα καὶ ἀκουσίως καὶ ἑκουσίως πράττειν τι τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ οὕτως ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν.—ἔτι εἴ τις λαμβάνοι ἐκ

*τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων.* ἀδικοῦσι γὰρ πάντες ἡτοι παρακαταθήκην 1138 a. 24. ἀποστεροῦντες ἢ μοιχεύοντες ἢ κλέπτοντες ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων ποιοῦντες οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε αὐτὸς αὐτὸν παρακαταθήκην ἀπεστέρησεν, οὐδ' ἐμοίχευσεν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυνᾶκα, οὐδ' ἔκλεψεν αὐτὸς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ· ὥστε εἰ τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐστίν, τούτων δὲ μηθὲν ἐνδέχεται πρὸς αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἀν ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν.

ὅλως κ.τ.λ.] ‘But indeed the question of τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν as a. 26. whole (*i.e.* whether we understand ἀδικεῖν as παρανομεῖν or as πλεονεκτεῖν) is answered by reference to the definition of ἀδικεῖν (ch. 9. §§ 4, 5), which enabled us to answer the question of τὸ ἑκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι.

Fritzsche has the following note on the words ὅλως δὲ . . . ἀδικεῖσθαι—‘Eadem et sententia est et verba eadem quae p. 1136 b. 23 (coll. p. 1136 b. 3-4) leguntur. Quae si ab eodem scriptore posita esse credimus, magnam habent offensionem, eadem si ab alio Peripatetico (*h. e.* Eudemo) in simili disputatione adhibita esse sumimus, explicationem habent facilem.’ Fritzsche’s view is that the Fifth Book was written by Aristotle, with the exception of this eleventh chapter, which comes from the lost book of Eudemus περὶ δικαιοσύνης (see Fritzsche, *Prolegomena*, p. xlvi).

§§ 7, 8.] Jackson places these sections, ‘which have obviously a. 28. nothing to do with the ἀποίατ raised in ch. 9,’ after ch. 5, § 18. See his *Introduction*, p. xvi. Ramsauer suggests the same locus for them. The writer of the *M. M.* passes on (i. 33. 1196 a. 25) immediately from a discussion parallel to that in ch. 11, §§ 1-6, to the subject dealt with in § 9.

§ 7. καὶ ὥσπερ . . . γυμναστικῆ] These words are probably a note a. 30. from the margin. As they stand, they have no grammatical connexion with the context. A ‘codex perantiquus’ referred to by Lambinus seems to have patched up a connexion by ὥσπερ ἔχει ὥσπερ ὑγιεινόν κ.τ.λ. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 77) supplies after μέσον the words τὸ δὲ δικαιοπραγεῖν μέσον.

χείρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν] The commentators refer to Plato, *Gorgias* a. 31. 443 A and 509 C.

κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς] The distinction is not, a. 33. as the Paraph. (in an alternative explanation) says, that between ἢ καθόλου ἀδικία and ἢ μερική, but (as the parenthesis after ἐγγύς

1138 a. 33. shows clearly) that between the *πάθη* which give rise to the voluntary and reprehensible, but not deliberate, acts of the *θυμῷ ποιῶν*, and the *ἔξις προαιρετική* of the *μοχθηρός* (see ch. 8, §§ 8-11). Michael Ephesius is right—λέγων κακίαν ἀπλῶς τὴν μετὰ προαιρέσεως ὅτι τὸ ἔκούσιον ἔχει, σύνεγγυς δὲ τὴν δίχα προαιρέσεως . . . διότι οὐδὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως πᾶν ἔκούσιον οἱ γὰρ ὄργιζόμενοι ὡς εἴπε πρότερον ἔκόντες πράττουσιν οὐ μὴν ἐκ προαιρέσεως. The expression *τελεία κακία*, = *ἡ μετὰ προαιρέσεως*, is, however, misleading, for it suggests (as Rama-  
sauer points out) the *ὅλη κακία* which is opposed to *ἡ τελεία ἀρετή* at the end of the first chapter of this Book.

b. 2. § 8. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ] Science takes no account of *τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. It is concerned either with *τὰ ἀναγκαῖα*, or with *τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*.

b. 5. § 9.] For ‘justice and injustice as between the parts of the soul’ the commentators refer to Plato, *Rep.* 432 A, 441 A, 443 C. The writer seems to warn his readers against what he conceives to be the misleading tendency of such a presentation of justice as we have it in the *Republic*. *Metaphorically* we can speak of justice and injustice *between the parts of the soul*. But this is no good reason for affirming that a man can be unjust *in the strict sense to himself*.

b. 7. οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν] i.e. not *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* as well as *τὸ δεσποτικόν* and the other forms distinguished in ch. 6, but the other forms *exclusive of τὸ πολιτικόν*. Thus the writer of the *M. M.* begins his parallel passage (i. 33. 1196 a. 25) with the words—οὐ τό γε πολιτικὸν ἀδίκημα ἀλλὰ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. Stahr translates—‘Doch gilt das nicht von der Gerechtigkeit in ihrem ganzen Umfange, sondern nur von derjenigen, wie sie der Herr gegen den Sklaven, der Hausvater gegen die Familie übt.’

b. 8. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις] This must surely mean ‘the theories in question’—i.e. the Platonic and other theories which speak of justice and injustice subsisting between the parts of the soul. But Mich. Eph. has ὃν λόγον ἔχει ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς δεσπότην τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ λογιζόμενον. τοιαύτην γὰρ διέστηκε ταῦτα διάστασιν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων ὡς εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον—i.e. he apparently takes *ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις* as meaning ‘in this ratio.’

b. 10. βλέπουσι] dat.

**δοκεῖ]** They think that the man, as a whole, can injure himself, 1138 b. 10. because one part of his soul can have its desire thwarted by the other part. They think that there subsists between these parts a sort of justice like that between ruler and subject. Justice, however, is between persons *oīs kai nōmos prōs autōs* (v. 6. 4), and 'parts are not persons,' as Peters (p. 179) well puts it. A theory of justice which forgets this is as misleading as a theory of voluntary action which fails to recognise ἡ ὅλη ψυχή—the organic unity behind the struggle of the 'parts': see *E.E.* ii. 8. 1224 b. 21 (quoted by Jackson)—*ωστε τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ἐκάτερον φάναι ποιεῦν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκάτερον ἀκοντα ποτὲ πράττειν κεχωρισμένα γάρ ὄντα ἐκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. οὐθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ὅλην μεταφέρουσι ψυχήν, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὄρωσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν ἡ δ' ὅλη ἐκοῦστα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βίᾳ δ' οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφότερα ἔχομεν.*

**ὅτι ἐν τούτοις]** Jackson brackets *ἐν*.

**τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὄρεξεis]** i. e. the ὄρεξεis of the several μέρη. The ὄρεξis b. 11. of the λόγον ἔχον μέρος may be thwarted by the ἀλογον μέρος, and vice versa. 'An ὄρεξis is loosely and κατὰ μεταφοράν attributed to the λόγον ἔχον' (Jackson).

**ἀρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ]** The editors quote *Pol. A.* 5. 1260 a. 5 *ἐν* b. 12. *ταύτῃ* [i. e. τῇ ψυχῇ] γάρ ἔστι φύσει τὸ μὲν ἀρχον τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον, ὃν ἐτέραν φαμὲν εἶναι ἀρετήν, οἷον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου.

**§ 10. τῶν ἡθικῶν]** Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 62) omits *τῶν* with L<sup>b</sup> and b. 13. M<sup>b</sup> [and NC.].





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